Robinson v. Webster Cty, et al

United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit

No. 20-60301
Summary Calendar

Felicia Robinson,

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

Webster County, Mississippi; Webster County Sheriff’s
Department; Tim Mitchell, in his official capacity;
Tim Mitchell, in his individual capacity; Santana
Townsend,

Defendants—Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Mississippi
USDC No. 1:19-CV-121

Before King, Smith, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Felicia Robinson appeals the district court’s Rule 12(c) dismissal of
her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims premised on alleged Fourteenth Amendment

*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the Court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
August 31, 2020

Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
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violations. She also challenges the district court’s denial of her motion to
strike various Webster County defenses, premised on judicial estoppel. We
agree with the district court and affirm.
While the relevant precedent is clear and requires our affirmance, we
acknowledge that the facts of this matter, as alleged by Robinson, are
unsettling. According to Robinson’s complaint, Webster County Sheriff
Tim Mitchell released Daren Patterson from jail for a weekend furlough.
Sheriff Mitchell allowed the release despite knowing Patterson’s propensity
for violence, particularly towards Robinson, his wife. The night of his
release, Patterson verbally and physically abused Robinson while at
Robinson’s home. Around 9:23 p.m., Robinson called Santana Townsend, a
Webster County Sheriff’s Department dispatcher, for help. Because
Robinson is related to Townsend, she called Townsend’s personal cell phone
rather than 9-1-1 or the sheriff’s department.
Despite Robinson’s request for help, Townsend did not send a deputy
to Robinson’s home to retrieve Patterson. Instead, Townsend gave the
phone to another prison trusty to speak to Patterson. After the call, Patterson
became angrier. Around midnight, Patterson attacked Robinson, punching
her repeatedly until she blacked out. Patterson then poured “Liquid Fire”
drain cleaner over Robinson’s nearly naked body, resulting in severe burns.
Robinson escaped and drove to the hospital where she received extensive
medical treatment before being transferred to a burn center. Patterson
returned to the Webster County Jail.
As a result of these events, Robinson filed this action against Webster
County, the Webster County Sheriff’s Department, Sheriff Mitchell (in his
individual and official capacity), Dispatcher Townsend (in her official
capacity), and Patterson. In her complaint, Robinson asserted eighteen
counts, including various § 1983 and state law claims. Patterson did not file
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a responsive pleading, and the clerk entered default against him. The
remaining parties filed answers and affirmative defenses.
Sheriff Mitchell (in his official capacity), Dispatcher Townsend, the
Webster County Sheriff’s Department, and Webster County also moved
jointly for judgment on the pleadings, contending Mitchell and Townsend
should be dismissed as duplicate official-capacity defendants. The Webster
County Sheriff’s Department filed a second motion for judgment on the
pleadings, contending it should be dismissed as an improper defendant not
amenable to suit. Webster County also filed a second motion for judgment
on the pleadings, contending Robinson’s claims against it failed as a matter
of law. Sheriff Mitchell (in his individual capacity) moved for judgment on
the pleadings, asserting qualified immunity. Finally, Robinson moved to
strike various defenses presented by Webster County, including that
Patterson was not in its custody at the time of the subject incident.
The district court addressed the parties’ motions in a single order and
memorandum opinion. In its order and opinion, the district court denied
Robinson’s motion to strike and granted dismissal to all parties except
Patterson. The district court agreed that Robinson’s claims against Sheriff
Mitchell (in his official capacity) and Dispatcher Townsend were duplicative
of Robinson’s claims against Webster County. The court also agreed that the
Webster County Sheriff’s Department lacked the capacity to be sued. The
court ultimately concluded that each of Robinson’s § 1983 claims failed as a
matter of law. Having determined that Robinson’s federal claims failed as a
matter of law, the court declined to retain supplemental jurisdiction over
Robinson’s state law claims.
1

1
Dispatcher Townsend also filed a pro se Answer and Counterclaim, and Robinson
filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings as to Dispatcher Townsend’s counterclaim.
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On appeal, Robinson asserts the district court erred (1) by finding
defendants did not have a special relationship with Robinson for purposes of
§ 1983, (2) by declining to apply the state-created danger theory, and (3) by
declining to apply the doctrine of judicial estoppel as requested in Robinson’s
motion to strike. Robinson also contends that the district court should retain
supplemental jurisdiction over Robinson’s state law claims if this action is
remanded.
We review de novo a district court’s grant of a Rule 12(c) motion.
Machete Prods., LLC v. Page, 809 F.3d 281, 287 (5th Cir. 2015). “A motion
brought pursuant to Rule 12(c) is designed to dispose of cases where the
material facts are not in dispute and a judgment on the merits can be rendered
by looking to the substance of the pleadings and any judicially noticed facts.”
Id. (quoting Great Plains Tr. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313
F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2002)). The standard for Rule 12(c) and Rule 12(b)(6)
motions is the same. In re Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 624 F.3d 201, 209–
210 (5th Cir. 2010). That is, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Id. at 210 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). Otherwise,
the complaint warrants dismissal. “In deciding whether the complaint states
a valid claim for relief, we accept all well-pleaded facts as true and construe
the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Id. (citing Doe v.
MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 2008)).
To state a valid claim for relief under § 1983, “a plaintiff must (1)
allege a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United
States and (2) demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was committed by a

