United States of America v. Deldrick Lamar Spence

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)
File Name: 26a0047p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
DELDRICK LAMAR SPENCE,
Defendant-Appellant.
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No. 25-5081
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky at Lexington.
No. 5:20-cr-00046-1—Danny C. Reeves, District Judge.
Argued: December 10, 2025
Decided and Filed: February 18, 2026
Before: BOGGS, BUSH, and READLER, Circuit Judges.
_________________
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Kaycee Berente, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Columbus,
Ohio, for Appellant. Amanda Harris Huang, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE,
Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Bethany N. Baxter, CHILDERS & BAXTER,
PLLC, Lexington, Kentucky, Kevin M. Schad, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC
DEFENDER, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellant. Amanda Harris Huang, Charles P. Wisdom Jr.,
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellee.
_________________
OPINION
_________________
READLER, Circuit Judge. While on supervised release, Deldrick Spence was charged
with a host of drug offenses as well as being a felon in possession of a handgun. With the
district court’s permission, Spence represented himself at his subsequent revocation hearing.
>

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There, the district court revoked Spence’s supervision and imposed a 24-month term of
imprisonment.
On appeal, Spence primarily challenges the validity of his waiver of counsel and the
procedural reasonableness of his sentence. As the district court did not err in allowing Spence to
proceed pro se and did not consider impermissible sentencing factors in imposing a within-
Guidelines sentence, we affirm.
I.
Spence has a long history with the criminal justice system. He became a felon at the age
of 20 after pleading guilty in 2007 in Kentucky state court to trafficking a controlled substance
and possessing drug paraphernalia. In 2013, while on parole for that conviction, he again ran
into trouble with the law. While riding as a passenger in a vehicle stopped for a traffic violation,
Spence initially gave the officer a false name. Officers ultimately discovered that Spence, a
convicted felon, was in possession of a handgun.
Spence pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Under his plea agreement, Spence “waive[d] his right to contest any aspect
of his conviction and sentence that could be contested under Title 18 or Title 28, or under any
other provision of federal law, except” for certain circumstances regarding the reasonableness of
his sentence. United States v. Spence, No. 14-cr-30103-NJR-1, Dkt. No. 24, at PageID 36 (S.D.
Ill. May 5, 2020). The district court sentenced Spence to 51 months’ imprisonment and two
years of supervised release. He did not appeal his conviction.
Spence began his federal supervised release in January 2020. Within a few months,
Spence twice tested positive for drugs (first marijuana, and then both marijuana and cocaine).
The district court revoked Spence’s release and imposed a 14-month prison term, to be followed
by 22 months of supervised release. Spence appealed, his counsel filed an Anders brief, and we
affirmed the revocation in an unpublished order. United States v. Spence, No. 20-5874, 2021
U.S. App. LEXIS 4321, at *12 (6th Cir. Feb. 16, 2021) (mem.).

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After serving that sentence, Spence was again released under supervision. And again, he
violated the terms of his release. In June 2023, Spence stipulated to three violations. The district
court revoked his release and imposed a 14-month custodial sentence along with six months of
supervised release. Spence was again released to supervision in July 2024.
Today’s appeal concerns Spence’s third revocation of supervised release, which arose
from his May 2023 arrest in Ballard County, Kentucky, on state charges including trafficking in
methamphetamine, possession of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, and being a felon
in possession of a handgun.
Here, the timeline of Spence’s criminal history becomes complicated. His May 2023
arrest occurred after the violations that led to his second supervised release revocation but before
his June 2023 revocation hearing, which addressed different violations. At the time of that
hearing, the district court was unaware of Spence’s May 2023 incident, meaning that the arrest
did not play a part in the district court’s revocation decision. Indeed, it was not until November
2024—after Spence had completed the custodial sentence imposed for his second revocation and
had again been released with supervision—that the probation office discovered Spence’s May
2023 arrest. At that point, the probation office, based on this previously unaddressed conduct,
sought to revoke Spence’s supervised release, initiating the proceedings at issue here.
Before this revocation hearing, his third, Spence moved to represent himself. The district
court held a waiver-of-counsel hearing to determine whether Spence’s request was knowing and
voluntary. The court asked Spence a series of questions to ensure that he understood “all the
consequences of representing [himself] in the case” as well as the nature of the four alleged
violations. R. 83, PageID 334. The court explained the burden of proof, the evidentiary standard
of a revocation proceeding, and the arguments that Spence would be expected to make. The
court also explained the potential penalties in detail. On top of that, the court emphasized that
appointed counsel was available free of charge.
Spence assured the district court that he understood the charges, the evidentiary
standards, the Guideline calculations, his sentencing exposure, and the difficulties of self-

