Charles H. Klein, Jr.; Annette Klein; Eric Havens; Shandra Havens v. United States Postal Service

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)
File Name: 26a0223p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
CHARLES H. KLEIN, JR.; ANNETTE KLEIN; ERIC
HAVENS; SHANDRA HAVENS,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE; MARY MITCHELL,
Postmaster, Georgetown Post Office, in her official
capacity; TERRENCE MANEY, Post Office Operations
Manager, in his official capacity,
Defendants-Appellees.
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No. 25-3965
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio at Cincinnati.
No. 1:24-cv-00672—Jeffery P. Hopkins, District Judge.
Argued: July 23, 2026
Decided and Filed: August 7, 2026
Before: BATCHELDER, MOORE, and THAPAR, Circuit Judges.
_________________
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Richard Ganulin, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellants. Douglas C. Dreier, UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellees. ON BRIEF:
Richard Ganulin, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellants. Douglas C. Dreier, Charles W. Scarborough,
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellees.
>

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_________________
OPINION
_________________
KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. The United States Postal Service delivers
the mail through snow, rain, heat, and gloom of night. It does not, however, deliver directly to
certain residential addresses on Hillman Ridge Road in Brown County, Ohio. Unhappy with this
situation, Plaintiffs Charles and Annette Klein and their neighbors Eric and Shandra Havens sued
in federal district court. Asserting a “class of one” equal-protection claim, they argue that the
Postal Service’s failure to deliver the mail to their property violates the Constitution. Because
their claim must instead be filed before the Postal Regulatory Commission, we AFFIRM the
district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ first amended complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Legal Background
Our nation’s semiquincentennial came this July 4, but our postal system reached the same
milestone almost a year earlier. On July 26, 1775, the Continental Congress established a
“[g]eneral post office” under the supervision of Benjamin Franklin, the first Postmaster General.
2 Journals of the Continental Congress 1774-1789, 208–09 (Government Printing Office 1905).
Fourteen years later, the Constitution gave Congress the authority “[t]o establish Post Offices
and post Roads.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 7. For nearly two centuries, Congress vested in the
Post Office Department the responsibility for delivering our nation’s mail. Nat’l Ass’n of
Greeting Card Publishers v. U.S. Postal Serv., 462 U.S. 810, 813 (1983). This ended with the
Postal Reorganization Act of 1970 (“PRA”), Pub. L. No. 91-375, 84 Stat. 719 (1970), which
“established the United States Postal Service as an independent agency under the direction of an
11-member Board of Governors.” Greeting Card Publishers, 462 U.S. at 813 (citing 39 U.S.C.
§§ 201–02).

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The PRA also created the Postal Rate Commission, an independent body with both
rulemaking and oversight responsibilities. PRA § 2, 84 Stat. at 759–60 (39 U.S.C. §§ 3601–04).1
In addition to these responsibilities, the PRA included a provision—codified at 39 U.S.C. § 3662
(entitled “Rate and service complaints”)—creating a procedure for the Rate Commission to hear
complaints by “[i]nterested parties who believe the Postal Service is charging rates which do not
conform to the policies set out in this title or who believe that they are not receiving postal
service in accordance with the policies of this title.” Id. at 764 (39 U.S.C. § 3662). On review of
such a complaint, the Rate Commission could recommend that the Postal Service’s Board of
Governors implement a remedy. Id. at 762 (39 U.S.C. § 3625). The Board’s decision whether to
adopt that recommendation was then reviewable by appeal to a “court of appeals of the United
States.” Id. at 763 (39 U.S.C. § 3628).
More than three decades later, Congress substantially amended the PRA by passing the
Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act of 2006 (“PAEA”), Pub. Law. No. 109-435, 120
Stat. 3198. The PAEA redesignated the Postal Rate Commission as the Postal Regulatory
Commission (hereinafter “Commission”). Id. § 604, 120 Stat. at 3241–42. The PAEA amended
§ 3662 as well, with that section now imbuing the Commission with the authority to hear
complaints that “the Postal Service is not operating in conformance with the requirements of the
provisions of sections 101(d), 401(2), 403(c), 404a, or 601.” 39 U.S.C. § 3662(a). The
Commission must act on such a complaint within 90 days by initiating proceedings or dismissing
the complaint. Id. § 3662(b). If the Commission ultimately “finds the complaint to be justified,
it shall order that the Postal Service take such action as the Commission considers appropriate in
order to achieve compliance with the applicable requirements and to remedy the effects of any
noncompliance.” Id. § 3662(c). Either party—the complainant or the Postal Service—may then
seek appellate review in the D.C. Circuit, which applies the Administrative Procedure Act’s
standards. Id. § 3663 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706). Relevant here, 39 U.S.C. § 403(c) provides that
the “Postal Service shall not, except as specifically authorized in this title, make any undue or
unreasonable discrimination among users of the mails, nor shall it grant any undue or
1Because § 2 of the PRA encompasses all of the Act’s additions to Title 39, we indicate the corresponding
section of code (as enacted) for ease of reference.

