Kassandra Memmer v. United Wholesale Mortgage, LLC

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)
File Name: 25a0097p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
KASSANDRA MEMMER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
UNITED WHOLESALE MORTGAGE, LLC,
Defendant-Appellee.
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No. 24-1144
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.
No. 2:23-cv-10921—Linda V. Parker, District Judge.
Decided and Filed: April 18, 2025
Before: MOORE, CLAY, and THAPAR, Circuit Judges.
_________________
COUNSEL
ON BRIEF: Carla D. Aikens, Rejanae M. Thurman, CARLA D. AIKENS, P.L.C., Detroit,
Michigan, for Appellant. James W. Rose, TAFT STETTINIUS & HOLLISTER LLP,
Southfield, Michigan, for Appellee.
MOORE, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which CLAY, J., concurred. THAPAR,
J. (pp. 17–25), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.
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OPINION
_________________
KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. Kassandra Memmer sued her former
employer, United Wholesale Mortgage (“UWM”), for discrimination that she allegedly faced
during her tenure there. The lawsuit includes allegations of sexual harassment. UWM moved to
dismiss the lawsuit and compel arbitration under the parties’ employment agreement.
>

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The district court granted the motion. Memmer appeals, arguing that the arbitration agreement is
invalid and that she has a right to go to court notwithstanding any otherwise valid agreement due
to the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021
(“EFAA”). UWM responds that EFAA does not apply here, because Memmer’s claims accrued
before the law was enacted. As a matter of first impression in our circuit, we conclude that
EFAA applies to claims that accrue after its date of enactment and to disputes, understood as
controversies between the parties, that arise after that date. We accordingly REVERSE and
REMAND for the district court to apply the correct interpretation of EFAA to this case.
I. BACKGROUND
Memmer was employed as a mortgage underwriter at UWM from September 30, 2019,
through July 9, 2021. R. 1 (Compl. ¶¶ 6, 45) (Page ID #2, 6). Memmer alleges that during her
time at UWM, she faced numerous instances of discrimination, including UWM’s refusal to
allow remote work while she was pregnant during the COVID-19 pandemic, id. ¶¶ 37–45 (Page
ID #5–6), and sexual harassment by a coworker, id. ¶¶ 35–36 (Page ID #5). She asserts claims
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”), the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act
(“ELCRA”), and Michigan’s Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act (“PWDCRA”).
After Memmer filed this lawsuit, UWM moved to dismiss and compel arbitration. R. 7
(Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss & Compel Arbitration) (Page ID #40). The district court granted the
motion, concluding that the parties had entered a valid contract to arbitrate Memmer’s claims.
Memmer v. UWM, No. 23-cv-10921, 2024 WL 187697, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 16, 2024). The
district court also rejected Memmer’s arguments that her statutory claims were non-arbitrable,
although the court did not address Memmer’s contention that EFAA applied. Id.
The district court dismissed Memmer’s complaint without prejudice “because her claims
must be arbitrated in accordance with her Employment Agreement.” R. 14 (J.) (Page ID #178).
Memmer timely appealed. R. 15 (Notice of Appeal) (Page ID #179). We have jurisdiction to
review the district court’s final decision concerning arbitration. 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(3); Great Earth
Cos. v. Simons, 288 F.3d 878, 885 (6th Cir. 2002).

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II. ANALYSIS
The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) allows a party to an arbitration agreement to
petition a federal court for enforcement. 9 U.S.C. § 4. Before granting a motion to compel
arbitration, the district court must assure itself that (1) the parties agreed to arbitrate; (2) the
claims asserted fall within the scope of the arbitration agreement; and (3) Congress did not
intend for those claims to be non-arbitrable. Fazio v. Lehman Bros., Inc., 340 F.3d 386, 392 (6th
Cir. 2003). We review the district court’s conclusions de novo. Bazemore v. Papa John’s
U.S.A., Inc., 74 F.4th 795, 797 (6th Cir. 2023).
A. Agreement to Arbitrate
We start with the parties’ agreement. Whether the parties entered a valid agreement to
arbitrate is a question of state contract law. Fazio, 340 F.3d at 393; see 9 U.S.C. § 2. Here,
Michigan law applies. R. 7-1 (Employment Agreement ¶ 30) (Page ID #81). In deciding
whether the parties agreed to arbitrate, the district court looked at documents beyond the
complaint, including the employment agreement and affidavits from both parties. Memmer,
2024 WL 187697, at *2. So, the district court appropriately applied the framework of Rule 56.
Boykin v. Family Dollar Stores of Mich., LLC, 3 F.4th 832, 838 (6th Cir. 2021). Under this
framework, UWM bears the initial burden to produce evidence sufficient to allow a trier of fact
to conclude that the parties entered a contract to arbitrate. Id. at 839. If UWM does that, the
burden shifts to Memmer to place the validity of the agreement at issue. Id. The only element in
dispute here is mutuality of contract—whether there was “a valid offer and acceptance” of the
employment agreement. McMillon v. City of Kalamazoo, 983 N.W.2d 79, 81 (Mich. 2023).
UWM met its initial burden here. The company submitted an employment agreement,
apparently e-signed by Memmer, containing a description of an arbitration process followed by
this all-caps language:
BY SIGNING THIS AGREEMENT, EMPLOYEE ACKNOWLEDGES THAT
HE OR SHE IS GIVING UP THE RIGHT TO A TRIAL IN A COURT OF LAW
AS TO ANY DISCRIMINATION OR OTHER STATUTORY CLAIMS, AND
IS HEREBY AGREEING TO SUBMIT ALL SUCH CLAIMS TO BINDING
ARBITRATION.

