CONNIE OVERSTREET, Personal Representative of the Estate of Paul Richard Bliven v. ONTONAGON COUNTY, MICHIGAN, a corporate subunit of government

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)
File Name: 26a0138p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
CONNIE OVERSTREET, Personal Representative of the
Estate of Paul Richard Bliven,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ONTONAGON COUNTY, MICHIGAN, a corporate subunit
of government; DALE RANTALA, Sheriff, JASON
DEVERE CLINESMITH, GIRARD WALDROP, DOUG
WILLIAMS ROBERTS, and JOHN JASON HASENBERG, in
their individual and official capacities,
Defendants-Appellees.
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No. 25-1873
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan at Marquette.
No. 2:23-cv-00098—Maarten Vermaat, Magistrate Judge.
Argued: April 30, 2026
Decided and Filed: May 8, 2026
Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; CLAY and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
_________________
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Racine M. Miller, THE MICHIGAN LAW FIRM, PC, Birmingham, Michigan, for
Appellant. G. Gus Morris, MCGRAW MORRIS MASUD, Troy, Michigan, for Appellees. ON
BRIEF: Racine M. Miller, THE MICHIGAN LAW FIRM, PC, Birmingham, Michigan, for
Appellant. G. Gus Morris, John T. Gemellaro, MCGRAW MORRIS MASUD, Troy, Michigan,
for Appellees.
>

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_________________
OPINION
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MURPHY, Circuit Judge. Paul Bliven committed suicide while a pretrial detainee in the
Ontonagon County Jail. A representative of his estate sued the County and several of its
corrections officers. She argued that the officers acted with deliberate indifference to the risk
that Bliven would kill himself and that the County’s policies facilitated his suicide. But Bliven
told the officers that he did not have any suicidal feelings and that he had never tried to commit
suicide before. Qualified immunity thus protects the officers because a reasonable jury could not
conclude that they knew of a strong likelihood that Bliven would take his life. And the County
did not enact any jail policies with the deliberate indifference required to hold it liable for its
employees’ actions. We thus affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to all
defendants.
I
Bliven lived in Ontonagon County in Michigan’s Upper Peninsula. His mental-health
struggles sometimes led him to mistakenly believe that criminals were “breaking into his home.”
Rep., R.59-2, PageID 450. One such incident occurred on January 8, 2021. On that day, a
worried Bliven called 911 and told the dispatcher that he had fled to his basement armed with a
shotgun in fear of intruders. Deputies with the Ontonagon County Sheriff’s Department
responded to the call. They found no evidence of intruders. Yet Bliven confessed that he had
shot his firearm out the window. His neighbors confirmed that they heard at least two shots.
They also explained that Bliven’s random gunfire had caused recurring concerns. A deputy
decided to commit Bliven because his mental illness threatened to “seriously physically injure
[him]self or others[.]” Id., PageID 453.
The next day, Bliven arrived at Marquette General Hospital for about two weeks of
inpatient mental-health treatment. During his stay, Bliven repeatedly denied having any current
or past suicidal feelings. Doctors ultimately diagnosed him with an “Unspecified Psychotic

