United States of America v. Jocelyn Benson

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)
File Name: 26a0180p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JOCELYN BENSON, in her official capacity as Secretary
of the State of Michigan; STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Defendants-Appellees,
MICHIGAN ALLIANCE FOR RETIRED AMERICANS;
DONALD DUQUETTE; KEELY CRIMANDO,
Intervenors-Appellees.
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No. 26-1225
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Michigan at Grand Rapids.
No. 1:25-cv-01148—Hala Y. Jarbou, District Judge.
Argued: May 13, 2026
Decided and Filed: June 24, 2026
Before: COLE, NALBANDIAN, and MATHIS, Circuit Judges.
_________________
COUNSEL
ARGUED: David N. Goldman, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Heather S. Meingast, OFFICE OF THE MICHIGAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL, Lansing, Michigan, for Defendants-Appellees. Aria C. Branch,
ELIAS LAW GROUP LLP, Washington, D.C., for Intervenors-Appellees. ON BRIEF: David
N. Goldman, Andrew G. Braniff, Jesus A. Osete, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Heather S. Meingast, Erik A. Grill, OFFICE OF
THE MICHIGAN ATTORNEY GENERAL, Lansing, Michigan, for Defendants-Appellees.
Aria C. Branch, Joshua C. Abbuhl, Branden D. Lewiston, Derek A. Zeigler, ELIAS LAW
GROUP LLP, Washington, D.C., Sarah Prescott, SALVATORE PRESCOTT PORTER &
>

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PORTER, Northville, Michigan, for Intervenors-Appellees. Zachary C. Larsen, Michael J.
Pattwell, CLARK HILL PLC, Lansing, Michigan, Jonathan R. Koch, DICKINSON WRIGHT
PLLC, Grand Rapids, Michigan, Charles R. Spies, DICKINSON WRIGHT PLLC, Washington,
D.C., William J. Olson, WILLIAM J. OLSON, P.C., Vienna, Virginia, Jonathan Miller, PUBLIC
RIGHTS PROJECT, Oakland, California, Daniel J. Freeman, DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL
COMMITTEE, Washington, D.C., Noah B. Bokat-Lindell, O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP,
Washington, D.C., Mark Brewer, GOODMAN ACKER P.C., Southfield, Michigan, Sejal
Jhaveri, CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER, Washington, D.C., Cory M. Carone, STOEL RIVES
LLP, Boise, Idaho, Gillian Cassell-Stiga, LAWYERS’ COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS
UNDER LAW, Washington, D.C., Carmine G. Iaccarino, STURGILL, TURNER, BARKER &
MOLONEY, PLLC, Lexington, Kentucky, Taylor A. Brown, KENTUCKY STATE BOARD OF
ELECTIONS, Frankfort, Kentucky, Gregory A. Clarick, CLARICK GUERON REISBAUM
LLP, New York, New York, Andrew G. Pappas, OSBORN MALEDON, Phoenix, Arizona,
Christopher T. Casamassima, Mairead C. Alhbach, WILMER CUTLER PICKERINGT HALE
AND DORR LLP, Los Angeles, California, Olu O. Oisaghie, WILMER CUTLER PICKERING
HALE AND DORR LLP, Washington, D.C., Lanny A. Breuer, COVINGTON & BURLING
LLP, Washington, D.C., for Amici Curiae.
MATHIS, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which COLE, J., concurred.
NALBANDIAN, J. (pp. 17–23), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.
_________________
OPINION
_________________
MATHIS, Circuit Judge. Congress enacted Title III of the Civil Rights Act of 1960 to
help end voting discrimination. Title III of the Act gave teeth to prior civil-rights legislation by
empowering the U.S. Attorney General to obtain certain state voting records so that he could
investigate potential violations and enforce federal election law. Back then, the government used
this power to ensure that everyone who had the right to vote could freely exercise that right. But
today, the government invokes Title III for an inverse purpose—to ensure that some people have
not voted.
Over the summer of 2025, the United States demanded election records from nearly every
State and the District of Columbia. As part of this endeavor, the government insisted that
Michigan Secretary of State Jocelyn Benson produce her state’s voter rolls. Three weeks later,
the government doubled down—it demanded not only the names on Michigan’s voter rolls, but
also the dates of birth, partial social security numbers, and driver’s license numbers of every

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registered voter in the state. Benson provided the government with the public version of
Michigan’s statewide registered voter list but refused to go any further; she believed the federal
government had no statutory authority to demand the sensitive, unredacted voter information it
sought. So the government filed suit to compel Benson to produce those records. The district
court dismissed the suit, concluding that Title III’s narrow text cannot withstand the weight of
the government’s broad request. We agree and affirm.
I.
States do most of the heavy lifting in overseeing federal elections. They receive this
authority from the U.S. Constitution’s Elections Clause, which charges State legislatures with
regulating “[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and
Representatives.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. The “manner” of holding elections “encompasses
matters like notices, registration, supervision of voting, protection of voters, prevention of fraud
and corrupt practices, counting of votes, duties of inspectors and canvassers, and making and
publication of election returns.” Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 523–24 (2001) (citation
modified). The Framers entrusted the States with this “broad power,” Tashjian v. Republican
Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 217 (1986), because “state governments” are “best acquainted
with the situation of the people,” United States v. Gradwell, 243 U.S. 476, 484 (1917) (quotation
omitted).
But Congress also has a role to play. “Congress may at any time by Law make or alter
such [state] Regulations.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. The Framers thus reserved for “Congress
the power to override state regulations by establishing uniform rules for federal elections,
binding on the States.” Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67, 69 (1997) (citation modified). So Congress
can add to state voting regulations, alter them, or displace them altogether. Smiley v. Holm, 285
U.S. 355, 366 (1932). “This grant of congressional power was the Framers’ insurance against
the possibility that a State would refuse to provide for the election of representatives to the
Federal Congress.” Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 570 U.S. 1, 8 (2013). “In
practice, the [Elections] Clause functions as a default provision; it invests the States with
responsibility for the mechanics of congressional elections, but only so far as Congress declines
to pre-empt state legislative choices.” Id. at 9 (citation modified).

