United States of America v. 1308 Selby Lane, Knoxville, Tn 37922, Real Property

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 17a0019n.06
Case No. 15-6353
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
1308 SELBY LANE, KNOXVILLE, TN
37922, REAL PROPERTY,
Defendant,
KNOX COUNTY,
Defendant-Appellant.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF
TENNESSEE
OPINION
BEFORE: CLAY, KETHLEDGE, and DONALD, Circuit Judges.
BERNICE BOUIE DONALD, Circuit Judge. Knox County, Tennessee (“Knox
County”) claims that the United States Attorney denied it, as a local taxing authority, due process
in a forfeiture proceeding involving real property located at 1308 Selby Lane and 1525 Wembley
Hill Road, Knoxville, Tennessee (collectively, the “Defendant Property”). Based on that
premise, Knox County filed a motion for relief from judgement and to determine the validity and
extent of tax liens it held on the Defendant property. The district court denied the motion finding
the forfeiture proceeding was valid. Knox County appeals. Because Knox County did not
properly intervene in the district court case, it was never a proper party to the lawsuit, and so this

-- 1 of 5 --

No. 15-6353, United States v. 1308 Selby Ln., et al.
- 2 -
Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this proceeding. Thus we DISMISS Knox County’s
appeal.
I.
The United States initiated an in rem civil forfeiture action on October 1, 2010 against the
Defendant Property. On September 27, 2012, the district court entered an ex parte Agreed
Consent Order and Entry of Forfeiture (the “Ex Parte Consent Order”) purporting to forfeit the
Defendant Property to the United States. On October 24, 2014 the United States informed Knox
County that the Defendant Property was scheduled to be sold. On November 6, 2014, Knox
County and the United States filed a Joint Motion for Agreed Order Holding Proceeds of Sale in
Escrow (the “Joint Motion”) until the validity and extent of Knox County’s tax lien could be
formally resolved. On December 12, 2014, Knox County filed a separate Motion for Relief from
Judgment and to Determine the Validity and Extent of Tax Lien. On April 16, 2016, the district
court issued a Memorandum and Opinion denying Knox County’s motion. On May 13, 2015,
Knox County filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment. On October 29, 2015, the district
court denied this motion as well. Knox County filed the instant appeal on December 8, 2015.
II.
Although the parties did not raise the issue in their briefs, this Court has “an independent
obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a
challenge from any party.” Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006). “If the court
determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the
action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). In the absence of jurisdiction, this Court’s only function is to
announce the lack of jurisdiction and dismiss or remand the case. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a
Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (citing Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 514 (1869)).

-- 2 of 5 --

No. 15-6353, United States v. 1308 Selby Ln., et al.
- 3 -
Because this requirement “springs from the nature and limits of the judicial power of the United
States, [it] is inflexible and without exception.” Id. at 94-95, quoting Mansfield, C. & L.M.R. Co.
v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884)).
“The rule that only parties to a lawsuit, or those that properly become parties, may appeal
an adverse judgment is well settled.” Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U.S. 301 (1988) (per curiam);
Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72, 77 (1987) (collecting cases); Fidel v. Farley, 534 F.3d 508, 512
(6th Cir. 2008) (“Generally, non-parties cannot appeal from an order of the district court, unless
they have first sought leave to intervene as a party.”). For this Court to have jurisdiction to hear
Knox County’s appeal, Knox County must have properly become a party to this lawsuit. Id.; see
also United States v. One-Sixth Share, 326 F.3d 36, 40 (1st Cir. 2003) (“Because civil forfeiture
is an in rem proceeding, the property subject to forfeiture is the defendant. Thus, defenses
against the forfeiture can be brought only by third parties, who must intervene.”); United States
v. All Funds in Banco Español de Credito, 295 F.3d 23, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“Civil forfeiture
actions are brought against property, not people. The owner of the property may intervene to
protect his interest.”). There are three ways that Knox County could have intervened in this case.
First, Knox County could have filed a verified claim stating its interest in the forfeited property
pursuant to the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims, as required by
the civil forfeiture statute relevant here. See 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(4)(A); One-Sixth Share, 326
F.3d at 41. Second, Knox County could have moved to intervene before the district court
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24. Finally, Knox County could have asked us for
permission to intervene post-judgment for purposes of appeal. See United Airlines, Inc. v.
McDonald, 432 U.S. 385, 394 (1977). Knox County did none of those things. We reviewed the
district court records and it appears that Knox County never filed a motion to intervene.

-- 3 of 5 --

No. 15-6353, United States v. 1308 Selby Ln., et al.
- 4 -
Moreover, during oral arguments, Knox County conceded that it did not file a motion to
intervene. Thus, we lack jurisdiction to hear this appeal.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we DISMISS this appeal for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Because we lack jurisdiction, we express no opinion on the merits of Knox
County’s claim.

-- 4 of 5 --

No. 15-6353, United States v. 1308 Selby Ln., et al.
- 5 -
KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part.
I respectfully disagree with my colleagues that we lack jurisdiction over the entirety of
this appeal. True, we lack jurisdiction over the County’s appeal from the district court’s original
consent judgment, if only because that judgment was entered more than four years ago. See Fed.
R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B). But the County also appeals the district court’s denial of the County’s
own motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). And the County’s problem there is not jurisdictional,
but rather that it is not a “party” entitled to relief under Rule 60(b). See generally Bridgeport
Music, Inc. v. Smith, 714 F.3d 932, 939 & n.6 (6th Cir. 2013). Nor is the County entitled to
relief as a nonparty, not least because the appeal itself is plainly meritless. See id. at 939-42. I
would therefore affirm the district court’s judgment rather than dismiss the appeal.

-- 5 of 5 --