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unreasonable preferences to any such user.” That subsection has remained unchanged since the
PRA’s passage. See PRA § 2, 84 Stat. at 723 (39 U.S.C. § 403(c)).
B. Facts and Procedural Background
Plaintiffs live on Hillman Ridge Road, a single-lane road in Brown County, Ohio. R. 13
(FAC ¶¶ 12–13, 18) (Page ID #49, 50). In 2015, the local Postmaster approved a request to
place a mailbox at the end of the Kleins’ driveway. Id. ¶ 17 (Page ID #50). In 2017, however,
the Postal Service stopped delivering to that mailbox. Id. ¶¶ 18–20 (Page ID #50–51). The
Postmaster explained to the Kleins that the decision to discontinue direct delivery was because of
a confrontation between one of Plaintiffs’ neighbors and a mail carrier. Id. ¶ 18 (Page ID #50).
Without direct delivery, Plaintiffs must now travel to a mailbox about half a mile down the road
to retrieve letters and five miles into Georgetown, Ohio, for parcels. Id. ¶ 20 (Page ID #51).
In summer 2024, a “temporary Postmaster . . . informed Klein that he could restore the
mailbox to the end of his driveway,” but then retracted this promise after a “carrier refused to
travel the subject portion of the road and did not deliver mail to Klein.” Id. ¶ 24 (Page ID #51–
52). “[U]nder duress, Klein moved the mailbox back to the distant location.” Id. Other services
deliver to Plaintiffs’ properties, and the Postal Service continues to deliver the mail directly to
properties on similar single-lane roads in Brown County. Id. ¶¶ 26, 29 (Page ID #52).
Seeking redress, Plaintiffs sued the Postal Service, Georgetown Postmaster Mary
Mitchell, and Operations Manager Terrence Maney in federal district court in December 2024.
R. 1 (Compl.) (Page ID #1–10). They filed their amended complaint, which asserts a “class of
one” equal-protection claim, a few months later. R. 13 (FAC ¶¶ 31–35) (Page ID #53).
Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1). R. 16 (Mot. to Dismiss) (Page ID #59–68). The district court, finding that Plaintiffs’
“dispute[] belong[s] exclusively before the Postal Regulatory Commission,” granted the motion.
R. 21 (Op. & Order at 10–11) (Page ID #94–95). Plaintiffs timely appealed. R. 23 (Notice of
Appeal) (Page ID #97).