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A.
This case implicates three federal laws that impact the States’ manner of conducting
federal elections: Title III of the Civil Rights Act of 1960 (Title III), the National Voter
Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA), and the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA). We
briefly discuss each.
1.
Title III. In response to de jure discrimination against black voters in the South, Congress
passed the Civil Rights Act of 1957, the first federal civil-rights law since Reconstruction. Pub.
L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634. It established a Commission on Civil Rights responsible for
investigating allegations that American citizens were “being deprived of their right to vote and
have that vote counted by reason of their color, race, religion, or national origin.” Id. at 635. It
also empowered the Attorney General to “seek injunctions against public and private interference
with the right to vote on racial grounds.” South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 313
(1966).
The Civil Rights Act of 1957 did not, however, arm the Attorney General with the tools
necessary to investigate allegations of voting discrimination. The government could institute
proceedings, but it lacked the power pre-suit to compel the production of documents and records
from States to build a discrimination case. And with state and local authorities motivated to
withhold their voting records from the federal government, efforts under the Act were largely
ineffective. See Rep. of the U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, at 87–94 (1959).
Enter the Civil Rights Act of 1960. Pub. L. No. 86-449, 74 Stat. 86. Title III of that law
requires States to keep certain voting records and give the Attorney General access to those
records. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 313; United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 134 (1965).
Specifically, Title III commands every election officer to retain “for a period of twenty-two
months from the date of any [federal] election . . . all records and papers which come into [the
official’s] possession relating to any application, registration, payment of poll tax, or other act
requisite to voting in such election.” 52 U.S.C. § 20701. And it authorizes criminal penalties for

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“[a]ny person . . . who willfully steals, destroys, conceals, mutilates, or alters any record or paper
required by section 20701 of this title to be retained and preserved.” Id. § 20702.
Records and papers subject to Title III must be “made available for inspection,
reproduction, and copying” if the Attorney General makes a “demand in writing” that specifies
“the basis and the purpose” for the inspection. Id. § 20703. The federal “district court for the
district in which a demand is made” has “jurisdiction by appropriate process to compel the
production of” the voting records. Id. § 20705. The Attorney General and his employees may
not divulge voting records produced under Title III “except to Congress and any committee
thereof, governmental agencies, and in the presentation of any case or proceeding before any
court or grand jury.” Id. § 20704.
2.
NVRA. In 1993, Congress passed the NVRA. Pub. L. No. 103-31, 107 Stat. 77. The
NVRA was primarily designed to “increase the number of eligible citizens who register to vote
in elections for Federal office.” 52 U.S.C. § 20501(b)(1). But Congress also sought “to ensure
that accurate and current voter registration rolls are maintained.” Id. § 20501(b)(4). So the
NVRA “has two main objectives: increasing voter registration and removing ineligible persons
from the States’ voter registration rolls.” Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Inst., 584 U.S. 756, 761
(2018).
The NVRA requires States to take certain actions to ensure that they have accurate voter
rolls. States must make “a reasonable effort to remove the names of ineligible voters from the
official lists of eligible voters” by reason of death or change of address. 52 U.S.C.
§ 20507(a)(4). The law also allows States to remove voters from voter rolls at their request or,
“as provided by State law, by reason of criminal conviction or mental incapacity.” Id.
§ 20507(a)(3)(A)–(B). To ensure compliance, the NVRA contains a public-disclosure provision
requiring States to “maintain for at least 2 years and . . . make available for public inspection . . .
all records concerning the implementation of programs and activities conducted for the purpose
of ensuring the accuracy and currency of official lists of eligible voters.” Id. § 20507(i)(1).

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Further, each State must “designate a State officer or employee as the chief State election official
to be responsible for coordination of State responsibilities under [the NVRA].” Id. § 20509.
3.
HAVA. Congress passed HAVA following the contentious 2000 presidential election.
Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666. HAVA aimed “to alleviate a significant problem voters
experience”—eligible voters being turned away at the polls because their names were missing
from voter registration lists. Sandusky Cnty. Democratic Party v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 565, 569
(6th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (citation modified). To that end, HAVA requires States to create a
“single, uniform, official, centralized, interactive computerized statewide voter registration list . .
. that contains the name and registration information of every legally registered voter in the State
and assigns a unique identifier to each legally registered voter in the State.” 52 U.S.C.
§ 21083(a)(1)(A). And “[i]f an individual is to be removed from the computerized list, such
individual shall be removed in accordance with the provisions of the National Voter Registration
Act of 1993.” Id. § 21083(a)(2)(A)(i).
HAVA also requires individuals to provide their driver’s license number or the last four
digits of their social security number to register to vote in a federal election. Id.
§ 21083(a)(5)(A)(i). If an applicant has neither, she is identified through the unique identifier
alone. Id. § 21083(a)(5)(A)(ii).
B.
On March 25, 2025, the President issued an executive order titled “Preserving and
Protecting the Integrity of American Elections.” Exec. Order No. 14248, 90 Fed. Reg. 14005
(Mar. 25, 2025). The order directs the Attorney General to “prioritize enforcement of 18 U.S.C.
[§§] 611 and 1015(f) and similar laws that restrict non-citizens from registering to vote or
voting” and to “take appropriate action with respect to States that fail to comply with the list
maintenance requirements” of the NVRA and HAVA. Id. at 14007.
On July 21, 2025, the Attorney General sent Benson a letter “seeking information
regarding Michigan’s compliance with the NVRA.” R. 1, PageID 10. The letter requested: (1) a

