United States of America v. Jeffrey I. Battle

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 26a0346n.06
Case No. 25-3723
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JEFFREY I. BATTLE,
Defendant-Appellant.
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ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF
OHIO
OPINION
Before: SILER, DAVIS, and RITZ, Circuit Judges.
SILER, Circuit Judge. Defendant Jeffrey I. Battle challenges the procedural
reasonableness of his sentence and claims ineffective assistance of counsel. We AFFIRM.
I. Background
In April 2024, an informant told investigators that Battle was distributing large quantities
of drugs around Mahoning County, Ohio. After receiving this information, law enforcement began
investigating Battle.
While surveilling a residence in Austintown, Ohio, investigators witnessed Battle arrive in
a rental truck. Subsequently, on numerous occasions, the investigators watched Battle carry items
to and from his rental truck and the residence. In August 2024, investigators saw Battle leave the
Austintown residence, enter a rental truck, and then arrive at a clothing store. Battle exited the
clothing store carrying an empty duffle bag.
Later that day, investigators watched Battle drive the rental truck to a truck stop parking
lot. Battle parked next to a semitruck, and he carried a duffle bag from the semitruck to the rear

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passenger seat of the rental truck. Another individual then loaded a second duffle bag into the
same seat. Shortly thereafter, Battle departed.
Law enforcement subsequently attempted to conduct a traffic stop on Battle’s rental truck.
Battle pulled the rental truck to the right side of the roadway, but he continued moving down an
exit ramp at around 15 miles per hour. When law enforcement pulled in front of the rental truck,
Battle abruptly turned left. As he turned, Battle struck an officer’s vehicle and fled, accelerating
to 90 miles per hour. Law enforcement eventually found the rental truck abandoned in a residential
area.
Upon searching the vehicle, law enforcement discovered two duffle bags containing
methamphetamine. One of the duffle bags matched the one that investigators had observed Battle
carrying earlier. Lab testing later confirmed that the duffle bags contained 36.9 kilograms of
methamphetamine. Law enforcement searched the area around the abandoned rental truck, found
Battle hiding, and arrested him.
Following this incident, the government filed a one-count indictment charging Battle with
possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and
(b)(1)(A). Battle later pled guilty without a plea agreement to the charge.
Prior to sentencing, probation issued a presentence report (PSR), which applied the federal
sentencing guidelines to calculate Battle’s offense level and criminal history category. The PSR
assigned Battle a base offense level of 38 because he possessed 4.5 kilograms or more of
methamphetamine. The PSR then assigned an additional two levels for obstruction of justice
because Battle struck a law enforcement vehicle and fled at high speeds. The PSR subtracted three
levels for Battle’s acceptance of responsibility, resulting in a total offense level of 37.

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Because Battle was convicted of marijuana possession in December 2015, the PSR
assigned Battle one criminal history point, which landed him in a criminal history category of I.
Battle objected to parts of the PSR. As relevant, he claimed that he was entitled to a
“downward departure” from his criminal history category under USSG § 4A1.3 cmt. n.3(A)(ii)
because his prior marijuana possession conviction did not involve an intent to sell or distribute the
drug. As a result, he claimed that he qualified as zero-point offender under USSG § 4C1.1. He
also contended that, in accordance with amendments to the sentencing guidelines adopted in April
2025, he was “simply a courier or mule” (as set forth in USSG § 2D1.1(e)(2)(B)(i)) and that he
thus qualified for a mitigating role reduction1 under USSG § 3B1.2.
Following the PSR, Battle filed a sentencing memorandum on his own behalf. He
reiterated his prior objections to the PSR and argued that he participated only “minimally” in the
drug trafficking operation and that he “never exceeded the lowest level of his organization’s drug
trafficking function.”
At sentencing, Battle argued that he was entitled to “a downward departure for the
defendant’s Criminal History Category and . . . that he should be a zero-point offender and not a
one-point.” On this issue, the district court observed that § 4A1.3 cmt. n.3(A)(ii) did not permit
1 The guidelines differentiate between minor participants and minimal participants with respect to
mitigating role reductions. USSG § 3B1.2. In his objections to the PSR, Battle stated that he
qualified as a “minor” participant rather than a “minimal” participant. Battle also requested a two-
level reduction, which suggests he was arguing for a minor role reduction under § 3B1.2(b). But
his reference to being a “courier” is an argument that he qualified as a minimal participant. See
§ 2D1.1(e)(2)(B)(i) stating that “[a]n adjustment under § 3B1.2(a) [the minimal participant
reduction] is generally warranted if the defendant’s primary function in the offense was plainly
among the lowest level of drug trafficking functions, such as serving as a courier”). Thus, it is
unclear whether Battle argued for a minimal or minor participant reduction in his objections to the
PSR.

