United States of America v. Cortez Blake

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)
File Name: 26a0033p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
CORTEZ BLAKE,
Defendant-Appellant.
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No. 24-2125
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.
No. 2:22-cr-20519-1—Laurie J. Michelson, District Judge.
Argued: December 10, 2025
Decided and Filed: February 5, 2026
Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; MURPHY and BLOOMEKATZ, Circuit Judges.
_________________
COUNSEL
ARGUED: William C. Livingston, BERKMAN, GORDON, MURRAY & DEVAN, Cleveland,
Ohio, for Appellant. Sarah Alsaden, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Detroit,
Michigan, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: William C. Livingston, BERKMAN, GORDON,
MURRAY & DEVAN, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellant. Sarah Alsaden, UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellee.
_________________
OPINION
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BLOOMEKATZ, Circuit Judge. Cortez Blake was convicted by a jury of aiding and
abetting kidnapping. On appeal, Blake challenges his conviction and sentence on five grounds,
spanning pre-trial motions, evidentiary objections, sufficiency of the evidence, and conditions of
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supervised release. We affirm the district court on four of the five grounds, but we remand this
matter for the district court to resolve the discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of
sentence and the written judgment.
BACKGROUND
I. Factual Background
Because Blake’s appeal follows a jury trial, we recite the facts in the light most favorable
to the jury’s verdict. See United States v. Maya, 966 F.3d 493, 496 (6th Cir. 2020).
On November 14, 2021, Taliyah Jackson picked up Blake in a rented SUV, and the two
spent several hours driving around Detroit. Around 5 P.M., they stopped at an intersection to
decide on their plans. While they were stopped, a car pulled up in front of them and blocked
them from moving. Jackson’s friend, Amiaya Bryant, and four armed men from a rival gang
exited the car and forced Jackson and Blake out of the SUV.
Blake and Jackson ran in opposite directions, and Jackson testified that she saw the men
shooting at Blake as he fled. After the shooting, Jackson found Blake holding on to a light pole
at a gas station with a gunshot wound to his upper leg that prevented him from walking. Blake
called two fellow gang members, and they soon arrived to drive Blake and Jackson to the
emergency room. When the hospital admitted Blake for treatment, he left his cellphone with his
friends.
Once Blake was admitted, Jackson left the hospital with Blake’s friends who told her
they would give her a ride home. Instead of taking Jackson home, they drove her to a vacant lot
where they questioned her about the carjacking, suspecting that she had helped orchestrate it
given her friendship with Bryant. They took her phone to search her Instagram account and her
messages with Bryant and pointed a gun at her head. Jackson testified that, while at the lot, she
did not feel free to leave and was scared for her life.
Upon leaving the lot, the men drove Jackson to Blake’s house and forced her inside,
where they continued the interrogation. They called two women, Maijah Greene and Shatonnia
Kimbrough, who arrived at the house and repeatedly attacked Jackson. Greene’s minor sister,

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known as “Fat Fat,” accompanied her sister and secretly filmed two videos of the beatings.
While Jackson was held at Blake’s house, she messaged her mother that she had been “jumped”
and was being “[h]eld hostage.” Gov’t Exh. 36, R. 442, PageID 5183. She also repeatedly told
her mother that she thought she was going to die.
While Jackson was at Blake’s house, Blake was discharged from the hospital and
returned to his home wearing a hospital gown and using crutches. Blake first took Jackson into
the bathroom for a private conversation, and she testified that she did not feel like she could
leave. He then took her into his bedroom and told Greene and Kimbrough to attack her again.
The women beat Jackson, and Blake hit her with his crutch.
After the beating, Blake ordered Jackson to go in a car with Greene and Kimbrough to
show them where Bryant lived. Jackson directed the women to Bryant’s house. Greene and
Kimbrough took pictures of the home, and then drove Jackson to a nearby location, returned her
phone, and let her exit the car. Greene told Jackson that Blake had directed her to keep the
phone and assault her again, but she chose to let her leave instead. At around 1 A.M. on
November 15, Jackson texted her mother to pick her up and asked her to hurry before they came
back.
II. The Search Warrants
Law enforcement obtained several search warrants while investigating this case, both
state and federal. Only the federal warrants are at issue on appeal, and none of the information
recovered from the state warrants was used to establish probable cause for the federal warrants,
so we do not discuss them.
The first federal warrant was issued on April 7, 2022, for copies of Instagram accounts
for Blake and five of his suspected fellow gang members, including co-defendants and non-
defendants in this case. From the April 7 search warrant, law enforcement discovered a
November 14–15, 2021, Instagram group chat discussing the carjacking and Jackson’s
kidnapping. Law enforcement discovered the chat during a search of non-defendant Ramone
Turner’s account because Blake and his co-defendants deleted the chat from their own accounts.