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list of Michigan’s election officials responsible for maintaining the voter registration list; (2) a
description of steps taken to comply with the NVRA; and (3) “[t]he current electronic copy of
Michigan’s computerized statewide voter registration list.” R. 39-2, PageID 492. It also sought
information about Michigan’s efforts to remove ineligible voters from registration rolls and its
processes for identifying and addressing duplicate registrations, among other concerns.
Less than three weeks later, on August 8, 2025, the Attorney General sent Benson a
second demand letter. The letter refused to extend the deadline for responding to most of the
government’s inquiries and again demanded production of Michigan’s statewide voter
registration list by August 18, 2025.
The Attorney General sent her a third letter on August 14, 2025. The August 14 letter
demanded Michigan’s unredacted statewide voter registration list under the NVRA, HAVA, and
Title III. The Attorney General’s stated purpose for the request was “to ascertain Michigan’s
compliance with the list maintenance requirements of the NVRA and HAVA.” R. 39-4, PageID
501.
Benson declined to provide the Attorney General with Michigan’s unredacted statewide
voter registration list, which includes the driver’s license numbers, dates of birth, and the partial
social security numbers for every registered voter. She instead provided the “public version” of
Michigan’s list with voters’ personal identifying information redacted. R. 1, PageID 13–14; R.
39-5, PageID 505. Michigan refers to its statewide voter registration list as its qualified voter
file. Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 168.509m(2)(b), 168.509o(1).
C.
On September 25, 2025, the government sued Benson and the State of Michigan under
Title III, the NVRA, and HAVA. It sought declaratory relief and an order requiring the
Michigan Defendants to provide an unredacted electronic copy of Michigan’s qualified voter
file. The district court permitted the Michigan Alliance for Retired Americans, along with two
registered Michigan voters, Donald Duquette and Keely Crimando, to intervene as defendants.

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All the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. The district court granted the
motions and dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim.
The government appeals. It challenges only the dismissal of its Title III claim. We
review the district court’s decision de novo. Mich. First Credit Union v. T-Mobile USA, Inc.,
108 F.4th 421, 425 (6th Cir. 2024).
II.
This case calls on us to construe provisions of Title III. We interpret statutes “based on
the traditional tools of statutory construction.” Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369,
403 (2024). The goal, of course, is to determine a statute’s “single, best meaning.” Id. at 400. If
a statute does not define a term, we give the term its ordinary meaning. EPA v. Calumet
Shreveport Refin., L.L.C., 605 U.S. 627, 638 (2025). We read a statute’s words “in their context
and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.” Id. at 643 (quotation omitted).
Contemporaneous dictionaries are an effective tool in the interpretive toolbox for determining
the ordinary meaning of an undefined term. See Corner Post, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed.
Rsrv. Sys., 603 U.S. 799, 810 (2024).
A.
We first consider whether Michigan’s qualified voter file is subject to Title III. Recall
that Title III requires election officers like Benson to “retain and preserve, for a period of twenty-
two months from the date of any [federal] election . . . [1] all records and papers which [2] come
into h[er] possession [3] relating to [4] any application, registration, payment of poll tax, or other
act requisite to voting in such election.” 52 U.S.C. § 20701.
Start with what the parties do not contest. First, they do not dispute that Michigan’s
qualified voter file is a “record.” And second, they acknowledge that the term “relating to” has a
broad meaning—“to stand in some relation; to have bearing or concern; to pertain; refer; to bring
into association with or connection with.” Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374,
383 (1992) (quotation omitted). But does the qualified voter file “come into [Benson’s]
possession”? And is the qualified voter file a record that Benson must “retain and preserve”?

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Title III does not define “come into . . . possession,” so we must determine its ordinary
meaning. Around the time that Congress enacted Title III, this term meant to “acquire,”
“obtain,” or “receive.” See Honeycutt v. United States, 581 U.S. 443, 449 (2017); Come into,
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 452 (1966) (“to enter upon or in possession of:
acquire esp. as an inheritance”); Acquire, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 18
(1961) (“to come into possession, control, or power of disposal of”); Obtain, 7 Oxford English
Dictionary 37 (1933) (“to come into the possession or enjoyment of (something)”); Receive,
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1894 (1961) (“to come into possession of:
acquire”).
Benson did not acquire, obtain, or receive the qualified voter file from a third party.
Instead, Michigan officials created it themselves. Indeed, Michigan law directs the secretary of
state to “establish[]” and maintain the qualified voter file. Mich. Comp. Laws § 168.509o(1)
(emphasis added). So it is an internally generated electronic database, not a record acquired
from an outside source. An ordinary English speaker would not say that she has come into
possession of something that she created, established, and maintained. Thus, the qualified voter
file did not “come into [Benson’s] possession” as that term is ordinarily understood.
An example from oral argument helps to prove the point. A baker may purchase
ingredients from a grocery store (flour, eggs, etc.) and then proceed to bake cakes. It would be
rather strange to say that the baker has “come into” possession of the cakes after pulling them out
of the oven. True, the baker did “come into” possession of the ingredients she used to make the
cakes by acquiring those items from the grocery store. But the baker did not “come into”
possession of the cakes—she created them.
And the statutory context confirms our conclusion. Election officers must preserve
records that come into their possession relating to “any application, registration, payment of poll
tax, or other act requisite to voting in such election.” 52 U.S.C. § 20701. Election officers do
not create these kinds of records. Rather, they obtain them from third parties—generally voters
or prospective voters.