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R. 7-1 (Employment Agreement ¶ 32) (Page ID #82). The agreement also contained this bolded
language right before Memmer’s e-signature.
As evidenced by Employee’s signature below, Employee hereby
acknowledges that he or she has read and understood all of the terms and
conditions of this Agreement, that Employee agrees to the terms and
conditions of this Agreement, and that this Agreement is binding upon
Employee in accordance with its terms.
R. 7-1 (Employment Agreement) (Page ID #84). UWM also submitted a declaration from Lisa
Enriquez, an employee of UWM responsible for “supervision of the hiring and onboarding
process for new employees of UWM.” R. 7-1 (Lisa Enriquez Decl. ¶ 1) (Page ID #66).
Enriquez states that Memmer signed the agreement through UWM’s online system by which
“candidates (including . . . Memmer) create their own profile, including their own unique log-in
and password.” Id. ¶ 3 (Page ID #67). This evidence satisfied UWM’s initial burden of
demonstrating that Memmer accepted its offer to arbitrate. See Boykin, 3 F.4th at 839;
Bazemore, 74 F.4th at 798; Tucker v. UWM, Inc., No. 24-1595, 2025 WL 1082316, at *2 (6th
Cir. Apr. 10, 2025).
Therefore, the burden shifts to Memmer. To create a “genuine” dispute, Memmer must
point to “specific facts, as opposed to general allegations” demonstrating that she did not accept
the contract. Boykin, 3 F.4th at 839 (citation omitted). Memmer must offer evidence that she did
not sign the agreement or otherwise accept its terms. See id. “[C]onvenient memory lapses do
not create factual disputes that are genuine,” but “an unequivocal denial that takes the form of
admissible evidence can create a genuine dispute of fact.” Id. at 839–40 (citation omitted). We
have previously held that affidavits from employees attesting that they never signed or never saw
the arbitration agreement sufficed to place the issue in dispute. See Bazemore, 74 F.4th at 798;
see also Hergenreder v. Bickford Senior Living Grp., LLC, 656 F.3d 411, 415, 418–19 (6th Cir.
2011).
Memmer has not met her burden. In opposition to UWM’s motion, she submitted a
declaration detailing her recollection of the agreement. But nothing in that declaration creates a
genuine dispute about whether she signed. The declaration states that she “do[es] not recall
signing,” R. 9-2 (Memmer Decl. ¶ 42), but as we have noted, “[c]onvenient memory lapses do

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not create factual disputes that are genuine,” Boykin, 3 F.4th at 839. The declaration further
contains statements suggesting that she did not understand the agreement and that she was under
time pressure to sign. She claims that she “was never told what [she] was signing,” “would not
have signed an arbitration agreement without further explanation,” and “was told to return [the
agreement] as soon as possible.” R. 9-2 (Memmer Decl. ¶¶ 43–45). However, these statements
do not amount to a denial that she saw and signed the agreement. See Tucker, 2025 WL
1082316, at *2–3; see also Mazera v. Varsity Ford Mgmt. Servs., LLC, 565 F.3d 997, 1002 (6th
Cir. 2009). Michigan courts presume that people who sign contracts have read and understood
them, and “one who signs a contract will not be heard to say, when enforcement is sought, that
he did not read it, or that he supposed it was different in its terms.” Komraus Plumbing &
Heating, Inc. v. Cadillac Sands Motel, Inc., 195 N.W.2d 865, 868 (Mich. 1972). Finally,
Memmer has not asserted, much less proved, any defense, such as unconscionability, fraud, or
duress that might excuse her signature. See id.; see also 9 U.S.C. § 2; Walker v. Ryan’s Family
Steak Houses, Inc., 400 F.3d 370, 377 (6th Cir. 2005). Hence, the district court correctly
concluded that Memmer and UWM agreed to arbitrate.
B. Scope of the Arbitration Agreement
The next step is to consider whether the claims asserted fall within the scope of the
arbitration agreement. They do. The agreement covers “any discrimination or other statutory
claims” arising out of her employment. R. 7-1 (Employment Agreement ¶ 32) (Page ID #82).
That includes Memmer’s claims under Title VII, FLSA, ADA, ELCRA, and PWDCRA.
C. Arbitrability of Memmer’s Claims
At this step, we would historically have concluded that Memmer’s claims were arbitrable.
“The FAA expresses a strong public policy favoring arbitration of a wide class of disputes.”
Walker, 400 F.3d at 376 (quoting Cooper v. MRM Inv. Co., 367 F.3d 493, 498 (6th Cir. 2004)).
We and the Michigan courts have previously recognized that similar statutory claims can be sent
to arbitration. Id. at 377 (FLSA); Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305, 309 (6th
Cir. 1991) (Title VII); Rembert v. Ryan’s Fam. Steak Houses, Inc., 596 N.W.2d 208, 210 (Mich.

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Ct. App. 1999) (ELCRA and PWDCRA); see 42 U.S.C. § 12212 (“encourag[ing]” arbitration of
ADA claims).1, 2
But Congress recently enacted a new law that affects our analysis. This law, EFAA,
allows an individual claiming sexual harassment or assault to elect judicial resolution, rather than
arbitral resolution of their claims, even if the individual previously agreed to arbitrate such
claims if they arose.3 EFAA amends the FAA as follows:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, at the election of the person
alleging conduct constituting a sexual harassment dispute or sexual assault
dispute, or the named representative of a class or in a collective action alleging
such conduct, no predispute arbitration agreement or predispute joint-action
waiver shall be valid or enforceable with respect to a case which is filed under
Federal, Tribal, or State law and relates to the sexual assault dispute or the sexual
harassment dispute.
9 U.S.C. § 402(a). On appeal, the parties do not dispute the applicability of EFAA to Memmer’s
case, which includes allegations of sexual harassment. The sole issue before us is whether the
events occurred at the right time. Memmer quit UWM before EFAA was enacted and all alleged
sexual harassment occurred before that date. But she filed her administrative claim with the
EEOC, as well as this lawsuit, after EFAA became law. We must decide whether EFAA applies
here.
1In her reply brief, Memmer argues that her Michigan state-law claims may not be arbitrable under a
forthcoming state court decision. Reply Br. at 9. Memmer forfeited the issue by raising it only in her reply brief.
Island Creek Coal Co. v. Wilkerson, 910 F.3d 254, 256 (6th Cir. 2018). In any event, any such rule would likely be
preempted by the FAA. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 341 (2011); see Tucker, 2025 WL
1082316, at *3.
2We do not reach Memmer’s forfeited argument that application of the arbitration agreement is contrary to
public policy due to other lawsuits pending against UWM.
3We reject UWM’s argument that Memmer forfeited reliance on EFAA by failing to raise it below. For
one, Memmer raised the statute in her opposition to UWM’s motion to compel, and UWM responded to the
argument in its reply brief, indicating that UWM was on notice of the argument. See R. 9 (Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot.
to Dismiss & Compel Arbitration at 12); R. 10 (Def.’s Reply in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss & Compel Arbitration at
7) (Page ID #133). For another, EFAA is directly codified as a limitation upon the court’s power to compel
arbitration under the FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 2, and we are doubtful that a party opposing arbitration can forfeit proper
application of the statute. Cf. United States v. Cabbage, 91 F.4th 1228, 1231 (6th Cir. 2024) (“[C]ourts have an
independent obligation to get the law right.”).