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The group chat commenced shortly after Blake arrived at the hospital. It began with
Blake’s codefendant Karamoh Turner sharing the Instagram profile of one of the men who
carjacked Blake. The participants discussed retaliating against Bryant and the carjackers. One
of the participants shared Bryant’s profile, saying that Jackson (referred to as “girly”) had
identified Bryant as involved in the carjacking. Later that night, members used the group chat to
coordinate transportation from Blake’s house to the house of Nasir Lewis, one of Blake’s co-
defendants.
The next day, someone sent the video Fat Fat recorded of Jackson’s beating in the group
chat. The participants discussed how Lewis was visible in the video poking Jackson with his
gun. Blake messaged that he had called Greene and told her to make Fat Fat delete the video.
Lewis complained about the recording and said, “That is kipnapping [sic].” An hour after the
conversation about the video, the chat ended with Turner telling everyone to “[l]eave this chat.”
Based on the group chat, law enforcement obtained a second federal warrant to search
seventeen Instagram accounts, including Blake’s and Turner’s, for an eight-day period for
evidence of the kidnapping.
III. Procedural History
Alongside several co-defendants, the government charged Blake with one count of
conspiracy to commit kidnapping and one count of aiding and abetting kidnapping. See
18 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a)(1), 2.
As we discuss in greater detail in our analysis, there are several pre-trial motions at issue
on appeal, including Blake’s motions to suppress and motion to exclude alleged co-conspirator
statements, and the government’s motion to limit cross-examination of Jackson. The district
court denied Blake’s motions to suppress and exclude and granted the government’s motion to
limit cross-examination of Jackson in part. During the trial, Blake moved for judgment of
acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, and the district court denied the motion.
At the close of the weeklong trial, the jury acquitted Blake of conspiracy to commit
kidnapping and convicted him of aiding and abetting kidnapping. The district court sentenced

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Blake to 198 months in prison, below his Guidelines range of 292 to 365 months. The court also
imposed a five-year term of supervised release. In doing so, the court dictated several special
conditions of release at the sentencing hearing; but in its subsequent written judgment, it
imposed two additional conditions that had been recommended in the presentence report but had
not been announced at sentencing.
Blake timely filed this appeal.
ANALYSIS
On appeal, Blake challenges his conviction and sentence on five grounds. First, he
argues that the district court erroneously denied his motions to suppress evidence seized from
search warrants for social media account data. Second, he argues that the district court erred by
admitting statements of his alleged co-conspirators. Third, he argues that the district court erred
by limiting his cross-examination of the alleged victim. Fourth, he contends that the evidence
was insufficient to support a verdict for aiding and abetting kidnapping. Fifth, he challenges the
district court’s imposition of three special conditions of supervised release. We analyze each
issue in turn.
I. Suppression of Social Media Evidence
Before trial, the district court denied Blake’s motions to suppress evidence obtained from
the state and federal warrants, reasoning that admitting the evidence did not violate Blake’s
Fourth Amendment rights. On appeal, Blake argues that the district court should have excluded
two key pieces of evidence obtained from the federal warrants: (1) the videos that Fat Fat
recorded and (2) the November 14–15 group chat. We disagree.
As to the videos, the government obtained them from Fat Fat’s own cellphone, not
through either of the federal warrants executed against Blake. Perhaps for that reason, Blake did
not move to suppress the videos below and did not object to their admission at trial, meaning he
has forfeited this argument. See Walker v. United States, 134 F.4th 437, 440 (6th Cir. 2025).
While Blake did move to suppress the Instagram messages before trial, his challenge still
comes up short. The government recovered the November 14–15 group chat from non-defendant

