W.g.a. v. JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General of the United States

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 16‐4193
W.G.A.,
Petitioner,
v.
J EFFERSON B. SESSIONS III,
Attorney General of the United States,
Respondent.
____________________
Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals.
No. Axxx‐xxx‐xxx.
____________________
A RGUED J ANUARY 18, 2018 — D ECIDED A UGUST 21, 2018
____________________
Before SYKES and H AMILTON, Circuit Judges, and LEE ,
District Judge. *
HAMILTON , Circuit Judge. In 2015, tattooed members of the
Mara 18 gang held a gun to petitioner W.G.A.’s head and
* Of the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.

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2 No. 16‐4193
threatened to kill him.1 The Mara 18—also known as the
“Calle 18,” “Barrio 18,” or “Eighteenth Street” gang—is one
of the two main gangs operating in El Salvador. Together with
their rivals, MS‐13, the Mara 18 terrorize the Salvadoran pop‐
ulation and government. The gangs use violence to exercise
an enormous degree of social control over their territories,
dictating where residents can walk, whom they can talk to,
what they can wear, and when they must be inside their
homes. The gangs have orchestrated labor strikes, brokered a
now‐defunct truce with the government, and plotted to bomb
government buildings. They brag about influencing elections
and controlling political campaigns within their territories.
They extort millions of dollars from local businesses through
threats of violence, and they are largely responsible for El Sal‐
vador’s homicide rate—one of the highest in the world.2 Two
days after the Mara 18 threatened W.G.A., he fled to the
United States.
The Department of Homeland Security apprehended
W.G.A. for illegally entering the United States and began re‐
moval proceedings against him. W.G.A. applied for asylum,
1 We refer to petitioner with an initialed pseudonym to protect his
identity. See Doe v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 445, 446 (7th Cir. 2007).
2 According to a report in the record by the U.S. Department of State,
the 2015 homicide rate in El Salvador was 103 murders per year for every
100,000 citizens. For context, Chicago has a murder rate of about 17.5 hom‐
icides per 100,000 inhabitants. Matthew Friedman, Ames Grawert & James
Cullen, NYU School of Law Brennan Center for Justice, Crime in 2016: Up‐
dated Analysis, Table 2, p. 3 (data updated Dec. 19, 2016), available at
http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/crime‐2016‐updated‐analysis.
The State Department estimates that the national homicide rate in the
United States is about 4.5 murders per year per 100,000 citizens.

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No. 16‐4193 3
statutory withholding of removal, and deferral of removal un‐
der Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture, arguing that
the Mara 18 gang would kill him if he returned to El Salvador.
The immigration judge denied his applications and ordered
removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed
W.G.A.’s appeal, and he petitions this court for review. We
grant W.G.A.’s petition for review and remand to the Board
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. Factual & Procedural Background
W.G.A. is a citizen of El Salvador who arrived in the
United States in January 2016. The immigration judge found
W.G.A. credible, and the Board of Immigration Appeals af‐
firmed that finding. We use W.G.A.’s testimony and the im‐
migration judge’s findings to provide the factual context in
this case.
W.G.A. grew up in a small farming community of about
170 families. In 2013, the Mara 18 gang began operating in his
rural community. By 2015 there were about 20 local gang
members. The gang engaged in their usual activities: extort‐
ing la renta, or “rent,” from local businesses, recruiting young
men as new members, and “disappearing” (as a transitive
verb) those who refused to join.
One day in 2014, petitioner’s younger brother S.R.P. failed
to return home from a trip to the store. Petitioner and his
mother searched for S.R.P. When they could not find him,
they guessed that the gang had forcibly recruited him. About
two months later, S.R.P. called petitioner. He was crying and
said that he did not know where he was and could not talk
long because the gang might kill him. S.R.P. then hung up ab‐

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4 No. 16‐4193
ruptly. Petitioner told his mother of the call, but neither con‐
tacted the police because they felt it would be useless. They
had seen others in their community seek help from the police
without success. Others had disappeared after reporting
crimes to police.
A few months later, the family learned that S.R.P. had
been arrested. Petitioner’s mother attended a court proceed‐
ing, where she saw that S.R.P. had a gang tattoo on his hand.
S.R.P. remained in prison until November 2015 when, on the
day of his release, he called W.G.A. to say that he did not want
to be a part of the gang anymore. S.R.P. said he could not
come home for fear of what the gang would do, but he did not
tell W.G.A. where he was going. W.G.A. assumed that his
brother headed toward Guatemala.
The next day, a man called W.G.A. from a private number.
The man told W.G.A. to “be careful” and that “they’re looking
for you,” and hung up without identifying himself. The fol‐
lowing day—two days after S.R.P. left prison—four tattooed
gang members approached W.G.A. at his house. They asked
him where his brother was. When W.G.A. responded that he
did not know, one man grabbed him by the collar of his shirt,
threw him to the ground, drew a gun, and put it to his head.
One of the men told petitioner: “if you don’t [hand] over your
brother, you’re going to die here.” 3 The men told W.G.A. that
he had four days to comply or they would kill him. They also
told him that they would kill him and his family if anyone
spoke to the police.
3 The transcript reads: “if you don’t have over your brother, you’re
going to die here.” We read “have” as a typographical error.