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this outcome because it “applies the departure to a defendant’s Criminal History Category and Mr.
Battle already falls into Criminal History Category I, so there’s nothing to depart from.”
Regarding the mitigating role reduction under § 3B1.2, the district court stated its belief
that Battle was arguing for a reduction based on his alleged role as a “drug mule or courier.” In
response, Battle did not attempt to modify the court’s understanding. The government contended
that Battle was not “a simple [courier]” and that Battle had not “qualified for any kind of role
reduction.” Battle’s counsel countered that Battle “was simply a mule.”
On this issue, the district court stated that a mitigating role reduction “is generally
warranted if the defendant’s primary function is plainly among the lowest level of drug trafficking
functions, such as serving as a courier.” The district court observed that Battle was trafficking a
large quantity of methamphetamine—an amount beyond typical “mule or courier quantities.” And
the court determined that he did not play the role of “a lookout or low level member of a drug
conspiracy.” The court noted that Battle had used commercial trucks to transport the drugs, and it
rejected Battle’s argument on this issue.
The court then credited a three-point deduction for Battle’s acceptance of responsibility.
Finally, the district court concluded that Battle’s total offense level was 37 and that with a Criminal
History Category of I, Battle had a sentencing range of 210 to 262 months.
Following the discussion of the sentencing guidelines, the district court heard argument
and sentenced Battle to a prison term of 216 months and a term of supervised release of 10 years.
II. Discussion
A. The Marijuana Conviction
Battle argues that his conviction for possession of marijuana should not count toward his
criminal history because marijuana possession is like the offenses enumerated in § 4A1.2(c)(1)

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and (c)(2). In response, the government first contends that Battle’s argument regarding § 4A1.2(c)
is forfeited. And the government argues that the district court did not plainly err when it found
that Battle’s marijuana conviction should count.
If a defendant receives any criminal history points under USSG § 4A1.1(c), then that
defendant cannot qualify as a zero-point offender under § 4C1.1(a). The reason is simple: to
qualify as a zero-point offender, a defendant must meet certain criteria, including that “the
defendant did not receive any criminal history points from Chapter Four, Part A.” § 4C1.1(a)(1).
A defendant receives criminal history points for sentences resulting from felony
convictions and certain misdemeanor convictions. USSG § 4A1.1(c). A misdemeanor sentence
typically counts toward a defendant’s criminal history, subject to two exceptions. USSG
§ 4A1.2(c). Under the first, § 4A1.2(c)(1), sentences for the enumerated offenses below are
“counted only if” the sentence was either “a term of probation of more than one year or a term of
imprisonment of at least thirty days” or “the prior offense was similar to an instant offense” for
which the defendant is being sentenced:
Careless or reckless driving
Contempt of court
Disorderly conduct or disturbing the peace
Driving without a license or with a revoked or suspended license
False information to a police officer
Gambling
Hindering or failure to obey a police officer
Insufficient funds check
Leaving the scene of an accident
Non-support
Prostitution
Resisting arrest
Trespassing.

