United States v. Lingle

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
November 22, 2004
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-10308
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CHRISTOPHER LANE LINGLE,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 3:03-CR-287-2-P
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Before JOLLY, HIGGINBOTHAM, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Christopher Lane Lingle appeals his guilty plea convictions
and sentences for conspiracy to make, possess, and pass
counterfeit $100 bills, aiding and abetting the manufacture of
approximately 156 counterfeit $100 bills, and aiding and abetting
the passing of approximately 37 counterfeit $100 bills. See 18
U.S.C. §§ 371, 471, 472, 2. Lingle first challenges the
sufficiency of the factual basis for his conspiracy and aiding
and abetting the making of counterfeit money convictions.

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Specifically, he contends that there was insufficient evidence
that he participated in manufacturing the counterfeit $100 bills.
Because Lingle did not lodge objections at rearraignment to the
factual basis for his guilty pleas, we review for plain error
only. See United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 58-59 (2002).
In the factual basis, Lingle stipulated that he and his
mother agreed that she would make counterfeit $100 bills, which
they both would spend. These facts were sufficient to support
Lingle’s conspiracy conviction. See United States v. Williams,
264 F.3d 561, 577 (5th Cir. 2001). Similarly, the factual basis
was sufficient to support Lingle’s conviction of aiding and
abetting the manufacture of counterfeit obligations since Lingle
stipulated that he shared in the criminal intent and because he
engaged in passing the counterfeit $100 bills. See United States
v. Sorrells, 145 F.3d 744, 753 (5th Cir. 1998). Lingle’s
deficient factual basis arguments fail to survive plain error
review. See Vonn, 535 U.S. at 58-59.
Lingle next contends that the two-level counterfeiting
enhancement he received pursuant to U.S.S.G § 2B5.1(b)(2) was
improperly applied since he “had no involvement in the making of
the counterfeit $100 bills.” Under a similar rationale, Lingle
also challenges the four-level loss enhancement that was assessed
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B5.1(b)(1).
Based on Lingle’s guilty plea stipulations, the
manufacturing of the $100 bills was a reasonably foreseeable act

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undertaken in furtherance of the counterfeiting conspiracy.
Furthermore, the district court’s intended loss calculation is
supported by record. Accordingly, we hold that the district
court did not clearly err in overruling Lingle’s objections to
both sentencing enhancements. See United States v. Maseratti, 1
F.3d 330, 340 (5th Cir. 1993); Anderson v. City of Bessemer City,
N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1985).
Citing Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), and
for purposes of preserving the issue for further review, Lingle
asserts that his challenged sentencing enhancements are
unconstitutional since they were based upon findings that were
neither found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt nor agreed to
by Lingle. Lingle correctly concedes that this argument is
foreclosed by United States v. Pineiro, 377 F.3d 464, 473 (5th
Cir. 2004), petition for cert. filed (U.S. July 14, 2004) (No.
03-30437).
AFFIRMED.

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