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Take the payment of poll taxes. At first glance, a “payment of poll tax” may seem
dissimilar to “application” and “registration,” thereby leading to a capacious reading of § 20701.
But the history of poll taxes tells a different story. In 1959, five States (Alabama, Arkansas,
Mississippi, Texas, and Virginia) still required voters to pay poll taxes. Rep. of U.S. Comm’n on
Civil Rights at 34, 36–38. In many of these States’ counties, a voter would go to the sheriff’s
office to pay her poll-tax bills. See, e.g., id. at 59–60. The sheriff would give the voter a receipt
reflecting the payment of the poll tax, and the voter had to give that receipt to election officials to
vote. See, e.g., id. at 32, 36–37; see also State v. Old, 34 S.W. 690, 690–91 (Tenn. 1896). After
the passage of Title III, election officers would have to retain and preserve the poll-tax receipts
submitted by voters, as these were often the only voter-registration documents these States had.
See 52 U.S.C. § 20701. In Arkansas and Texas, for example, the payment of the poll tax was
“equivalent” to registering to vote. Rep. of U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights at 42,
51. Accordingly, poll-tax receipts qualify as records that election officers “come into”
possession of. 52 U.S.C. § 20701.
That Michigan election officials and others must constantly change information in the
qualified voter file further shows that it is not subject to Title III. The government may
prosecute anyone who “willfully steals, destroys, conceals, mutilates, or alters” any record that
Title III requires election officers to retain and preserve. Id. § 20702. But the NVRA and
HAVA require Michigan election officials to alter the qualified voter file routinely as part of
their “reasonable effort[s]” to ensure accuracy. See id. §§ 20507(a)(4), 21083(a)(4)(A). To that
end, the qualified voter file consists of “[a]n electronic network that allows participating
designated executive departments, state agencies, and county, city, and township clerks to
electronically add, change, or delete records.” Mich. Comp. Laws § 168.509p(b). So the
secretary of state and other public officials can add individuals to the qualified voter file. See id.
§§ 168.493a(2), 168.509o(3), 168.509ii. And they can also change information about individuals
in the qualified voter file or remove them entirely. See id. §§ 168.493b, 168.509o(4).
Thus, construing § 20701 in a manner that subjects the qualified voter file to Title III
would place Title III on a collision course with the NVRA and HAVA. This runs afoul of the
harmonious-reading canon of statutory interpretation. That canon guides us, whenever possible,

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to “interpret Congress’s statutes as a harmonious whole rather than at war with one another.”
Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U.S. 497, 502 (2018); see also Dep’t of Agric. Rural Dev. Hous.
Serv. v. Kirtz, 601 U.S. 42, 63 (2024) (stating that courts should “approach federal statutes
touching on the same topic with a strong presumption they can coexist harmoniously” (citation
modified)). Title III tells election officials to retain and preserve certain records and papers that
come into their possession, and the NVRA and HAVA tell election officials to remove ineligible
voters from statewide voter registration lists. We should not adopt a reading that would place
election officials in violation of one federal law for trying to comply with others.
The surplusage canon of construction confirms that Michigan’s qualified voter file is not
subject to Title III. “Proper respect for Congress cautions courts against lightly assuming that
any of the statutory terms it has chosen to employ are superfluous or void of significance.”
Kirtz, 601 U.S. at 53 (citation modified). This canon “can be meaningful when a competing
interpretation would avoid superfluity.” Bufkin v. Collins, 604 U.S. 369, 387 (2025).
A construction that makes all voting records and papers in the election officers’
possession subject to Title III would render “come into” superfluous. After all, Congress could
have designed Title III to cover all records broadly, as it did in the NVRA. The NVRA requires
States to make available for public inspection “all records concerning the implementation of
programs and activities conducted for the purpose of ensuring the accuracy and currency of
official lists of eligible voters.” 52 U.S.C. § 20507(i)(1). Congress used the narrower
language—“all records and papers which come into h[er] possession”—in Title III. Id. § 20701.
Reading Title III in a way that requires election officers to retain and preserve voting records and
papers that they obtain, acquire, or receive allows “come into [her] possession” to do real work.
The government makes several counterarguments. None of them persuade us.
First, the government argues that the qualified voter file is a record under Title III
because other courts have determined that statewide voter registration lists are “records” under
the NVRA. See Jud. Watch, Inc. v. Lamone, 399 F. Supp. 3d 425, 440 (D. Md. 2019). But
identical statutory terms may carry different meanings in different statutory schemes, or even
within different sections of the same statute. See Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 537

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(2015). Accordingly, that statewide voter registration lists may qualify as records under the
NVRA tells us nothing about whether such lists are records that come into the possession of
election officers under Title III.
Second, the government argues that it is entitled to the qualified voter file under Title III
because Benson would have acquired records from voters and then relied on those records in
creating the qualified voter file. The problem for the government is that it has not requested the
records or papers that Benson obtained in creating the qualified voter file—the government has
requested the qualified voter file itself.1 Nothing in Title III allows the government to obtain
something that the secretary of state created and established. See Mich. Comp. Laws
§ 168.509o(1). Not only that, but the qualified voter file contains information from diverse
sources, many of which have nothing to do with “act[s] requisite to voting.” See 52 U.S.C.
§ 20701. It includes information gathered from state health-department records as well as the
Social Security Death Index, to name just two examples. See Pub. Int. Legal Found. v. Benson,
136 F.4th 613, 626 (6th Cir. 2025).
1The qualified voter file contains the following information for qualified voters:
(a) The name; residence address including house number and street
name or rural route and box number, and the apartment number, if any; city;
state; zip code; and date of birth.
(b) The driver license number or state personal identification card
number or similar number issued by a designated voter registration agency.
(c) Jurisdictional information including county and city or township;
village, if any; metropolitan district, if any; and school district.
(d) Precinct numbers and ward numbers, if any.
(e) Any other information that the secretary of state determines is
necessary to assess the eligibility of qualified electors or to administer voter
registration or other aspects of the election process.
(f) Voting history for a 5-year period.
(g) Before June 30, 2025, the most recent digitized signature of an
elector if captured or reproduced by the secretary of state or a county, city, or
township clerk from a voter registration application under section 509hh, or
captured or reproduced by the secretary of state under section 307 of the
Michigan vehicle code. Beginning June 30, 2025, and subject to section
493b(7), the digitized signatures of an elector if captured or reproduced by the
secretary of state or a county, city, or township clerk from a voter registration
application under section 509hh, or captured or reproduced by the secretary of
state under section 307 of the Michigan vehicle code.
Mich. Comp. Law § 168.509q(1) (citation modified).

