United States of America v. Julianna Jenkins Hawkins (24-6002); Jimmy Crafton, Jr. (25-5063)

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)
File Name: 26a0016p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JULIANNA JENKINS HAWKINS (24-6002); JIMMY
CRAFTON, JR. (25-5063),
Defendants-Appellants.
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Nos. 24-6002/25-5063
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee at Winchester.
No. 4:23-cr-00011—Curtis L. Collier, District Judge.
Decided and Filed: January 20, 2026
Before: GIBBONS, STRANCH, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
_________________
COUNSEL
ON BRIEF: Erin P. Rust, FEDERAL DEFENDER SERVICES OF EASTERN TENNESSEE,
INC., Chattanooga, Tennessee, for Appellant Hawkins. Brandon Douglas Raulston,
Chattanooga, Tennessee, for Appellant Crafton. Luke A. McLaurin, UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Knoxville, Tennessee, for Appellee.
_________________
OPINION
_________________
JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. In this consolidated criminal appeal, Julianna
Hawkins and Jimmy Crafton, Jr., challenge the sentences imposed upon them by the district
court. Hawkins and Crafton both pled guilty to charges regarding their involvement in a
>

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conspiracy to possess and distribute methamphetamine in the Eastern District of Tennessee. The
defendants now ask us to find that their sentences are unreasonable under our circuit’s precedent.
For the reasons discussed below, we affirm Crafton’s sentence as reasonable but reverse
the district court’s order sentencing Hawkins and remand her case for resentencing.
I.
From June 9, 2022, to February 22, 2023, Defendants-Appellants Julianna Hawkins and
Jimmy Crafton, Jr., were involved in a conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine in the Eastern
District of Tennessee. Crafton provided resale amounts of methamphetamine that Hawkins,
among others, helped to distribute.
A. The Underlying Conspiracy and Investigation
While conducting surveillance on Hawkins’s residence on June 9, 2022, investigators for
the Coffee County Sheriff’s Department observed Crafton exit Hawkins’s home and drive away.
After unsuccessfully attempting to conduct a traffic stop of Crafton, investigators returned to
Hawkins’s residence and conducted a search of the premises with her consent. This search
yielded approximately 108.5 grams of methamphetamine with a confirmed substance purity of
97%. Hawkins waived her Miranda rights and told investigators that she purchased the
methamphetamine from Crafton. She was not arrested at that time.
A little over seven months later, on January 31, 2023, a confidential source (“CS”) hired
by law enforcement purchased from Hawkins 14.16 grams of methamphetamine with a
confirmed purity of 98%. The next day, law enforcement sent another CS to purchase
methamphetamine from Hawkins and Crafton. Hawkins sold the CS 5.88 grams of
methamphetamine, confirmed 99% pure, and Crafton sold the CS 54.69 grams of
methamphetamine, confirmed 98% pure. On February 6, 2023, a CS purchased 24.16 grams of
methamphetamine, confirmed 98% pure, from Crafton, with Hawkins present. Law enforcement
arrested Crafton shortly after on February 22, 2023. During an interview with police, Crafton
stated that his source had provided him about ten ounces of methamphetamine every two weeks

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over the past seven months, and he estimated that Hawkins purchased “85 percent” of his supply.
DE 64, Hawkins Am. PSR, Page ID 278.
During her own interview with law enforcement, Hawkins confirmed that she began
purchasing methamphetamine from Crafton about seven months prior, in June of 2022. Hawkins
told investigators that the most methamphetamine she had ever purchased from Crafton was
eight ounces, but she “normally purchased four-ounce-quantities from him.” Id. Hawkins did
not specify how often she purchased methamphetamine from Crafton and recalled that she
typically resold the methamphetamine in 3.5-gram quantities.
B. Hawkins’s Sentence
The grand jury indicted Hawkins on three counts: (1) conspiracy to distribute and possess
with intent to distribute a mixture and substance containing a detectable amount of
methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C), and 846; (2) possession
with intent to distribute a mixture and substance containing a detectable amount of
methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C); and (3) distribution
of a substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C). She ultimately pled guilty to count three in exchange for the
dismissal of the remaining counts.
The amended presentence investigation report (“PSR”) held Hawkins responsible for a
total of 3,414.62 grams of methamphetamine (actual). The PSR arrived at that number by taking
the total amount of methamphetamine Crafton claimed he received each month (10 ounces every
two weeks, so 20 ounces total each month) and multiplying that number by seven (for the seven
months Hawkins claimed she obtained the drugs from Crafton), which yielded 140 ounces. The
PSR then calculated the amount of drugs that made up 85% of those 140 total ounces, relying on
Crafton’s statement that Hawkins purchased 85% of Crafton’s biweekly supply. The PSR
determined that 85% of 140 ounces yielded 119 ounces, or 3,306.12 grams. The PSR then
determined the final total of 3,414.62 by adding the 108.5 grams that investigators found during
the search of Hawkins’s residence on June 9, 2022, to those 3,306.12 grams. After accounting
for pertinent adjustments, the PSR set Hawkins’s total offense level at 31. Given her criminal

