Elaine R. Smith, guardian for Thomas K. Irwin, a protected person v. Miami Valley Hospital

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)
File Name: 26a0116p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
ELAINE R. SMITH, guardian for Thomas K. Irwin, a
protected person,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
MIAMI VALLEY HOSPITAL and PREMIER HEALTH
PARTNERS, care of Cara W. Powers, Registered Agent;
TRENT DAVIS,
Defendants-Appellants.
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No. 24-3983
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio at Dayton.
No. 3:23-cv-00365—Michael J. Newman, District Judge.
Argued: March 18, 2026
Decided and Filed: April 20, 2026
Before: BUSH, READLER, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
_________________
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Catherine H. Jackson, BIESER, GREER & LANDIS, LLP, Dayton, Ohio, for
Appellants. Robert G. Kamenec, FIEGER, FIEGER, KENNEY & HARRINGTON, P.C.,
Southfield, Michigan, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: John F. Haviland, Amber R. Mullaly, Jaren A.
Hardesty, BIESER, GREER & LANDIS, LLP, Dayton, Ohio, for Appellants. Robert G.
Kamenec, FIEGER, FIEGER, KENNEY & HARRINGTON, P.C., Southfield, Michigan, for
Appellee.
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No. 24-3983 Smith v. Miami Valley Hosp., et al. Page 2
_________________
OPINION
_________________
JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge. After exiting Miami Valley Hospital, Thomas K. Irwin
publicly urinated. Following a brief pursuit, Officer Trent Davis tackled Irwin, leaving Irwin
permanently incapacitated. Elaine R. Smith, Irwin’s mother and guardian, sued Davis and his
employers (among others) for excessive force and state-law torts.
Davis answered, and Smith served discovery requests on him and his employers. They
did not respond. Instead, they moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and to stay discovery. The summary judgment
record includes a video that shows all relevant events (albeit without audio). An affidavit from
Davis explaining his version of events was also attached to the summary judgment papers.
Smith asked the district court to deny Davis’s motion to stay discovery and sought a
deferral of a ruling on summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d)1 based on
Davis and his employers’ failure to engage with discovery prior to moving for summary
judgment. The district court denied the motion to stay discovery, ordered further discovery, and
deferred ruling on the summary judgment motion until after the close of discovery.2 The district
court explained that additional discovery was necessary because “[s]ome differences appear
when the allegations in Defendant Davis’s affidavit are compared to the allegations in Plaintiff’s
complaint.” R. 56, Order, PageID 897. The district court did not explain how the video fit into
the summary judgment analysis. Despite some apparently contradictory allegations, the district
court “d[id] not intend to find or even suggest that genuine issues of material fact do or do not
exist.” Id. at PageID 897 n.4. It cabined discovery to those issues necessary to “inexpensively,
justly, and expeditiously litigate [the] motion for summary judgment.” Id. at PageID 898.
1The Rules Advisory Committee renumbered Rule 56(f) to Rule 56(d) in 2010 without changing the rule’s
text. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d) advisory committee’s note to the 2010 amendment.
2The district court did not explicitly rule on the request for a deferral under Rule 56(d), but the district
court’s decision to order further discovery before deciding the summary judgment motion effectively granted that
request.