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In a statutory note, Congress provided that EFAA “shall apply with respect to any dispute
or claim that arises or accrues on or after the date of enactment of this Act,” which was March 3,
2022. 9 U.S.C. § 401 note (“application note”). To interpret this statutory language, we start
with the text. It is a “cardinal principle of statutory construction that it is our duty to give effect,
if possible, to every clause and word of a statute.” Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 173 (1997)
(cleaned up). Here, the statute refers to “any dispute or claim that arises or accrues.” 9 U.S.C.
§ 401 note (emphasis added). Because Congress used the disjunctive “or,” we infer that
Congress meant to differentiate, and we must see if separate meaning can fairly be given to each
word.
Turning to the words themselves, we see that Congress used two nouns—“dispute” and
“claim”—together with two verbs—“arises” and “accrues.” The remaining parts of the statute,
together with our background legal understandings, help us understand how they interact. In
legal parlance, the term “claim” is commonly associated with the concept of “accrual.” See
Accrue, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (“To come into existence as an enforceable
claim or right, to arise.”). The word “dispute,” on the other hand, does not correspond with the
word “accrue.” We have not heard of “disputes that accrue.” But we are familiar with “disputes
that arise.” And so is the statute. On two occasions, the statute refers to “dispute[s] that had not
yet arisen at the time of the making of the agreement.” 9 U.S.C. § 401(1)–(2) (emphasis added).
These reference points—in our legal understanding and the statutory text—clarify the
grammatical structure of the sentence, demonstrating that the EFAA applies to claims that
accrue and disputes that arise on or after March 3, 2022. In our endeavor to give effect to each
of these clauses, we ask whether each bears separate meaning. We conclude that they do.
The word “claim” carries multiple related meanings in the law—but only one in the
context of the application note. The word can refer to (1) “[a] statement that something yet to be
proved is true,” like “claims of torture”; (2) “[t]he assertion of an existing right . . . even if
contingent or provisional,” like a “spouse’s claim to half of the lottery winnings”;
(3) “[a] demand for money, property, or a legal remedy to which one asserts a right,” i.e., a
“claim for relief”; and (4) “[a]n interest or remedy recognized at law; the means by which a
person can obtain a privilege, possession, or enjoyment of a right or thing,” i.e., “a cause of

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action” like a “claim against the employer for wrongful termination.” Claim, Black’s Law
Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). In the context of accrual, “claim” bears only the last meaning: cause
of action. Corner Post, Inc. v. Bd. of Govs. of Fed. Rsrv. Sys., 603 U.S. 799, 810 (2024). A
claim accrues “when the plaintiff has a ‘complete and present cause of action’—i.e., when she
has the right to ‘file suit and obtain relief.’” Id. at 809 (quoting Green v. Brennan, 578 U.S. 547,
554 (2016)).
Claim accrual is significant in the litigation and arbitration contexts. In litigation, the
statute of limitations usually runs from the date on which the claim accrued. Id. at 811. If a
plaintiff waits too long to file suit, she is barred from pursuing her claim in court. Although
statutes of limitations do not directly apply to arbitration, 31 Williston on Contracts § 79:115
(4th ed. 2024), parties use accrual dates and statutes of limitations to set boundaries on the time
to file for arbitration. Here, for example, the employment contract between Memmer and UWM
requires that an employee “request arbitration . . . within six (6) months of the date of
termination or accrual of the claim, or within a shorter period of time if one is prescribed by the
statute upon which [the] [e]mployee’s claim is based.” R. 7-1 (Employment Agreement ¶ 32)
(Page ID #82). Should the employee fail to request arbitration in that time, the “[e]mployee’s
claim [is] waived.” Id.
“[W]here Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition and
meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were
attached to each borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken and the meaning
its use will convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise instructed.” Morissette v. United States,
342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952). Accordingly, when we talk about claims in the context of accrual, we
can infer that Congress means something specific: a cause of action that becomes complete and
ready to vindicate once certain elements are in place. Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. Jarkesy, 603
U.S. 109, 125 (2024) (“[W]hen Congress transplants a common-law term, the old soil comes
with it.” (quoting United States v. Hansen, 599 U.S. 762, 778 (2023)). Hence, under the statute,
if a claim, i.e., cause of action, accrues after March 3, 2022, EFAA applies.

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The word “dispute,” on the other hand, usually denotes a controversy between parties. A
dispute is a “conflict or controversy, esp[ecially] one that has given rise to a particular lawsuit.”
Dispute, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019); Dispute, Ballentine’s Law Dictionary (3d ed.
2010) (“controversy. An allegation of fact by one person denied by another, each acting with
some show of reason.”). This is how the statute uses the term “dispute.” The statute defines a
“sexual harassment dispute” as “a dispute relating to conduct that is alleged to constitute sexual
harassment under applicable Federal, Tribal, or State law.” 9 U.S.C. § 401(4). And it defines a
“predispute arbitration agreement” as “any agreement to arbitrate a dispute that had not yet
arisen at the time of the making of the agreement.” Id. § 401(1). These uses of “dispute” denote
a controversy between the parties regarding certain kinds of conduct, conduct which may support
claims under state and federal law. A predispute arbitration agreement, then, is an agreement to
resolve a controversy, which may or may not relate to claims that can be asserted in arbitration or
in court. See Pulsifer v. United States, 601 U.S. 124, 149 (2024) (“In a given statute, the same
term usually has the same meaning and different terms usually have different meanings.”).
Unlike claim accrual, we lack a set legal framework to determine when a dispute arises.
Depending on the facts, a dispute could arise when an injured party sends the defendant a
demand letter, files an administrative charge, requests arbitration, commences a lawsuit, or some
other event occurs. See Famuyide v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 111 F.4th 895, 897–98 (8th
Cir. 2024). The relevant question is when the parties became adverse to one another. Id.; see
Cornelius v. CVS Pharmacy Inc., No. 23-2961, -- F.4th --, 2025 WL 980309, at *5 (3d Cir. April
2, 2025). In many cases, the dispute will arise after the claim accrues. For example, a sexual-
harassment claim may accrue when one employee makes an inappropriate remark to another, but
the dispute may not arise until the employer resists the employee’s complaints. But the converse
could also be true. A dispute may arise between the parties about the harassment, but if the
harassment continues, a continuing violation, such as a hostile work environment claim, might
subsequently accrue due to the later events. See Olivieri v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 112 F.4th 74,
85–87 (2d Cir. 2024). Ultimately, when a dispute arises is a fact-dependent inquiry that can be
determined in the context of each case.

