United States of America v. Chad Dewayne Bartley

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 23-4560
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CHAD DEWAYNE BARTLEY,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at
Asheville. Martin K. Reidinger, Chief District Judge. (1:15-cr-00015-MR-WCM-1)
Submitted: June 25, 2024 Decided: June 27, 2024
Before RICHARDSON and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: John G. Baker, Federal Public Defender, Charlotte, North Carolina, Melissa
S. Baldwin, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC
DEFENDER, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellant. Dena J. King, United States
Attorney, Elizabeth M. Greenough, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

-- 1 of 3 --

2
PER CURIAM:
In 2009, Chad Dewayne Bartley pleaded guilty to possession with intent to
distribute oxycodone (Count 1) and possession of a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking
crime (Count 4). The district court sentenced him to 78 months’ imprisonment, plus
concurrent supervision terms of three years (for Count 1) and five years (for Count 4). Just
over three years after Bartley’s release from prison, the probation officer filed a revocation
petition alleging that Bartley had committed several new crimes while on supervised
release. The district court revoked Bartley’s supervised release and sentenced him to 24
months’ imprisonment as to Count 1 and 60 months’ imprisonment as to Count 4.
Bartley now appeals his revocation sentence, asserting that the district court relied
too heavily on the seriousness of his new criminal conduct. He also claims that the court
lacked jurisdiction to impose the 24-month prison term. For the reasons that follow, we
affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.
“[A] district court may not impose a revocation sentence based predominately on
the seriousness of the releasee’s violation . . . .” United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 642
(4th Cir. 2013). However, the court may consider, “to a limited degree, the seriousness of
the underlying violation,” as long as the sentence “sanction[s] primarily the defendant’s
breach of [the court’s] trust.” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual ch. 7, pt. A(3)(b), p.s.
(2023); accord Webb, 738 F.3d at 641. Because Bartley did not contest the court’s
sentencing explanation below, we review only for plain error. Webb, 738 F.3d at 640.

-- 2 of 3 --

3
Here, while the district court alluded to the severity of Bartley’s new criminal
conduct, the court did so in connection with its discussion of the egregious breach of trust
occasioned by Bartley’s violations. We therefore discern no plain error.
Finally, Bartley argues—and the Government concedes—that the 24-month
revocation sentence must be vacated because Count 1’s term of supervised release had
expired at the time the revocation petition was filed. We agree.
Accordingly, we affirm the revocation judgment as to Count 4, vacate the revocation
judgment as to Count 1, and remand so that the district court may enter an amended
revocation judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART,
VACATED IN PART,
AND REMANDED

-- 3 of 3 --