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history category of III, the PSR calculated a Guidelines range of 135 to 168 months’
imprisonment.
Hawkins objected to the PSR, challenging specifically its use of “averaging” to prove the
purity of ghost weight and its calculation of her base offense level based on Crafton’s statements
regarding the amount of methamphetamine Hawkins purchased from him. DE 58, Obj. to PSR,
Page ID 154–56; DE 87, Tr. Sent. Hr’g, Page ID 559–62. Hawkins also moved for a downward
variance from her Guidelines range, arguing that a range of 87 to 108 months’ imprisonment was
more appropriate due to her “personal characteristics” and because the Guidelines range
overstated her culpability. DE 62, Mot. Downward Variance, Page ID 200. And the government
separately requested a downward departure.
At Hawkins’s sentencing hearing on October 30, 2024, the district court departed from
the Guidelines and lowered her offense level to 28, which decreased her advisory sentencing
range to 97 to 121 months’ imprisonment. Hawkins renewed her objections to the PSR and
requested a downward variance from the new Guidelines range imposed by the court. Hawkins
argued that her characteristics, as well as those of her case, in addition to potential sentencing
disparities between Hawkins and previous defendants due to methamphetamine’s higher purity
in today’s drug trade, warranted a downward departure. The government opposed a variance
from Hawkins’s lowered Guidelines range. After balancing the factors set out in 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a), the district court denied Hawkins’s request for a variance and imposed a sentence of 98
months’ imprisonment.
C. Crafton’s Sentence
The grand jury indicted Crafton on two counts: (1) conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or
more of methamphetamine (actual), in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), and
846; and (2) conspiracy to distribute a mixture and substance containing a detectable amount of
methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C), and 846. Crafton
eventually pled guilty to a lesser included offense of count one. The amended PSR set Crafton’s

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offense level at 35 with a criminal history category of III, resulting in a Guidelines range of 210
to 240 months’ imprisonment.1
Prior to his sentencing hearing, Crafton filed a motion requesting that the court vary
downward from his Guidelines range. At his sentencing hearing on January 15, 2025, Crafton
renewed his request for a downward variance for two reasons which mirrored the arguments
presented in his original motion. First, Crafton argued that his “general personal characteristics,”
including his “age, health issues, his background, [and] things of that nature,” supported a
downward variance. DE 97, Tr. Sent. Hr’g, Page ID 723–24. Second, Crafton asserted that his
prior 1996 conviction at age twenty-two for controlled substance distribution, which counted for
three out of his four criminal history category points, overstated his criminal history, thereby
unfairly increasing his Guidelines range. Crafton also noted that because he completed the
sentence for that previous conviction fourteen years ago, under § 4A1.1(a) of the Sentencing
Guidelines only one year remained for it to count towards his sentencing in this case. See
U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(a).
The district court denied Crafton’s request. The court determined that in the fourteen
years since Crafton’s release from his sentence for his controlled substance distribution
conviction, he had not demonstrated that he could maintain a law-abiding record for a substantial
time. And a defendant’s ability to demonstrate that he can maintain a law-abiding record, the
court explained, is the very rationale for no longer considering previous convictions at
sentencing after fifteen years under § 4A1.1(a). The district court also denied a downward
variance based on Crafton’s other proffered basis, which the court referred to as his “physical
history and characteristics.” DE 97, Tr. Sent. Hr’g, Page ID 729. The court reasoned that the
“Bureau of Prisons is able to take into account” those “issues.” Id. at 730. The district court
subsequently sentenced Crafton to 210 months’ imprisonment.
1Crafton’s Guidelines range was actually 210 to 262 months’ imprisonment, but because that range
exceeded the statutory maximum of 240 months, the district court capped the sentence at 240 months’
imprisonment. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(C), 846. And while Crafton requested an extension of time to file
objections to his PSR, he did not ultimately file any objections, or object during sentencing, to his PSR.

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Crafton and Hawkins each filed a timely notice of appeal. Shortly thereafter, our court
consolidated their cases for purposes of appeal.
II.
We review sentences imposed by the district court, whether inside or outside the
Sentencing Guidelines range, for abuse of discretion. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51
(2007). The abuse of discretion standard covers claims challenging a sentence’s substantive and
procedural reasonableness. United States v. Ruiz, 777 F.3d 315, 319 (6th Cir. 2015). A sentence
is procedurally reasonable “where the trial court follows proper procedures and gives adequate
consideration to the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Johnson, 26 F.4th 726, 734 (6th Cir.
2022) (citation modified). On the other hand, substantive reasonableness concerns whether the
district court properly weighed the § 3553(a) factors and “at bottom, addresses a claim that a
sentence is too long.” United States v. Nunley, 29 F.4th 824, 830 (6th Cir. 2022) (citation
modified). We afford sentences within the Guidelines range a presumption of reasonableness.
United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 389 (6th Cir. 2008).
III.
The district court must impose a sentence that is both procedurally and substantively
reasonable. United States v. Parrish, 915 F.3d 1043, 1047 (6th Cir. 2019). Hawkins and Crafton
now challenge the reasonableness of their individual sentences. We review their claims in turn.
A. The Reasonableness of Hawkins’s Sentence
Hawkins asks us to find that her sentence of 98 months’ incarceration was both
procedurally and substantively unreasonable. For the reasons discussed below, we reverse
Hawkins’s sentence because it is procedurally unreasonable.
a. Determining Procedural or Substantive Reasonableness Review
Hawkins argues that her reasonableness claim challenges both the procedural and
substantive reasonableness of her sentence. It is true that we have acknowledged the “border
between procedural and substantive reasonableness can be blurry, and the analysis often
overlaps.” United States v. Small, 988 F.3d 241, 258 (6th Cir. 2021). Yet we have also