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Third, relying on United States Department of Justice v. Tax Analysts, Inc., 492 U.S. 136
(1989), the government argues that a person can come into possession of documents that she
creates. The government’s reliance on Tax Analysts is misplaced. The Court considered whether
certain materials were “agency records” under the Freedom of Information Act. Id. at 141. The
Court construed “agency records” broadly to include materials that an agency “either create[s] or
obtain[s].” Id. at 144 (quotation omitted). That expansive term captures self-generated
materials. But Tax Analysts provides no insight about the narrower term “come into h[er]
possession,” as Title III uses it.
Fourth, the government argues that the term “come into h[er] possession” imposes a
temporal obligation such that election officers must retain any voting records or papers that they
obtain or create for 22 months after a federal election. Even if we accept this as a correct
interpretation of Title III (it is not), this interpretation does not entitle the government to the
qualified voter file. In response to the NVRA’s enactment, the Michigan legislature directed the
Michigan secretary of state to create the qualified voter file, which became the official voter file
by 1998. Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 168.509n–p (1995). Thus, even under the government’s
strained interpretation, Benson did not come into possession of the qualified voter file within
22 months after the 2022 federal election—the time period subject to the government’s requests.
The qualified voter file had existed for decades before that election. And nothing in the statute
requires the production of a preexisting database that long predates the election at issue. The
better construction of Title III requires election officials to retain and preserve any voting records
or papers that they obtain, acquire, or receive for 22 months after a federal election.
The notion of a temporal distinction between coming into possession and being in
possession falls apart when considered in a different context. For instance, federal law makes it
a felony for a “Postal Service officer or employee” to destroy or open mail “which shall come
into his possession, and which was intended to be conveyed by mail.” 18 U.S.C. § 1703(a). This
statute criminalizes destroying or opening mail that a postal-service worker has acquired,
obtained, or received in the course of their employment—not self-generated mail. Yet under the
government’s rationale, a postal-service worker would commit a crime by opening or destroying
her own mail. But that cannot be right. And nothing in this statute suggests a temporal

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component—if at any time a postal-service worker destroys or opens another’s mail, that worker
has violated the statute.
Fifth, the government’s contention that our interpretation would “paralyze the United
States’ ability to enforce various federal voting laws” is unpersuasive. D. 25 at p.33. “Pure
policy considerations, of course, do not constitute a proper method of statutory interpretation.”
Reichert v. Kellogg Co., 170 F.4th 473, 487 (6th Cir. 2026).
Sixth, the government points to an opinion from the Department of Justice Office of
Legal Counsel (OLC), which concludes that Title III covers statewide voter registration lists such
as Michigan’s qualified voter file. Courts may accord “due respect to Executive Branch
interpretations of federal statutes.” Loper Bright, 603 U.S. at 385. That respect is “especially
warranted” when the Executive Branch issues its interpretation around the time of a statute’s
enactment and the interpretation remains “consistent over time.” Id. at 386. But that is not the
kind of interpretation we have here.
OLC issued the opinion the day before oral argument here, roughly 66 years after Title
III’s enactment. So the interpretation is, of course, not contemporaneous with the passage of
Title III. And the government has not shown that OLC’s opinion adheres to some earlier
Executive Branch interpretations of Title III. Not only that, for the reasons we have explained,
OLC’s opinion conflicts with the plain language of Title III. So we reject OLC’s interpretation
of Title III.
The dissent’s arguments fare no better as they largely rest on a mismatch between what
the government actually requested from Benson and what the dissent thinks the government
requested. The government sought Michigan’s unredacted voter list, and it said so plainly in its
August 8 and August 14, 2025 letters. And in its complaint, the government protests that Benson
provided only the public version of the voter list “without crucial identifying information” such
as “full date of birth, as well as driver’s license number and/or last four digits of social security
numbers.” R. 1, PageID 14. The dissent, however, believes that the government requested a
compilation of individual voter records used to create the voter list. But that is wrong. And it
taints the dissent’s entire analysis.

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B.
The government’s Title III claim falters for another reason—the government failed to
comply with § 20703. That provision requires election officers to produce “[a]ny record or paper
required by section 20701 . . . upon demand in writing by the Attorney General or his
representative.” 52 U.S.C. § 20703. “This demand shall contain a statement of the basis and
purpose therefor.” Id.2
The government sent three letters to Benson requesting Michigan’s unredacted qualified
voter file. The July 21 letter and the August 8 letter reference the NVRA and HAVA as the
authority entitling the government to the unredacted qualified voter file. Those letters did not
mention Title III. And even if we assume that the letters indicate a basis for the government’s
request, they do not identify a purpose for the request. The August 14 letter, by contrast,
mentions Title III and specifies the purpose for the government’s request for Michigan’s
qualified voter file. But that letter does not state a basis for the request.
“Shall” and “and” are important words in § 20703. “The use of the word ‘shall’” in a
statute “creates an obligation impervious to judicial discretion.” Smith v. Spizzirri, 601 U.S. 472,
476 (2024) (quotation omitted). The word “and” is a conjunction “whose function is to connect
specified terms.” Pulsifer v. United States, 601 U.S. 124, 133 (2024). It means “along with or
together with.” Id. (quotation omitted).
The government cannot pinpoint a Title III demand with a statement of the basis and
purpose. None of the three letters contains both a statement of the basis along with the purpose
of the government’s request for Michigan’s qualified voter file. The statutory context suggests
that any demand must contain both. For example, the Supreme Court concluded that several
federal agencies complied with their obligation under the Administrative Procedure Act to
“incorporate in the rules adopted a concise general statement of their basis and purpose,”
5 U.S.C. § 553(c), where the agencies’ final rules “explain[ed] that the rules were necessary to
2The dissent suggests that the question of whether the government has complied with § 20703 is “virtually
unreviewable by a federal court.” Dissent at 21. For support, the dissent relies on 60-year-old out-of-circuit caselaw
such as Kennedy v. Lynd, 306 F.2d 222 (5th Cir. 1962). But subsequent binding precedent from the Supreme Court
and this court carves out a role for the courts in reviewing civil investigative demands like the government’s. See,
e.g., United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 58 (1964); United States v. Markwood, 48 F.3d 969, 976 (6th Cir. 1995).