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II. ANALYSIS
Because Defendants have lodged a facial challenge to the district court’s subject matter
jurisdiction, we “treat[] the facts alleged in the complaint as true” and review the district court’s
decision de novo. W6 Rest. Grp., Ltd. v. Loeffler, 140 F.4th 344, 349 (6th Cir. 2025).
A. The Thunder Basin Framework
Plaintiffs allege that the Postal Service violated their constitutional right to equal
protection. And, as a general matter, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 “gives district courts authority over
constitutional claims.” Elgin v. Dep’t of Treasury, 567 U.S. 1, 9 (2012); see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”). Congress may, however, make exceptions
to this general grant of jurisdiction, including by “creat[ing] procedures ‘designed to permit
agency expertise to be brought to bear on particular problems.’” Free Enter. Fund v. Public Co.
Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 489 (2010) (quoting Whitney Nat’l Bank in Jefferson Parish
v. Bank of New Orleans & Tr. Co., 379 U.S. 411, 420 (1965)). When Congress creates such
procedures, they are usually held “to be exclusive.” Id. (quoting Whitney, 379 U.S. at 420).
To determine whether an administrative review scheme divests a district court of
jurisdiction over a constitutional claim, we employ a two-step process. To begin the first step,
we consider whether the review scheme would “‘deny any judicial forum for a colorable
constitutional claim,’” or whether it “simply channels judicial review of a constitutional claim to
a particular court.” Elgin, 567 U.S. at 9 (quoting Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988)). In
the former instance, “where Congress intends to preclude judicial review of constitutional
claims” entirely, “its intent to do so must be clear.” Id. (quoting Webster, 486 U.S. at 603). In
the latter, we “instead ask[] only whether Congress’ intent to preclude district court jurisdiction
[is] ‘fairly discernible in the statutory scheme.’” Id. at 9–10 (quoting Thunder Basin Coal Co. v.
Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 207 (1994)) (citation modified); see also Krafsur v. Davenport, 736 F.3d
1032, 1036 (6th Cir. 2013).
If such intent is fairly discernible, we proceed to step two, at which we consider
three questions regarding the particular constitutional or statutory claim at issue: (1) whether

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“‘a finding of preclusion could foreclose all meaningful judicial review’”; (2) whether “the suit is
‘wholly collateral to a statute’s review provisions’”; and (3) whether “the claim[] [is] ‘outside the
agency’s expertise.’” Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 489 (quoting Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at
212–13). These “three considerations[,] . . . commonly known now as the Thunder Basin
factors,” help courts determine “whether particular claims” concerning agency action are “‘of the
type Congress intended to be reviewed within th[e] statutory structure.’” Axon Enter., Inc. v.
Fed. Trade Comm’n, 598 U.S. 175, 186 (2023) (quoting Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 212). “The
first Thunder Basin factor recognizes that Congress rarely allows claims about agency action to
escape effective judicial review.” Id. “The second and third reflect in related ways the point of
special review provisions—to give the agency a heightened role in the matters it customarily
handles, and can apply distinctive knowledge to.” Id.
Two pairs of Supreme Court decisions inform our application of this framework. We
first consider Thunder Basin and Elgin. The former involved a coal company’s challenge to a
“Mine Act” requirement that the company provide its employees’ representatives—in this case,
non-employee union officials—with access to its workplace. 510 U.S. at 204–05. The company
raised both statutory and constitutional objections to the Mine Act and its review scheme, which
channeled enforcement challenges through the Federal Mine Safey and Health Review
Commission. Id. at 205–06. The Court held that Congress intended the company’s particular
claim to proceed through the agency process, finding that (1) the “petitioner’s statutory and
constitutional claims . . . can be meaningfully addressed in the Court of Appeals,” (2) the
challenge was not collateral to the issue of the petitioner’s rights and duties under the Mine Act,
and (3) “‘agency expertise [could] be brought to bear’” on the questions at issue. Id. at 214–15
(quoting Whitney, 379 U.S. at 420). Elgin, in turn, involved the Civil Service Reform Act’s
channeling of certain claims through the Merit Systems Protection Board (“MSPB”), with review
by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 567 U.S. at 5–6. The plaintiffs there, men who
failed to register for the Selective Service, challenged their dismissals as unconstitutional sex-
based discrimination. Id. at 6–8. After finding it “‘fairly discernible’ that Congress precluded
district court jurisdiction,” id. at 10, the Court considered the three Thunder Basin factors, id. at
16–23. Examining the review scheme in detail, the Court held that (1) the Federal Circuit stood
ready to review the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims; (2) the claims were not “wholly collateral”

