United States of America v. Harold Lamont Parker

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 23-4561
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
HAROLD LAMONT PARKER,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at
Greensboro. William L. Osteen, Jr., District Judge. (1:14-cr-00344-WO-1)
Submitted: April 8, 2024 Decided: April 19, 2024
Before WILKINSON and NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit
Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: William S. Trivette, WILLIAM S. TRIVETTE, ATTORNEY AT LAW,
PLLC, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Kyle David Pousson, Assistant United
States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Harold Lamont Parker appeals the district court’s judgment revoking his supervised
release and sentencing him to 21 months’ imprisonment without an additional term of
supervised release. Appellate counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal but
questioning whether the sentence is plainly unreasonable. The Government has declined
to file a brief. Although notified of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief, Parker has
not done so. We affirm.
“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a sentence upon revocation of
supervised release.” United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). “We will
affirm a revocation sentence if it is within the statutory maximum and is not plainly
unreasonable.” United States v. Slappy, 872 F.3d 202, 207 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “When reviewing whether a revocation sentence is plainly
unreasonable, we must first determine whether it is unreasonable at all.” United States v.
Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 546 (4th Cir. 2010). “A revocation sentence is procedurally
reasonable if the district court adequately explains the chosen sentence after considering
the Sentencing Guidelines’ nonbinding Chapter Seven policy statements and the applicable
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.” Slappy, 872 F.3d at 207; see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). A
revocation sentence is substantively reasonable if the court states a proper basis for
concluding that the defendant should receive the sentence imposed. See United States v.
Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 440 (4th Cir. 2006).

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“A court need not be as detailed or specific when imposing a revocation sentence as
it must be when imposing a post-conviction sentence, but it still must provide a statement
of reasons for the sentence imposed.” Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Only if a sentence is either procedurally or substantively unreasonable do we
then determine whether the sentence is plainly unreasonable. United States v. Moulden,
478 F.3d 652, 656-57 (4th Cir. 2007). Although “we must consider the extent of [any]
variance from the [policy statement] range,” we will not vacate a defendant’s sentence just
because we conclude a different sentence might have been appropriate. See United
States v. McKinnie, 21 F.4th 283, 292 (4th Cir. 2021).
We conclude that Parker’s sentence is both procedurally and substantively
reasonable. Although the district court imposed a sentence above the Sentencing
Guidelines policy statement range, it considered the relevant statutory factors and gave
sufficiently detailed reasons for the sentence imposed, expressly noting Parker’s repeated
inability to abide by the conditions of his supervised release and his blatant disregard for
the law.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record and have found no
meritorious grounds for appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s revocation
judgment. This court requires that counsel inform Parker, in writing, of the right to petition
the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Parker requests that a petition
be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may
move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state
that a copy thereof was served on Parker.

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We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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