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recognized that “whether a district court improperly relied on erroneous information or
assumptions in fashioning a sentence relates to the procedural reasonableness of the sentence.”
Id. (emphasis added); see United States v. Miller, 73 F.4th 427, 430 (6th Cir. 2023). We have
also held that challenges based on “unreasonable speculation”2 concern procedural
reasonableness. Parrish, 915 F.3d at 1047.
Hawkins’s argument on appeal is that the district court erred by relying on Crafton’s
statement to calculate the estimated quantity of methamphetamine that Hawkins was responsible
for distributing. Hawkins’s amended PSR used Crafton’s statement that Hawkins “purchased 85
percent of the [ten ounces of methamphetamine Crafton received every two weeks]” to calculate
the bulk of the total 3,414.62 grams of methamphetamine attributed to her. See DE 64, Hawkins
Am. PSR, Page ID 278–79. The PSR then used the total drug estimate to calculate Hawkins’s
total offense level of 31 (after adjustments). The district court concluded that the PSR accurately
stated the facts and correctly calculated Hawkins’s Guidelines range. Thus, her challenge
addresses the district court’s factual findings underlying her total offense level, so we will treat it
as a challenge to her sentence’s procedural reasonableness. See Small, 988 F.3d at 258; Miller,
73 F.4th at 430; United States v. Jeross, 521 F.3d 562, 570 (6th Cir. 2008) (“A district court’s
drug-quantity determination is a factual finding.”); United States v. Warman, 578 F.3d 320, 349–
50 (6th Cir. 2009) (confirming the defendant’s drug quantity claim was “one of procedural
unreasonableness”).
b. Procedural Reasonableness
For a sentence to be procedurally reasonable, the district court must properly calculate the
Guidelines range and treat it as advisory, consider the § 3553(a) factors, avoid considering
impermissible factors, and adequately explain its chosen sentence. See Miller, 73 F.4th at 429–
30. But most importantly to Hawkins’s challenge on appeal, the district court must base its
2Hawkins cites only the unpublished opinion United States v. Ewing, 832 F. App’x 416 (6th Cir. 2020) to
argue that her challenge also relates to her sentence’s substantive reasonableness because it is based on speculative
information. However, we recognized in United States v. Parrish, a published decision, that such claims address
procedural reasonableness. 915 F.3d at 1047. And we have recognized, albeit in another unpublished decision, that
the holding of United States v. Parrish is binding in our circuit. See United States v. Watson, 780 F. App’x 245, 247
(6th Cir. 2019).

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sentence on facts that are not clearly erroneous. See id. at 430. We will not disturb the district
court’s factual findings, including drug quantity estimates, unless we are satisfied that they are
indeed clearly erroneous. Jeross, 521 F.3d at 570.
Thus, to succeed here, Hawkins must satisfy us that the district court committed clear
error by relying on Crafton’s statement to calculate the drug amount attributable to Hawkins.
See id.; United States v. Histed, 93 F.4th 948, 955 (6th Cir. 2024). The district court’s estimate
must ultimately be supported by a preponderance of the evidence, and the government bears the
burden of proof. Histed, 93 F.4th at 955; United States v. Simpson, 138 F.4th 438, 446 (6th Cir.
2025). To properly determine drug quantity when the exact amount cannot be ascertained, “[t]he
district court can make a reasonable estimate based on physical evidence or testimony.” Histed,
93 F.4th at 955 (quoting United States v. Tisdale, 980 F.3d 1089, 1096 (6th Cir. 2020)); United
States v. Treadway, 328 F.3d 878, 885 (6th Cir. 2003). However, the evidence underlying the
district court’s estimate “must have a minimal level of reliability” and the court should “err on
the side of caution” when making such estimates. United States v. Sandridge, 385 F.3d 1032,
1037 (6th Cir. 2004) (citation modified).
Here, the district court accepted as true and accurate the PSR’s calculation that Hawkins
was responsible for 3,414.62 total grams of methamphetamine. The PSR calculated most of that
amount, 3,306.12 grams, by relying on Crafton’s statement that he received ten ounces of
methamphetamine every two weeks over seven months and Hawkins purchased 85% of his
supply. The PSR calculated the remainder, 108.5 grams, by relying on the methamphetamine
investigators physically seized from Hawkins on June 9, 2022. At sentencing, the district court
heard argument on Hawkins’s objection to the PSR’s reliance on Crafton’s statement for its drug
estimate and correctly identified that Crafton’s statement needed to meet a “minimal level of
reliability.” See DE 87, Tr. Sent. Hr’g, Page ID 559–65.
The court concluded that Crafton’s statements exhibited the requisite minimum indicia of
reliability for two stated reasons. First, the court recognized that no evidence suggested that
Crafton meant that he sold 85% of his methamphetamine supply to Hawkins only at certain
times; instead, the plain meaning of Crafton’s statement pointed to Hawkins purchasing 85% of
his total supply over the relevant seven-month period. Second, the court found that Hawkins

