CELESTE FRIERSON, Individually v. Hiscox Inc.

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 25-1388
CELESTE FRIERSON, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of
DOROTHY M. CONYERS, deceased; RUFUS CARTER; SYLVIA CARTER
MONTGOMERY; HERBERT CARTER; ROBERT CARTER; OLIVE WATSON,
Personal Representative of the Estate of Charles Watson
Plaintiffs - Appellants
and
PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE GUARANTY CORPORATION
Defendant - Appellant
v.
HISCOX INC.; HISCOX INSURANCE COMPANY, INC.; BENONS, LLC, trading as
Falcon Transport; GEICO CASUALTY COMPANY; MARYLAND AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE FUND
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt.
Adam B. Abelson, District Judge. (8:24-cv-01200-ABA)
Submitted: February 13, 2026 Decided: May 15, 2026
Before KING, AGEE, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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ON BRIEF: Paul D. Bekman, Aryeh M. Rabinowitz, BEKMAN, MARDER, HOPPER,
MALARKEY & PERLIN, LLC, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellants Celeste Frierson,
Rufus Carter, Sylvia Carter Montgomery, Herbert Carter, Robert Carter, and Olive Watson.
John M. Seeberger, LAW OFFICES OF JOHN M. SEEBERGER, P.A., Baltimore,
Maryland, for Appellant Property & Casualty Insurance Guaranty Corp. Leland H. Jones
IV, Lena Mirilovic, LAVIN RINDNER DUFFIELD LLC, Washington, D.C., for
Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
This case arises from a dispute over an insurance company’s duty to defend and
indemnify an insured. But our inquiry on appeal begins and ends with subject-matter
jurisdiction. After the plaintiffs filed a declaratory judgment action in state court, a
defendant removed the case to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. As pled,
however, there is not complete diversity of citizenship between the parties. Nor has the
district court passed on a request that it realign the parties to satisfy the requirements of
diversity jurisdiction. Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s judgment and remand so
that the district court can review this issue and consider in the first instance the request for
realignment.
This controversy began in Maryland state court. The plaintiffs, most of whom are
citizens of Maryland, allege that their mother died as the result of negligence by defendant
Falcon Transport, a non-emergency medical transport company based in Maryland. After
filing a state-court suit against Falcon, the plaintiffs requested that Hiscox, Inc., one of
Falcon’s insurers, defend and indemnify Falcon. When Hiscox failed to respond, the
plaintiffs filed the instant declaratory judgment action, still in Maryland state court, seeking
a determination of Hiscox’s duty to defend and indemnify.
Hiscox, a citizen of Delaware and Georgia, removed the plaintiffs’ declaratory
judgment action to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1441(a), (b) (removal); 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (diversity jurisdiction). The district court did
not address subject-matter jurisdiction. Instead, in the order now before us on appeal, the

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court applied Maryland law and granted Hiscox’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim. See Frierson v. Hiscox, Inc., 2025 WL 934337 (D. Md. Mar. 27, 2025).
We must assure ourselves of jurisdiction before turning to the merits of this appeal.
See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 93–94 (1998). And as this case
was pled, diversity jurisdiction appears to be lacking. The statute authorizing diversity
jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, applies only when there is “complete diversity” – only, that
is, when no party on one side of a suit shares common citizenship with a party on the other
side. See, e.g., Mayes v. Rapoport, 198 F.3d 457, 461 (4th Cir. 1999). Had the plaintiffs
sued only Hiscox in their declaratory judgment action, we would have complete diversity:
The plaintiffs are citizens of Maryland and South Carolina, and defendant Hiscox is not.
The problem is that the plaintiffs named other defendants as well. And three of those
defendants – Falcon, the Maryland Automobile Insurance Fund, and the Maryland Property
& Casualty Insurance Guaranty Corporation – are, like most of the plaintiffs, citizens of
Maryland. With Maryland citizens on both sides, this lawsuit cannot proceed in federal
court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction.
Hiscox appears to have been aware of this problem, because in its notice of removal,
it asserted – albeit briefly – that the requirements of diversity jurisdiction could be satisfied
if the district court realigned the Maryland defendants. As we have explained, a district
court assessing diversity of citizenship may in certain circumstances “look beyond the
pleadings” and realign the parties – here, for instance, realign the Maryland defendants as
plaintiffs – “according to their positions with respect to the primary issue” in dispute. U.S.
Fid. & Guar. Co. v. A & S Mfg. Co., 48 F.3d 131, 133 (4th Cir. 1995) (discussing realignment

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of parties in declaratory judgment action arising from insurance coverage dispute). But
that has not happened here – at least, not yet. Hiscox never formally moved to realign the
parties; the plaintiffs never weighed in on realignment; and the district court never
considered the question. And on appeal, the parties continue to leave the
issue unaddressed.
Hiscox removed this case to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. But
when the district court ruled on Hiscox’s motion to dismiss, the parties, as aligned in the
plaintiffs’ complaint, lacked complete diversity of citizenship. Accordingly, we must
vacate the judgment of the district court. We leave it to the district court, on remand, to
consider party realignment in the first instance.
VACATED AND REMANDED

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