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Disorder” and discharged him on January 25. Rep., R.62-2, PageID 738. For the next several
months, Bliven engaged in no erratic behavior (at least so far as the record reveals).
But he soon returned to his dangerous ways. On May 22, Bliven’s neighbor called the
police after someone shot at the neighbor’s home “several times.” Rep., R.55-2, PageID 202.
Troopers with the Michigan State Police spoke with the neighbor and came to suspect Bliven of
firing the shots. They detained him and called in the state crime lab. While lab personnel
investigated, the troopers questioned Bliven. He confessed to shooting at his neighbor’s home
with an air rifle but said some delusional things in the process. According to Bliven, he fired
“lasers” at the neighbor’s home because the neighbor belonged to a “gang” that was using
“microwave frequencies to fry him from the inside.” Id., PageID 203. During the questioning,
the troopers also noticed that Bliven had what they described as “meth bite[s]” (itchy scabs) on
his arms. Id. The troopers thus recommended that prosecutors charge Bliven with reckless
discharge of a firearm, aggravated assault, and methamphetamine possession. They arrested
Bliven and transported him to the Ontonagon County Jail.
The jail still followed COVID-19 protocols at this time. These protocols required new
inmates to quarantine for 14 days. Corrections officers would presumptively use the jail’s detox
cell to isolate new inmates. The jail otherwise reserved this detox cell for “intoxicated” or
“suicidal” inmates so that the officers could regularly observe them. Jail Policy, R.55-14,
PageID 385. The detox cell also had fewer items in it to reduce the risk that inmates might harm
themselves. It contained only a toilet, mattress, blanket, and pillow.
When one new inmate occupied the detox cell, officers might use what they called the
“capious” cell to house a second new inmate for the isolation period. Waldrop Dep., R.55-6,
PageID 243. That cell contained more items, including a bunk bed, bench, table, toilet, sink,
shower, television, and electric fan. The record leaves unclear how the cell got its name. As the
district court recognized, courts historically issued a writ of capias when they ordered officers to
take someone into custody. See Overstreet v. Ontonagon County, 2025 WL 2486708, at *1 n.1
(W.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025). Perhaps the cell once housed those subject to these writs. But
officers have come to use it to detain female inmates. In all events, we will follow the parties’

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lead in how to spell the name of this cell, which, as relevant now, housed new inmates
quarantining during the pandemic.
Girard Waldrop, a corrections officer, booked Bliven into the jail. The intake process
required him to ask Bliven a litany of questions and input the answers into an electronic form on
his computer. Among other questions, Waldrop asked Bliven if he currently had suicidal
feelings or had ever thought about killing himself. Bliven answered no. Bliven also gave a
negative answer when asked if he had plans to harm himself in the jail. Yet Bliven did disclose
some modest red flags. He suggested that he had previously felt useless or hopeless when his
spouse died two years ago (although he clarified that he had not had those feelings recently).
And Bliven flagged his mental-health treatment at Marquette, noting that the hospital had
prescribed him anxiety pills that he no longer took. Waldrop also believed that Bliven might be
intoxicated or have mental-health problems because Bliven claimed that the jail needed to check
him for radiation from his microwave. Waldrop lastly could tell that Bliven’s arrest had made
him “mad” because he was “screaming a lot[.]” Waldrop Dep., R.55-6, PageID 252. Despite
these issues, Waldrop otherwise saw no “cause to think that [Bliven] would harm himself.” Id.,
PageID 262.
When an officer inputs an inmate’s responses to these screening questions, the computer
program picks the inmate’s classification. The program classified Bliven as either minimum or
medium risk. (The record has contradictory evidence on this point.) Yet Waldrop also had to
use his judgment on where to detain Bliven. Officers would normally place potentially
intoxicated inmates in the detox cell. But that cell was unavailable on May 22 because the door
had swollen and become nearly impossible to open. So Waldrop put Bliven in the capious cell
for the 14-day isolation period. Waldrop had to “override” the computer for this placement
because it flagged that only females should remain in this cell. Id., PageID 249. Although
Waldrop would have normally asked a supervisor for this override, he did not need this
permission during the pandemic.
Bliven’s next several days in the capious cell passed without incident. Jail policy
requires officers to perform rounds checking on inmates at least once an hour in unpredictable