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never directly stated that she stopped dealing methamphetamine at any point due to any health
issues, as she argued at sentencing. Instead, the court concluded that the record showed that
Hawkins in fact continued to distribute methamphetamine while hospitalized for a time during
the commission of the conspiracy. While hearing argument concerning Hawkins’s objections to
the PSR’s drug estimate, the district court also attempted to clarify whether Hawkins ever stated
that she was dealing in lower quantities than the PSR suggested, and the government responded
that it could not confirm whether Hawkins made any such statements.
As a threshold matter, we are satisfied that the district court did not simply “summarily
adopt the factual findings in the presentence report or simply declare that the facts are supported
by a preponderance of the evidence.” See Treadway, 328 F.3d at 885 (citation modified); see
also United States v. Bradley, 897 F.3d 779, 784 (6th Cir. 2018) (“In the context of drug-quantity
determinations, the court must rule on disputed calculations.”). We are further satisfied that the
district court created a record sufficient to facilitate our review of its decision. See Histed, 93
F.4th at 955 (confirming that to create a clear record to facilitate our review, the district court
must specify the evidence it relies upon, make specific factual findings, articulate the
methodology it uses, and explain how it reached the final figure).
The question we must answer now is whether it was clear error for the district court to
accept the PSR’s drug estimate as true when the PSR relied on Crafton’s statement to calculate
the bulk of the drugs attributable to Hawkins. We hold that the answer is yes. While the
minimum indicia of reliability standard applied to evidence offered at sentencing is a “relatively
low hurdle,” it nonetheless still requires “some evidentiary basis beyond mere allegation.”
United States v. Moncivais, 492 F.3d 652, 659 (6th Cir. 2007) (emphasis in original) (citation
modified); United States v. Johnson, 732 F.3d 577, 583 (6th Cir. 2013).
The evidentiary bases advanced by the government as corroboration do not support
Crafton’s statement. See Moncivais, 492 F.3d at 659; United States v. Woodside, 895 F.3d 894,
902–03 (6th Cir. 2018) (finding that there was “ample testimonial evidence” concerning the
district court’s drug estimate due to corroborated testimony). Moreover, the evidence on the
record provides no corroboration for Crafton’s statement otherwise, and his statement, made out
of court and lacking in detail and specificity, is therefore mere allegation. Cf. Moncivais,

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492 F.3d at 659 (“The district court found that [the co-conspirator’s] statement was ‘richly
detailed,’ and was both internally and externally consistent.”). We will first address the
government’s arguments before turning to the statement’s broader issues.
First, the government contends that Crafton’s statement was consistent with “Hawkins’s
own admissions.” CA6 R. 34, Appellee Br., at 16. We disagree. The amended PSR stated that
Hawkins “declared the most methamphetamine she purchased from Crafton was approximately
eight ounces, but she normally purchased four-ounce-quantities from him. She did not specify
how often she obtained methamphetamine from Crafton.” DE 64, Hawkins Am. PSR, Page ID
278 (emphasis added). Although Hawkins’s statement confirms that she purchased eight ounces
from Crafton at some point, which would indeed be 85% of his biweekly ten-ounce supply, she
maintained that she normally purchased four-ounce quantities from him. See id. This statement
therefore implies that Hawkins regularly purchased less than half of Crafton’s biweekly ten-
ounce supply, not 85% of it as Crafton claimed. See id. As a result, her statement is not
consistent with Crafton’s and instead appears to contradict it.
Second, the government points to the 108.5 grams physically seized from Hawkins and
the “98.86 grams” purchased by a CS “from her and Crafton over a 7-day period in early 2023”
as physical evidence corroborating Crafton’s statement. CA6 R. 34, Appellee Br., at 17–18.
Again, we disagree. Since 108.5 grams converts to just under four ounces (3.83 ounces, to be
exact), this amount seized from Hawkins corroborates her statement that she normally purchased
four-ounce quantities from Crafton. And the PSR contains no indication that Hawkins sold
98.86 grams to a CS; instead, it states only that Hawkins sold an additional 14.16 grams of
methamphetamine to a CS on January 31, 2023, and 5.88 grams on February 1, 2023. These
sales add up to a total of 20.04 grams, which is less than one ounce of methamphetamine. All
other amounts of methamphetamine that the PSR ties to purchases by a CS came from Crafton,
not Hawkins. As a result, the physical evidence presented by the PSR also does not provide any
evidentiary basis to corroborate Crafton’s statement.
We find no other evidence on the record to keep us from concluding that Crafton’s
statement is precisely the kind of mere allegation that the district court cannot rely on. See
Moncivais, 492 F.3d at 659; United States v. Johnson, 732 F.3d at 583. Accordingly, we are left