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Our interpretation of the statute accords with the approach adopted by Third and Eighth
Circuits. Famuyide, the Eighth Circuit case, concerned a suit like this one wherein the relevant
claims accrued before the effective date of the statute. See 111 Famuyide, F.4th at 897. Relying
on the definition of “dispute” from Black’s Law Dictionary, the panel concluded that the dispute
arose once there was a controversy between the parties. Id. at 898. The panel rejected
Chipotle’s argument that the dispute arose when the relevant harassing conduct occurred—likely
when the claim accrued—because, at that point, “Famuyide had not asserted any right, claim, or
demand against Chipotle, and Chipotle had not registered disagreement with any position of
Famuyide’s.” Id. The court also rejected Chipotle’s argument that the dispute arose when
Famuyide’s counsel sent a letter to Chipotle explaining that he was investigating claims of sexual
harassment because “[t]his sort of exploratory letter from counsel does not establish a dispute or
inevitably lead to one.” Id. Having disposed of Chipotle’s arguments, the Eighth Circuit
affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to compel arbitration. Id. at 899. The Third
Circuit recently followed the Eighth Circuit’s approach. In Cornelius, the Third Circuit panel
held that the “ordinary meanings of both ‘dispute’ and ‘arise’” compelled the conclusion that
EFAA applies “when an employee registers disagreement—through either an internal complaint,
external complaint, or otherwise—with his or her employer, and the employer expressly or
constructively opposes that position.” Cornelius, 2025 WL 980309, at *5. We agree.
Our approach is also consistent with the Second Circuit’s recent opinion on claim accrual
as it pertains to EFAA. In Olivieri, the Second Circuit did not reach the question of when a
dispute arose because the case concerned a hostile-work-environment claim, which re-accrued
after the litigation began. 112 F.4th at 85–87. The panel noted, however, that its decision was
consistent with the Eighth Circuit because both decisions “support[ed] [the] conclusion that
events occurring before the EFAA’s effective date can be relevant to application of the EFAA.”
Id. at 90 n.8.4
4The only other federal appellate court to address this issue is the Fourth Circuit, which declined to apply
EFAA to claims that accrued before the law was enacted. Bopda v. Comcast of the Dist., LLC, No. 23-2148, 2024
WL 399081, at *1 (4th Cir. Feb. 2, 2024). The Bopda decision is not persuasive because it addressed the application
note in a one-paragraph, nonbinding, unpublished order that did not grapple with the statutory language.

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Opposing the application of EFAA here, UWM cites several state and district court
opinions declining to apply EFAA to claims that accrued before EFAA was enacted. Many of
those cases involved lawsuits filed before EFAA was enacted. See, e.g., Murrey v. Superior
Court, 304 Cal. Rptr. 3d 439, 447 (Cal. Ct. App 2023). Our decision is not inconsistent with
these cases because they involve disputes (here, lawsuits) that arose before EFAA was enacted.
Other courts have understood “dispute” as referring to the allegedly harassing or assaultive
conduct itself and looked to when the conduct occurred, which frequently coincides with the
moment when the claim accrued. See, e.g., Jackson Memmer v. UWM, No. 23-cv-11261, 2023
WL 8818298, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 18, 2023); Barnes v. Festival Fun Parks, LLC, No. 3:22-
cv-165, 2023 WL 4209745, at *10 (W.D. Pa. June 27, 2023). We do not find those opinions
persuasive, because they deprive the word “dispute” of its ordinary meaning. See Cornelius,
2025 WL 980309, at *4. And they conflict with the use of the word “dispute” elsewhere in the
statute. See 9 U.S.C. § 401(4) (defining a “sexual harassment dispute” as “a dispute relating to
conduct that is alleged to constitute sexual harassment under applicable Federal, Tribal, or State
law” (emphasis added)). Finally, UWM cites a case that attributes the statute’s use of the word
“dispute” to an effort to “encompass various kinds of proceedings.” Walters v. Starbucks Corp.,
623 F. Supp. 3d 333, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 2022). The dissenting opinion makes a version of this
argument, which we grapple with more fully below.
Before finally reaching our disagreement with the dissenting opinion, we pause briefly to
note why we also reject plaintiff’s proposed interpretation of EFAA, which would run the
“dispute” clock only from the date when the lawsuit is filed. This interpretation of the word
“dispute” is too narrow and fails to capture the broader, ordinary meaning of the word “dispute.”
See Cornelius, 2025 WL 980309, at *5. Further, the statute refers elsewhere to “a case which is
filed,” 9 U.S.C. § 402(a), suggesting that, if Congress meant to so limit the meaning of the word
“dispute,” it would have done so. See Pulsifer, 601 U.S. at 149. Depending on the facts of the
case, a dispute may arise on the date that a lawsuit was filed, but it may arise earlier, too.
Parting ways with our sibling circuits, the dissenting opinion takes the position that
“dispute” means “claim” in the application note, and Congress used the term “dispute” only to
“speak[] the language of both arbitration and civil litigation.” Dissenting Op. at 19. According