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No. 25-5081 United States v. Spence Page 4
representation. And he affirmed several times that he wished to proceed pro se. Following
nearly forty minutes of colloquy, the district court granted Spence’s motion to represent himself.
The district court held the final revocation hearing four days later. After hearing from the
parties, the district court found that Spence violated three conditions of his release. The court
classified Spence’s May 2023 conduct, which included the firearm and drug-trafficking charges,
as a Grade A violation of the terms of his supervised release, a conclusion that required the court
to revoke Spence’s supervised release. See U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual § 7C1.5 cmt. n.2.
In explaining the revocation sentence, the district court emphasized several
considerations. It noted Spence’s repeated violations on supervision, including drug use, prior
revocations, and the seriousness of the new criminal conduct. It stressed deterrence, the need to
protect the public, and Spence’s repeated inability to comply with supervision. And it noted that
the alleged new conduct—including another felon in possession offense—reflected the same
behavior underlying Spence’s original federal conviction, reinforcing the need for a custodial
sentence. Taking all of this into consideration, the district court revoked Spence’s supervised
release and imposed a 24-month term of imprisonment, the statutory maximum. Spence timely
appealed.
II.
Spence advances three arguments on appeal: First, that his waiver of counsel at the
revocation hearing was not knowing; second, that the district court erred at sentencing by
considering impermissible factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e); and third, that the revocation
judgment rests on an unconstitutional underlying conviction, and thus must be vacated.
A.1. Beginning with the validity of his waiver of his right to counsel, Spence asserts that
the district court’s colloquy was inadequate to allow the district judge to discern whether his
waiver was knowing. Resolving the matter requires that we first understand the nature of the
right being waived, which informs our standard of review. Spence believes that his right to
counsel derives in part from the Sixth Amendment. As a result, he says, we must apply de novo
review, as our Sixth Amendment waiver precedents command. See United States v. Johnson, 24
F.4th 590, 600 (6th Cir. 2022). The government counters that we should apply abuse of

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discretion review, as other courts have done, see, e.g., United States v. Boultinghouse, 784 F.3d
1163, 1172 (7th Cir. 2015), because the right to counsel at a revocation proceeding does not
derive from the Sixth Amendment, and because a revocation hearing presents less risk of a
deprivation of liberty than does a criminal proceeding. United States v. Walton, 145 F.4th 476,
484 (4th Cir. 2025).
We agree with the government. The Sixth Amendment guarantees the “Assistance of
Counsel” to a defendant facing a “criminal prosecution[].” U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The
Supreme Court has long understood this guarantee to encompass both sides of the representation
coin: the right to counsel and, conversely, the right to proceed pro se. See Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 821 (1975). These
protections attach at “critical stages of the criminal process.” Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 80–81
(2004). Where it applies, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is “fundamental and essential.”
Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
That said, it bears emphasizing that not all proceedings in which liberty is at stake
constitute criminal prosecutions within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment. See Lassiter v.
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981). The Supreme Court has identified at least one
example. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972). Morrissey held that the Sixth
Amendment does not apply to parole revocation in a state system, a holding we have extended to
the revocation of federal supervised release. See, e.g., United States v. Kirby, 418 F.3d 621, 628
(6th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he protections of the Sixth Amendment do not extend to revocation
hearings.” (citing Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489)). Unlike a criminal prosecution, a revocation
proceeding at most “deprives an individual, not of the absolute liberty to which every citizen is
entitled, but only of the conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special parole
restrictions.” Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480.
Although the relatively robust Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not attach at the
revocation stage, defendants facing revocation still enjoy some procedural safeguards. With
respect to constitutional protections, a defendant remains entitled to the minimum requirements
of due process, see Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973), which in rare instances may

