Patricia Ellen Bowen v. Social Security Administration

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 14a0831n.06
No. 14-5079
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
PATRICIA ELLEN BOWEN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
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ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF
TENNESSEE
BEFORE: SILER, SUTTON, and McKEAGUE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM. Patricia Ellen Bowen appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the
denial of her application for disability insurance benefits.
In 2009, Bowen filed an application for disability insurance benefits, alleging that she
became disabled on May 10, 2005. After the Social Security Administration denied the
application, Bowen requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ). The ALJ
denied Bowen relief, and the Appeals Council declined to review the case. The district court
affirmed the denial of Bowen’s application.
On appeal, Bowen raises three arguments: (1) the ALJ erred by discounting the medical
opinion of her treating physician; (2) the ALJ erred by concluding that her testimony was not
fully credible; and (3) the ALJ erred by concluding that she retained the residual functional
capacity (RFC) to perform light work. “Our review of the ALJ’s decision is limited to whether

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Bowen v. Soc. Sec. Admin.
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the ALJ applied the correct legal standards and whether the findings of the ALJ are supported by
substantial evidence.” Blakley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 405 (6th Cir. 2009). “The
substantial-evidence standard is met if a reasonable mind might accept the relevant evidence as
adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. at 406 (internal quotation marks omitted). “We give de
novo review to the district court’s conclusions on each issue.” Id.
Bowen first argues that the ALJ erred by discounting the medical opinion of her treating
physician, Dr. Denise Dingle, that Bowen had significant work-related physical impairments. A
medical opinion from a treating source must be given controlling weight if it is well-supported
by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and not inconsistent with
other substantial evidence in the record. Gayheart v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 710 F.3d 365, 376
(6th Cir. 2013). If not given controlling weight, the ALJ must weigh the treating source’s
opinion based on the nature of the treatment relationship, the specialization of the medical
source, and the consistency and supportability of the opinion. Id.
Substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s decision to discount Dr. Dingle’s medical
opinion. Dingle made her assessment of Bowen’s physical limitations nearly two years after the
period relevant to the disability determination, and she failed to specifically identify when the
alleged limitations began and the extent to which the limitations were present during the relevant
period. In addition, Dingle’s conclusion that Bowen had significant physical limitations
conflicted with her treatment notes and the other medical evidence in the record, which generally
demonstrated that Bowen’s physical condition was stable and that she was not suffering from
debilitating physical impairments.
Bowen next argues that the ALJ erred by concluding that her testimony concerning the
extent of her impairments was not fully credible. We accord great weight and deference to an

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ALJ’s credibility finding, but such a finding must be supported by substantial evidence. Walters
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 531 (6th Cir. 1997). The ALJ could reasonably discount
Bowen’s testimony that she had severe physical impairments, given the lack of supporting
medical evidence, the evidence that she engaged in significant activities of daily living, and the
fact that she refused to comply with the advice of her physician to wear a compression garment
as an important part of her treatment. Thus, the ALJ’s credibility determination was supported
by substantial evidence.
Finally, Bowen argues that the ALJ erred by concluding that she retained the exertional
capacity to perform light work. Given that Bowen performed light or medium work until the
alleged onset date of disability and that there is no credible medical evidence or testimony
showing that she subsequently developed limitations precluding light work, substantial evidence
supported the ALJ’s RFC determination.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.

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