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intervals. The record contains no evidence that Bliven ever expressed concerns to officers
during these many checks.
A state court arraigned Bliven via video around 1:30 p.m. on May 26. Bliven’s lawyer
discussed his physical ailments but raised no mental-health concerns. The court set Bliven’s bail
at $50,000.
Later that afternoon, Officer Doug Roberts worked at the jail desk. He took calls, made
rounds, monitored security cameras, and handled anything else that might arise. Jail records
show that Roberts performed a round checking on inmates (including Bliven) at 1:25 p.m.
Jason Clinesmith, the jail administrator, subsequently decided to try to fix the detox cell’s
door using a grinder. That cell was only 25 feet away from the capious cell. Clinesmith thus
warned Bliven at 2:09 p.m. that there “was going to be some noise.” Clinesmith Dep., R.55-8,
PageID 313. Bliven responded: “it’s your jail do whatever the fuck you want.” Id. Clinesmith
thanked him and began grinding down the door. Roberts decided to help Clinesmith with this
task for safety reasons. The project thus took him away from monitoring the security cameras at
the desk. But jail policies did not require him to continuously watch the cameras.
About 20 minutes after Clinesmith spoke to Bliven, Deputy John Hasenberg completed
his patrol shift and arrived at the jail. Hasenberg spoke with Clinesmith and Roberts and then
walked to the main office with the security cameras. Around 2:45 p.m., he looked at the screen
from the capious cell’s camera and noticed Bliven “standing” in a “weird manner[.]” Hasenberg
Dep., R.55-10, PageID 351. Hasenberg zoomed in on the cell and recognized that Bliven was
hanging. A half hour before, Bliven had used the electric fan’s cord to create a makeshift noose,
stepped up on the bench, tied the cord to a window frame, and stepped off the bench. The
officers rushed to the cell and cut Bliven down. Hasenberg called 911 while Clinesmith began
CPR. Paramedics arrived in 10 minutes. But they could not save Bliven and pronounced him
dead at the scene.
Connie Overstreet, Bliven’s daughter and his estate’s representative, sued Waldrop,
Roberts, Clinesmith, Hasenberg, Sheriff Dale Rantala, and Ontonagon County. Overstreet
alleged that the individual defendants (collectively, the “Officers”) had acted with deliberate

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indifference to the risk that Bliven would commit suicide. And she sought to hold Ontonagon
County liable for this constitutional violation under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436
U.S. 658 (1978). Overstreet also pursued negligence and wrongful-death claims under Michigan
law.
After the parties conducted discovery, the district court granted summary judgment to the
Officers and County. See Overstreet, 2025 WL 2486708, at *19. The court held that no
reasonable jury could find that any Officer subjectively believed that Bliven would commit
suicide. Id. at *9–15. It also rejected Overstreet’s Monell claim against the County. See id. at
*16–18. Lastly, it declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her state-law claims. See
id. at *19.
II
Overstreet has appealed the dismissal of her deliberate-indifference claims against the
Officers and her Monell claim against the County. We review the district court’s rejection of
both claims de novo, while accepting Overstreet’s position on any of the genuinely disputed
facts. See Gambrel v. Knox County, 25 F.4th 391, 399 (6th Cir. 2022).
A. Individual Claims Against the Officers
The Officers have raised a qualified-immunity defense against Overstreet’s deliberate-
indifference claims. To rebut this defense, Overstreet must show two things. She must show
that the Officers violated the Constitution. See District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 62–
63 (2018). And she must show that the governing precedent clearly established the right that
they infringed at the time that they acted. See id. at 63.
To satisfy qualified immunity’s first (constitutional) requirement, Overstreet must
identify the right that the Officers allegedly violated. See Lawler ex rel. Lawler v. Hardeman
County, 93 F.4th 919, 926 (6th Cir. 2024). Different rights protect different detainees. See id. A
prisoner whom a court has convicted has a right against “cruel and unusual punishments” under
the Eighth Amendment. U.S. Const. amend. VIII. In contrast, a pretrial detainee like Bliven
whom a court has yet to punish has a right against “depriv[ations]” “of life, liberty, or property,