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to the dissenting opinion, the statute applies only when a claim accrues after the enactment date.
Respectfully, we disagree.
To begin, the dissenting opinion errs by overstating the nexus between disputes and
arbitration, and claims and litigation. Legal dictionaries recognize that litigation and arbitration
are both methods of dispute resolution. As Black’s Law Dictionary explains, a court “consist[s]
of one or more judges who sit to adjudicate disputes.” Court, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed.
2019) (emphasis added). A civil proceeding is “[a] judicial hearing, session, or lawsuit in which
the purpose is to decide or delineate private rights and remedies, as in a dispute between litigants
in a matter relating to torts, contracts, property, or family law.” Civil Proceeding, Black’s Law
Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (emphasis added). Arbitration, similarly, is a “dispute-resolution
process in which the disputing parties choose one or more neutral third parties to make a final
and binding decision resolving the dispute.” Arbitration, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed.
2019) (emphasis added). Arbitration offers an alternative “procedure for settling a dispute by
means other than litigation.” Alternative Dispute Resolution, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed.
2019) (emphasis added).
The U.S. Code recognizes the same. The Code refers to disputes in both judicial and
arbitral contexts. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 4001(g); 36 U.S.C. § 220509(a); 49 U.S.C.
§§ 11708(b)(1), 14708. And the Code recognizes that both judicial and arbitral disputes may
involve claims, which could be asserted in either forum. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1367, 2679; 42
U.S.C. § 9622(h); 49 U.S.C. § 44308(b). Likewise, the parties’ own arbitration agreement refers
to the “submi[ssion]” of both “dispute[s]” and “claims to binding arbitration.” R. 7-1
(Employment Agreement ¶ 32) (Page ID #82). Disputes and claims are relevant to both
litigation and arbitration.
The dissenting opinion improperly conflates the term “dispute” with the term “claim” as
it is used in the context of this statute. As we have explained, the terms “dispute” and “claim”
both may suggest legal controversies in some contexts. But it does not follow that “dispute” and
“claim” always share the same meaning. Here, Congress chose to use a specialized meaning of
the word “claim” by coupling it with the word “accrue,” telling the reader that it was referring to
a cause of action. But Congress used the word “dispute” in a more general way. The dissenting

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opinion’s logical leap elides the ordinary meaning of “dispute” with the specific meaning of
“claim” and narrows the application of EFAA beyond what we can find in the statutory
language. Had Congress wanted to limit EFAA’s application to claims that accrue after the date
of enactment, it could have used the language of claim accrual alone. Considering the ubiquity
of claims in both litigation and arbitration, Congress had no need to use the word dispute only to
make the statute understandable to the world of arbitration, as the dissenting opinion suggests.
See Dissenting Op. at 20 n.1. We recognize, as the dissenting opinion points out, that there is no
ready formula for calculating when a dispute arises, like there is for calculating when a claim
accrues. But this administrability concern is not a valid reason for overriding the statutory text
here. See Cornelius, 2025 WL 980309, at *5 n.9.
Further, the dissenting opinion’s use of legislative history is not persuasive. The
legislative history relied upon by the dissenting opinion—a House Report and floor debates—
does not speak directly to the application note at all. To the extent it is relevant, the House
Report’s discussion of § 402 “provid[ing] that at the election of a person alleging conduct that
constitutes a sexual harassment or sexual assault claim, no pre-dispute arbitration agreement or
pre-dispute joint-action waiver shall be valid or enforceable relating to disputes described within
the chapter,” H. Rep. No. 117–234, at 19 (emphasis added), supports the conclusion that we
reach—that the conduct may constitute a claim, and that disputes are controversies that may
pertain to enforceable claims.
The floor debates offer no more insight into the specific issue we face. In these debates,
legislators used the words “claim” and “dispute,” sometimes in ways that suggest
interchangeability, but often not. See Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (“[T]here are many other faces in the crowd.”). For example, Rep. Jayapal seemed
to equate claims and disputes when she criticized “forced arbitration agreements” for
“requir[ing] that people with disputes against a company use a secretive, one-sided mediation
process instead of the judicial system.” 168 Cong. Rec. H987 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 2022) (emphasis
added). But minutes later, Rep. Jordan, a critic of the Act, used the word “dispute” to refer to a
controversy outside the arbitration conference room, stating that “if parties can’t agree in
advance to arbitrate, then they are unlikely to agree to arbitrate after there has been a dispute.”

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Id. at H990 (emphasis added). Shortly thereafter, Rep. Nadler, the bill’s sponsor, distinguished
between claims and disputes, stating that the Act would “giv[e] [survivors] a real choice of
whether to go to court or to arbitrate their claim after the dispute has arisen.” Id. at H991
(emphasis added). As these examples show, the words “dispute” and “claim” were used in
different ways at different time in the floor debates—whereas Rep. Jayapal used the word
“dispute” to suggest the legal equivalent of a claim, Reps. Jordan’s and Nadler’s statements
suggest that a dispute is a disagreement distinct from the arbitration proceeding. The floor
debates are of little interpretive value here, and we should be wary to engage in “legislative-
history tea-reading,” Wallace v. Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 954 F.3d 879, 901 (6th Cir. 2020)
(Thapar, J., concurring), about the significance of how legislators used these particular words.
None of the dissenting opinion’s objections to our interpretation moves the needle. First,
the dissenting opinion claims that our interpretation of the statute fails to appreciate the statutory
context. See Dissenting Op. at 21. The opposite is true. Whereas we have taken account of the
way the statute uses the words “dispute” and “claim,” the dissenting opinion relies on the mere
use of the word “dispute” elsewhere in the statute without considering how that word is
deployed. Second, the dissenting opinion asserts that the ordinary meaning of “dispute” favors
its position, because the definition suggests that a dispute precedes the lawsuit. Dissenting Op. at
21 (citing Dispute, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024)). In so doing, the dissenting opinion
concedes that the ordinary meaning of a dispute refers to the times when “something happens,
and it generates conflict or disagreement.” Id. And we have never suggested that the dispute
always arises at the time the lawsuit is filed. Indeed, in most cases, the parties recognize their
own disagreement before filing suit. Third, the dissenting opinion accuses us of creating
superfluity because, as we interpret the word “dispute,” the dispute will often arise after the
claim has accrued. See Dissenting Op. at 24. On this score, the dissenting opinion fares poorly,
since, under its interpretation, a dispute can never arise at any time except when the claim
accrues. Moreover, Congress enacted the law with an unmistakable purpose of enabling
survivors of sexual harassment and assault to pursue their claims in court rather than arbitration,
even though the parties had previously agreed to do otherwise. See H. Rep. 117-234 at 3–4. We
think it is more likely that Congress intended to provide these individuals with more expansive
access to the courts that the dissenting opinion would provide.