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because the “constitutional claims [were] the vehicle by which” the plaintiffs sought “to reverse
the removal decisions”; and (3) the issues involved in their claims fell “squarely within the
MSPB’s expertise.” Id. at 22–23.
The Supreme Court reached the opposite conclusion in Free Enterprise Fund and Axon,
each of which involved “challenges . . . to the structure or very existence of an agency.” Axon,
598 U.S. at 189. Because these challenges were “about subjection to an illegitimate proceeding,”
post-proceeding judicial review would “come too late to be meaningful.” Id. at 191. The nature
of the challenge in those cases was therefore also “collateral” because “[t]he parties’ separation-
of-powers claims d[id] not relate to the subject of the enforcement actions.” Id. at 193. Finally,
because the agencies in those cases knew “nothing special about the separation of powers,” the
claims clearly fell outside their expertise. Id. at 194.
B. Step One
We begin with step one of the analysis, looking to whether the PAEA, “by specifying a
different method to resolve claims about agency action,” implicitly supplants § 1331’s grant of
jurisdiction. Axon, 598 U.S. at 185. To do so, we ask whether it is “fairly discernible” that
Congress intended claims within the Commission’s ambit to proceed exclusively through the
PAEA’s administrative review scheme. Elgin, 567 U.S. at 10. That is because, as in Elgin, the
scheme does not completely foreclose judicial review of Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims. See id.
at 9–10. A party unhappy with the Commission’s final decision has an unqualified right to seek
review in the D.C. Circuit, 39 U.S.C. § 3663, which may decide whether the Commission’s
decision was “contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity,” 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(B).2 Upon review of the PAEA’s text, structure, context, and purpose, Congress’s
intent to supplant federal district court jurisdiction over those matters expressly placed within the
Commission’s purview is fairly discernible.
2We leave it to the Commission to decide in the first instance whether it may grant Plaintiffs relief on
constitutional grounds, or whether it may only apply the framework in 39 U.S.C. § 403(c), which prevents
“unreasonable discrimination,” to the extent that provision’s protections deviate from the Constitution’s. We note,
however, the Postal Service’s concession at oral argument that whether or not the “Commission would opine on
whether an act was constitutional or not,” “the D.C. Circuit would indeed have jurisdiction . . . to decide this equal
protection class of one claim.” Oral Arg. Audio at 13:57–14:25.

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Text. The PAEA established the Commission as a body of “5 Commissioners, appointed
by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.” 39 U.S.C. § 502. The
Commission may consider “[r]ate and service complaints” arising under several statutory
provisions, id. § 3662(a), including complaints that the Postal Service has engaged in “undue or
unreasonable discrimination among users of the mails,” id. § 403(c). Once a complaint is filed,
the Commission may not dither—it must within 90 days either initiate proceedings or dismiss the
complaint, and “issue a written statement setting forth the bases of its determination.” Id.
§ 3662(b). The Commission may appoint from its ranks of its staff and Administrative Law
Judges a presiding officer to manage a complaint, 39 C.F.R. § 3010.106, and it has enacted
regulations governing the processing of such complaints, id §§ 3022.1–50. The presiding
officers are empowered to “administer oaths, examine witnesses, take depositions, . . . receive
evidence,” “issue subpoenas,” and “order the taking of depositions.” 39 U.S.C. § 504(f)(1)–(2).
If a complaint is ultimately found “to be justified,” the Commission will require the Postal
Service to take remedial action “in order to achieve compliance with the applicable
requirements.” Id. § 3662(c). After the conclusion of proceedings, any unsatisfied party may
petition for review in the D.C. Circuit. Id. § 3663.
All this considered, we agree with the D.C. Circuit’s recent holding that this text
“contains all the hallmarks of a statutory scheme that precludes district court jurisdiction.” New
York v. Trump, --- F.4th ---, 2026 WL 2023744, at *3 (D.C. Cir. July 14, 2026). This
comprehensive textual channeling of service- and rate-related grievances to the Commission
strongly suggests that Congress intended that the Commission’s jurisdiction over such
complaints “[is] to be exclusive.” Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 489 (quoting Whitney, 379 U.S.
at 420).
Plaintiffs respond by arguing that § 3662(a)’s permissive language, which provides that
an aggrieved party “may lodge a complaint,” (emphasis added) suggests that Congress intended
to allow an aggrieved party the choice between filing a complaint with the Commission or in
federal district court. D. 22 (Appellant Br. at 14–15). We disagree, and read the use of “may” as
simply indicating that the decision whether or not to file a complaint at all lies with the aggrieved
party. The fact that a party “may lodge a complaint” with the Commission does not necessarily