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Ramone Turner’s account because the chat had been deleted from Blake’s and co-defendants’
accounts. Thus, the district court held that Blake lacked standing to challenge the admission of
the November 14–15 group chat. As the district court reasoned, Blake did not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in “group chat conversations [he] may have personally engaged in but that
were acquired from a search of another individual’s account,” and therefore could not challenge
the admission of the group chat on Fourth Amendment grounds. Order on Mots. to Supp., R.
249, PageID 1759.
Critically, Blake does not challenge this basis for the district court’s denial of his motion
to suppress. As we have explained, a party’s failure to address every independent ground of a
district court decision renders the judgment unreviewable because the party abandoned its
challenge to rulings that independently sustain the judgment’s validity. Stewart v. IHT Ins.
Agency Grp., LLC, 990 F.3d 455, 456 (6th Cir. 2021). Following that principle, we have held
that a defendant who did not challenge every independent ground for a denial of a motion to
suppress could not prevail on appeal. United States v. Perry, No. 22-2031, 2024 WL 692890, at
*8 (6th Cir. Feb. 20, 2024); United States v. Fox, 363 F. App’x 375, 377 (6th Cir. 2010).
Likewise, Blake cannot prevail here because he failed to challenge the district court’s conclusion
that he did not have standing to exclude the November 14–15 group chat on Fourth Amendment
grounds.
Blake’s response is that the district court did not rest its denial of the motion to suppress
on standing grounds. He points to the district court’s statement at the suppression hearing that
the “defendants maintained a subjective expectation of privacy in the group chat messages that
was objectively reasonable.” Mot. to Supp. Hr’g Tr., R. 253, PageID 1852–53. But that
statement did not distinguish between group chat messages obtained from a defendant’s own
account versus another person’s account. And the district court’s subsequent written order
resolved any ambiguity, clearly explaining that the defendants did not have standing to challenge
evidence of chats they “may have personally engaged in,” but the government obtained from
“another individual’s account.” Order on Mots. to Supp., R. 249, PageID 1759. Without
challenging that basis for the district court’s decision, Blake’s suppression challenge fails.

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II. Admissibility of Co-Conspirator Statements
Blake next challenges the district court’s decision to admit the November 15 group chat
messages as co-conspirator statements. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E),
co-conspirator statements are not hearsay if made “during and in furtherance of the conspiracy.”
For this rule to apply, the government must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that (1) a
conspiracy existed, (2) Blake was a member of the conspiracy, and (3) co-conspirator statements
were made in furtherance of the conspiracy. United States v. Wilson, 168 F.3d 916, 920–21 (6th
Cir. 1999). Whether the government made the necessary showing to meet these three elements is
a question of fact for the district court that we review for clear error, but we review the district
court’s “ultimate legal conclusion regarding admissibility de novo.” United States v. Warman,
578 F.3d 320, 335 (6th Cir. 2009). If we conclude that the district court erred in admitting the
evidence, we ask whether the error was harmless. United States v. Iossifov, 45 F.4th 899, 917
(6th Cir. 2022)
Subject to the defendants’ continuing objections at trial, the district court conditionally
admitted the November 14–15 group chat messages under Rule 801(d)(2)(E). See United States
v. Vinson, 606 F.2d 149, 153 (6th Cir. 1979). Then, at the close of the government’s case-in-
chief, the district court overruled Blake’s hearsay objections and admitted the messages. The
court found that the government had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) a
conspiracy existed to kidnap Jackson, (2) Blake was a member of the conspiracy, and (3) the co-
conspirator statements were made in furtherance of the conspiracy.
Blake no longer challenges the admission of the November 14 messages, in which
members discussed plans to respond to the carjacking while they actively held Jackson. Instead,
he focuses on the November 15 statements, which were exchanged after someone shared Fat
Fat’s video—more than twelve hours after Jackson was released and picked up by her mother.
Given the timing, Blake argues that the November 15 statements were made after the purpose of
the conspiracy was accomplished and cannot be “in furtherance” of the conspiracy to kidnap
Jackson, even assuming he was a member. See United States v. Payne, 437 F.3d 540, 546–47
(6th Cir. 2006) (citing United States v. Franklin, 415 F.3d 537, 552 (6th Cir. 2005)). The

