United States v. Smith

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
July 6, 2006
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-30417
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
OYAH M. SMITH,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
USDC No. 3:04-CR-30006-1
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Before KING, WIENER, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Oyah M. Smith appeals the district court’s denial of his
motion to suppress drug evidence discovered during a search of
his vehicle pursuant to a traffic stop. Smith contends that the
district court erred in three ways: (1) it did not hold the
Government to a sufficiently high burden of proof when it
accepted Officer Crowder’s testimony about checking the Malibu’s
license plates, (2) it credited Office Crowder’s testimony about
the license plate checks, and (3) it found reasonable suspicion

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No. 05-30417
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for the stop based on the erroneous license plate information
Officer Crowder received.
The district court’s fact findings, including its
credibility findings, are reviewed for clear error and its legal
conclusions de novo. United States v. Lopez- Moreno, 420 F.3d
420, 429 (5th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1449 (2006);
United States v. Roberson, 6 F.3d 1088, 1092 (5th Cir. 1993).
“The decision to stop an automobile is reasonable [under the
Fourth Amendment] where the police have probable cause to believe
that a traffic violation has occurred.” Whren v. United States,
517 U.S. 806, 810(1996).
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Officer Dwayne
Crowder testified that he observed a Chevrolet Malibu speeding.
Before he could pace the vehicle or confirm its speed by radar,
the Malibu turned into a driveway. The officer then called in
the license plate and was told by the dispatcher that the plate
should be displayed on a Ford Escort. The officer reconfirmed
the plate information and then initiated a traffic stop. At the
motion hearing, Smith presented evidence that, in fact, the
Malibu had displayed the correct license plate. There was no
evidence that Officer Crowder’s testimony was not truthful or
that Officer Crowder had reason to question what he was told by
the police dispatcher.
Given the evidence presented during the suppression hearing,
the district court did not clearly err in crediting Officer

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No. 05-30417
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Crowder’s testimony regarding checking and reconfirming the
license plate information. Roberson, 6 F.3d at 1092. Based upon
that information, Officer Crowder had a reasonable suspicion
based on articulable facts justifying the initial stop of the
vehicle. United States v. Garcia, 942 F.2d 873, 876-77 (5th Cir.
1991); United States v. DeLeon-Reyna, 930 F.2d 396, 399 (5th Cir.
1991). Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.

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