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USSG § 4A1.2(c)(1). Likewise, if a defendant’s misdemeanor conviction is like one of the
following offenses it is “never counted” toward the criminal history calculation:
Fish and game violations
Hitchhiking
Juvenile status offenses and truancy
Local ordinance violations (except those violations that are also
violations under state criminal law)
Loitering
Minor traffic infractions (e.g., speeding)
Public intoxication
Vagrancy.
USSG § 4A1.2(c)(2). To determine whether an offense is “similar” to an offense in § 4A1.2(c)(1)
and (c)(2), the court should use a “common sense approach.” USSG § 4A1.2(c) cmt. n.12(A).
That common sense approach “includes consideration of relevant factors” such as:
(i) a comparison of punishments imposed for the listed and unlisted offenses;
(ii) the perceived seriousness of the offense as indicated by the level of punishment;
(iii) the elements of the offense;
(iv) the level of culpability involved; and
(v) the degree to which the commission of the offense indicates a likelihood of
recurring criminal conduct.
Id.
In the district court, Battle objected to the PSR, arguing that he was entitled to a “downward
departure” for his criminal history category under § 4A1.3 cmt. n.3(A)(ii) and § 4C1.1(a) because
he possessed marijuana without intent to sell or distribute it. Now, Battle argues that the district
court should not have added a criminal history point for his marijuana conviction because it is like
one of the offenses in § 4A1.2(c)(1) or § 4A1.2(c)(2). This is a challenge to the procedural
reasonableness of his sentence, as it questions the court’s application of the sentencing guidelines.
See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Ordinarily, we review challenges to the
procedural reasonableness of a sentence for an abuse of discretion. Id. But because Battle did not

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raise this objection below, we review this claim for plain error. See United States v. Cooper, No.
23-2058, 2025 WL 429915, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb. 7, 2025).
The problem with Battle’s argument on this issue is straightforward: We have consistently
held that a prior conviction for marijuana possession does not meet one of the exceptions contained
in § 4A1.2(c). See, e.g., United States v. Stubblefield, 265 F.3d 345, 347 (6th Cir. 2001); United
States v. Collins, 600 F. App’x. 433, 435-37 (6th Cir. 2015); United States v. Tatum, 743 F. App’x
589, 594 (6th Cir. 2018). Because this issue is reviewed for plain error and because we have
consistently held that marijuana possession is unlike the offenses in § 4A1.2(c), Battle cannot show
that any error was “obvious or clear.” See Collins, 600 F. App’x at 437 (citation modified);
Cooper, 2025 WL 429915, at *2 (concluding the same).
Battle attempts to avoid this conclusion by acknowledging our past precedents and arguing
that his case is different. Specifically, Battle notes that since our decision in Tatum, many states
have legalized marijuana possession and that the state where Battle committed the possession
offense (Arizona) is one of these. So, he contends that marijuana possession is no longer a serious
offense and is now like the offenses listed in § 4A1.2(c). This argument ignores that, following
Tatum, we have continued deciding this issue against the defendants raising them. See Cooper,
2025 WL 429915, at *2; United States v. Solomon, No. 23-3854, 2024 WL 3675603, at *3-4 (6th
Cir. Aug. 6, 2024); United States v. Malory, No. 22-2110, 2023 WL 7550018, at *3-5 (6th Cir.
Nov. 14, 2023). So, the assertion that the marijuana-legalization movement changes the analysis
runs head-long into our continued adherence to Stubblefield, Collins, and Tatum.
B. Mitigating Role Reduction
Battle argues that the district court erred by assessing whether Battle was a minimal
participant when he had raised a claim that he was a minor participant in the drug trafficking