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without due process of law” under the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
The distinction between these two rights historically did not matter because our precedent
followed the same test for claims that officers acted with deliberate indifference to the risk of
harm to an inmate. See Lawler, 93 F.4th at 926–27. In September 2021, though, we adopted a
more lenient test for pretrial detainees like Bliven. See Brawner v. Scott County, 14 F.4th 585,
591–97 (6th Cir. 2021).
But this recent change does not affect this case if we resolve it by jumping to qualified
immunity’s second (clearly established) prong. See Lawler, 93 F.4th at 925, 927. Bliven
committed suicide in May 2021, so the events here took place before we lowered the standards
for pretrial detainees the following September in Brawner. As a result, that later decision had yet
to “clearly establish anything” when the Officers acted months earlier. Id. at 927. To show a
violation of clearly established law, then, Overstreet must meet the more demanding deliberate-
indifference test that applied to pretrial detainees before Brawner. Id. at 927–28.
That test has both objective and subjective elements. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, 834 (1994). The objective element requires a plaintiff to show a “substantial risk of serious
harm” to an inmate. Id. Suicide no doubt qualifies as a serious harm. See Lawler, 93 F.4th at
928. Yet what suffices to establish the “substantial risk” that this harm would arise? Farmer,
511 U.S. at 834. Does the suicide alone prove that this risk existed? Or must estates that
represent deceased inmates identify objective markers that predate a suicide, such as a prior
suicide attempt? Our cases have gone both ways on these questions. See Lawler, 93 F.4th at
928–29 (collecting cases).
That said, our cases have uniformly recognized that the subjective element sets “a high
bar” in suicide cases. Gibson v. Abate, 2025 WL 1913247, at *2 (6th Cir. July 11, 2025). As a
general matter, a plaintiff must establish both that an officer knew “of facts from which the
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exist[ed]” and that the officer
personally drew this “inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. And even if plaintiffs meet this test,
they still must show that the officer “responded” in an unreasonable way to the known risk. Id.
at 844. When applying this framework to the suicide context, we have recognized that suicide is
hard “to predict” and “often occurs without warning.” Gray v. City of Detroit, 399 F.3d 612, 616

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(6th Cir. 2005). To account for that reality, we have rejected deliberate-indifference claims
when an officer knew only of a “possibility” or “even a likelihood” that inmates would take their
lives. Downard ex rel. Downard v. Martin, 968 F.3d 594, 601 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Galloway
v. Anuszkiewicz, 518 F. App’x 330, 336 (6th Cir. 2013)). We have instead held that plaintiffs
must show that an officer believed that there was a “strong likelihood” that an inmate would
commit suicide. Lawler, 93 F.4th at 929 (quoting Barber v. City of Salem, 953 F.2d 232, 235
(6th Cir. 1992)).
How can plaintiffs satisfy this “demanding” strong-likelihood test? Id. (citation omitted).
They might rely on direct evidence, such as testimony that an officer believed that an inmate
posed a strong suicide risk. See id. But officers do not commonly “admit” to these beliefs. Id.;
Stewart v. Warren Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 821 F. App’x 564, 570 (6th Cir. 2020). So plaintiffs
often must fall back on circumstantial evidence to prove an officer’s knowledge. Lawler, 93
F.4th at 929. To avoid summary judgment using this evidence, the suicide risk must have risen
to such a level that a reasonable jury could find that the officer knew of the risk from its obvious
nature alone. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842. Our cases do not find this test easily met. Plaintiffs
“typically” must introduce suicide-specific evidence—such as evidence that an officer knew that
a doctor had placed an inmate on “suicide watch” or that the inmate had expressed suicidal
feelings. Downard, 968 F.3d at 601. In contrast, more generic evidence—such as evidence of
an inmate’s depressed state—will typically fall short. See Lawler, 93 F.4th at 930. And an
inmate’s consistent denial of suicidal feelings represents “strong” circumstantial “evidence” that
the officers lacked the required knowledge. Craddock v. Wellpath, LLC, 2025 WL 278577, at *4
(6th Cir. Jan. 23, 2025).
Here, Overstreet’s evidence does not meet the demanding standards for this subjective
element, so we need not consider whether she has met the standards for the objective one. Cf.
Downard, 968 F.3d at 600. Under § 1983, Overstreet may not impose liability on one Officer for
the actions of others. See Hehrer v. County of Clinton, 161 F.4th 955, 964 (6th Cir. 2025); see
also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). So Overstreet must prove that each Officer
possessed the required beliefs. See Hehrer, 161 F.4th at 964. We will consider them in turn.