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mean that it may do so in any other way. This reading is consistent with ordinary English usage.
We would not read a sign stating that job applicants “may schedule an interview during a
timeslot on Wednesday” as implying that they may also schedule interviews on another day or
may apply through some other means. And, as the D.C. Circuit noted in addressing the same
argument, “other statutory schemes containing similar language” have been “found to preclude
district court jurisdiction.” New York, 2026 WL 2023744, at *3 (citing Elgin, 567 U.S. at 12–13;
Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 207–08; Miriyeva v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 9 F.4th 935,
939–40 (D.C. Cir. 2021)). The civil-service scheme in Elgin, for instance, provides that “[a]n
employee . . . may submit an appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board.” 5 U.S.C. § 7701(a)
(emphasis added). We cannot agree with Plaintiffs that the similar language here merits a
different result.
Structure and context. The Act’s structure and the context in which it was enacted also
support our conclusion. To start, 39 U.S.C. § 409(a), which provides for federal district court
jurisdiction over actions by or against the Postal Service, limits that jurisdictional grant with the
words “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this title.” This indicates that such exceptions exist in
Title 39, or else the qualifying language would be unnecessary surplusage. And Plaintiffs do not
identify (nor are we aware of) any other potential limitation apart from the provisions in
§§ 3662–63, suggesting that these provisions provide the exception that § 409(a) references.
The interpretive context in which the PAEA was passed likewise demonstrates that
§§ 3662–63 are exactly the limitations on jurisdiction Congress had in mind. Under the pre-
PAEA version of the PRA, 39 U.S.C. § 409(a) read: “[e]xcept as provided in section 3628 of
this title.” PRA § 2, 84 Stat. at 725 (39 U.S.C. § 409(a)). Section 3628, in turn, was the pre-
PAEA provision providing for appellate review of Postal Rate Commission proceedings. Id. at
763. This demonstrates an intent to divide potential claims against the Postal Service into two
mutually exclusive categories: (1) those which may be filed in federal district court and (2) those
which are cognizable on a petition for review in a federal court of appeals. Courts, including
ours, therefore interpreted the PRA’s original structure as precluding federal district court
jurisdiction over rate- and service-related complaints. See Enter., Inc. v. Bolger, 774 F.2d 159,
161–62 (6th Cir. 1985) (per curiam); Erickson v. U.S. Post Off., No. 06-186, 2006 WL 2583158,

