Brian Eugene Hux v. Randall L. Williams

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 26a0324n.06
No. 24-5903
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
BRIAN EUGENE HUX,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
RANDALL L. WILLIAMS,
Defendant-Appellant
KNOX COUNTY, TENNESSEE, et al.
Defendant.
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ON APPEAL FROM THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE EASTERN
DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
OPINION
Before: CLAY, GIBBONS, and BLOOMEKATZ, Circuit Judges.
CLAY, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Brian Eugene Hux filed this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
and Tennessee state law against Defendants Randall Williams and Knox County, Tennessee.
Under § 1983, Plaintiff claimed that Defendant Williams violated his Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights against excessive force and unlawful stops and seizures. Plaintiff also raised a
Monell claim against Defendant Knox County under a failure-to-train and supervise theory.
Defendant Williams filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint, but the district court denied
granting qualified immunity to Defendant Williams as to Plaintiff’s § 1983 Fourth Amendment
unlawful seizure claim. Defendant Williams now appeals the district court’s denial of qualified
immunity. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment denying
qualified immunity.

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I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
Around 3:19 P.M. on October 10, 2022, Defendant Williams was on patrol when he
received a “be on the lookout” (“BOLO”) call from the Knox County Sheriff’s Office (“KCSO”)
to search for a man named Matthew Messer, who was suspected of evading the police after being
placed on “police hold” pending his treatment at the University of Tennessee Medical Center
(“UTMC”). First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), R. 20, PageID #96 ¶ 29. The dispatcher told
Defendant that Messer was a 6-foot-tall 34-year-old white male with long brown hair. Defendant
also knew that Messer had been charged with non-violent misdemeanors.
Around 4:18 P.M. that same day, Defendant was on patrol and discovered Plaintiff walking
along grass next to a roadway in South Knox County, Tennessee. Defendant thought Plaintiff
matched Messer’s descriptions, but Plaintiff was a fair bit different. At the time, Plaintiff was 64
years old, measured 5-feet 9-inches in height, weighed around 150 pounds, had a beard and
mustache, and had long hair that had been dyed purple closer to his roots and was brown towards
its ends. Regardless, Defendant “initiated” his patrol vehicle’s emergency lights and “attempted
to make contact.” Id. at PageID #97 ¶ 30.
This encounter went poorly. Upon exiting his vehicle, Defendant ran towards Plaintiff and
twice shouted “[c]ome here,” to which Plaintiff twice responded, “what for?” Id. at PageID #97
¶ 33; Body Camera Footage, R. 16, at 00:32–00:36. Plaintiff moved briskly away from Defendant
onto the pavement for a couple of seconds while Defendant ran towards him with a taser. Plaintiff
then started to run away from Defendant. Body Camera Footage, R. 16, at 00:40. Once Defendant
got within 8 feet of Plaintiff, he warned Plaintiff that he was going to tase him and pulled the
trigger. The taser prongs hit Plaintiff and he seized up and crashed face-first onto the pavement.

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While blood “streamed freely” from Plaintiff’s head and face and while Plaintiff “moan[ed] and
groan[ed] in pain,” Defendant instructed Plaintiff not to “fucking move” and that he would “tase
[Plaintiff] again, if [Plaintiff] move[d].” FAC, R. 20, at PageID #98 ¶ 35; Body Camera Footage,
R. 16, at 02:12–02:15. Defendant also blamed Plaintiff’s injuries on his decision to run and asked
him why he was “running from the cops,” to which Plaintiff explained that “he had got a warrant”
for his arrest. FAC, R. 20, PageID #98 ¶ 36; Body Camera Footage, R. 16, at 04:30–04:50.
Defendant radioed for an ambulance. Plaintiff was admitted to the intensive care unit at
UTMC for treatment, where a University of Tennessee security officer quickly confirmed that
Plaintiff was not Matthew Messer. As a result of this incident, Plaintiff suffered several “severe
and life-threatening injuries, including an ‘intracranial hemorrhage and skull base fracture with
associated narrowing of the basilar artery.’” FAC, R. 20, PageID #101 ¶ 45. Additionally, KSCO
impounded and auctioned off Plaintiff’s car while he was recovering at UTMC. Plaintiff now lives
in a residential facility because he is no longer able to live without assistance.
B. Procedural History
In 2023, Plaintiff filed this suit against Defendant Williams, several unnamed officer
defendants, and Knox County. He claimed that Defendant Williams violated his Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights against excessive force and unlawful stops and seizures under
42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988. He also raised a Monell claim against Defendant Knox County under
a failure-to-train and supervise theory under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988. Plaintiff then raised
Tennessee battery and negligence claims against Defendants Williams and Knox County, as well
as a reckless or intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against Defendant Williams.
As relevant to the instant case, Defendant Williams moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s excessive
force, unlawful stop and seizure, and Tennessee state law claims on the grounds that those claims