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with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was committed through the district court’s
acceptance of the PSR’s reliance on that statement to calculate the drug estimate. See United
States v. Russell, 595 F.3d 633, 646 (6th Cir. 2010). We cannot find a case where we have
affirmed a district court’s drug estimate based on such little information as was presented here—
essentially the co-conspirator’s statement alone. Where we have affirmed a district court’s heavy
reliance on co-conspirators’ statements, we have most often done so when the co-conspirators
provided testimony. See, e.g., United States v. Mosley, 53 F.4th 947, 962 (6th Cir. 2022) (“[The
district court’s] reasoned estimate follows from [the co-conspirator’s] testimony.”). And more
often than not, we have affirmed reliance on testimony when that testimony was corroborated.
See United States v. Henley, 360 F.3d 509, 515–16 (6th Cir. 2004) (where we affirmed the
district court because “[d]uring the sentencing hearing, the district court referenced the testimony
of various witnesses”); Bradley, 897 F.3d at 785 (affirming the district court’s reliance on the
probation officer’s calculation, which in turn relied on co-conspirator testimony presented at
trial); Woodside, 895 F.3d at 902-03 (affirming the district court based on “ample
testimonial evidence”).
Thus, it is undoubtedly true, and the government correctly notes, that “[t]estimonial
evidence from a coconspirator may be sufficient to determine the amount of drugs for which
another coconspirator should be held accountable.” Jeross, 521 F.3d at 570 (quoting United
States v. Swanberg, 370 F.3d 622, 625 (6th Cir. 2004)). But we have not recognized that
testimonial evidence in the form of statements merely relayed by the PSR, without any testimony
whatsoever and with no other supporting evidence, may be sufficient.
Moreover, we are aware of only a handful of instances in which we have affirmed the use
of co-conspirator statements not in the form of actual testimony—both of which are highly
distinguishable from Hawkins’s case. For example, in Swanberg, we upheld the district court’s
drug estimate based on a co-conspirator’s statements contained only in the PSR, alleging that the
defendant purchased 75% of the cocaine the co-conspirator obtained. 370 F.3d at 625.
However, the co-conspirator’s statement was consistent with other evidence presented. See id.
Similarly, in Moncivais, we affirmed the district court’s reliance on the drug calculation in the
PSR, which itself relied heavily on a co-conspirator’s proffered statement discussing the timeline

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of the defendant’s involvement, to calculate the drug estimate. 492 F.3d at 655–56, 658–60.
However, not only did the government call a federal agent to testify at Moncivais’s sentencing as
to the reliability of the proffered statement, but the Moncivais court further found that the
statement was “full of detail” and both “internally and externally consistent” Id. at 656, 659.
The statements made outside of testimony in Swanberg and Moncivais therefore reflected
much stronger indicia of reliability than the facts on this record. We cannot say that Crafton’s
three-line statement concerning Hawkins’s involvement in their drug distribution scheme was
bolstered by any other statement in the record, nor that it is “full of detail.” See Swanberg, 370
F.3d at 625; Moncivais, 492 F.3d at 656; see also United States v. Armstrong, 920 F.3d 395,
398–99 (6th Cir. 2019) (affirming district court’s reliance on statements made by a confidential
informant that were corroborated by two police officers and contained extensive detail).
Accordingly, we cannot find that the logic in our previous few cases affirming drug estimates
based on co-conspirators’ statements not offered as testimony extends to Hawkins’s case.
While we will often refrain from finding clear error where two permissible views of the
evidence exist, see Jeross, 521 F.3d at 570, we do not find the district court’s view of the
evidence in Hawkins’s case permissible. The court’s view here led to an approximation of drug
quantity that was clearly erroneous as it was not supported by competent evidence in the record.
See id. If Crafton had testified as to his statement, then the district court could have observed
and analyzed its veracity, and cross-examination could have tested the statement’s—and
Crafton’s—reliability. See, e.g., United States v. Hough, 276 F.3d 884, 892 (6th Cir. 2002)
(affirming drug calculation based on testimony); Mosley, 53 F.4th at 962 (where we affirmed the
district court’s reliance on co-conspirator’s statement because “after hearing Bravo’s live
testimony, [the court] found him credible”). But the district court in Hawkins’s case was not
afforded this opportunity. And as we have discussed at length, we do not find sufficient
evidence on the record to corroborate Crafton’s statement otherwise, which was so lacking in
detail and specificity. Cf. United States v. Johnson, 732 F.3d at 583 (“[B]oth [the co-
conspirator’s] out-of-court proffer and her testimony at sentencing was detailed, consistent with
earlier statements, and corroborated by other facts.”). We are thus persuaded that the district
court, by relying so heavily on Crafton’s statement, failed to carry out its duty to err on the side

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of caution when calculating the drug estimate regarding Hawkins in order to appropriately
underestimate the amount of drugs attributable to her. See United States v. Anderson, 526 F.3d
319, 326 (6th Cir. 2008); Sandridge, 385 F.3d at 1037.
As a result, we reverse the district court’s imposition of Hawkins’s sentence and remand
for resentencing. The district court committed clear error by relying on Crafton’s scant,
uncorroborated, and out-of-court statement to estimate the bulk of the drugs attributable to
Hawkins, resulting in a procedurally unreasonable sentence. At resentencing, the court should
limit its review to the evidence currently in the record regarding the drug quantity determination.
See Histed, 93 F.4th at 957 (“On remand, the court should limit its review to the evidence in the
record in making its drug-quantity determination.”). The government initially had the burden to
produce sufficient evidence on this issue at sentencing, and we will not grant it a “second bite at
the apple” to present additional evidence that it did not use at Hawkins’s original sentencing
hearing. See id. (quoting United States v. Mukes, 980 F.3d 526, 540 (6th Cir. 2020)); United
States v. Goodman, 519 F.3d 310, 323 (6th Cir. 2008); United States v. Gill, 348 F.3d 147, 156
(6th Cir. 2003).
B. The Reasonableness of Crafton’s Sentence
Crafton asks us to find that his sentence of 210 months’ imprisonment is both
procedurally and substantively unreasonable. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm
Crafton’s sentence as reasonable.
a. Procedural Reasonableness
Crafton argues that the district court committed procedural error by failing to consider his
arguments concerning his lower likelihood of recidivism based on his advanced age and
declining to make a finding about whether his health issues presented an extraordinary physical
impairment in fashioning his sentence. “In determining procedural reasonableness, we review
whether the district court properly calculated the Guidelines range, treated the Guidelines as
advisory, considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, selected a sentence based on a reasonable
determination of the facts, and adequately explained the sentence.” United States v. Battaglia,
624 F.3d 348, 350–51 (6th Cir. 2010). The sentencing judge must also set forth enough to