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Officer Waldrop. No reasonable jury could find that Officer Waldrop subjectively
believed there was a “strong likelihood” that Bliven would take his life when Waldrop booked
him into the jail. Lawler, 93 F.4th at 930. To start, Overstreet lacks direct evidence that
Waldrop held this belief. Waldrop instead testified that he “was shocked” when he learned that
Bliven committed suicide because Bliven “didn’t give [the Officers] any cause to think that he
would harm himself.” Waldrop Dep., R.55-6, PageID 261–62. Next, Overstreet did not produce
the type of circumstantial evidence that could permit a reasonable jury to find that Waldrop
believed Bliven was suicidal despite his sworn statements to the contrary. See Lawler, 93 F.4th
at 929–30. In fact, most circumstantial evidence cuts the other way. Bliven told Waldrop that he
was not currently feeling suicidal. Intake Assess., R.55-3, PageID 214; cf. Craddock, 2025 WL
278577, at *4; Lawler, 93 F.4th at 931. Bliven also disclosed that he had never tried to kill
himself in the past. Intake Assess., R.55-3, PageID 214. He disclosed that he had no plans to
harm himself in the jail. Id. And he disclosed that he had no recent feelings of hopelessness. Id.
Overstreet responds by pointing to three other things that Waldrop learned from speaking
with Bliven: that Bliven had recently received mental-health treatment at a hospital, that he may
have been intoxicated, and that he seemed to suffer from a “mental condition” because he raised
concerns about “radiation from his microwave.” Id., PageID 213–14. But these bits of
information fall far short of the type of circumstantial evidence that can create a genuine issue of
material fact over an officer’s state of mind. See Lawler, 93 F.4th at 930. Indeed, we have
rejected other deliberate-indifference claims with much stronger circumstantial evidence. We
have held, for example, that “even an inmate’s recent threats of suicide” do not suffice when
coupled with the inmate’s current denials of feeling suicidal. Downard, 968 F.3d at 601
(discussing Nallani v. Wayne County, 665 F. App’x 498, 507–08 (6th Cir. 2016)); see Lawler, 93
F.4th at 931. And we have held that an officer’s knowledge of “generic risk factors” (such as an
inmate’s mental-health struggles or painful drug withdrawals) do not suffice without specific
evidence of an immediate suicide risk. Lawler, 93 F.4th at 931–32 (discussing Crocker ex rel.
Est. of Tarzwell v. County of Macomb, 119 F. App’x 718, 723 (6th Cir. 2005)); see Mantell v.
Health Pros. Ltd., 612 F. App’x 302, 307 (6th Cir. 2015). This case should be no different. As
the sheriff explained, inmates commonly make strange comments in jail (like Bliven’s comment