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protect sincerely held moral and religious objections and summariz[ed] the legal analysis
supporting the exemptions,” Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home v.
Pennsylvania, 591 U.S. 657, 686 (2020) (citation modified). Because the government did not
comply with its mandatory statutory obligation to submit a demand to Benson containing a
statement of both the basis and purpose of its request, Benson did not violate Title III by refusing
to produce the unredacted qualified voter file.
III.
For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.

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_________________
DISSENT
_________________
NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting. This complicated case turns on three
questions. The first asks us to distinguish between types of “records”: Must compilation records
like Michigan’s qualified voter file meet Title III’s requirements themselves, or is it enough that
their constituent parts satisfy the statute? The second asks us to parse Title III’s “come into . . .
possession” requirement: Assuming that Michigan’s voter file must itself “come” into Benson’s
“possession,” does it meet that requirement? 52 U.S.C. § 20701. And the third asks us to
determine whether the DOJ adequately stated its basis and purpose in seeking Michigan’s voter
list. Because my answer to these questions differs from the majority’s, I respectfully dissent.
First, I’ll explain why Michigan’s qualified voter file is a record that meets Title III’s
requirements because its constituent parts “c[a]me into” Benson’s “possession.” Id. Second, I’ll
explain why Title III covers some government-generated documents and doesn’t impose a strict
source-of-origin limitation. Thus, even if Michigan’s voter file must itself “come into” Benson’s
“possession” (as the majority demands), that requirement is met here. And third, I’ll briefly
address the majority’s conclusion that the Attorney General’s demand lacked a proper basis and
purpose.
I.
Title III’s text and structure clarify that the statute pertains to individual records. So
Michigan’s voter file is a record that needn’t itself “come into” Benson’s “possession” so long as
the file’s constituent records come into her possession. Id. And they do.
Title III’s “come into . . . possession” requirement refers to individual records—not to
compilations like Michigan’s voter file. The statute requires an election officer to retain “all
records and papers which come into [her] possession relating to any application, registration,
payment of poll tax, or other act requisite to voting in [an] election.” Id. So “relating to” and the
subsequent list of voting acts modify the statute’s “come into . . . possession” limitation. Id.
That enumerated list—applications, registrations, and poll tax payments—describes individual

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actions.1 What’s more, the word “any” provides the statute’s unit of coverage: the individual
application, the individual registration, the individual poll-tax payment. See Ali v. Fed. Bureau
of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 219 (2008) (“any” means “one or some . . . of whatever kind” (citation
modified)).
And here, the voter file’s component, individual records satisfy Title III. The file is a
compilation of externally sourced information—whether from state agencies, other states, the
federal government, or voters themselves. The district court said as much. See United States v.
Benson, 819 F. Supp. 3d 753, 769 (W.D. Mich. 2026) (noting that the file includes information
from “other state agencies,” “data from the . . . Social Security Administration,” “information
shared by other states,” and “information in voter registration applications”).2
Michigan’s voter file assumes the quality of being a record only because it’s composed of
individual records that independently satisfy Title III’s “come into possession” requirement.3
Therefore, the aggregate file needn’t come into Benson’s possession as a thing-in-itself.4 The
individual records meet the requirement, and that’s enough.5
The majority’s contrary holding is inconsistent with our responsibility to “make sense
rather than nonsense out of the corpus juris.” W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83,
101 (1991). It blesses Benson’s invocation of two modern statutes (the NVRA and HAVA) to
1Applying the canon of ejusdem generis, the “other act” catch-all applies to individual actions as well. See
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 114–15 (2001) (“[W]here general words follow specific words in a
statutory enumeration, the general words are construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects
enumerated by the preceding specific words.” (citation modified)).
2Individual voting histories aren’t externally sourced. But Benson admits that the Attorney General didn’t
request voting histories. Michigan Br. 32. Perhaps because the Attorney General didn’t consider them to be part of
the qualified voter list.
3The majority parses Title III’s enumeration of “application[s], registration[s], [and] payment[s] of poll
tax[es]” to conclude that Title III covers only records “from third parties—generally voters or prospective voters.”
Maj. Op. at 10. In so doing, the majority hunts for a nonexistent external-source limitation but fails to recognize the
statute’s heavy-handed textual and structural hints that its limiting language applies to individual records—not to
compilations of the individual records.
4This reading doesn’t render “come into . . . possession” superfluous because Michigan’s voter list is
composed of documents which satisfy that requirement. 52 U.S.C. § 20701.
5The majority confuses this conclusion with an assertion that the DOJ requested a compilation of individual
records used to create the voter list, rather than the list itself. Not so. The DOJ requested the list itself, but—as I
explained—the list’s constituent parts satisfy the CRA’s “come into . . . possession” requirement.