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government responds that the statements were made in furtherance of a broader conspiracy to
retaliate against Bryant and the rival gang, which was ongoing after Jackson’s release.
But we need not resolve this dispute because any purported error would be harmless, as
the November 15 messages were admissible on other grounds. Four messages sent by Blake
were admissible as party-opponent admissions under Rule 801(d)(2)(A). Gov’t Exh. 76c, R. 442,
PageID 5197–98 (Statements 28, 29, 34, 37). Another nine were admissible as questions and
commands, categories of statements that are generally not hearsay because they are not
“assertive speech” and thus not offered for their truth. United States v. Rodriguez-Lopez, 565
F.3d 312, 314 (6th Cir. 2009); Gov’t Exh. 76c, R. 442, PageID 5196–200 (Statements 21, 23, 24,
27, 30, 32, 39, 41 as questions; Statement 43 as command). And seven were admissible to
provide context rather than for the truth of the matter asserted. Gov’t Exh. 76c, R. 442, PageID
5196–200 (Statements 20, 22, 25, 26, 38, 40, 42); see United States v. Jaffal, 79 F.4th 582, 598
(6th Cir. 2023). Blake asserts that all the November 15 statements were inadmissible hearsay,
but he does not specifically dispute the admissibility of these twenty messages.
Instead, Blake disputes whether the four remaining messages qualify as statements
against penal interest. Gov’t Exh. 76c, R. 442, PageID 5197–98 (Statements 31, 33, 35, 36).
The statements at issue, which were made by co-conspirators, are:
• Statement 31: “That is kipnapping”;
• Statement 33: “Ima beat tht lil girl ass who recorded”;
• Statement 35: “They dumb asf got me all in that camera”; and
• Statement 36: “[They] shouldn’t have all those extra bodies in the house fr
that shit was dumb.”
Rule 804(b)(3) excepts certain statements against a person’s penal interest from the
definition of hearsay. For a statement to be admitted as a statement against penal interest, (1) the
declarant must be unavailable; (2) “the statements must, ‘from the perspective of the average,
reasonable person,’ be adverse to the declarant’s penal interest”; and (3) “corroborating
circumstances must ‘truly establish the trustworthiness of the statement.’” United States v.
Johnson, 581 F.3d 320, 326–27 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Tocco, 200 F.3d 401,

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414 (6th Cir. 2000)). Blake does not challenge unavailability, instead focusing on the other two
prongs—adversity and trustworthiness.
These four statements are, from a reasonable person’s perspective, against penal interest
because they implicate the co-conspirators who made these statements in Jackson’s
kidnapping and beating. Blake counters that the co-conspirators made these statements without
understanding that they were subjecting themselves to criminal liability. But the test is an
objective one, and a reasonable person would think admitting to kidnapping or assault is against
their penal interest. See id. at 327. Blake’s reliance on United States v. Alvarez to argue the
contrary is unavailing because its facts are not analogous. 266 F.3d 587 (6th Cir. 2001). In
Alvarez, the defendant’s attorney recorded a conversation he had with a potential witness, in
which the attorney enticed the witness “into making a self-inculpatory statement,” in part by
telling the witness that if he admitted to the illegal acts, any prosecution would be unsuccessful.
Id. at 592. Here, there was no reason for the members of the November 15 group chat to think
that, if disclosed, their statements would not subject them to criminal liability. In fact, they
decided to end the group chat abruptly, and many participants deleted it from their accounts.
Blake next argues that the group chat context—with its “jokes and laughing emojis”—
brings the trustworthiness of the statements into question. Reply Br. at 7. Rule 804(b)(3)’s
trustworthiness analysis focuses not “on whether other evidence in the case corroborates what
the statement asserts,” but instead asks whether “there are corroborating circumstances which
clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement itself,” meaning corroboration that the
unavailable person made the purported statement and did so without an intent to fabricate.
Johnson, 581 F.3d at 327 (quoting Franklin, 415 F.3d at 547); see also Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3)
Advisory Committee Note (explaining corroboration requirement’s “purpose of circumventing
fabrication”). Here, the government obtained the messages directly from Instagram; they are an
exact record of a group chat among friends, not a hazy recollection of the chat from an outsider.
See Johnson, 581 F.3d at 327 (finding statement trustworthy because conversation between
friends was secretly recorded). Thus, there is no question as to the messages’ occurrence or
accuracy, making them “trustworthy” for the purpose of this hearsay exception.