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satisfy our court that he has considered the parties’ arguments and “has a reasoned basis for
exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority.” United States v. Gapinski, 561 F.3d 467,
474 (6th Cir. 2009) (citation modified); United States v. Moon, 513 F.3d 527, 539 (6th Cir.
2008).
We must acknowledge at the outset of this inquiry that Crafton failed to object to the
district court’s procedures in sentencing him when prompted by the district judge during his
sentencing hearing. Following its announcement of Crafton’s sentence, the court explicitly
asked the parties whether they had any objections not previously raised to the sentence
announced, and both parties replied in the negative. The government contends that Crafton’s
failure to timely raise a procedural challenge at sentencing means that our court should evaluate
his procedural reasonableness claim on appeal for plain error. We agree. See United States v.
Jeter, 721 F.3d 746, 755 (6th Cir. 2013) (recognizing that plain error review applies where the
defendant failed to object to procedural reasonableness).
To establish that the district court plainly erred as to his sentence’s procedural
reasonableness, Crafton must show: “(1) error (2) that was obvious or clear, (3) that affected
[his] substantial rights[,] and (4) that affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the
judicial proceedings.” Vonner, 516 F.3d at 386 (citation modified). Crafton maintains on appeal
that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the district court failed to consider his
arguments concerning his age and health issues when fashioning his sentence. Specifically,
Crafton asserts that the court should have considered his arguments that his advanced age greatly
decreases his chance of recidivism, and that the prison system cannot adequately address his
health issues.
To start, the arguments Crafton raises on appeal meaningfully differ from the arguments
he made at sentencing and in his motion requesting a downward variance. On appeal, Crafton
presents—for the first time—several arguments concerning the Sentencing Commission’s
research on the relationship between advanced age and recidivism. We cannot say the district
court committed procedural error, let alone error that was plain, by failing to consider arguments
that were never raised before it. See United States v. Embry, 728 F. App’x 544, 548 (6th Cir.
2018) (a sentencing court does not “abuse[] its discretion by failing to consider an argument that

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Defendant did not raise, particularly where, as here, the court would have been obligated only to
consider—not to accept—the argument”); United States v. Winfree, No. 24-1911, 2025 WL
3111234, at *3 (6th Cir. Nov. 6, 2025) (concluding that the sentencing court did not plainly err in
not considering recidivism information that the defendant never raised). And the district court
was not required to consider research or statistical data compiled by the Sentencing Commission
before issuing a sentence. See United States v. Hymes, 19 F.4th 928, 935–36 (6th Cir. 2021);
United States v. Bailey, 27 F.4th 1210, 1219 (6th Cir. 2022) (Gilman, J., concurring) (explaining
that the district court did not err in failing to consider the Sentencing Commission’s age-based
recidivism data).
As to the mitigating arguments regarding his age and health issues that Crafton did assert
below, we are satisfied based on the record before us that the district judge properly considered
them. See United States v. Madden, 515 F.3d 601, 610 (6th Cir. 2008); United States v. Brooks,
628 F.3d 791, 796 (6th Cir. 2011). At sentencing, Crafton requested a downward variance from
his Guidelines range on the basis of “just general personal characteristics,” which included “[his]
age, health issues, his background, things of that nature.” DE 97, Tr. Sent. Hr’g, Page ID 723–
24. Crafton did not offer any further reasoning regarding his age or health issues—these short
statements were the extent of his argument before the district court. Although Crafton also filed
a motion requesting a downward variance ahead of his sentencing hearing, it does not add much
substance to his claims. As to his age, Crafton’s motion summarily stated that he “[was] 50
years of age.” DE 88, Mot. Downward Variance, Page ID 598. Regarding his health issues, the
motion simply stated that Crafton had “a variety of issues including back and neck pain related to
previous vehicle accidents, as well as nerve damage,” and further shared that he suffered from
depression. Id. at 598–99.
It is not clear that the district court failed to consider these arguments. During Crafton’s
sentencing, the district judge confirmed that Crafton was requesting a downward variance based
in part on his “physical history and characteristics,” which Crafton had established included his
“age” and “health issues,” before stating that “the Bureau of Prisons is able to take into account”
those concerns as they were “not so unusual.” DE 97, Tr. Sent. Hr’g, Page ID 723–24, 729–30.
And upon request from Crafton, the district court recommended that “the Bureau of Prisons

