United States of America v. Terrill A. Walker

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted July 3, 2012∗
Decided July 6, 2012
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge
WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge
ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge
No. 11-3895
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
TERRILL A. WALKER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United
States District Court for the
Southern District of Illinois.
No. 99-40013-GPM-01
G. Patrick Murphy, Judge.
Order
After the Sentencing Commission reduced the Guideline ranges for crack-cocaine
offenses, and made that change retroactive, Terrill Walker applied for a reduction under
18 U.S.C. §3582(c)(2). Walker's lawyer and counsel for the United States agreed that the
sentence should be reduced from 248 months to 197 months. The district judge issued a
revised judgment implementing the parties’ agreement.
∗ This successive appeal has been submitted to the original panel under Operating Procedure 6(b). Judge
Rovner has been substituted for Judge Coffey, who has retired. After examining the briefs and the record,
we have concluded that oral argument is unnecessary. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); Cir. R. 34(f).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 11-3895 Page 2
Despite receiving exactly the relief he requested, Walker filed a notice of appeal.
(Actually, he filed a document captioned “Abuse of Discretion”, which the district clerk
sensibly treated as a notice of appeal.)
The United States contends that Walker has waived any entitlement to a further
reduction. That is correct; a litigant who receives the relief he requests is not aggrieved
by the judgment and is not entitled to further review. Moreover, the arguments that
Walker presents in his appellate brief suppose that §3582(c)(2) authorizes a full
resentencing. He contends that the district judge erred by not completing all steps
required for imposing an original sentence. But the Supreme Court has held that
§3582(c)(2) does not authorize full resentencing, see Dillon v. United States, 130 S. Ct.
2683 (2010), so Walker’s argument is frivolous on the merits in addition to being
waived.
AFFIRMED

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