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Therefore, even assuming the November 15 group chat messages could not be admitted
as made “in furtherance of the conspiracy,” any error would be harmless because the messages
were otherwise admissible.
III. Limitation on Cross-Examination of Victim
Blake next argues that the district court violated the Confrontation Clause by limiting his
cross-examination of Jackson regarding state charges pending against her.
Before trial, the government sought to limit the cross-examination of Jackson about post-
kidnapping events. While the kidnapping prosecution was pending, federal agents had relocated
Jackson to Florida and provided her with about $37,300 for living expenses. Under the
government’s relocation agreement, Jackson agreed to avoid committing any criminal offenses.
But Jackson was charged in state court with misdemeanor theft and felony fraudulent use of a
credit card. The government moved to preclude cross-examination on these charges, and Blake
moved to cross-examine Jackson on the charges and their impact on her relocation agreement.
Jackson, through appointed counsel, explained that she would exercise her Fifth Amendment
privilege if cross-examined about the charges.
The district court limited, but did not prevent, cross examination about Jackson’s charges.
The court allowed cross-examination as to the existence of the charges, because they were
relevant to Jackson’s credibility, and it agreed to require Jackson to invoke her Fifth Amendment
rights in front of the jury. See Fed. R. Evid. 608. But it prohibited additional questions about the
details of the charges or their impact on Jackson’s relocation agreement. So at trial, counsel
asked Jackson only “While in Florida, you were charged with stealing a credit card and using it,
right?” and “Suffice to say, you’re not in Florida anymore, right?” to which she invoked her Fifth
Amendment privilege. Trial Tr., R. 328, PageID 3186.
Blake contends that the district court’s limitation violated his rights under the
Confrontation Clause. The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause guarantees a criminal
defendant the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against [them].” U.S. Const. amend.
VI. A trial court violates the Confrontation Clause when it prohibits a defendant from “engaging
in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the

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part of the witness.” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 680 (1986). Prototypical forms of
bias include: (1) “the witness’s criminal history or status as a parolee or probationer”; (2) “any
immunity or plea deals” involving the witness; (3) the witness’s “inconsistent statements”;
and (4) “other ‘prejudices, or ulterior motives,’” that can undermine the witness’s reliability.
Blackston v. Rapelje, 780 F.3d 340, 349 (6th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted).
We review alleged violations of the Confrontation Clause de novo. United States v.
Roberts, 84 F.4th 659, 666–67 (6th Cir. 2023). We use a three-step process to guide our
analysis. Boggs v. Collins, 226 F.3d 728, 739 (6th Cir. 2000). At the first step, we must decide
whether the district court limited Blake’s ability to cross-examine Jackson about her “bias,
prejudice or motive to testify.” Id. If so, we move to the second step and consider whether,
despite the limits placed on the cross-examination, the jury had sufficient information to assess
Blake’s “theory of bias or improper motive.” Id. If the jury did not have enough information to
assess the theory, we turn to the third step: a balancing test that weighs the government’s
interests against Blake’s right to confront adverse witnesses. Id. If a constitutional violation
occurred, we then analyze whether the error was harmless. United States v. Henderson, 626 F.3d
326, 333 (6th Cir. 2010).
Blake’s Confrontation Clause challenge falters at the first step. The district court
correctly found that the evidence at issue here was relevant to Jackson’s credibility rather than
her bias, prejudice, or motive to testify. Blake sought to cross-examine Jackson on how her
pending state charges for misdemeanor theft of a credit card and felony fraudulent use of a credit
card interacted with her promise under the relocation agreement to not commit any crimes. But,
as the government explained, Jackson was not an informant and had not entered any agreement
regarding the charges, such as an agreement for leniency in exchange for her testimony. The
government further disclosed that it did not learn of Jackson’s charges until it was preparing for
trial, and it did not help Jackson leave Florida to avoid arrest. Given this context, the district
court properly concluded that the evidence did not go to bias, prejudice, or motive but instead to
Jackson’s general credibility. And “cross-examination as to bias, motive or prejudice is
constitutionally protected, but cross-examination as to general credibility is not.” Boggs, 226
F.3d at 737 (citing Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 232 (1988)). Therefore, the court did not