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require the appointment of counsel for revocation proceedings. Id. at 790–91 (requiring counsel
in limited circumstances, as determined on a case-by-case basis).
There are statutory guardrails, too. Through the Criminal Justice Act (CJA), Congress
instructed district courts to “place in operation . . . a plan for furnishing representation for any
person financially unable to obtain adequate representation,” including when a person is
“charged with a violation of supervised release.” 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a), (a)(1)(E). The Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure further provide that a district judge must inform defendants in
revocation proceedings of their “right to retain counsel or to request that counsel be appointed if
the person cannot obtain counsel.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(1)(B)(i).
These authorities do not purport to create something equivalent to the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel, however. For one, the CJA does not define the scope of any entitlement that it
may create. See United States v. Islam, 932 F.3d 957, 964 (D.C. Cir. 2019); 18 U.S.C.
§ 3006A(a), (a)(1)(E). For another, a revocation proceeding is traditionally understood to be a
civil proceeding concerning a breach of trust, not a criminal proceeding. See Morrissey, 408
U.S. at 480; United States v. Hill, 48 F.3d 228, 232 (7th Cir. 1995). That reality affords some
“flexib[ility]” in the procedures a district court may utilize, rendering the proceedings less rigid
and complex, thereby lessening the need for sophisticated representation. United States v.
Stephenson, 928 F.2d 728, 732 (6th Cir. 1991) (noting that a district court may consider hearsay
evidence in a revocation proceeding); see also United States v. Owen, 854 F.3d 536, 541–42 (8th
Cir. 2017) (emphasizing that, at bottom, procedures in revocation hearings must satisfy
constitutional limits only to the extent of protecting due process and fundamental fairness). For
these reasons, we would not apply in this setting the equivalent standard of review—de novo—
that we do in Sixth Amendment waiver settings. Cf. Johnson, 24 F.4th 590 at 600 (applying de
novo review to a waiver of a Sixth Amendment right to counsel).
Instead, we align with our sister circuits in holding that an abuse of discretion standard
applies to our review of a district court’s acceptance of a waiver of counsel as part of a
revocation proceeding. See, e.g., Walton, 145 F.4th at 484 (reviewing waiver of counsel in
revocation proceedings for abuse of discretion); United States v. Hodges, 460 F.3d 646, 650 (5th
Cir. 2006) (same); Boultinghouse, 784 F.3d at 1172 (same); United States v. Ivers, 44 F.4th 753,

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No. 25-5081 United States v. Spence Page 7
755–56 (8th Cir. 2022) (same). Applying abuse of discretion review comports with the standard
we apply when considering the waiver of other supervised release procedures. See, e.g., United
States v. Hoyle, 148 F.4th 396, 402 (6th Cir. 2025) (right to be advised of the entitlement to
hearing). It likewise accords with the standard under which we review revocation decisions
generally. See, e.g., id. Accordingly, reversal of a district court’s decision to accept a waiver of
counsel in the revocation proceeding setting is warranted only if the district court relied on
clearly erroneous findings of fact, misapplied the law or employed an erroneous legal standard,
or otherwise committed a clear error of judgment. United States v. Hale, 127 F.4th 638, 640 (6th
Cir. 2025); United States v. Kumar, 750 F.3d 563, 566 (6th Cir. 2014).
A.2. With that framework in mind, we turn to the waiver issue at hand. Spence
characterizes his waiver as “unknowing and involuntary,” but he does not meaningfully develop
an argument that his decision was not of his own volition. Appellant Supp. Br. 14. Instead, his
arguments focus on whether he adequately understood his rights and the consequences of
proceeding without counsel. We thus assess whether the district court abused its discretion in
determining that Spence knowingly waived his right to counsel.
As with the standard of review, the revocation context informs how we evaluate the
adequacy of the district court’s assessment and the accuracy of its finding. And here as well, we
do not apply Sixth Amendment precedents, which require a more exacting inquiry. See Hodges,
460 F.3d at 652; see also Johnson, 24 F.4th at 602–03 (Sixth Amendment case describing
Faretta as requiring substantial compliance with the model inquiry in the Bench Book for United
States District Judges).
That is so in light of the many reasons just articulated as to why the Sixth Amendment
does not apply in this setting: The CJA-conferred entitlement to counsel is not equivalent to the
Sixth Amendment right, see Islam 932 F.3d at 964; revocation proceedings are civil in nature
and do not present the same liberty consequences as criminal proceedings, see Morrissey, 408
U.S. at 480; and district courts enjoy wide discretion in that context, see United States v. Givens,
786 F.3d 470, 471 (6th Cir. 2015). Instead, like our sister circuits, we instruct the district court
to evaluate the validity of a waiver under the “totality of the circumstances.” See, e.g., Walton,