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at *2 (D. Minn. Sep. 7, 2006); LeMay v. U.S. Postal Serv., 450 F.3d 797, 799–801 (8th Cir.
2006); Bovard v. U.S. Postal Serv., No. 94-6360, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 3846, at *3–4 (10th
Cir. Feb. 24, 1995); Village of Niles v. U.S. Postal Serv., No. 84 C 10102, 1985 WL 2900, at *4
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 1985); Tedesco v. U.S. Postal Serv., 553 F. Supp. 1387, 1390 (W.D. Pa.
1983). Our decision in Enterprise, Inc. was clear that this logic extended to complaints
challenging a “mail rate or classification decision” on constitutional grounds. 774 F.2d at 161–
62 (noting that “Congress can require that a constitutional challenge be made only under the
special statutory procedure established in an act”).
The PAEA, while expanding the Commission’s authority, changing its name, and
specifying the complaints encompassed by § 3662, largely preserved the PRA’s review structure.
By retaining—if not strengthening—this scheme, Congress may be presumed to have ratified the
pre-PAEA judicial consensus. See Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 239–40 (2009)
(“Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and
to adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without change.” (quoting Lorillard v.
Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978)). If the PAEA Congress wanted to reopen district courts to cases
like Plaintiffs’, it could (and should) have made that clear.
Purpose. The legislative purpose and history underlying the 1970 and 2006 Acts also
reveal Congress’s intent that the Commission have exclusive jurisdiction over service- and rate-
related complaints. Elgin, 567 U.S. at 10 (“To determine whether it is ‘fairly discernible’ that
Congress precluded district court jurisdiction over petitioners’ claims, we examine the CSRA’s
text, structure, and purpose.”); see also Axon, 598 U.S. at 186 (looking to Congress’s intent).
The PRA set up the Postal Service as a self-governing and self-supporting business. Franchise
Tax Bd. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 467 U.S. 512, 519–20 (1984). And the PAEA vests in the
Commission the day-to-day oversight of that business enterprise. See H.R. Rep. No. 109-66, pt.
1, at 52 (2005) (envisioning the Postal Regulatory Commission’s “enhanced authority” to
quickly and effectively “respond to complaints of pricing, service, or other actions by the Postal
Service in violation of law”); Enter. Inc., 774 F.3d at 161 (reviewing PRA’s legislative history
and finding “Congressional intent that even constitutional questions . . . should be raised initially
at the agency level”). By allowing for accelerated and expert review of rate and service

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complaints, the PRA and PAEA reduce the litigation burden that might arise from dealing with
such matters in federal district court. See LeMay, 450 F.3d at 800 (“The PRA’s legislative
history shows that, in crafting the Act, Congress intended to minimize external intrusions on the
Postal Service’s managerial independence.”). This “integrated scheme of review,” which allows
an expert body to deal with complaints covered by § 3662 in the first instance, could “be
seriously undermined if, as [Plaintiffs] would have it,” anyone unhappy with their local post
office’s operations could elude the Commission’s jurisdiction by framing their complaint in
constitutional terms. Elgin, 567 U.S. at 14.
We therefore hold at step one of the Thunder Basin framework that the PAEA gives the
Commission, not federal district courts, jurisdiction over § 3662 complaints. And because
Plaintiffs’ complaint, at bottom, is one alleging “unreasonable discrimination among users of the
mails,” 39 U.S.C. § 403(c), it involves the “particular problems” over which the Commission’s
“procedures are to be exclusive,” Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 489 (citation modified).
C. Step Two
Plaintiffs fare no better at step two, because each of the three Thunder Basin factors
indicates that this particular case belongs before the Postal Regulatory Commission. First,
“preclusion of district court jurisdiction” will not “‘foreclose all meaningful judicial review.’”
Axon, 598 U.S. at 190 (quoting Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 212–13). Plaintiffs may present their
claim to the Postal Regulatory Commission in the form of a complaint that “the Postal Service is
not operating in conformance with the requirements of the provisions of section[] . . . 403(c).”
39 U.S.C. § 3662(a). They may incorporate into that complaint their constitutional claim that the
Postal Service’s refusal to deliver directly to their addresses violates their right to equal
protection. The Commission must then either initiate proceedings on the complaint or dismiss it.
Id. § 3662(b). If the Commission fails to act on the complaint, dismisses it, or if the proceedings
end unfavorably, Plaintiffs may then seek review in the D.C. Circuit, id. §§ 3662(b), 3663, which
stands ready to consider whether the Commission’s actions were “contrary to constitutional
right, power, privilege, or immunity,” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B); see 39 U.S.C. § 3663 (incorporating
Administrative Procedure Act standard of review); GameFly, Inc. v. Postal Regul. Comm’n, 704
F.3d 145, 146 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (requiring Commission to remedy discriminatory Postal Service