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shirk her obligations under an older one (Title III). On the majority’s view, the NVRA and
HAVA impose list-maintenance requirements that run afoul of Title III’s preservation
obligations, so Benson can comply with two statutes but simply ignore the third. I disagree.
The NVRA, HAVA, and Title III form one harmonious arrangement—just not in the way
the majority assumes. As I explained, the qualified voter file is a record only because it consists
of individual records that came into Benson’s possession. So when the Attorney General
requested the file, she requested its constituent individual records—which Michigan must
preserve under Title III. 52 U.S.C. § 20701. But Michigan also generates a current snapshot of
eligible voters. Title III’s preservation obligations run to the underlying individual records—not
to that current-eligibility snapshot. And though the NVRA and HAVA require Michigan to keep
that snapshot current through regular list maintenance, see id. §§ 20507(a)(4), 21083(a)(4)(A),
they don’t require Michigan to destroy the underlying records. So there’s no conflict. To see
why, note that the current-voter snapshot isn’t synonymous with the underlying records (which
form the list that the Attorney General seeks). Benson may update the snapshot at any time, but
she may not willfully “destroy[], conceal[], mutilate[], or alter[]” the underlying individual
records for the duration of Title III’s “twenty-two month[]” preservation period. Id. § 20701–02.
For example, she may add new voters to the list. That doesn’t “alter[]” an existing individual
record. Id. § 20702. Indeed, adding a new registration doesn’t touch existing records at all, as
the Attorney General observes. See Reply Br. 15–16 (“[U]pdating the list is supplementing it,
not ‘willfully’ altering it in a punishable sense.”). And Benson may update an existing voter’s
status or remove him from the current-voter list—if she preserves the underlying records. To
cite the Attorney General’s low-tech example, that’s akin to “inserting a new hardcopy voter-
registration card . . . in a binder-file that contains all the hardcopy voter-registration cards.” Id.
at 16.
The majority’s reading also contravenes the canon against implied repeal. Courts are
loath to conclude that subsequently enacted statutes impliedly repeal earlier ones unless
“provisions in two statutes are in irreconcilable conflict.” Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 273
(2003) (citation modified). And no such conflict exists here for the reasons I explained: Benson
can comply with HAVA and the NVRA by updating the voter file and comply with Title III by

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No. 26-1225 United States, et al. v. Benson, et al. Page 20
preserving the underlying individual records that “c[a]me” into her “possession.” 52 U.S.C.
§ 20701.
Thus, the Attorney General is entitled to the voter file as the aggregated form of
documents which are themselves subject to Title III disclosure. Benson can’t insulate individual
records from Title III disclosure by pointing to their present (and HAVA-mandated) aggregated
form.6
II.
But even on the majority’s view that an aggregate record must itself “come into”
Benson’s “possession,” Title III covers at least some government-generated records—including
Michigan’s voter file.
Let’s go back to the text. Title III requires “[e]very officer of election” to “retain and
preserve . . . all records and papers which come into [her] possession relating to any application,
registration, payment of poll tax, or other act requisite to voting.” Id. Our job is to “interpret the
words consistent with their ordinary meaning at the time Congress enacted the statute.” Wis.
Cent. Ltd. v. United States, 585 U.S. 274, 277 (2018) (citation modified).
So which “records . . . relating to . . . act[s] requisite to voting” might contemporaries
have understood to “come into” an election officer’s “possession”? 52 U.S.C. § 20701.
Contemporary problems provide the answer. One practice in the Jim Crow South was the use of
“voucher” systems, whereby municipalities required prospective voters to find registered voters
who could vouch for them. See Rep. of the U.S. Comm’n on Civ. Rights 93 (1959). And county
boards of registrars maintained internal indices that tracked the number of times each registered
voter “vouched” for an applicant. Id. So if a county board sent a voucher index to a state
election official, this index would have “come” into the state official’s “possession.” 52 U.S.C.
§ 20701. Even though government officials created the index, it came from an external source.
The same result obtains as a purely linguistic matter. The county board compiled voter-supplied
6Indeed, one district court rejected any form-based distinction between a voter file and its underlying
records and noted that the plaintiff’s request for a state’s voter file reflected the aggregated form of the underlying
records—not a request for the voter file as a thing of itself. See Jud. Watch, Inc. v. Lamone, 399 F. Supp. 3d 425,
440–41 (D. Md. 2019) (“[A] voter list is simply a pared down compilation of voter registrations.”).

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information, aggregated it into an index, and passed it up the ladder. So the state official came
into possession of the index. Look no further than the majority’s own sources. See, e.g.,
Acquire, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 18 (1961) (“to come into possession,
control, or power of disposal of”).
So too here.7 Even on the majority’s view that the aggregate record must come into
Benson’s possession, if Benson’s employees generated the voter file—and therefore didn’t
“come into . . . possession” of the list themselves—Benson nonetheless “c[a]me into . . .
possession” of the file when her employees sent it to her.8 52 U.S.C. § 20701. Text and
structure drive the point home. Title III focuses on individual “officer[s] of election” and
“person[s] having custody, possession, or control of such record[s] or paper[s].” Id. §§ 20701,
20703. As long as even one “officer[] of election”9 (i.e., Benson) “comes into . . . possession” of
the voter list, Title III applies. Id. § 20701.
III.
Finally, the Attorney General has stated a proper basis and purpose.
To start, at least one of our sister circuits has held that this question is virtually
unreviewable by a federal court: There’s “no place for any . . . procedural device . . . to ascertain
the factual support for, or the sufficiency of, the . . . basis and [] purpose [] set forth in the written
demand.” Kennedy v. Lynd, 306 F.2d 222, 226 (5th Cir. 1962); see also Coleman v. Kennedy,
313 F.2d 867, 868 (5th Cir. 1963) (per curiam) (“[T]he Attorney General [need only] identify in
7For what it’s worth, Benson and amici argue, based on their reading of “comes into . . . possession,” that
the statute doesn’t cover any internally or self-generated record. So if a county clerk were to keep track of anyone,
by race, who paid a poll tax or was given a literacy test or otherwise tried to register to vote, that record could not be
obtained by the DOJ. Broadly speaking, I’m skeptical that “comes into possession” is anything more than a
temporal and custodial limitation—not a broader limitation on the source of origin of a record.
Regardless, I don’t see a categorical restriction against “self-generated” records in the statute. And even
under Benson’s reading, such a document could be sent from one official to another and therefore come into the
recipient’s possession.
8Nor does this reading render “come into . . . possession,” 52 U.S.C. § 20701, superfluous because at a
minimum, that language cabins an election official’s liability to documents she received during her tenure.
9Title III defines “[o]fficer of election” broadly to include any person who, under color of law, “performs
or is authorized to perform any function . . . in connection with any application, registration, payment of poll tax, or
other act requisite to voting.” 52 U.S.C. § 20706.