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consider the defendant’s medical needs and also place the defendant in a facility where those
needs can be addressed.” Id. at 738–39. Although the district court’s explanation was brief, this
did not make its determination procedurally unreasonable. See Madden, 515 F.3d at 610–12
(relying on Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007), and confirming that a district court has
discretion to determine how much explanation is necessary when addressing a defendant’s
arguments for a reduced sentence).
Moreover, when announcing Crafton’s sentence shortly after this, the court confirmed
that it had considered the § 3553(a) factors. Specifically, it had considered the nature and
circumstances of the offense and Crafton’s background, history, and characteristics, which
necessarily included his age and health issues. That is enough to show that the district court both
considered and responded to Crafton’s mitigating arguments, as well as adequately considered
the § 3553(a) factors so as to satisfy our review.3 See id. at 610 (“A district judge need only set
forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties’ arguments and has a
reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority.”) (citation modified);
Brooks, 628 F.3d at 796 (similar).
Accordingly, we affirm Crafton’s sentence as procedurally reasonable.
b. Substantive Reasonableness
We first clarify some confusion in Crafton’s briefing on substantive reasonableness.
While Crafton states in his brief that he challenges both the procedural and substantive
reasonableness of his sentence, he explicitly addresses substantive reasonableness only once, on
one page of his brief. He alludes to substantive reasonableness at two other points in his
briefing—when he argues that “the Court failed to properly weigh Crafton’s age and medical
3Crafton argues that remand is appropriate in his case so that the district court can consider his argument
regarding his lower likelihood of recidivism, as there is no evidence that the district court considered his claim. But
Crafton did not present this claim in the district court. As we have stated, the district court cannot be faulted for not
considering an argument that was never presented, and Crafton may not present arguments for the first time on
appeal. See Embry, 728 F. App’x at 548; Winfree, 2025 WL 3111234, at *3. Crafton also contends that the district
court must conduct further fact-finding to determine the extent of his health issues, citing United States v. Johnson,
71 F.3d 539, 545 (6th Cir. 1995). Crafton’s reliance on Johnson is misplaced. In that case, Johnson had presented
evidence of treatment and diagnoses from two medical doctors including his attending physician and psychiatrist.
Johnson, 71 F.3d at 544–45. Crafton presented no similar evidence here.

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conditions when fashioning an appropriate sentence,” and that “weight should be given to the 14-
year time period in between Crafton’s release from confinement and the commitment of the
crime at issue in this case.” CA6 R. 12, Appellant Br., at 10, 20 (emphasis added); see United
States v. Kerns, 9 F.4th 342, 347 (6th Cir. 2021) (analyzing the defendant’s arguments
concerning the weight assigned to the defendant’s characteristics under substantive
reasonableness); United States v. Boucher, 937 F.3d 702, 707, 709-714 (6th Cir. 2019) (similar).
Thus, we read Crafton’s substantive reasonableness challenge as two-fold, asserting that the
district court’s sentence was substantively unreasonable because the court (1) “failed to properly
weigh” his age and health issues, and (2) failed to properly “consider[] the totality of [his]
circumstances” regarding his criminal history, “in conjunction with the age of his past
conviction.” CA6 R. 12, Appellant Br., at 10, 24.4
“If we agree that the sentence is procedurally sound, we then consider whether the
sentence is substantively reasonable and not ‘too long (if a defendant appeals) or too short (if the
government appeals).’” United States v. Zabel, 35 F.4th 493, 504 (6th Cir. 2022) (quoting
United States v. Rayyan, 885 F.3d 436, 442 (6th Cir. 2018)). The “essence” of a claim that a
sentence is substantively unreasonable is “whether the length of the sentence is greater than
necessary to achieve the sentencing goals set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” United States v.
Tristan-Madrigal, 601 F.3d 629, 632–33 (6th Cir. 2010) (citation modified). The substantive
reasonableness inquiry ultimately directs us to determine whether the district court properly
weighed the § 3553(a) factors such that it did not place too much weight on some, and too little
on others. See Rayyan, 885 F.3d at 442.
Crafton’s first argument concerning his sentence’s substantive unreasonableness is that
the district court gave improper weight to his age and health issues. While it does seem that the
4The only other reasonable way to characterize Crafton’s arguments on appeal would be to view them as
challenges to the district court’s decision not to depart downward from the Guidelines. However, our circuit has
long held that challenges to a district court’s decision to deny a downward departure are unreviewable by our court
unless the district court incorrectly believed it lacked authority to grant such a departure. See Madden, 515 F.3d at
610; United States v. Skouteris, 51 F.4th 658, 673 (6th Cir. 2022). Nothing in this record suggests the district court
incorrectly believed it lacked authority to grant a downward departure from Crafton’s Guidelines range. In light of
this and given the government’s treatment of these claims as a substantive challenge in its briefing, and Crafton’s
employment of substantive reasonableness terminology, though scarce, we believe it appropriate to view these
arguments as challenges to the substantive reasonableness of Crafton’s sentence.