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rates under 39 U.S.C. § 403(c)). There is thus little reason to question the D.C. Circuit’s ability,
affirmed by that court’s own recent decision in New York, to searchingly review this sort of
agency action. 2026 WL 2023744, at *4.
Second, far from being “wholly collateral to [the] statute’s review provisions,” Plaintiffs’
equal-protection challenge mirrors the type of complaint the Commission is tasked with
handling. Elgin, 567 U.S. at 15 (quoting Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 489). Plaintiffs do not,
like the parties in Free Enterprise Fund or Axon, challenge the very authority of the Postal
Regulatory Commission to act. See New York, 2026 WL 2023744, at *6 (holding that claim
there was “not like a structural constitutional claim, which would normally be resolved by
courts”). Instead, Plaintiffs’ “constitutional claims are the vehicle by which they seek to” litigate
their claim that the Postal Service is improperly discriminating against them by failing to deliver
down their street—a claim that fits comfortably within § 403(c)’s terms. Elgin, 567 U.S. at 22.
The two claims may in fact be nearly identical. To prevail on a “class of one” equal-
protection challenge, Plaintiffs must show that they were “intentionally treated differently from
others similarly situated and that there [was] no rational basis for the difference in treatment.”
Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (per curiam). This sounds quite a lot
like § 403(c)’s prohibition on “unreasonable discrimination among users of the mails.” If
anything, the constitutional claim presents a higher hurdle than the equivalent statutory claim,
because “a ‘class of one’ theory requires proof of intentional discrimination.” Fouts v. Warren
City Council, 97 F.4th 459, 470 (6th Cir. 2024). In any event, these similarities demonstrate the
logic behind the second Thunder Basin factor. Allowing for a “class of one” equal-protection
claim to proceed in federal district court simply because a plaintiff claims it is “wholly
collateral” to the statutory review scheme could wreak havoc on administrative review schemes
everywhere. An enterprising plaintiff could reframe just about any arbitrary-and-capricious
challenge or other complaint as a claim that an agency treated them differently with no rational
basis, see Olech, 528 U.S. at 564, thus circumventing congressional efforts to require agency
review.
Third, Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims do not fall outside the Postal Regulatory
Commission’s expertise. See Elgin, 567 U.S. at 22–23. To be sure, the Commission is not

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expert in constitutional law, but neither was the MSPB in Elgin or the Federal Mine Safety and
Health Commission in Thunder Basin. See id.; Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 214–15. Its expertise
on matters postal may nevertheless be “brought to bear” on the issues at hand, including whether
any rational basis exists for the Postal Service’s refusal to deliver on Hillman Ridge Road.
Elgin, 567 U.S. at 23 (quoting Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 215). That factual question is at the
core of determining whether any violation, constitutional or statutory, occurred. In this respect,
the Commission “can apply distinctive knowledge” not possessed by federal district courts.
Axon, 598 U.S. at 186.
All three Thunder Basin factors therefore indicate that Plaintiffs’ “claim is ‘of the type’
Congress thought belonged within [the] statutory scheme.” Axon, 598 U.S. at 188–89 (quoting
Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 212). This helps explain why courts, including ours, have all held
that the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over claims like Plaintiffs’, even when they are
framed as constitutional issues. See, e.g., Torp v. United States, No. 21-1422, 2022 U.S. App.
LEXIS 2824, at *5–7 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2022) (order); White v. U.S. Post Off., No. 23-1239, 2024
WL 2973705, at *2 (10th Cir. June 13, 2024); Glover v. Thompson, No. 20-10313, 2022 WL
2405362, at *3–5 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 11, 2022); Pep-Wku, LLC v. U.S. Postal Serv., No. 1:20-cv-9,
2020 WL 2090514, at *2–3 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 30, 2020); Powell v. U.S. Postal Serv., No. 15-
12913-FDS, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12175, at *3–5 (D. Mass. Feb. 2, 2016). We agree with
those decisions and hold that a plaintiff bringing a “class of one” equal-protection challenge to
the Postal Service’s “services. . . [,] classifications, rates, [or] fees” must do so by filing a
complaint with the Commission. 39 U.S.C. §§ 403(c), 3662.
III. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ complaint for
lack of jurisdiction.

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