United States of America v. Andrew Timothy Jones

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 22-6071
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ANDREW TIMOTHY JONES,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at
Charlotte. Frank D. Whitney, District Judge. (3:03-cr-00055-FDW-DCK-1)
Submitted: June 6, 2022 Decided: June 27, 2022
Before MOTZ and KING, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Andrew Timothy Jones, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Andrew Timothy Jones appeals from the district court’s order denying his motion
for compassionate release. On appeal, he raises several claims of error. We vacate the
district court’s order and remand for further proceedings.
Upon motion of a prisoner, a district court may reduce a term of imprisonment under
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) if “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a
reduction.” We review a district court’s ruling on a motion for compassionate release for
abuse of discretion. United States v. Kibble, 992 F.3d 326, 329 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 142
S. Ct. 383 (2021). A district court abuses its discretion when it “act[s] arbitrarily or
irrationally, . . . fail[s] to consider judicially recognized factors constraining its exercise of
discretion, . . . relie[s] on erroneous factual or legal premises, or . . . commit[s] an error of
law.” United States v. High, 997 F.3d 181, 187 (4th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
A district court’s decision whether to reduce a defendant’s sentence under
§ 3582(c)(1)(A) generally entails three considerations. See Kibble, 992 F.3d at 329-32.
First, the court determines whether “extraordinary and compelling reasons” support a
sentence reduction. High, 997 F.3d at 186. Second, the court considers whether granting
a sentence reduction would be “consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the
[United States] Sentencing Commission.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Third,
even if a court finds extraordinary and compelling reasons for granting compassionate
release, it retains the discretion to deny a defendant’s motion after balancing the § 3553(a)
factors. See id. However, a court need not explicitly make findings on extraordinary and

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compelling reasons where consideration of the § 3553(a) factors counsels against release.
Id. at 186-87.
Jones first contends that the district court abused its discretion by concluding that
he failed to establish extraordinary and compelling reasons for release based on the
disparity between the sentence imposed and the sentence to which he would be subject
under current law for his 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) convictions. In United States v. McCoy, 981
F.3d 271, 285-86 (4th Cir. 2020), the Court held that the district court may treat “the
severity of the defendants’ § 924(c) sentences and the extent of the disparity between the
defendants’ sentences and those provided for under the First Step Act” as “extraordinary
and compelling reasons” for compassionate release. The McCoy court acknowledged that
Congress did not make the changes to the stacking rules retroactively applicable and thus
does not “mandate more lenient sentences across the board,” but “instead gives new
discretion to the courts to consider leniency.” Id. at 288 (emphasis added) (citation
omitted). Thus, the district court erred (albeit prior to McCoy) in ruling that the changes
in § 924(c) could not form the basis for a compassionate release motion.
Next, Jones contends that the district court did not properly consider his medical
conditions. The court stated that it was “unclear whether [his] medical issues are based on
voluntary drug use or a seizure disorder.” (E.R. 1032). However, the Government’s
allegations that Jones’s “seizure” might have been a “drug overdose” focused on a single,
specific incident. Given that Jones alleged he had been diagnosed with an ongoing seizure
disorder and that the Government did not address this contention, the wholesale rejection

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of Jones’s claim on the basis of the Government’s response was unwarranted.* Further,
the district court did not acknowledge Jones’s assertions that his conditions were not
properly treated, so it is unclear whether the court considered this basis for compassionate
release.
Finally, Jones asserts that the district court did not properly consider his criminal
history, prison behavior, and rehabilitative progress. However, in his motion, the only
document from Jones before the court at the time of its decision, Jones attached evidence
of his rehabilitative progress but did not discuss any of the other factors challenged on
appeal. “Although a district court is not required to address each of a defendant’s
arguments for a reduced sentence, just how much of an explanation is required depends
upon the narrow circumstances of the particular case.” United States v. Jenkins, 22 F.4th
162, 170 (4th Cir. 2021); see High, 997 F.3d at 187 (declining to categorically require
district court to explicitly address each argument).
Here, the district court did not acknowledge Jones’s rehabilitative efforts or permit
sufficient time for Jones to respond to the Government’s contentions. Moreover, as
discussed above, the district court committed errors in addressing Jones’s medical
conditions and the changes to the relevant sentencing landscape. Thus, while a brief
* While Jones’s motion focused on his alleged mistreatment as a reason for his
release rather than his medical condition, he did specifically aver that his medical records
showed that he was on medication to prevent further seizures. Moreover, the district court
denied his motion soon after the Government’s response, which did not allow Jones to file
a response addressing the Government’s contentions. While we review the district court’s
exercise of its discretion based upon what it had before it when it made its decision, the
subsequent filings in the case make clear that Jones has a seizure disorder.

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discussion may have been sufficient in this case, the court’s errors rendered its review of
the § 3553 factors insufficient. Specifically, the court was unable to weigh either the
seriousness of Jones’s medical condition or the fact that Jones was sentenced to a
substantially longer sentence than he would have been under current law.
Although we express no opinion on the merits of Jones’s motion, we vacate the
district court’s order and remand for further consideration. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED

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