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were barred by qualified immunity. The district court granted in part and denied in part this
motion, first declining to dismiss Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment unlawful stop and seizure claim
by finding that qualified immunity did not apply to Defendant Williams’ alleged conduct. The
court, however, found that qualified immunity protected Defendant Williams from Plaintiff’s
excessive force and Tennessee battery claims and subsequently dismissed those claims.1 The court
also dismissed the remaining state law claims against Defendant Williams. Defendant Williams
timely appealed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity as to Plaintiff’s Fourth
Amendment unlawful stop and seizure claim.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
We review “de novo a district court’s denial of a defendant’s motion to dismiss on qualified
immunity grounds.” Marvaso v. Sanchez, 971 F.3d 599, 605 (6th Cir. 2020). We may do so “on
an interlocutory basis so long as [the dismissal] ‘turns on an issue of law.’” DeVooght v. City of
Warren, 157 F.4th 893, 898 (6th Cir. 2025) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530
(1985)). “[W]e lack jurisdiction to review orders denying qualified immunity if genuine factual
issues remain.” Id.
“[T]o overcome a defendant’s qualified immunity defense at the motion to dismiss stage,
a plaintiff must plausibly allege facts showing ‘(1) that the official violated a statutory or
constitutional right, and (2) that the right was clearly established at the time of the challenged
1 The district court relied on our precedents in Rudlaff v. Gillispie, 791 F.3d 638, 641 (6th Cir. 2015) and
Perez v. Simpson, 83 F.4th 1029, 1031 (6th Cir. 2023) to hold that Defendant Williams did not use excessive force
when he tased Plaintiff because Plaintiff actively resisted arrest by fleeing from Defendant Williams. While Plaintiff’s
§ 1983 Fourth Amendment excessive force claim is not properly before us on interlocutory appeal, we note that our
precedents support such a holding only if a suspect is actively resisting arrest. Relatedly, we have previously held that
an “officer’s simple request to ‘come here,’” without more, did not constitute a stop because the individual “could
have politely declined to do so, and walked away.” United States v. Matthews, 278 F.3d 560, 562 (6th Cir. 2002),
abrogated on other grounds by United States v. McMurray, 653 F.3d 367 (6th Cir. 2011).

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conduct.’” Marvaso, 971 F.3d at 605 (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011)).
“This is a low bar, given that granting qualified immunity at the motion to dismiss stage is usually
disfavored.” Id. (citing Courtright v. City of Battle Creek, 839 F.3d 513, 518 (6th Cir. 2016)).
B. Analysis
1. Jurisdiction on Interlocutory Appeal
As a threshold matter, Plaintiff contends that we lack jurisdiction to consider the district
court’s denial of qualified immunity to Defendant Williams over Plaintiff’s § 1983 Fourth
Amendment unlawful seizure claim. Plaintiff claims that Defendant’s appeal improperly
“cross[es] over the fact-law line,” and thus genuine factual issues remain which make interlocutory
review inappropriate. Plaintiff’s Br., at 21 (quoting Berryman v. Rieger, 150 F.3d 561, 563 (6th
Cir. 1998)).
We disagree. We have jurisdiction to review a district court’s denial of qualified immunity
at the motion-to-dismiss stage. DeLanis v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 160 F.4th
732, 737 (6th Cir. 2025). Plaintiff’s concern that Defendant improperly raises questions of fact on
interlocutory appeal, as explained in Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 307 (1995), “applies only to
cases that reach summary judgment.” Delanis, 160 F.4th at 737. “Because we must credit all
well-pleaded facts at the pleading stage, no factual disputes exist and Johnson thus is ‘not
triggered.’” Id. (quoting Myers v. City of Centerville, 41 F.4th 746, 757 (6th Cir. 2022)).
Accordingly, we may consider Defendant Williams’s arguments against the district court’s denial
of qualified immunity.
2. Plaintiff has a Constitutional Right and a Legally Cognizable Interest to Be Free
from Unlawful Seizures
Defendant Williams first claims that the Plaintiff’s outstanding warrant for his arrest
deprived him of any cognizable liberty interest or legal right against being unlawfully stopped and

