United States of America v. Yashine Abdul McLain

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 25-4110
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
YASHINE ABDUL MCLAIN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at
Greensboro. William L. Osteen, Jr., District Judge. (1:12-cr-00369-WO-1)
Submitted: August 21, 2025 Decided: August 26, 2025
Before WILKINSON, HARRIS, and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, Kathleen A. Gleason, Assistant
Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Randall S. Galyon, Acting United States
Attorney, Julie C. Niemeier, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Yashine Abdul McLain appeals the 14-month sentence imposed following the
revocation of his supervised release. On appeal, McLain asserts that the imposed sentence
is plainly unreasonable because, in choosing an appropriate sentence, the district court
relied on the need to protect the public from further crimes by McLain, even though there
was no evidence that McLain engaged in violent acts or possessed firearms during his most
recent term of supervised release. Finding no error, we affirm.
“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a sentence upon revocation of
supervised release.” United States v. Patterson, 957 F.3d 426, 436 (4th Cir. 2020). We
“will affirm a revocation sentence if it is within the statutory maximum and is not plainly
unreasonable.” Id. Before deciding “whether a revocation sentence is plainly
unreasonable, [we] must first determine whether the sentence is procedurally or
substantively unreasonable,” id., evaluating “the same procedural and substantive
considerations that guide our review of original sentences” but taking “a more deferential
appellate posture than we do when reviewing original sentences,” United States v. Padgett,
788 F.3d 370, 373 (4th Cir. 2015) (citation modified). Only if we conclude that a
revocation sentence is either procedurally or substantively unreasonable will we proceed
to consider whether it “is plainly unreasonable—that is, whether the unreasonableness is
clear or obvious.” Patterson, 957 F.3d at 437 (internal quotation marks omitted).
“A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court adequately
explains the chosen sentence after considering the Chapter Seven policy statement range
and the applicable [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) sentencing factors.” Id. at 436; see 18 U.S.C.

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§ 3583(e) (listing applicable factors). “[A]lthough the court need not be as detailed or
specific when imposing a revocation sentence as it must be when imposing a post-
conviction sentence, it still must provide a statement of reasons for the sentence imposed.”
United States v. Slappy, 872 F.3d 202, 208 (4th Cir. 2017) (citation modified). Thus, the
district court must, at a minimum, explain the sentence sufficiently to permit meaningful
appellate review, “with the assurance that the court considered any potentially meritorious
arguments raised by [the defendant] with regard to his sentencing.” United States v. Gibbs,
897 F.3d 199, 205 (4th Cir. 2018) (citation modified). “A sentence is substantively
reasonable if the totality of the circumstances indicates that the court had a proper basis for
its conclusion that the defendant should receive the sentence imposed.” United States v.
Amin, 85 F.4th 727, 740 (4th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted).
We have reviewed the record and conclude that the revocation sentence imposed
here is not unreasonable. Specifically, the district court properly calculated the advisory
policy statement range, which it expressly acknowledged. The court also provided the
parties the opportunity to argue for an appropriate sentence during which time the parties
asked that a seven-month sentence be imposed. The district court explained the imposed
sentence, expressly tethering it to the applicable § 3553(a) factors, and indicated that so
long as McLain refuses to abstain from substance abuse—which the court correctly
observed appears to have precipitated most of his prior crimes—he posed a danger to the
community. Given the court’s explanation for the 14-month sentence, which is below the
statutory maximum applicable to McLain’s violations, we find that the imposed sentence
is reasonable. See Patterson, 957 F.3d at 436; Gibbs, 897 F.3d at 205. Accordingly, we

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affirm the revocation judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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