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Ultimately, the dissenting opinion offers an intriguing tale of how Congress resolved
“something of a pickle,” Dissenting Op. at 20, but we need not write a story when the statute
gives us the answer. Congress had no need to “bridge[] two legal worlds,” id. at 18, because
disputes and claims are relevant to both worlds and carry separate meanings in the context of the
statute. To summarize, when a dispute arises, or when the relevant claim accrues on or after
March 3, 2022, a plaintiff may elect to proceed in court notwithstanding a preexisting agreement
to arbitrate.
The question then is whether (1) Memmer’s sexual-harassment claim accrued on or after
the date of enactment or (2) the parties’ dispute arose on or after the date of enactment. Memmer
quit her job at UWM on July 9, 2021. R. 1 (Compl. ¶ 45) (Page ID #6). She filed a charge of
discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on April 26,
2022. R. 9-1 (Charge of Discrimination) (Page ID #108). The EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter
on January 19, 2023. R. 9-3 (Notice of Right to Sue) (Page ID #116). She filed the present
lawsuit on April 19, 2023. See R. 1 (Compl.) (Page ID #1). As the record stands, it appears that
Memmer’s claim accrued before the date of enactment, March 3, 2022, because she quit her job
several months prior, and any injury, therefore, preceded that date. However, all subsequent
events, including the filing of a charge with the EEOC, took place after the date of enactment.
When the dispute—the controversy between the parties—arose under the facts of this
case is a question best answered in the first instance by the district court. Accordingly, we will
remand for the district court to decide and, if needed, obtain a factual record on which to do so.
We recognize that the district court did not address EFAA in its initial opinion and, on remand,
other questions may become relevant. For example, must plaintiff’s sexual harassment claim be
“plausible” to remain in court? See Yost v. Everyrealm, Inc., 657 F. Supp. 3d 563, 583–88
(S.D.N.Y. 2023). Does Memmer’s single sexual harassment claim suffice to preserve her entire
case in court, or should the other claims be sent to arbitration? See Johnson v. Everyrealm, Inc.,
657 F. Supp. 3d 535, 558–61 (S.D.N.Y. 2023). These and other novel questions about the
application of EFAA have not been meaningfully raised before us, and we leave it to the district
court to consider in the first instance such issues as they arise.

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III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the judgment of the district court and
REMAND for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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_________________
DISSENT
_________________
THAPAR, Circuit Judge, dissenting. Courts normally don’t read statutory text divorced
from its context. But that’s what the majority does today. When read in context, the text of the
Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act doesn’t cover
Kassandra Memmer’s suit. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
I.
Memmer worked as an underwriter for United Wholesale Mortgage (UWM). After
quitting her job, Memmer sued UWM in federal court, bringing various claims under state and
federal law for retaliation, hostile workplace environment, failure to accommodate,
discrimination, harassment, and overtime and minimum wage law violations. Some of her
claims included allegations of workplace sexual harassment.
Memmer’s suit has a problem. Before she started working for UWM, Memmer signed an
employment agreement with UWM. And that agreement expressly provided that all disputes
arising out of her employment that touch on discrimination or other statutory violations had to be
submitted to arbitration.
The majority correctly concludes that the employment contract that Memmer signed with
UWM is a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).
Further, Memmer’s claims fall within the scope of the FAA.
Normally, those conclusions would end this case and call for affirming the district court’s
decision to dismiss Memmer’s suit and compel arbitration. But there’s a complication.
Congress passed a law in 2022 invalidating arbitration agreements as applied to sexual assault
and sexual harassment disputes. The Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual
Harassment Act provides that controversies about sexual assault and sexual harassment that
previously would have been arbitrable disputes destined for a conference room are now claims
destined for a courtroom. But the Act covers only disputes that arise on or after March 3, 2022,

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and Memmer’s time with UWM came to an end back in July 2021—well before March 2022. So
I disagree with the majority that there’s any chance that Memmer’s suit falls within the scope of
the Act.
II.
As always, start with the text. The Act provides that no arbitration agreements are valid
“with respect to a case” that “relates to” sexual assault or harassment disputes. Pub. L. No. 117-
90, § 2(a), 136 Stat. 26, 27 (2022). But the Act applies only to a “dispute or claim that arises or
accrues on or after [its] date of enactment”—March 3, 2022. Id. § 3, 136 Stat. at 28.
Courts interpreting the Act’s effective date provision often presume that its operative
language—disputes or claims that arise or accrue after March 3, 2022—pairs the noun “dispute”
with the verb “arises” and the noun “claim” with the verb “accrues.” So, they assume, the date
upon which a dispute arises is different from the date upon which a claim accrues.
That’s a fair assumption. The words “dispute” and “claim” are different words paired by
a disjunctive “or.” And when interpreting statutes, we normally presume that each word does
independent work. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979). This is sometimes
called the “presumption against surplusage” canon of statutory interpretation.
But “like all other canons, this one must be applied with judgment and discretion, and
with careful regard to context.” Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The
Interpretation of Legal Texts 176 (2012). After all, drafters may “repeat themselves.” Id. at 177.
There can be good reason for repetition, depending on the context. This case presents
one such context because the Act bridges two legal worlds by shifting controversies about sexual
assault and harassment from arbitration into civil litigation.
In civil litigation, the coin of the realm is the “claim,” and claims make up a plaintiff’s
“case.” When a plaintiff has a claim against a defendant, he has a “case” and files suit. So,
when regulating civil litigation, both Congress and state legislatures often speak of “claims.”
See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1367, 2679; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2744.04(B). So do the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