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detained. According to Defendant, this defeats Plaintiff’s § 1983 Fourth Amendment claim in two
ways: (1) Plaintiff purportedly suffered no cognizable injury to have standing to sue; and
(2) Plaintiff could not be deprived of a liberty interest he did not have.
These propositions are not supportable. There is no question that Plaintiff has a right to
challenge the unreasonable seizure of his own person. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968)
(“No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of
every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or
interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.” (quoting Union Pac.
Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891))). This right applies regardless of whether an
individual has outstanding warrants for their arrest. Cf. United States v. Ivy, 165 F.3d 397, 404
(6th Cir. 1998) (“The guarantees of the Fourth Amendment do not expire merely because an
individual is suspected of a crime; indeed, it is in such a situation that the protections against illegal
police search and seizure become most meaningful. The occasional benefits that compliance with
the Fourth Amendment confers upon the guilty must be recognized as a necessary consequence of
guaranteeing constitutional protections for all members of our community.”). Thus, an outstanding
warrant does not rob an individual of a liberty interest against the unreasonable seizure of their
person.
Against this backdrop, we reject both of Defendant’s approaches. Regarding standing, “[a]
party invoking federal-court jurisdiction must show (1) an injury in fact, (2) causation, and (3)
redressability.” Mackinac Ctr. for Pub. Pol’y v. United States Dep’t of Educ., 175 F.4th 692, 700
(6th Cir. 2026) (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)). “An injury in fact
is ‘an invasion of a legally protected interest’ that is ‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’” Id. (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330,

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339 (2016)). An injury to one’s constitutional rights is a prototypical injury in fact. See FDA v.
All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. 367, 381 (2024). Plaintiff alleges an injury to his Fourth
Amendment constitutional right against unreasonable seizure that was caused by Defendant
Williams and can be redressed by this Court. Accordingly, Plaintiff has standing to sue Defendant
for this alleged deprivation of his constitutional rights. See id. at 380–81.
Similarly, Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff had no liberty interest that the alleged
unlawful seizure could deprive also fails. To adequately plead a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must
allege “(1) that he or she was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United
States; and (2) that the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of law.” Robertson v.
Lucas, 753 F.3d 606, 614 (6th Cir. 2014). As discussed, there is no question that Plaintiff has a
constitutional right against unlawful seizures and that Defendant, as alleged, deprived him of that
right. See Terry, 392 U.S at 9. Thus, Plaintiff’s § 1983 Fourth Amendment unlawful seizure claim
does not fail as a matter of law, and the district court did not err when it found that Plaintiff had
sufficiently alleged a violation of that right.
3. Qualified Immunity
a. Constitutional Right Violation
The Fourth Amendment protects the people “against unreasonable searches and seizures.”
U.S. Const. amend. IV. “A ‘seizure’ triggering the Fourth Amendment’s protections occurs only
when government actors have, ‘by means of physical force or show of authority, . . . in some way
restrained the liberty of a citizen.’” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989) (quoting
Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16). “A warrantless search or seizure is ‘per se unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions.’” United States v. Pearce, 531 F.3d 374, 379–80 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting United

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States v. Roark, 36 F.3d 14, 17 (6th Cir. 1994)). Those exceptions include “(1) consensual
encounters in which contact is initiated by a police officer without any articulable reason
whatsoever and the citizen is briefly asked questions; (2) a temporary involuntary detention or
Terry stop which must be predicated upon ‘reasonable suspicion;’ and (3) arrests which must be
based upon ‘probable cause.’” Id. at 380 (quoting United States v. Alston, 375 F.3d 408, 411 (6th
Cir. 2004)).
At issue in this appeal is the second exception: whether Defendant Williams could have
lawfully “conduct[ed] a brief, investigatory stop” because he “ha[d] a reasonable articulable
suspicion that criminal activity [was] afoot.” Id. (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123
(2000)). “To determine whether a particular stop is permissible under the Fourth Amendment, a
court ‘must look at the totality of the circumstances of the case to see whether the detaining officer
has a particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing. This process allows
officers to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and
deductions about the cumulative information available to them that ‘might well elude an untrained
person.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002)) (citation modified).
“While ‘reasonable suspicion’ is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a
showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence, the Fourth Amendment requires at
least a minimal level of objective justification for making the stop.” Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123.
“The officer must be able to articulate more than an ‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or
hunch’ of criminal activity.” Id. at 123–24 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27).
Defendant contends that he had or acquired reasonable suspicion to detain Plaintiff before
or during his encounter with Plaintiff. First, Defendant claims that the total mix of information
available to Defendant from the BOLO call description of Messer and what Defendant observed