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No. 16‐4193 5
Fearing for his life, W.G.A. fled two days later. He traveled
through Guatemala and Mexico to the United States. Since
W.G.A. left El Salvador, gang members have repeatedly
threatened his family—over the phone and in person—to de‐
mand his and his brother’s whereabouts. Petitioner’s mother
was so frightened by the threats that she arranged for her
other teenage son, J.R.P., to go into hiding.
In January 2016, W.G.A. entered the United States through
Texas without valid entry documents. The Department of
Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against
him. See 8 C.F.R. § 1239.1. W.G.A. conceded that he was re‐
movable under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). He then applied
for asylum under 8 U.S.C. § 1158, withholding of removal un‐
der 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3), and deferral of removal under Arti‐
cle 3 of the Convention Against Torture, 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c),
1208.18.
The immigration judge concluded that W.G.A. did not
qualify for any of his asserted grounds of relief and ordered
removal. W.G.A. appealed to the Board of Immigration Ap‐
peals, which agreed with the immigration judge and dis‐
missed W.G.A.’s appeal. The immigration judge’s order of re‐
moval became final, see 8 C.F.R. § 1241.1(a), and W.G.A. peti‐
tioned for review in this court, see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), (b)(1).
While W.G.A.’s appeal was pending before the Board, DHS
wrongfully removed him to El Salvador. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.6(a) (staying execution of immigration decisions while
appeal is pending). This removal did not affect the Board’s or
our jurisdiction. Matter of Diaz‐Garcia, 25 I. & N. Dec. 794 (BIA
2012); Marin‐Rodriguez v. Holder, 612 F.3d 591, 593–94 (7th Cir.
2010). We ordered briefing on whether we had the authority
to order DHS to permit W.G.A. to return to the United States

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6 No. 16‐4193
while his appeal was pending. Rather than litigate the issue
further, the government agreed to facilitate W.G.A.’s return.
The parties have successfully returned W.G.A. to the United
States, where he remains detained.
II. Scope of Review
It is helpful to start by clarifying the scope of our review.
The answer depends on whether the Board’s order is inde‐
pendent of or supplemented the immigration judge’s deci‐
sion. See Liu v. Ashcroft, 380 F.3d 307, 311 (7th Cir. 2004). When
the Board issues an independent opinion that replaces the im‐
migration judge’s reasoning with its own, our review is lim‐
ited to the Board’s opinion. Jabateh v. Lynch, 845 F.3d 332, 337
(7th Cir. 2017), citing Sarhan v. Holder, 658 F.3d 649, 653 (7th
Cir. 2011). Our review is broader when the Board relies on the
immigration judge’s findings and supplements that opinion
“with additional observations.” Sarhan, 658 F.3d at 653. In
those cases, we review the immigration judge’s findings as
supplemented by the Board’s. Id., citing Mema v. Gonzales, 474
F.3d 412, 416 (7th Cir. 2007). In a footnote, W.G.A. states that
our review is limited to the Board’s opinion. The Attorney
General argues that the Board’s order was supplementary to
the immigration judge’s decision. We agree with the Attorney
General’s reading and see no reason in this case to narrow our
review.
III. Asylum and Withholding of Removal
To qualify for asylum, W.G.A. must show that he is “un‐
able or unwilling to return” to El Salvador “because of perse‐
cution or a well‐founded fear of persecution.” 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1158(b)(1)(A), 1101(a)(42)(A). The persecution must be “on