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err by allowing limited cross-examination about the existence of the charges but prohibiting
additional questions about their details or impact on Jackson’s relocation agreement. The court
also permitted cross-examination about payment and other aspects of the relocation agreement,
which were relevant to Jackson’s bias or motive to testify.
To challenge the district court’s limitation, Blake relies entirely on our recent decision in
United States v. Taylor, 127 F.4th 1008 (6th Cir. 2025). But that case, which held that the
district court’s limits on cross examination violated the Confrontation Clause, is distinguishable
from the circumstances here. In Taylor, we held that a defendant’s desired cross-examination of
a key government witness on his felon-in-possession charge went to the witness’s bias and
motivation for testifying. Id. at 1015. The court noted that the witness had requested benefits for
cooperating in the defendant’s prosecution and that the state prosecutor intended to dismiss the
felon-in-possession charge and considered dropping a revocation case against the witness for his
testimony against the defendant. Id. Therefore, whether the witness’s preferential treatment
influenced his testimony was “core impeachment evidence” that went to bias and motivation to
testify. Id. (quoting United States v. Ralston, 110 F.4th 909, 918 (6th Cir. 2024)). Here, by
contrast, the government informed the district court that Jackson had not received any
preferential treatment in her Florida case and had no agreement with the government about her
pending charges. This case, therefore, is akin to situations where our court has affirmed
limitations on cross-examination because there was no link between the government’s actions
and the witness’s testimony. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 430 F.3d 345, 360–61 (6th Cir.
2005) (government’s failure to turn over witness to local authorities not linked to witness’s
testimony). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s limitation on cross-examination.
IV. Sufficiency of Evidence
Blake next argues that the district court erred in denying his Rule 29 motion for judgment
of acquittal because the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for aiding and
abetting kidnapping. We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a
conviction de novo. United States v. Pritchett, 749 F.3d 417, 430 (6th Cir. 2014). The test for
sufficiency of the evidence is “whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime

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beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 430–31 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319
(1979)).
The kidnapping statute requires four elements for a completed offense: (1) “the defendant
unlawfully seized, confined, inveigled, decoyed, abducted, or carried away the victim”; (2) “the
defendant held the victim”; (3) “the holding was for ransom or reward or otherwise”; and
(4) “the defendant did so in a manner [that created] federal jurisdiction.” United States v.
Ferguson, 65 F.4th 806, 811 (6th Cir. 2023); see 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a). To prove that Blake aided
and abetted kidnapping, the government needed to show that he “(1) [took] an affirmative act in
furtherance of that offense, (2) with the intent of facilitating the offense’s commission.”
Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65, 71 (2014). Liability attaches even if Blake aided only
one or some of the kidnapping’s phases or elements. United States v. Soto, 794 F.3d 635, 661
(6th Cir. 2015).
A review of the evidence in the record reveals that, construed in favor of the verdict,
Blake affirmatively acted to facilitate the kidnapping. Blake did not arrive until after other gang
members brought Jackson to his house and began interrogating her, but when he arrived, he
confined her in the bathroom, then in his room; ordered Greene and Kimbrough to beat her; and
then ordered them to drive her to Bryant’s house. Having heard these facts, a rational juror could
have found Blake guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aiding and abetting kidnapping.
Blake makes three sufficiency counterarguments, none of which are persuasive. He first
argues that he never “held” Jackson, as that term is defined for kidnapping. But Blake’s
conviction does not rest on a finding that he himself “held” Jackson. He was convicted for
aiding and abetting, not for the kidnapping itself. And Blake does not dispute that the jury could
have convicted him by finding that any of his confederates kidnapped Jackson, including by
holding her, and that he took affirmative acts that intentionally facilitated that crime.
Even so, the evidence is sufficient to show that Blake himself “held” Jackson. Holding
requires an “unlawful physical or mental restraint for an appreciable period against the
person’s will and with a willful intent to confine the victim.” Chatwin v. United States, 326 U.S.
455, 460 (1946). “Remarkably little case law elucidates the standard set down in Chatwin.”