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about the microwave) and those comments do not raise a “red flag of suicide.” Rantala Dep.,
R.55-7, PageID 290.
Overstreet also criticizes several of Waldrop’s actions, including his decision to put
Bliven in a cell with an electric-fan cord and his failure to refer Bliven for a mental evaluation.
But the question whether Waldrop “responded reasonably” to a suicide risk only matters if he
subjectively believed that this risk existed. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844. Because no reasonable
jury could find that Waldrop held such a belief, we need not consider the propriety of his actions.
Officer Roberts. Overstreet argues that Officer Roberts failed to adequately monitor
Bliven on the day that he committed suicide. This claim fails for similar reasons. She points to
no direct evidence that Roberts believed Bliven was suicidal. In fact, Roberts testified that he
“never had any troubles” with Bliven. Roberts Dep., R.55-9, PageID 340. And when Roberts
conducted a cell check at 1:25 p.m. (less than 50 minutes before Bliven committed suicide), he
did not notice anything unusual. Overstreet also has even less circumstantial evidence against
Roberts than she does against Waldrop. No evidence suggests that Roberts knew anything about
Waldrop’s background or mental health.
Overstreet responds that Roberts unreasonably left his desk monitoring the security
cameras to help Clinesmith repair the detox cell’s door. But the jail had no policy requiring an
officer to monitor security cameras at all times. Besides, this argument again addresses a
separate question: whether Roberts “responded reasonably” to the risk that Bliven would commit
suicide. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844. So it is irrelevant to our holding, which turns on Roberts’s
lack of knowledge that a suicide risk even existed.
Overstreet also tries to withstand summary judgment against Roberts by quoting our
statement that a jury should resolve the point at which “bare minimum observation ceases to be
[a] constitutionally adequate” response to a substantial risk of harm. Helphenstine v. Lewis
County, 60 F.4th 305, 317 (6th Cir. 2023) (quoting Greene v. Crawford County, 22 F.4th 593,
609 (6th Cir. 2022)); Howell v. NaphCare, Inc., 67 F.4th 302, 316 (6th Cir. 2023). In these cases
(which applied Brawner’s lower standard), we first held that the “obvious” nature of an inmate’s
medical needs could allow a jury to find the subjective element met. Helphenstine, 60 F.4th at

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318; see also Howell, 67 F.4th at 316. We then added that the additional question whether the
officers acted reasonably merely by observing the inmate also belonged to a jury.
See Helphenstine, 60 F.4th at 326. Here, by contrast, we need not reach this additional question
because it was far from “obvious” that Bliven would take his life. Id. at 318.
Jail Administrator Clinesmith. The same logic dooms Overstreet’s claims against
Clinesmith, the jail administrator. Like the other Officers, Clinesmith testified to his belief that
Bliven showed “no signs of being suicidal.” Clinesmith Dep., R.55-8, PageID 317. He also
confirmed that Waldrop properly placed Bliven in the capious cell because Bliven “displayed no
signs of any kind of suicidal ideation.” Id., PageID 318. And Clinesmith had almost no
interaction with Bliven. So Clinesmith knew of no facts (let alone “obvious” ones) that would
allow a reasonable jury to find that he was lying about his beliefs. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842.
Overstreet counters that Clinesmith had a brief interaction with Bliven moments before
Bliven killed himself. When Clinesmith told Bliven that he was about to make noise fixing the
detox cell’s door, Bliven responded: “it’s your jail do whatever the fuck you want.” Clinesmith
Dep., R.55-8, PageID 313. According to Overstreet, this hostile remark showed that Bliven
harbored suicidal feelings. But nothing about the statement mentioned suicide or conveyed any
type of distress. As Clinesmith said, “at that time” Bliven gave “no sign of any kind of harm to
himself[.]” Id. And no reasonable jury would draw the conclusion that Clinesmith knew of
Bliven’s secret suicidal feelings merely because Bliven used all-too-common profanity.
Deputy Hasenberg. Overstreet fares even worse with her claims against Deputy
Hasenberg. Hasenberg may have had prior interactions with Bliven back in January 2021, but he
had not “formed any type of opinion” about Bliven’s mental state. Hasenberg Dep., R.55-10,
PageID 350. And although Hasenberg knew that Bliven was in the “facility” in May, no
evidence suggests that he knew anything else about Bliven. Id. So he also did not know any
facts that would make it “obvious” that Bliven would likely commit suicide. Farmer, 511 U.S.
at 842.
Overstreet has one rebuttal. She claims that jail policy required Hasenberg to
immediately check on the inmates upon his arrival at the jail and that Hasenberg should not have