The district court dismissed Robinson’s motion without prejudice when it declined to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.
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person acting under color of state law.” James v. Texas Collin County, 535 F.
3d 365, 373 (5th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
As this Court has previously recognized, “[t]he right to be protected by the
state from private violence is limited and rests on substantive due process.”
Doe v. Columbia-Brazoria Indep. Sch. Dist., 855 F.3d 681, 688 (5th Cir. 2017)
(citation omitted). As a general rule, a state’s “failure to protect an
individual against private violence simply does not constitute a violation of
the Due Process Clause.” DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,
489 U.S. 189, 197 (1989). But there is an exception to this rule, which applies
when the state—or in this case, the county—creates a “special relationship”
with a citizen, requiring it to protect that citizen from harm. Doe ex rel. Magee
v. Covington Cnty. Sch. Dist. ex rel. Keys, 675 F.3d 849, 855–56 (5th Cir. 2012)
(en banc). Several other circuits have also adopted a second exception known
as the “state-created danger” theory, applicable when the state affirmatively
created or exacerbated a dangerous situation that led to a person’s injury. See
Kovacic v. Villarreal, 628 F.3d 209, 214 (5th Cir. 2010). But this Court has
declined to join our sister circuits in recognizing that theory on several
occasions.
2
See, e.g., Keller v. Fleming, 952 F.3d 216, 226–27 (5th Cir. 2020);
Columbia-Brazoria, 855 F.3d at 688; Covington, 675 F.3d at 865; Kovacic, 628
F.3d at 214.
Here, Robinson’s claims are premised on an act of private violence.
She contends that Webster County, via Sheriff Mitchell, violated her
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by releasing Patterson from jail
and permitting him to terrorize her. While Robinson recognizes that under

2
“Although we have not recognized the [state-created danger] theory, we have
stated the elements that such a cause of action would require[:] . . . ‘[1] the defendants used
their authority to create a dangerous environment for the plaintiff and [2] that the
defendants acted with deliberate indifference to the plight of the plaintiff.’” Covington, 675
F.3d at 865 (quoting Scanlan v. Texas A&M Univ., 343 F.3d 533, 537–38 (5th Cir. 2003)).
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the general rule the county is not liable for Patterson’s violent acts against
her, Robinson contends that the district court erred by (1) finding Webster
County did not have a special relationship with her and (2) declining to apply
the state-created danger theory. Based on our precedent, we must disagree.
Robinson first asserts that she has a special relationship with the
county because the county effectively limited her liberty by releasing
Patterson from jail. But this does not suffice to create a special relationship
between Robinson and the county. Under the special relationship theory,
“[t]he affirmative duty to protect arises not from the [s]tate’s knowledge of
the individual’s predicament or from its expressions of intent to help him,
but from the limitation which it has imposed on his freedom to act on his own
behalf.” DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200. In her complaint, Robinson does not
allege that the county restricted her ability to act on her own behalf. It follows
that the district court correctly concluded that the special relationship theory
does not apply here.
Robinson next asserts the district court should have applied the state-
created danger theory. As Robinson recognizes, however, this Court has
“‘repeatedly noted’ the unavailability of the [state-created danger] theory in
this circuit.” Columbia-Brazoria, 855 F.3d at 688 (citation omitted). The
district court correctly declined to stray from circuit precedent. And we
decline as well. See In re Hidalgo Cnty. Emergency Serv. Found., 962 F.3d 838,
841 (5th Cir. 2020).
Accordingly, Robinson’s § 1983 claims fail as a matter of law, and the
district court correctly dismissed them. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 197. We
do not address the district court’s denial of Robinson’s motion to strike
because the dismissal of her claims renders it moot. Likewise, we do not
address the district court’s decision not to retain supplemental jurisdiction
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over Robinson’s remaining state law claims because Robinson premised that
request on this action being remanded.
AFFIRMED.
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