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In the world of arbitration, the coin of the realm is the “dispute.” Indeed, Black’s Law
Dictionary defines “arbitration” as a “dispute-resolution process in which the disputing parties
choose one or more neutral third parties to make a final and binding decision resolving the
dispute.” Arbitration, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (emphasis added). Likewise,
American Heritage defines it as “[t]he process by which the parties to a dispute submit their
differences to the judgment of an impartial person or group appointed by mutual consent or
statutory provision.” Arbitration, American Heritage Dictionary (5th ed. 2022) (emphasis
added).
Congress has long appreciated that arbitration is a process for resolving “disputes,” just
as civil litigation is a process for resolving “claims.” The U.S. Code is filled with provisions
regarding how and which “disputes” get “arbitrated.” See, e.g., 49 U.S.C.
§§ 11708(b)(1), 14708; 25 U.S.C. § 416a(c); 17 U.S.C. § 1321(d). State codes are no different.
See, e.g., 205 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 715/15 (“Arbitration of disputes”); Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§ 903.14 (“[T]he parties to the dispute shall submit the dispute to an arbitrator for nonbinding
arbitration.”); Cal. Health & Safety Code § 1373.20(a). In fact, Memmer’s employment
agreement with UWM provided that if a “dispute” arose under the employment agreement, it
would be submitted “to binding arbitration.” R. 7-1, Pg. ID 82.
At bottom, both claims and disputes are terms of art that define legal controversies. In
both instances, one party has allegedly violated the legal rights of another. The underlying
controversy arises at the same time, no matter the venue—an arbitrator’s conference room or a
judge’s courtroom—in which the parties choose to settle their differences. But we often call that
controversy by a different name depending on the venue. Claims get litigated in courtrooms.
Disputes get arbitrated in conference rooms.
The Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act moves
sexual harassment and sexual assault disputes out of the conference room and into the
courtroom. In bridging the gap between arbitration and civil litigation, the Act understandably
speaks the language of both arbitration and civil litigation. It talks of “sexual harassment
dispute[s]” and “sexual assault dispute[s].” 9 U.S.C. §§ 401(3), (4). That makes sense because
the heart of the Act reaches back to those same disputes and explains that they are no longer

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arbitrable. If the employee-plaintiff decides to “file[]” a “case” in court about a sexual assault or
sexual harassment controversy (that is, a sexual assault or sexual harassment “dispute”), then the
relevant “predispute arbitration agreement” is no longer valid. Id. § 402(a). The courthouse
doors, once tightly shut, are now wide open. What would have been an arbitrable “dispute” is
now a “claim” that can be litigated.
But which predispute arbitration agreements does the Act cover? Which arbitrable
disputes can now be litigated claims? In offering an answer to these questions, Congress
confronted something of a pickle. In the statute thus far, Congress had mostly been speaking the
specialized language of arbitration. It was explaining which sorts of once-arbitrable disputes the
Act covers. Hence its use of “disputes.” But on the timing front, there’s no established body of
law governing when arbitrable disputes “arise.” As the majority itself recognizes, “we lack a set
legal framework to determine when a dispute arises.” Maj. Op. at 9. Indeed, the “dispute[s]
aris[ing]” construction is unknown to the U.S. Code, save for this Act.
So, if Congress had pegged the Act’s effective date to the date on which the dispute
arose, courts would be forced to fashion novel rules dictating when arbitrable disputes “arise” to
figure out which disputes the Act covers. (Which is what the majority elects to do.) But there is
an established body of law governing when claims accrue. And recall that there’s no inherent
difference between arbitrable “disputes” and actionable “claims”; the two are different only
insofar as they are resolved in distinct forums. So, Congress lumped the two together in the
effective date provision, thereby giving us a clue about when a dispute arises: the time at which
it accrues as a claim.1
In sum, the statute’s structure and its unique context (of bridging the worlds of arbitration
and civil litigation) together show that for purposes of the Act’s effective date provision, disputes
arise when claims accrue.
1The majority contends that Congress “could have used the language of claim accrual alone” in the
effective date provision if it had wanted to tie that provision to the claim accrual date. Maj. Op. at 13. Not
necessarily. Thus far, the Act had spoken in terms of sexual harassment and sexual assault disputes. See 9 U.S.C.
§§ 401(3), (4). It would have been puzzling to abruptly omit “dispute” from the effective date provision.

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III.
Ignoring the statute’s context and structure, the majority slices the effective date
provision into discrete phrases—“a formula for disaster.” Herrmann v. Cencom Cable Assocs.,
Inc., 978 F.2d 978, 982 (7th Cir. 1992) (Easterbrook, J.). Instead of pairing the time at which a
dispute arises with the time at which a claim accrues, the majority reasons that “[d]epending on
the facts, a dispute could arise when an injured party sends the defendant a demand letter, files
an administrative charge, requests arbitration, commences a lawsuit, or some other event
occurs”—which, of course, tends to be after the injured party’s claim accrues. Maj. Op. at 9.
Even putting statutory context aside, the majority’s interpretation still misses the mark.
Pairing when disputes arise with when claims accrue best squares with the ordinary meaning of
the text viewed in isolation. A “dispute” is a “conflict or controversy, esp. one that has given
rise to a particular lawsuit.” Dispute, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (emphasis
added). So, the conflict or controversy is separate and apart from the formal legal demand to
which it may give rise. Disputes arise in the real world—something happens, and it generates
conflict or disagreement. In response, someone may sue and ask a judge to resolve the
preexisting dispute. The lawsuit doesn’t create the dispute; the dispute creates the lawsuit. In all
cases, the dispute predates the formal legal demand—whether that may be the filing of a lawsuit,
an administrative charge, a demand letter, a request for arbitration, or “some other event.” Maj.
Op. at 9. Given the ordinary meaning of the term “dispute,” the formal charge or suit to which it
gives rise can’t possibly mark its emergence. The dispute must pre-exist the lawsuit, just as a
claim must.
IV.
If any doubt remains, the legislative history confirms our reading of the Act’s text in
context and that context’s bearing on the effective date provision’s meaning.
Legislative history can never override the statute’s text, but it can illuminate the
“context” in which the statute was passed. Matter of Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1342 (7th Cir.
1989) (Easterbrook, J.). Context is critical: “no ‘textualist’ favors isolating statutory language
from its surrounding context.” Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 Va. L. Rev. 347, 348