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spoken to Roberts and Clinesmith beforehand. Yet counsel admitted at oral argument that the
claim against Hasenberg would fail if Hasenberg arrived at the jail after Bliven committed
suicide. Oral Arg. 8:55–9:00. And undisputed evidence shows this order of events. Hasenberg
arrived at the jail at 2:30 p.m.—about fifteen minutes after the video shows Bliven committing
suicide. So Overstreet’s argument fails on its own terms. Regardless, no evidence suggests that
Hasenberg had a duty to check cells because he was a deputy rather than a corrections officer.
And even setting that fact aside, Overstreet’s argument still implicates only whether Hasenberg
“responded reasonably” to Bliven’s suicide risk. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844. But we reject her
claim because Hasenberg lacked knowledge of that risk.
Sheriff Rantala. This analysis leaves Overstreet’s claim against Sheriff Rantala.
Overstreet concedes that Rantala had no “personal knowledge” of Bliven’s circumstances. Beck
v. Hamblen County, 969 F.3d 592, 601 (6th Cir. 2020). As sheriff, though, Rantala oversaw the
jail’s policies. And Overstreet argues that two of those policies were deliberately indifferent to a
generic suicide risk for all inmates: the policy to hold inmates in a cell with an electric-fan cord
and the policy not to require officers to monitor the security cameras at all times. We doubt that
plaintiffs could use generic evidence to bypass the usual rule that an officer must know of a
“strong likelihood” that a specific inmate would commit suicide. Lawler, 93 F.4th at 929
(citation omitted). But we need not resolve the point in this qualified-immunity context. Even if
the theory has merit, Overstreet points to no case that would render it “beyond debate” that the
policies violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Beck, 969 F.3d at 601 (citation omitted). So
qualified immunity protects Rantala on this claim. See id.
Apart from her individual theories against each Officer, Overstreet also raises high-level
factual and legal points about why they should all face liability. Factually, she claims that
Bliven told his attorney during a jail call that he would “rather just lay down in [his] cell and die”
and that he would “die in here.” Appellant’s Br. 23 (quoting Compl., R.1, PageID 7). And she
claims that a reasonable jury could find that the Officers all knew about this call because the jail
recorded it. But Overstreet cites only her complaint for these allegations. Although we must
take her view of the disputed facts at this stage, she must produce more than the “bare allegations
of the complaint” to trigger that rule. Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 582 (6th Cir.

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1992). So we may ignore these evidence-free allegations when deciding whether to grant
summary judgment to the Officers. See Chappell v. City of Cleveland, 585 F.3d 901, 906 (6th
Cir. 2009).
Legally, Overstreet argues that four cases purportedly prove that a “classic jury question”
exists over the Officers’ state of mind. Appellant’s Br. 23 (citing Troutman v. Louisville Metro
Dep’t of Corr., 979 F.3d 472 (6th Cir. 2020); Lawrence v. Madison County, 695 F. App’x 930
(6th Cir. 2017); Linden v. Washtenaw County, 167 F. App’x 410 (6th Cir. 2006); Comstock v.
McCrary, 273 F.3d 693 (6th Cir. 2001)). Contrary to Overstreet’s representations, though,
Lawrence involved a state-law negligence claim, not a constitutional deliberate-indifference
claim. See 695 F. App’x at 931. And the inmates in the other three cases posed greater suicide
risks. In both Troutman and Linden, the inmates had unsuccessfully tried to kill themselves just
days before they did so. Troutman, 979 F.3d at 477–80; Linden, 167 F. App’x at 414. And in
Comstock, a psychologist had decided that an inmate was suicidal before changing his mind.
273 F.3d at 698, 704. Unlike the inmates in Troutman and Linden, Bliven never previously tried
to commit suicide. And unlike the psychologist in Comstock, the Officers never found Bliven
suicidal.
One last point. Overstreet argues that our conclusion (that her evidence would not permit
a reasonable jury to find that the Officers knew of the suicide risk) ignores her expert. But the
expert asserted that the Officers’ practices fell below the standard of care and that they “should”
have done things differently. Appellant’s Br. 40–43. This type of expert evidence might suggest
that the Officers “should have perceived” the suicide risk. Stewart, 821 F. App’x at 572 (citation
omitted). But such a “should have” standard does not suffice to hold them liable. Id. (citation
omitted). Instead, the Officers must have actually perceived that risk. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at
837–38. And the evidence does not meet this more demanding standard.
B. Monell Claim Against the County
Overstreet also challenges the dismissal of her Monell claim against Ontonagon County.
(She also brought this claim against Sheriff Rantala, but official-capacity suits seeking damages
from an officer add nothing to Monell claims against a county. See Hehrer, 161 F.4th at 967.)