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145 F.4th at 485. This functional test asks whether the record gives the district court a basis to
determine that the defendant made an informed choice to proceed without counsel. Id.
Taking account of the totality of the circumstances, we are assured that the district court
did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Spence’s waiver was knowing. Start with the
colloquy between the district court and Spence. The thoroughness of the court’s inquiry is
highly probative of the validity of the defendant’s waiver of counsel. See Boultinghouse, 784
F.3d at 1173. And here, the district court—as reflected by its scrutiny of whether Spence
understood any potential statutory right enjoyed by him and the consequences of waiving that
right—well exceeded the requirements of due process and thus did not abuse its discretion in
granting the waiver.
Prior to the revocation hearing, the district court held a separate hearing to confirm that
Spence wished to represent himself and to ensure that he understood “all the consequences” of
doing so. R. 83, PageID 334; cf. Hodges, 460 F.3d at 652 (informal, abbreviated colloquy during
the revocation hearing was sufficient). During that hearing, the district court repeatedly advised
Spence of his right to counsel and of the availability of appointed counsel at no cost to him. The
court also listed the rights available to Spence at that hearing and detailed the revocation process,
including the applicable evidentiary standards, the alleged violations, and the potential penalties.
Further, as Spence acknowledges, the court warned him that he would not have the benefit of an
attorney’s assistance in navigating those proceedings. See Hodges, 460 F.3d at 652–53 (finding
probative of a valid waiver a district court’s warning that self-representation is not in a
defendant’s best interest). The district court even took care to correct Spence through a Socratic
back-and-forth when Spence expressed confusion about the possible penalties.
During the hearing, Spence confirmed that his waiver was voluntary and knowing,
providing further evidence of the validity of his decision. Boultinghouse, 784 F.3d at 1173–74.
Spence repeatedly assured the district court that he understood his right to counsel and the
consequences of waiving that right, affirming multiple times that he wished to represent himself.
R. 61; R. 83, PageID 334–35. Throughout the colloquy, Spence’s answers to the district court’s
questions were coherent and responsive. Further, Spence stated that he possessed the
“knowledge” necessary to proceed pro se. R. 83, PageID 340–41. And Spence, remember, was

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no rookie when it came to criminal proceedings. His experience—including multiple revocation
proceedings and other encounters with the criminal justice system—further demonstrates his
familiarity with the process. Walton, 145 F.4th at 485–86 (emphasizing that the defendant’s
history with the criminal system points to the validity of a waiver).
Spence resists this conclusion on a host of fronts, largely taking issue with the way the
district court phrased its warnings and formulated its queries. But not even the Sixth
Amendment requires a district court to follow a prescribed script when assessing a waiver of
counsel. Tovar, 541 U.S. at 88 (“We have not . . . prescribed any formula or script to be read to
a defendant who states that he elects to proceed without counsel.”); United States v. Bankston,
820 F.3d 215, 223–24 (6th Cir. 2016) (explaining that substantial compliance with the Bench
Book’s model inquiry suffices). So in the revocation setting—where the right to counsel is more
limited—the district court likewise need not follow a rigid script in assuring itself of a waiver’s
validity. See Hodges, 460 F.3d at 650, 652 (explaining a court need not recite “magic words” or
follow a “sacrosanct litany” to ensure the validity of a waiver of counsel).
Against that backdrop, Spence’s objections miss the mark. He first contends that his
waiver was not knowing because the district court did not ask whether he had studied the law
generally or federal criminal procedure specifically. But the record shows otherwise: The court
expressly reminded Spence of his lack of legal education. R. 83, PageID 336 (“You’ve never
really studied the law. I believe you have a GED . . . .”). Spence next asserts that the district
court “never admonished” him that he would be better off with counsel. Appellant Supp. Br. 17.
While the district court did not reprimand him, it did warn him about the difficulties of
proceeding without the assistance of a lawyer. That warning, together with the court’s detailed
explanation of the revocation process, sufficed to inform Spence of the consequences of self-
representation.
Spence also points to aspects of his pro se representation at the revocation hearing—his
limited cross-examination, concessions regarding the violations, and failure to advance
mitigating arguments—as further proof that his waiver was uninformed. By his own admission,
Spence may not have been particularly effective in advancing his interests. But that is not the
legal benchmark, just as effectiveness is not the measuring stick where the Sixth Amendment’s