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(2005). “To strip a word from its context is to strip that word of its meaning.” Biden v.
Nebraska, 600 U.S. 477, 511 (2023) (Barrett, J., concurring). Thus, textualism requires
examining the context “in which a statute was enacted because this may have an important
bearing on what its words were understood to mean at the time of enactment.” Bostock v.
Clayton County, 590 U.S. 644, 705 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting).
Therefore, though always a fraught business, looking to a statute’s legislative history can
be useful to the extent that it clarifies the ever-critical context in which Congress enacted a
statute. Why? Because the legislative history may reveal “the setting of the enactment and the
assumptions its authors entertained about how their words would be understood. It may show,
too, that words with a denotation ‘clear’ to an outsider are terms of art, with an equally ‘clear’
but different meaning to an insider.” Matter of Sinclair, 870 F.2d at 1342. That is, “legislative
history” can help “establish[] linguistic usage”—namely, “that a particular word or phrase is
capable of bearing a particular meaning.” Scalia & Garner, supra, at 388.
The Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act’s
legislative history makes clear that members of Congress understood “disputes” and “claims” to
be the same thing—legal controversies. This insight cuts against the majority’s strained
interpretation of these words to mean that there are different potential trigger dates for when the
same legal controversy comes into being.
Consider the House Judiciary Committee report’s description of Section 402—the heart
of the Act. Section 402 states: “at the election of the person alleging conduct constituting a
sexual harassment dispute or sexual assault dispute, . . . no predispute arbitration agreement or
predispute joint-action waiver shall be valid or enforceable.” 9 U.S.C. § 402(a) (emphases
added). In describing this provision, the House Committee wrote that it “provides that at the
election of a person alleging conduct that constitutes a sexual harassment or sexual assault claim,
no pre-dispute arbitration agreement or pre-dispute joint-action waiver shall be valid or
enforceable relating to disputes described within the chapter.” H. Rep. No. 117–234, at 19
(emphases added). In other words, the House report swapped out “dispute” for “claim.” That
change indicates the two are interchangeable.

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The House report wasn’t alone. Representative Nadler stated that the bill gives survivors
of sexual assault or harassment “a real choice of whether to go to court or to arbitrate their
claim.” 168 Cong. Rec. H985 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 2022). Representative Nadler’s characterization
of the Act’s focus on “claims,” even when all of its operative provisions deal with sexual assault
or sexual harassment “disputes,” was echoed by a number of the Act’s co-sponsors. See, e.g., id.
at H987 (statement of Rep. Griffith), H987 (statement of Rep. Jayapal), H988 (statement of Rep.
Jackson Lee), H989 (statement of Rep. Garcia). And these same speakers would also use
“claim” and “dispute” interchangeably within the course of a single speech. Representative
Nadler discussed survivors’ “claims” in the same speech in which he referred to survivors’
“disputes.” Id. at H984. Other co-sponsors did the same. See, e.g., id. at H987 (Rep. Jayapal
referring to both “disputes” and “claims”).
The point of this legislative history is not to deduce “the contents of the authors’ heads”
but to understand “the rules of language they used.” Matter of Sinclair, 870 F.2d at 1342. It
reveals that the rules of language on Capitol Hill when Congress passed the Act included a
presumption that “disputes” and “claims” are the same. Indeed, the former just happens to be
what we call the legal controversy when it’s arbitrated as opposed to litigated. So, it doesn’t
make much sense when interpreting the effective date provision to conclude that they are any
different.
The majority, for its part, concludes that legislators used the words “claim” and “dispute”
in the floor debates loosely. Exactly. As I’ve pointed out, legislators regularly used these words
interchangeably. Legislators didn’t seem to conceive of much of a difference between claims
and disputes. Again, that loose language can be probative for the limited purpose of grasping
“the rules of language” that the legislators “used.” Id.
In sum, the legislative history confirms what the rest of the statute’s context and structure
indicate: that “disputes” and “claims” are one in the same, such that they “arise” or “accrue” at
the same time. “Since iteration is obviously afoot in the relevant passage, there is no justification
for extruding an unnatural meaning” from the words, given the Act’s context, “simply in order to
avoid iteration.” Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 120 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

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V.
Understood in this way, Congress’s repetition makes good sense and isn’t a case of
superfluity. Though disputes arise and claims accrue at the same time, each of these words did
work in the statute by helping bridge the gap between arbitration and civil litigation.
In fact, the majority’s reading that gives independent meaning to “disputes” (and when
they “arise”) and “claims” (and when they “accrue”) will often give rise to a superfluity concern
of its own. Such a reading begins by drawing on the ordinary meaning of the word “dispute,”
without paying attention to its specialized meaning in the arbitration context. Recall that a
“dispute” is a “conflict or controversy, esp. one that has given rise to a particular lawsuit.”
Dispute, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). So, the majority reasons, the dispute arises
once “the parties [become] adverse to one another”—perhaps through some formal notification
such as the filing of a lawsuit. Maj. Op. at 9.
If this were correct, then the date upon which a dispute arises would nearly always
postdate the date upon which the employee’s underlying claim allegedly accrues. After all,
employees notify their employers of the harms they claim to have suffered once they sustain that
harm—that is, after their claim accrues. So, except for instances where a violation continues,
and thus a claim re-accrues, disputes would always arise after claims accrue. And if that’s the
case, then the effective date provision’s claim accrual language would often, in a practical sense,
be pointless.
Memmer’s own argument about the effective date provision’s meaning falls into a
version of this superfluity trap. She argues that thanks to its language regarding when
“dispute[s] . . . arise[],” the Act applies to all lawsuits filed after its enactment in March 2022.
She filed suit in April 2023.
Memmer’s argument fails for the reasons explained above—namely, that it’s a mistake to
distinguish between the date on which a dispute arises and the date on which a claim accrues
when interpreting the effective date provision.

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In addition, had Congress wanted to peg the effective date of the Act to filing dates, it
could have. See, e.g., Pub. L. 101-580, § 2(a), 104 Stat. 2863 (1990); Pub. L. 103-333, Title I,
§ 101(c), 108 Stat. 2548 (1994); Pub. L. 100-418, Title IX, § 9101(d)(1), 102 Stat. 1568 (1988).
Congress knows how to countenance the “filing” of civil suits. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 2401,
2415(b). In fact, Congress used phraseology about when “case[s]” are “filed” in the Act itself.
See 9 U.S.C. § 402(a). But that’s not the language Congress used in the effective date provision.
Its decision to omit such “filing” language in the effective date provision is quite telling. See
Digital Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, 583 U.S. 149, 161–62 (2018). We should not ignore the
choice Congress made.
VI.
Memmer quit her job on July 9, 2021. All her claims relate to discrimination and
mistreatment that she experienced while an employee of UWM. So the latest that any of her
claims could have accrued was July 2021—well before the Act took effect in March 2022.
Therefore, the Act doesn’t block her valid arbitration agreement with UWM.
* * *
Thus, I would affirm the district court. I respectfully dissent.

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