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a general way the reasons for his demand. Clearly a sufficient statement would be the assertion
that the demand was made for the purpose of investigating possible violations of a Federal
statute. No showing even of a prima facie case of a violation of Federal law need be made.”
(citation modified)).10
But in any event, the DOJ’s letters establish a proper basis and purpose. The DOJ’s July
21, 2025 letter referred to Michigan’s NVRA11 and HAVA obligations. It explained that the
DOJ received a complaint alleging HAVA violations by Michigan, and it cited various anomalies
in Michigan’s voter registration data. The letter cited the NVRA but didn’t mention Title III.
Then, the DOJ sent a follow-up letter on August 14,12 which clarified that it’s “empowered by”
Title III to assess “Michigan’s compliance with the list maintenance requirements of the NVRA
and HAVA.” R.39-4, Letter, PageID 501. The majority strains to bifurcate the two letters into
discrete “demands” and concludes that neither passes muster. On its view, the July 21 letter
articulated a basis (purported anomalies in Michigan’s voter data) but no purpose. And while the
August 14 letter invoked a “purpose” (“to ascertain Michigan’s compliance with . . . the NVRA
and HAVA,” id.), it failed to recount the basis.
10Cases like United States v. Markwood, 48 F.3d 969, 976–77 (6th Cir. 1995), aren’t to the contrary
because the DOJ has met the “statutory requirements pertaining to the issuance and enforcement of the subpoena”
by providing a basis and purpose.
11Intervenors-appellees cite Public Interest Legal Foundation (PILF) v. Benson, 136 F.4th 613, 628 (6th
Cir. 2025), to suggest that the DOJ’s basis is inadequate given our recent characterization of Michigan’s list-
maintenance efforts as “more than reasonable” under the NVRA. True, we held there that the NVRA’s “reasonable
effort” requirement demands only a “serious attempt that is rational and sensible,” not a “perfect, or even optimal,”
attempt to remove all ineligible voters,” and that Michigan’s program met the requirement. Id. at 625. But in PILF,
a private organization sued Benson alleging that Michigan failed to conduct list maintenance. Id. at 624. The
parties sparred over discovery, see id. at 623, and our holding was cabined by the record developed in that case—
which uncovered low numbers of unremoved ineligible voters, id. at 626–29. But we didn’t hold that the DOJ is
foreclosed from developing a different (and better) record of Michigan’s NVRA non-compliance. And for good
reason. Like other investigative statutes, the CRA doesn’t deprive the DOJ of investigative authority when a private
plaintiff secures a favorable merits ruling on a different (and perhaps less-developed) record. The DOJ “can
investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being violated, or even just because it wants assurance that it is not.”
United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 F.3d 632, 642–43 (1950). And here, the DOJ cited statistics that paint a very
different picture of Michigan’s compliance with the NVRA. See R.39-2, Letter.
12The DOJ sent another letter on August 8, 2025 informing Benson that her request for “another 88 days to
respond . . . is not acceptable.” R.39-3, Letter, PageID 497. That letter isn’t relevant here.

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The majority concludes that the DOJ must provide its basis and purpose in one
communication. But it shuns the common-sense inquiry of whether the DOJ put Michigan on
notice.
To start, the Attorney General needn’t articulate a basis and a purpose in a single
communication. Title III refers to retention and preservation obligations “upon demand . . . by
the Attorney General.” 52 U.S.C. § 20703. It doesn’t refer to a demand. So the statute doesn’t
require that a single communication contain both a “basis” and a “purpose,” because two (or
more) communications could amount to one “demand.” Id. The provision’s sole use of the
indefinite article “a” is its requirement that “[t]his demand . . . contain a statement of the basis
and purpose therefor.” Id. (emphasis added). That’s consistent with my reading because, again,
two communications could compose one demand. Cf. Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 593 U.S. 155, 171
(2021) (concluding otherwise because, unlike here, the indefinite article “a” preceded the word
“notice”).
And regardless, the August 14 letter satisfies the CRA’s requirements. It invokes the
CRA and explicitly states a purpose: “to ascertain Michigan’s compliance with the list
maintenance requirements of the NVRA and HAVA.” R.39-4 at PageID 501. As for basis,
though the August 14 letter doesn’t spell out the litany of questionable registration practices
outlined in the July 21 letter, it refers to that earlier letter. See R.39-4 at PageID 500
(“clarify[ing] the DOJ’s existing “request”); id. (“[w]e have requested Michigan’s [voter list]”).
So any common-sense reading of the DOJ’s “purpose”—which invokes its CRA authority to
enforce the NVRA and HAVA—also contains a “basis” because (1) the DOJ referred to the
earlier letter, which specified the potential NVRA/HAVA violations, and (2) the DOJ referred to
the NVRA and HAVA in explaining its purpose. The July 21 letter and its basis, then, are
incorporated by reference into the August 14 letter.
IV.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

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