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more demanding standards apply. See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 n.46 (explaining that a defendant
“cannot thereafter complain that the quality of his own defense amounted to a denial of ‘effective
assistance of counsel’”). And, in any event, we note that Spence was able to at least minimally
question a witness and state his position. At day’s end, the district court’s thorough colloquy and
repeated assurances support our conclusion that the district court did not abuse its discretion
here.
B. Turning to Spence’s sentence on revocation, he asserts that the sentence was
procedurally unreasonable because the district court relied on an impermissible factor in setting
his sentence. United States v. Adams, 124 F.4th 432, 438 (6th Cir. 2024). In the supervised
release setting, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) directs a district court as to whether, and for how long, to
imprison a defendant who has violated the conditions of his release. United States v. Patterson,
158 F.4th 700, 702 (6th Cir. 2025) (explaining that § 3583(e) instructs district courts to consider
most of the general sentencing facts under § 3553(a)). According to Spence, the district court, in
making that assessment, violated the rule set forth in Esteras v. United States, 145 S. Ct. 2031
(2025), which prohibits a district court from considering the factors listed in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(2)(A) in fashioning its sentencing determination. See 145 S. Ct. at 2041. In particular,
Spence explains, the district court improperly considered promoting “respect for the law” and
“the seriousness of the offense” in conducting Spence’s sentencing analysis. Id. at 2039.
All agree that plain error review applies to this issue because Spence did not object to his
sentence at the revocation hearing. See United States v. Vaughn, 119 F.4th 1084, 1089 (6th Cir.
2024). That leaves Spence facing an uphill climb. To prevail on plain error, Spence must show
(i) an error, (ii) that is plain, (iii) that affects his substantial rights, and (iv) that seriously affects
the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Greer v. United States, 141
S. Ct. 2090, 2096 (2021); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736 (1993). He cannot satisfy
even the first prong, as the district court did not err, let alone plainly so.
He first claims that the district court violated Esteras by “adopting” the government’s
argument that a 24-month sentence was necessary to promote “respect for the law.” Appellant
Supp. Br. 11; R. 82, PageID 325. But hearing an argument is not the same as embracing it, and
Spence identifies nothing that suggests the district court in the end relied on the government’s

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§ 3553(a)(2)(A) reasoning. As we read the record, the district court focused on factors that
remain permissible in the revocation context, including deterrence, protection of the public,
Spence’s repeated violations, and the Grade A nature of his most recent violations. In any event,
Esteras prohibits reliance on “respect for the law” only insofar as it reflects retribution for the
underlying offense, not when such considerations are invoked in service of permissible goals like
deterrence or enforcing compliance with conditions of supervised release. 145 S. Ct. at 2039–40.
Spence next argues that the district court violated Esteras by considering “the seriousness
of the offense.” To bolster the point, Spence emphasizes two remarks: the district court’s
reference to the “penalty” when discussing the appropriate length for Spence’s sentence, and its
statement that it considered “in some part the nature of the offense.” Neither comment treads
into prohibited territory.
The district court’s use of the word “penalty” was not a retributive invocation of
§ 3553(a)(2)(A)’s “just punishment” concept. The district court used the term in the ordinary
sense—synonymous with a “sentence”—as it did when noting that Spence’s previous revocation
resulted in a “Grade C penalty.” Nothing suggests that the district court was appealing to the
seriousness of the underlying crime of conviction, the concern at issue in Esteras. See Patterson,
158 F.4th at 702.
The same is true for the district court’s reference to “the nature of the offense.” To begin,
we presume that district courts understand and apply the governing law, and we do not read
ambiguous sentencing remarks to manufacture error where the record as a whole reflects reliance
on permissible considerations. See United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 392 (6th Cir. 2008)
(en banc); United States v. Johnson, No. 24-3787, 2026 WL 50666, at *3 (6th Cir. Jan. 7, 2026).
And here, read in context, the district court was describing the supervised release violations
before it—explicitly identifying them as “Grade A violations,” the most serious offense category.
Under Esteras, the seriousness and nature of the supervised release conduct remains a
permissible consideration; only the seriousness of the underlying federal offense is off limits.
See Patterson, 158 F.4th at 702 (citing Esteras, 145 S. Ct. at 2040) (“When § 3553(a)(2)(A)
speaks of the ‘seriousness of the offense,’ the term ‘offense’ refers to ‘the underlying crime of