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No. 24-3983 Smith v. Miami Valley Hosp., et al. Page 3
Davis and the employers appealed. Smith moved to dismiss the appeal, and our motions
panel ordered the motion carried with the case. Smith v. Mia. Valley Hosp., No. 24-3983, 2025
LX 267118, at *2 (6th Cir. July 21, 2025).
Ordinarily, interlocutory orders, like discovery orders, are not immediately appealable.
See Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484, 491 (6th Cir. 2009); In re Flint Water Cases, 960 F.3d 820,
829 (6th Cir. 2020). However, when “the district court effectively denie[s] . . . qualified
immunity,” we have jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine. Klein v. Long, 275 F.3d
544, 549 (6th Cir. 2001). An inappropriate Rule 56(d) deferral is immediately appealable as an
order effectively denying qualified immunity.3 See Everson, 556 F.3d at 493.
Officers are entitled to a decision on qualified immunity at the earliest stage in the
litigation because qualified immunity is an immunity from suit, not an immunity from liability.
Skousen v. Brighton High Sch., 305 F.3d 520, 525–27 (6th Cir. 2002). That means the defendant
is entitled to avoid “the potential disruptiveness of discovery.” Everson, 556 F.3d at 491. When
the district court is “faced with a motion based on qualified immunity,” it cannot “avoid ruling
on the issue” by simply ordering further discovery. Id. at 492 (quoting Summers v. Leis, 368
F.3d 881, 886 (6th Cir. 2004)). If qualified immunity “is properly raised prior to discovery, the
district court has a duty to address it.” Summers, 368 F.3d at 886.
That said, “[a] district court can, of course, determine in its reasoned judgment that a
decision on a motion for summary judgment cannot be made without further discovery.”
Everson, 556 F.3d at 492–93. To justify such a finding, the district court must “review the
motion and its supporting documents[,] as well as the plaintiff’s opposition and its supporting
documents,” Skousen, 305 F.3d at 527, to determine “whether discovery [i]s actually necessary”
3Generally, we cannot consider any merits issues unless we have first determined that we have appellate
jurisdiction. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 379 (1981). But when the answer to a
jurisdictional question turns in part on the merits, this “court must still answer the jurisdictional question,” even if “it
must inevitably decide some, or all, of the merits issues.” Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela v. Helmerich & Payne
Int’l Drilling Co., 581 U.S. 170, 178 (2017). Here, whether we have jurisdiction turns in part on whether the district
court could “determine in its reasoned judgment that a decision on a motion for summary judgment cannot be made
without further discovery.” Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484, 492–93 (6th Cir. 2009). So the proper procedure is to
review only those merits issues necessary to deciding the jurisdictional issue, decide the jurisdictional issue, and
then act accordingly. See Follen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 167 F.4th 352, 357–58 (6th Cir. 2026); see also Everson,
556 F.3d at 492–93 (following this procedure in reviewing a Rule 56(d) deferral).

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No. 24-3983 Smith v. Miami Valley Hosp., et al. Page 4
to resolve the qualified immunity issue. Everson, 556 F.3d at 493. “Only then, and only on a
finding that material facts [are] in dispute, [is] the court at liberty to hold the motion in abeyance
pending discovery.” Skousen, 305 F.3d at 527.
Even though the district court identified “some differences” between the parties’ accounts
of the interaction, it expressly disclaimed finding or intending to find any genuine dispute of
material fact. And it appeared to consider only some of the facts available to it. In particular, its
order makes no mention of the video evidence. That omission is significant for our decision here
because unambiguous videos can prevent a district court from finding that a genuinely disputed
material fact makes summary judgment inappropriate. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380–81
(2007). The district court was therefore required to review the video and determine whether, in
light of the video and the allegations made in the Rule 56(d) affidavit, “discovery [i]s actually
necessary” to decide the qualified immunity issue because there remained a genuine dispute of
material fact. Everson, 556 F.3d at 493. Without such an analysis and finding, we cannot
conclude that the district court correctly determined “that a decision on a motion for summary
judgment cannot be made without further discovery.” Id. at 492–93. Such an error effectively
denied qualified immunity, which gives us jurisdiction to correct the district court’s error. See
Everson, 556 F.3d at 493. We therefore vacate the district court’s order.
Davis asks us to go further and reach the merits of his qualified immunity claim.
Although we have at times resolved the summary judgment issue on appeal before the district
court ruled on the motion, see Everson, 556 F.3d at 490, our usual practice is to allow a district
court, which errs on a predicate issue, to consider subsequent issues in the first instance, see e.g.,
Cavin v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 927 F.3d 455, 459 (6th Cir. 2019). That approach accords with
the nature of the district court’s misstep. Its mistake here was failing to stay discovery without
finding a genuine dispute of material fact, not failing to grant summary judgment. And the
district court’s order refusing to stay discovery was what Davis appealed. Our decision vacating
that order remedies the harm to Davis from further potential discovery while the district court
sorts out whether he is entitled to qualified immunity on the extant summary judgment record.
See Wallin v. Norman, 317 F.3d 558, 564 (6th Cir. 2003) (remanding to the district court to

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No. 24-3983 Smith v. Miami Valley Hosp., et al. Page 5
address the merits of summary judgment after determining that the district court should not have
let discovery proceed). There is no need to go any further.
We therefore DENY the motion to dismiss, VACATE the district court’s order, and
REMAND for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

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