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Ferguson, 65 F.4th at 811. But in Chatwin, the Supreme Court reversed a kidnapping conviction
on the holding element because there was “no proof that [the defendant] or any of the other
petitioners willfully intended through force, fear or deception to confine the girl against her
desires,” no evidence that the alleged victim “was deprived of her liberty, compelled to remain
where she did not wish to remain, or compelled to go where she did not wish to go,” and instead
evidence showed that “she was perfectly free to leave the [defendants] when and if she so
desired.” 326 U.S. at 460. By contrast, here, the government presented ample evidence that
Blake willfully intended through force to confine Jackson against her desires, deprived Jackson
of her liberty, and both compelled her to remain where she did not wish to remain—the house—
and to go where she did not wish to go—in a car to Bryant’s house. And Jackson testified,
corroborated by contemporaneous texts to her mother, that she did not feel like she could leave
and did not voluntarily follow Blake. Therefore, the evidence shows that Blake “held” Jackson.
Next, Blake makes a cursory argument that he did not aid and abet the kidnapping. But
the evidence of Blake’s actions discussed above is enough to establish that he aided and abetted
the kidnapping. And, to the extent that Blake argues that the evidence was insufficient because
the jury acquitted him of conspiracy, he is not permitted to challenge his conviction for aiding
and abetting on the basis that “it was inconsistent with the jury’s verdict of acquittal on another
count.” United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 58, 64–65 (1984).
Finally, Blake argues that there was insufficient evidence to create federal jurisdiction.
At trial, the government presented evidence that Blake and his codefendants used cellphones in
furtherance of the kidnapping. Blake acknowledges that we have held that a defendant’s
intrastate use of a cellphone satisfies the interstate commerce requirement for kidnapping
because a cellphone is itself an instrumentality of interstate commerce. See, e.g., United States v.
Windham, 53 F.4th 1006, 1011 (6th Cir. 2022). Therefore, his challenge fails under our binding
precedent. That precedent has been questioned, United States v. Allen, 86 F.4th 295, 308
(6th Cir. 2023) (Murphy, J., concurring), but Blake raises this jurisdictional argument only to
preserve it for further review. We also note that Blake and his codefendants used social media to
communicate during the kidnapping, but since the government identified that social-media use as

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a basis for federal jurisdiction in a conclusory manner, we do not opine on the sufficiency of that
evidence.
Since Blake’s sufficiency challenge fails, we affirm the district court’s denial of his Rule
29 motion for judgment of acquittal.
V. Special Conditions of Supervised Release
Blake further contends that his supervised release conditions should be vacated or
modified because the district court erred in imposing three special conditions: (1) prohibiting
Blake from being “found in the social company of any person who you know or reasonably
ought to know is a member of or associated with [] a gang”; (2) prohibiting Blake from
“possess[ing], wear[ing] or display[ing] any article of clothing to which any insignia or name
(including, for example, either a designer’s name or symbol), which is easily discernible from a
distance or more than 10 feet”; and (3) prohibiting him from acquiring “tattoos, body markings
or piercings of any kind.” Judgment, R. 393, PageID 4496. All three conditions were
recommended in Blake’s presentence report, and Blake’s counsel did not object to them. The
district court orally pronounced the first condition at sentencing, but it imposed the other two
only in the written judgment. Compare Sent’g Hr’g Tr., R. 406, PageID 4724, with Judgment,
R. 393, PageID 4496.
As a threshold matter, we reject the government’s contention that Blake’s challenge is not
ripe. Generally, “conditions of supervised release may be ripe for appellate review immediately
following their imposition at sentence.” United States v. Lee, 502 F.3d 447, 449–50 (6th Cir.
2007). We have found a challenge to be unripe when the challenged conditions were “potential,
rather than mandatory.” See United States v. Zobel, 696 F.3d 558, 573 (6th Cir. 2012). But the
conditions Blake challenges are all mandatory which makes his challenge ripe for review. See
id.
We turn to the first challenged condition—prohibiting Blake from being “found in the
social company of any person who you know or reasonably ought to know is a member of or
associated with [] a gang.” Since the district court orally pronounced this condition at sentencing
without objection from Blake, the parties agree that we review for plain error. Zobel, 696 F.3d at

