United States of America v. Brett Leonza Freeman

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 23-4120
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
BRETT LEONZA FREEMAN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at
Martinsburg. Gina M. Groh, District Judge. (3:22-cr-00033-GMG-RWT-1)
Submitted: July 20, 2023 Decided: July 25, 2023
Before NIEMEYER and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Kristen M. Leddy, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE
FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Martinsburg, West Virginia, for Appellant. Lara Kay
Omps-Botteicher, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Martinsburg, West
Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Brett Leonza Freeman pled guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute cocaine hydrochloride and
cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), 846. The district court
sentenced Freeman to 48 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, counsel has filed a brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no meritorious
issues for appeal but questioning whether the district court imposed an unreasonable
sentence by failing to adequately consider the policies issued by the U.S. Department of
Justice addressing the crack-to-powder cocaine disparity in sentencing. Freeman has not
filed a pro se supplemental brief, and the Government has elected not to file a brief. We
affirm.
We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying “a deferential abuse-of-
discretion standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). This review entails
consideration of both the procedural and substantive reasonableness of the sentence. Id.
at 51. In determining procedural reasonableness, we consider whether the district court
properly calculated the defendant’s Sentencing Guidelines range, gave the parties an
opportunity to argue for an appropriate sentence, considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
factors, and sufficiently explained the selected sentence. Id. at 49-51. If there are no
procedural errors, we then consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence,
evaluating “the totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 51. “Any sentence that is within or
below a properly calculated [Sentencing] Guidelines range is presumptively reasonable,”
and this “presumption can only be rebutted by showing that the sentence is unreasonable

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when measured against the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Louthian, 756
F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir. 2014).
Here, the district court correctly calculated Freeman’s advisory Guidelines range,
heard argument from counsel, provided Freeman an opportunity to allocute, considered the
§ 3553(a) sentencing factors, and explained its reasons for imposing the chosen sentence.
The court acknowledged Freeman’s argument regarding the crack-to-powder cocaine
sentencing disparity and ultimately determined that this issue—in combination with the
other sentencing factors—warranted a downward variant sentence, albeit not as great a
variance as Freeman requested. Consequently, we conclude that the court committed no
procedural error in its determination of Freeman’s sentence. Finally, because Freeman has
not demonstrated that his term of imprisonment “is unreasonable when measured against
the . . . § 3553(a) factors,” he has failed to rebut the presumption of reasonableness
accorded his below-Guidelines sentence. Id. We therefore conclude that Freeman’s
sentence is also substantively reasonable.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have
found no meritorious grounds for appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.
This court requires that counsel inform Freeman, in writing, of the right to petition the
Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Freeman requests that a petition
be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may
move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state
that a copy thereof was served on Freeman. We dispense with oral argument because the

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facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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