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No. 25-1873 Overstreet v. Ontonagon County, et al. Page 14
Plaintiffs cannot hold a county liable under § 1983 simply because its employees commit a
constitutional violation. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. Rather, the plaintiffs must show that the
county’s conduct itself represents “the ‘moving force’ behind” the constitutional violation. Bd.
of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997). To make this showing,
plaintiffs must connect the violation to a county “policy” or “custom.” See Gambrel, 25 F.4th at
408. Plaintiffs next must show that the county “acted with ‘deliberate indifference’” to the fact
that this policy or custom would lead its employees to violate the Constitution. Id. (quoting
Brown, 520 U.S. at 407). Finally, plaintiffs must show that the policy or custom “actually
caused” the complained-of harm. Id. (quoting Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 70 (2011)).
“Very few cases” have met these standards in this suicide context. Gray, 399 F.3d at 618.
This is not one of the rare cases that does. Overstreet tries to connect Bliven’s suicide to
three policies. But none of her three theories satisfies the required elements. Overstreet first
tries to tie Bliven’s suicide to the County’s policy of not requiring its officers to monitor the
security cameras at all hours of the day. But the County “did have policies in place” to prevent
harm to inmates. Troutman, 979 F.3d at 490. It required officers to check on inmates at least
once an hour in irregular intervals. Policy, R.55-14, PageID 372. And Overstreet has not shown
that the County acted with “deliberate indifference” to the constitutional rights of jail inmates by
enacting this monitoring policy. Brown, 520 U.S. at 410. Under that “stringent standard of
fault,” id., a plaintiff cannot hold a municipality liable for the violation of a constitutional right
unless the right was “clearly established,” Campbell v. Riahi, 109 F.4th 854, 862 (6th Cir. 2024)
(quoting Arrington-Bey v. City of Bedford Heights, 858 F.3d 988, 994 (6th Cir. 2017)). But
Overstreet identifies no cases clearly establishing that counties must require their officers to
watch security cameras 24 hours of the day.
Overstreet next argues that the Officers violated the County’s policy requiring them to
place intoxicated or suicidal inmates in the detox cell. Yet the Officers’ “negligent” failure to
follow policy does not establish that the County itself acted with deliberate indifference.
Troutman, 979 F.3d at 490. Overstreet’s second theory thus would improperly impose vicarious
liability on the County for the alleged misconduct of its employees. See Brown, 520 U.S. at 410.

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No. 25-1873 Overstreet v. Ontonagon County, et al. Page 15
Overstreet fares no better with her third theory: that the County ratified the Officers’
unconstitutional conduct by failing to adequately investigate it. This alleged ratification
occurred after Bliven committed suicide and thus could not have caused that suicide by itself.
See Pineda v. Hamilton County, 977 F.3d 483, 495 (6th Cir. 2020). Rather, Overstreet must
allege that the County engaged in a “series of” prior “investigative failures” to show that its
systemic deficiencies generated the “harmful action” in her case. Id. But Overstreet did not
even try to identify any prior incidents. So this theory lacks the necessary evidence.
We affirm.

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