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would have furnished any reasonable officer with the reasonable suspicion necessary to stop and
detain Plaintiff. Second, he claims that Plaintiff’s “flight” from Defendant also provided
reasonable suspicion to then justify an investigatory stop.
Defendant lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop on Plaintiff. Prior to his
confrontation with Plaintiff, Defendant was only armed with the BOLO call’s description of
Messer and Defendant’s observations of Plaintiff’s physical appearance. As discussed, the BOLO
call described Messer as a 6-foot tall 34-year-old white male with long brown hair. From
Defendant’s perspective, it was unreasonable to stop Plaintiff from this information alone.
Plaintiff was a 5-foot 9-inch 64-year-old white male with facial hair and long hair, the color of
which was either partially or entirely purple. Though Plaintiff was initially walking a few yards
from Defendant in the shade at the start of the encounter, thereby possibly making it difficult for
Defendant to differentiate purple from brown and discern Plaintiff’s exact height, Plaintiff’s
relatively advanced age should have immediately disqualified him as Messer in the eyes of a
reasonable officer. The district court thus did not err when it found that these circumstances did
not justify reasonable suspicion to detain Plaintiff.
Plaintiff’s subsequent provoked flight also did not supply Defendant with reasonable
suspicion. Normally, “when an officer, without reasonable suspicion or probable cause,
approaches an individual, the individual has a right to ignore the police and go about his business.”
Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125. “[A]ny ‘refusal to cooperate, without more, does not furnish the
minimal level of objective justification needed for a detention or seizure.’” Id. (quoting Florida
v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991)).
To be sure, an individual’s conduct during an unlawful stop may give rise to reasonable
suspicion. For example, “if a suspect’s response to an illegal stop is itself a new distinct crime,

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then the police constitutionally may arrest the suspect for that crime.” United States v. Allen, 619
F.3d 518, 526 (6th Cir. 2010) (citation modified). Additionally, an individual’s unprovoked flight
from the police may furnish an officer with the necessary reasonable suspicion to conduct an
investigatory stop. See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125; see also United States v. Jeter, 721 F.3d 746,
753–54 (6th Cir. 2013).
Neither of these situations, however, applies in the instant appeal. Plaintiff initially ignored
Defendant’s two commands to “come here,” as was his right. Body Camera Footage, R. 16, at
00:32–00:36; see Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125. Plaintiff did not begin his “flight,” or his running
away from Defendant, until after Defendant began to run toward Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s flight was
thus provoked and in response to being charged by Defendant. Cf. Jeter, 721 F.3d at 754 (“If
police officers put a defendant in reasonable fear of physical harm, that might also qualify as
provocation.”). In such a scenario, Plaintiff’s flight, without more, does not provide Defendant
with the necessary reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop. The district court thus
did not err when it found that Defendant provoked Plaintiff’s flight and thus lacked reasonable
suspicion to lawfully detain Plaintiff.
b. Clearly Established Law
When a plaintiff demonstrates that an “‘officer’s conduct violated a constitutional
right[,]’ . . . we next ask ‘whether the right was clearly established . . . in light of the specific
context of the case.’” Binay v. Bettendorf, 601 F.3d 640, 646 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Scott v.
Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 377 (2007)). “A right is clearly established for purposes of overcoming the
qualified immunity defense only when ‘existing precedent [has] placed the statutory or
constitutional question beyond debate,’ although we do not require ‘a case directly on point.’”
Ouza v. City of Dearborn Heights, 969 F.3d 265, 275 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S.

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at 741). Plaintiff “bears the burden of showing that an officer is not entitled to qualified
immunity.” Schulkers v. Kammer, 955 F.3d 520, 533 (6th Cir. 2020). Furthermore, “where the
violation was sufficiently ‘obvious’ under the general standards of constitutional care[,] . . . the
plaintiff need not show ‘a body’ of ‘materially similar’ case law” to demonstrate a clearly
established right. Lyons v. City of Xenia, 417 F.3d 565, 579 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Brosseau v.
Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 199 (2004)).
Plaintiff easily meets this burden. It was clearly established at the time of the offense that
an officer must have reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop. See Terry, 392 U.S.
at 30. As discussed above, Defendant Williams never acquired reasonable suspicion to detain
Plaintiff. Defendant’s conduct thus violated Plaintiff’s clearly established right against
unreasonable seizures of his person.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment denying
qualified immunity.

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