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No. 24-2125 United States v. Blake Page 16
573. Our sister circuits are split on whether such a prohibition on associating with gang
“associates” is impermissibly vague or overbroad. Compare United States v. Johnson, 626 F.3d
1085, 1090–91 (9th Cir. 2010) (vacating condition prohibiting association with “anyone known
to him to be a Rollin’ 30’s gang member or persons associated with the Rollin’ 30’s gang”), with
United States v. Marshall, 808 F. App’x 11, 12–13 (2d Cir. 2020) (order) (upholding condition
prohibiting association “with any member, associate or prospect of any criminal gang, club or
organization”), and United States v. Romig, 933 F.3d 1004, 1005–07 (8th Cir. 2019) (upholding
condition prohibiting defendant from “associat[ing] with any member, prospect, or associate of
the Hell’s Angels motorcycle gang, or any other gang”). A circuit split precludes our finding
plain error, so we affirm the imposition of this condition at this stage. Zobel, 696 F.3d at 574–
75. We do not resolve Blake’s challenge on the merits, however, and do not opine on its validity
under a different standard of review.
The parties next dispute the appropriate standard of review for the other two conditions
disclosed in the presentence report but not orally pronounced. Blake argues for de novo review
based on the discrepancy between the oral and written sentences. See United States v. Booker,
994 F.3d 591, 600 (6th Cir. 2021). The government, on the other hand, argues for plain error
review, because Blake did not object to that portion of the presentence report despite having the
opportunity to do so. See United States v. Doyle, 711 F.3d 729, 732 (6th Cir. 2013); see also
United States v. Bryant, No. 24-3360, 2025 WL 1178394, at *2–3 (6th Cir. Apr. 23, 2025).
We agree with Blake that de novo review applies. Blake has a Fifth Amendment Due
Process right to be present at sentencing, United States v. Hayden, 102 F.4th 368, 371 (6th Cir.
2024), and the oral pronouncement (rather than the written judgment) constitutes his sentence,
United States v. Shaw, 139 F.4th 548, 553 (6th Cir. 2025). During that oral pronouncement, the
district court did not incorporate the special conditions in the presentence report by reference, as
it did for the standard conditions. See Hayden, 102 F.4th at 372. Nor did it otherwise orally
announce these two special conditions. We do not require criminal defendants to flag potential
harsher supervised release conditions that the district court did not impose at the sentencing
hearing just to preserve their appellate rights should the court later add them in a written
judgment. And given that Blake had no opportunity to object to the conditions imposed in the

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No. 24-2125 United States v. Blake Page 17
written judgment alone, we do not apply plain error review. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 51(b). Instead,
we review the discrepancy between the oral pronouncement and written judgment de novo
because Blake alleges constitutional error. United States v. Carpenter, 702 F.3d 882, 884 (6th
Cir. 2012).
As to these conditions, the district court’s written judgment imposes greater restrictions
than those announced at sentencing. At sentencing, the district court told Blake that he could
“not possess, wear or display in any manner, any insignia, clothing, articles of clothing,
designed, arranged or used in any way to symbolize membership in, affiliation with or approval
of a gang.” Sent’g Hr’g Tr., R. 406, Page ID 4724. But the written judgment included another
sentence which drastically expanded the scope of the restriction by telling Blake that he could
“not possess, wear or display any article of clothing to which any insignia or name (including,
for example, either a designer’s name or symbol), which is easily discernible from a distance or
more than 10 feet.” Judgment, R. 393, PageID 4496. Similarly, the district court imposed a
third condition prohibiting Blake from acquiring “tattoos, body markings or piercings of any
kind” without announcing it at sentencing. Id. That discrepancy violates Blake’s right to be
present at sentencing. See Hayden, 102 F.4th at 371. On appeal, Blake also raises serious
questions about the constitutionality of these conditions. He contends that the conditions are
impermissibly vague and overbroad, in violation of his First Amendment rights. By our read,
these conditions would prohibit Blake from wearing a Detroit Lions jersey or obtaining an ear
piercing, even if neither item had any gang significance.
Given Blake’s constitutional right to right to be present at sentencing, we remand to the
district court to resolve the discrepancy between the orally pronounced sentence and the written
judgment and, if necessary, to address Blake’s constitutional challenges to the latter two
conditions with the benefit of argument from the parties.
CONCLUSION
We affirm Blake’s conviction and remand Blake’s sentence to the district court for
further actions consistent with this opinion as to the second and third challenged special
conditions of supervised release.

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