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conviction, not the violation of the supervised-release conditions.’” (quoting Esteras, 145 S. Ct.
at 2040)).
True, the district court did mention Spence’s underlying offense. But it did so only in
discussing the severity of his violations of supervised release. See R. 82, PageID 319 (“Your
actions here are similar to that original offense.”). The court plainly invoked the original crime
to show that greater deterrence was needed to sanction repeated offenses of similar severity—not
to punish for the original offense once more.
C. Finally, Spence argues that § 922(g)(1), the felon in possession statute, violates the
Second Amendment as applied to him because he is not a “dangerous” criminal. Appellant Br.
10–13; see also United States v. Williams, 113 F.4th 637, 657 (6th Cir. 2024) (discussing
circumstances under which the felon in possession statute may be unconstitutional as applied to
certain individuals). This challenge, it bears emphasizing, goes to the validity of his federal
conviction for which he was serving a term of supervised release, not the validity of the
revocation of his supervised release. That fact is decisive. A defendant “may not attempt to
invalidate his original conviction at a supervised-release-revocation hearing” in an appeal from a
revocation of supervised release. United States v. Lewis, 498 F.3d 393, 395 (6th Cir. 2007); see
also United States v. Flanory, 45 F. App’x 456, 460 (6th Cir. 2002); United States v. Hall, 735 F.
App’x 188, 190 (6th Cir. 2018). Instead, the proper fora for such challenges are direct appeals
and, if appropriate, a petition for release under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which grants federal prisoners
“the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States” and to “move the court which imposed the sentence to
vacate, set aside or correct the sentence”).
In his reply brief, Spence protests that to label his argument as a collateral attack is to
misunderstand it. He contends that his challenge to the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) is
jurisdictional because, in his view, an unconstitutional underlying conviction deprives the district
court of authority to revoke supervised release. But jurisdiction concerns a court’s statutory or
constitutional power to adjudicate a case, not the validity of the underlying conviction. See
United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630–31 (2002). Alleged defects in the conviction thus go
to the merits and must be raised through direct appeal or collateral review, not in an appeal from

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a revocation judgment. See United States v. Terry, 234 F. App’x 82, 84 (4th Cir. 2007) (per
curiam). Spence’s relabeling of his claim as jurisdictional does not make it so.
Even if we ignore that defect, Spence’s Second Amendment challenge is unavailing. He
argues that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to him because he is not dangerous. See
Williams, 113 F.4th at 657. As a procedural matter, Spence likely waived the right to contest the
validity of his conviction in his plea agreement. There, he agreed to “waive his right to contest
any aspect of his conviction and sentence . . . under any . . . provision of federal law,” Spence,
No. 14-cr-30103-NJR-1, Dkt. No. 24, at 36, sweeping language that fairly covers his Second
Amendment challenge. See Watson v. United States, 165 F.3d 486, 488 (6th Cir. 1999)
(enforcing a plea agreement with similar language).
Spence would lose on the merits in any event. His crimes, which include drug
trafficking, fall into the “second category” of offenses described in Williams, that is, conduct that
poses “a significant threat of danger” even absent overt violence. 113 F.4th at 659; see also
United States v. Oravets, No. 24-3817, 2025 WL 2682632, at *1 (6th Cir. Sep. 19, 2025)
(“[D]rug trafficking often motivates violent crime.”). Spence’s repeated involvement with drug
distribution and firearms demonstrates the kind of dangerousness that the statute targets,
confirming § 922(g)(1)’s constitutionality as applied to him.
* * * * *
We affirm.

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