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scheme. In response, the government argues that, although Battle initially argued that he was a
minor participant, he later confined his argument to being a minimal participant in the drug
trafficking scheme.
As relevant, § 3B1.2 “provides a range of adjustments for a defendant who plays a part in
committing the offense that makes him substantially less culpable than the average participant in
the criminal activity.” USSG § 3B1.2 cmt. n.3(A). In particular, the defendant’s offense level is
decreased if the defendant is either a “minimal participant” in the criminal activity or a “minor
participant” in the criminal activity. USSG § 3B1.2(a), (b).
A minimal participant reduction provides the biggest reduction and “is generally warranted
if the defendant’s primary function in the offense was plainly among the lowest level of drug
trafficking functions, such as serving as a courier, running errands, sending or receiving phone
calls or messages, or acting as a lookout.” USSG § 2D1.1(e)(2)(B)(i). A minor participant
reduction is appropriate if “the defendant’s primary function in the offense was performing another
low-level trafficking function, such as distributing controlled substances in user-level quantities
for little or no monetary compensation or with a primary motivation other than profit.” USSG
§ 2D1.1(e)(2)(B)(ii). Finally, whether a minimal or minor participant adjustment is warranted
turns on the totality of the circumstances. USSG § 3B1.2 cmt. n.3(C). And, in evaluating the
circumstances, courts should consider “the following non-exhaustive list of factors”:
(i) the degree to which the defendant understood the scope and structure of the
criminal activity;
(ii) the degree to which the defendant participated in planning or organizing the
criminal activity;
(iii) the degree to which the defendant exercised decision-making authority or
influenced the exercise of decision-making authority;

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(iv) the nature and extent of the defendant’s participation in the commission of
the criminal activity, including the acts the defendant performed and the
responsibility and discretion the defendant had in performing those acts;
(v) the degree to which the defendant stood to benefit from the criminal activity.
Id.
Although Battle’s initial arguments regarding the mitigating role reduction were unclear,
Battle subsequently clarified in his sentencing memorandum and at sentencing that he was seeking
a minimal participant reduction under § 3B1.2(a) rather than a minor participant reduction under
§ 3B1.2(b).
Accordingly, at sentencing, the district court stated its belief that Battle was arguing for a
minimal participant reduction. The district court then recited the standard for a minimal participant
reduction under § 2D1.1(e)(2)(B)(i)—that a mitigating role reduction “is generally warranted if
the defendant’s primary function is plainly among the lowest level of drug trafficking functions,
such as serving as a courier.” The court concluded that the minimal participant reduction did not
apply because Battle was more than a courier. Because the district court applied the minimal
participant standard to Battle’s claim for a minimal participant reduction, it did not apply an
incorrect standard.
Despite the above, Battle additionally contends that the district court erred because it failed
to consider the totality of the circumstances in concluding that Battle was not entitled to a
mitigating role reduction. In its analysis, the court focused on two points: the quantity of
methamphetamine Battle was transporting and his use of commercial trucks to transport the drugs.
It also noted that Battle was not a mere “lookout.” Thus, the court gave consideration to “the
nature and extent of the defendant’s participation” in the drug trafficking operation under § 3B1.2
cmt. n.3(C)(iv). And, by referencing the use of commercial trucks, the court appeared to consider

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“the degree to which the defendant understood the scope and structure of the criminal activity”
and Battle’s “planning or organizing” role within the drug trafficking operation under § 3B1.2 cmt.
n.3(C)(i), (ii). In other words, the district court weighed the factors in § 3B1.2 cmt. n.3(C) and
thus assessed the totality of the circumstances.
C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Battle also urges that his counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that his conviction for
marijuana possession is like the offenses in § 4A1.2(c). But we disfavor reviewing ineffective
assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal because the record is typically inadequate to evaluate
such claims. United States v. Ferguson, 669 F.3d 756, 762 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Massaro v.
United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504-05 (2003)). And here we find that the record is inadequate
because nothing at the sentencing hearing related to why Battle’s counsel made certain arguments,
declined to raise others, or whether his counsel was ineffective. So, we decline to review this
claim. Despite this, Battle may still raise his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in a “proper
post-conviction hearing.” United States v. Josic, 324 F. App’x 472, 482 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing
United States v. Wunder, 919 F.2d 34, 37 (6th Cir. 1990)).
III. Conclusion
For the above reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

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