Brooke Tolan v. Commissioner of Social Security

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 24a0498n.06
No. 24-3385
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
BROOKE TOLAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
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ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
OPINION
Before: KETHLEDGE, THAPAR, and LARSEN, Circuit Judges.
KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge. Brooke Tolan appeals the district court’s decision to affirm
the denial of her latest application for social-security disability benefits. We affirm.
Brooke Tolan previously worked as an administrative clerk. In 2004, Tolan filed the first
of several unsuccessful applications for disability benefits and supplemental-security income
based on her growing number of physical and mental impairments. In 2016, at age 37, Tolan filed
her current application for disability benefits. An ALJ held two hearings, ordered physical and
mental evaluations, and, in 2020, concluded that Tolan was not disabled. Tolan challenged that
decision and, after she sought judicial review, the parties stipulated to a remand to the agency for
further proceedings under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
The Appeals Council, in turn, directed the ALJ to reevaluate the medical-source opinion
of B.T. Onamusi, M.D., and to reconsider Tolan’s residual functional capacity when determining

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anew whether Tolan was disabled under the five-step sequential analysis required by the
regulations. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a). The ALJ did so and again found that
Tolan had the following severe impairments: “diabetes mellitus, status/post bilateral carpal tunnel
release, cubital tunnel syndrome, status/post brain tumor, obesity with status/post gastric bypass,
depression, [and] bipolar disorder.” Tolan also had non-severe impairments of “sleep apnea,
hypersomnia, migraines, hypothyroidism, medial and lateral epicondylitis, and peripheral
neuralgia.” But those impairments—considered individually or together—did not meet or equal
the severity of any “listed” impairment. Tolan’s non-exertional limitations—including to work
that involves only simple, routine, and repetitive tasks and decisions—prevent her from returning
to her prior semi-skilled work. None of those findings are contested here.
The ALJ also found that Tolan could perform a “reduced range” of light work with
restrictions that included “lifting up to 15 pounds occasionally.” That restriction made Tolan’s
capacity for work less than “light work,” which “involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time
with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b),
416.967(b). But Tolan argued that she could not do even that reduced range of light work because,
according to Dr. Onamusi, she could not lift or carry any amount of weight on a frequent basis.
Specifically, as part of the consultative examination report, Onamusi completed a check-
the-box form on which Onamusi indicated that Tolan could lift or carry up to 20 pounds
occasionally but did not indicate that she could lift or carry any amount of weight “frequently.”
The ALJ did not adopt either of those limitations. Instead, the ALJ placed “significant weight” on
the narrative portion of Onamusi’s report, because that portion (a letter) provided “a more open-
ended opportunity for Dr. Onamusi to give clear and specific recommendations.” The letter
described some of Tolan’s medical history; noted that Tolan’s shoulders, elbows, and wrists were

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“doing fine”; reported that Tolan could “do housework, laundry, and grocery shop”; and
concluded, in part, that Tolan could “lift up to 15 pounds occasionally [and] use the upper
extremities for gross and fine motor tasks frequently.” The ALJ adopted 15 pounds as the most
Tolan could be required to lift on an occasional basis, but the ALJ also found nothing in the letter
that clearly contradicted Tolan’s capacity to lift or carry up to 10 pounds frequently. A vocational
expert testified that 100,000 unskilled jobs existed in the national economy that can be performed
by a person with Tolan’s age, education, experience, and work capacity. The ALJ therefore
concluded that Tolan was not disabled. The Appeals Council declined to review that decision, and
Tolan appealed to federal court. A magistrate judge recommended that the district court affirm
the ALJ’s decision. Over Tolan’s objections, the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s
recommendation. This appeal followed.
We review only whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards and reached a
conclusion supported by substantial evidence. See Kyle v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 609 F.3d 847, 854
(6th Cir. 2010). Tolan argues that the ALJ erroneously disregarded Onamusi’s recommended
limitation that she not lift or carry any amount of weight frequently. But “controlling weight” is
reserved for treating sources, which Onamusi was not. See Gayheart v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 710
F.3d 365, 376 (6th Cir. 2013). And the effect of Tolan’s condition on her capacity to work is a
determination expressly reserved for the ALJ. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2); Social Security
Ruling 96-5P, 1996 WL 374183, at *5 (July 2, 1996). Nor must an ALJ incorporate every
limitation from a medical source’s recommendation whenever it finds that source persuasive in
some respects. Kinney v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 23-3889, 2024 WL 2273365, at *3 (6th Cir.
May 20, 2024). Instead, when an ALJ’s work-capacity finding conflicts with an opinion from a
medical source, the ALJ must explain why that recommended limitation was not adopted. See id.

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(quoting Social Security Ruling 96-8P, 1996 WL 374184, at *7 (July 2, 1996)). The ALJ did so
here.
The district court’s judgment is affirmed.

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