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district court assigned greater weight to certain sentencing factors—such as the nature and
circumstances of the present offense, Crafton’s criminal history, and the need for the sentence
imposed—this does not mean that the court unreasonably weighed the factors. We have
recognized that one or two factors often prevail while others pale. See United States v. Gardner,
32 F.4th 504, 531 (6th Cir. 2022). On the other hand, nothing in the record shows us that the
district court arbitrarily selected Crafton’s sentence, based it on impermissible factors, failed to
consider pertinent § 3553(a) factors, or gave an unreasonable amount of weight to any factor.
See United States v. Robinson, 892 F.3d 209, 213 (6th Cir. 2018). As a result, Crafton’s sentence
was not substantively unreasonable based on the district court’s assigning less weight to
Crafton’s age and health issues than to other relevant factors. See Gardner, 32 F.4th at 531.
Crafton’s second argument concerning his sentence’s substantive reasonableness is that
“the district court should have considered the totality of [his] circumstances, in conjunction with
the age of his past conviction, when fashioning an appropriate sentence.” CA6 R. 12, Appellant
Br., at 24. Specifically, Crafton argues that “weight should be given to the 14-year time period
in between [his] release” for his 1996 controlled substance distribution conviction, serving as the
basis for three out of his four criminal history points, and the crime committed in this case. Id. at
20. Crafton further argues that the court should have considered other circumstances in its
determination: the twenty-eight years between his 1996 conviction and the conviction in the
present case, the difference in the quantities of drugs he trafficked in these cases, and his
completion of drug abuse treatment and willingness to continue treatment.
Despite Crafton’s arguments to the contrary, it appears the district court properly
considered the totality of his circumstances and age of his previous conviction when fashioning
his sentence. At sentencing, the district court heard argument and engaged in a lengthy colloquy
with Crafton regarding his previous conviction. In doing so, the court clearly weighed the length
of time since Crafton’s 1996 conviction and the fact that Crafton was one year away from his
prior conviction no longer counting towards his criminal history points under the Guidelines.
And after considering these circumstances, the court concluded that while it “underst[ood] the
argument about the offense for which he received points being right on the edge,” Crafton had
not demonstrated that he was able to “maintain a law-abiding record for a substantial time” and

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denied his motion for variance on that ground. DE 97, Tr. Sent. Hr’g, Page ID 729. The court
then confirmed that it “considered the nature and circumstances of this offense, [Crafton’s]
background, history, and characteristics, the guideline range . . . and also the 3553(a) factors.”
Id. at 734.
Our court “will not lightly disturb decisions to depart, or not, or related decisions
implicating degrees of departure.” United States v. Herrera-Zuniga, 571 F.3d 568, 583 (6th Cir.
2009) (citation modified). It is clear from the sentencing hearing transcript that the district court
weighed the totality of Crafton’s circumstances in conjunction with the time that had passed
since his 1996 conviction. In fact, the transcript makes clear that the district court considered
these concerns at great length. At bottom, Crafton’s argument does not actually address how the
district court allegedly improperly weighed the totality of his circumstances but rather seems to
raise concerns with the Sentencing Guidelines themselves, specifically § 4A1.1(a), which covers
the calculation of his criminal history category. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(a). But those concerns
are not ours to address. Our job as an appellate court is simply to ensure that the district court
did not commit a substantively unreasonable error, such as determining Crafton’s sentence
arbitrarily, basing it on impermissible factors, failing to consider a relevant sentencing factor, or
assigning unreasonable weight to any one factor. Nunley, 29 F.4th at 834. We find no such error
here.
Considering the totality of the circumstances ourselves, including the Guidelines, the
§ 3553(a) factors, and Crafton’s history and characteristics, we find further reason to view his
210-month sentence as substantively reasonable. See Robinson, 892 F.3d at 213 (affirming
substantive reasonableness after examining the defendant’s “totality of the circumstances”);
United States v. Johnson, 640 F.3d 195, 209 (6th Cir. 2011) (same). Crafton was implicated in a
months-long conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, a harmful and addictive drug, in the
Eastern District of Tennessee. He is ultimately being held responsible for just under 4,000 total
grams of methamphetamine. Crafton further advised a CS that he had multiple substances for
sale during this time, including “Adderall, Xanax, Ecstasy, 7.5s, 10s, and Roxies.” Crafton also
has a lengthy criminal history dating back to when he was twenty years old, which includes
several misdemeanor charges, some involving drugs, and at least one assault charge, received

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after his 1996 conviction for controlled substance distribution. And we agree with the district
court that several of these charges, which resulted in guilty pleas, show a disrespect for the law.
It is our duty to respect the district court’s “reasoned discretion” to weigh the § 3553(a)
factors when fashioning a sentence. United States v. Perez-Rodriguez, 960 F.3d 748, 754 (6th
Cir. 2020). And a within-Guidelines sentence, such as Crafton’s, is presumptively reasonable.
Id. There is nothing on the record that convinces us to rebut this presumption. Notably, after
weighing the sentencing factors, the court sentenced Crafton at the bottom of his 210 to 240
months’ Guidelines range. See United States v. Massey, 663 F.3d 852, 860 (6th Cir. 2011)
(confirming that substantive reasonableness requires that a sentence not be greater than necessary
to satisfy the purposes of sentencing in light of the § 3553(a) factors). To be sure, 210 months’
imprisonment is a lengthy sentence, especially in light of Crafton’s age and health issues, but it is
a conclusion that requires our due deference. See United States v. Petrus, 588 F.3d 347, 353 (6th
Cir. 2009) (“In general, we must give ‘due deference’ to the district court’s conclusion that the
sentence imposed is warranted by the § 3553(a) factors.” (citation modified)). While we might
reasonably conclude that a different sentence was appropriate, that is insufficient to justify
reversing the district court. Id. at 353–54. We therefore affirm Crafton’s sentence as
substantively reasonable.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court’s sentence with respect to
Hawkins and remand for resentencing consistent with this opinion, and we affirm Crafton’s
sentence as reasonable.

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