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No. 16‐4193 7
account of” one of five protected grounds: “race, religion, na‐
tionality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.” § 1101(a)(42)(A). If W.G.A. proves that he was per‐
secuted in the past because of one or more of the protected
grounds, he is presumed to have a well‐founded fear of future
persecution on the same grounds. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1). The
Attorney General can rebut that presumption by showing that
country conditions have changed or that W.G.A. can safely
relocate to another part of El Salvador. § 1208.13(b)(1),
(b)(1)(i). Withholding of removal is similar. The Attorney
General must withhold removal of W.G.A. if his “life or free‐
dom would be threatened in” El Salvador because of one of
the same five protected grounds. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). If
he shows past persecution, W.G.A. is again entitled to a re‐
buttable presumption that his life or freedom would be threat‐
ened. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(1)(i).
W.G.A. has shown past persecution. He testified, and the
immigration judge credited his testimony, that the Mara 18
threatened his life at gunpoint. That point is not in dispute in
this case. The Board found that the threat amounted to perse‐
cution. See Nakibuka v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 473, 477 (7th Cir.
2005) (“A death threat, especially one that is accompanied by
an attacker pressing a gun to the victim’s head, is a serious
factor supporting a finding of persecution.”), citing Boykov v.
INS, 109 F.3d 413, 416 (7th Cir. 1997), and Mitev v. INS, 67 F.3d
1325, 1331 (7th Cir. 1995).
The first disputed issue is whether the persecution was
motivated by a reason covered by the asylum statutes. W.G.A.
contends that the gang was motivated by his membership in
one of two particular social groups: (1) members of his nu‐

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8 No. 16‐4193
clear family or (2) family members of tattooed former Salva‐
doran gang members. The immigration judge and the Board
found that this persecution was not sufficiently connected to
W.G.A.’s membership in a particular social group. We decide
the issue by addressing two questions: (1) whether W.G.A.
has shown that he is a member of a qualifying social group;
and (2) whether he has shown that the Mara 18 persecuted
him on account of his membership in that group. We agree
with W.G.A. that he has identified a cognizable social group
and that the record compels the conclusion that the Mara 18
persecuted him on account of his membership in it.
A. General Remand
We first address the Attorney General’s request for a gen‐
eral remand. The Attorney General made no substantive ar‐
guments related to asylum or withholding of removal in this
appeal. Instead, he requests that we remand to the Board for
reconsideration without engaging in any review ourselves.
In some past cases, we have allowed the Attorney General
to seek a remand without confessing error so that the Board
can reconsider asylum decisions “in light of the emerging case
law.” Ren v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 446, 448 (7th Cir. 2006). In some
cases where we have accommodated these requests, we have
been disappointed: the Board has disregarded the Attorney
General’s stated reasons for remand. See, e.g. Reyes‐Mendez v.
Lynch, 629 Fed. App’x 757, 761 (7th Cir. 2015) (criticizing
Board for repeating “its social‐group analysis word for word”
after the Attorney General requested general remand for
Board to reconsider social‐group analysis); see also Marin‐
Rodriguez v. Holder, 612 F.3d 591, 595–96 (7th Cir. 2010)
(rejecting Attorney General’s request for a general remand for
Board to reconsider merits, when Board’s position was that it

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No. 16‐4193 9
did not have jurisdiction to consider merits). In light of these
cases, we will grant a general remand only when there is a
persuasive reason to do so, at least where, as here, the request
is opposed by the petitioner.
The Attorney General offers two reasons for a general re‐
mand. First, he requests that the Board have a chance to re‐
consider whether “family members of tattooed former Salva‐
doran gang members” is cognizable in light of circuit and
Board precedents that predate this case. The Attorney General
does not explain why the Board needs a second chance to ap‐
ply case law that was available when it decided W.G.A.’s ap‐
peal, and we decline to remand on that basis.
Second, the Attorney General seeks a remand to permit the
Board to consider Matter of L‐E‐A‐, 27 I. & N. Dec. 40 (BIA
2017) (requiring petitioner to demonstrate that family rela‐
tionship is at least one central reason for persecution). The
Board issued L‐E‐A‐ after it dismissed W.G.A.’s appeal, and
the Attorney General argues that L‐E‐A‐ provides “critical
guidance” for cases that involve “family‐based particular so‐
cial groups.” But L‐E‐A‐ did not establish a new rule. As the
government agreed at oral argument, L‐E‐A‐ applied the same
analysis that the Board has followed since at least 2007. See In
re J‐B‐N‐ & S‐M‐, 24 I. & N. Dec. 208, 212–16 (BIA 2007) (inter‐
preting the “one central reason” requirement for asylum). In
this case, the immigration judge applied the already‐estab‐
lished rules summarized in L‐E‐A‐ and found that social‐
group membership was not a central motivation for the Mara
18. We decline to remand on this basis as well.

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10 No. 16‐4193
B. Cognizable Social Group
The first substantive question is whether W.G.A. is a mem‐
ber of a particular social group within the meaning of the Im‐
migration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).
Whether a group qualifies as a “particular social group” is a
question of law that we review de novo, though we give Chev‐
ron deference to the Board’s “reasonable interpretation set
forth in precedential opinions.” Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662,
668–69 (7th Cir. 2013) (en banc), citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
In Matter of Acosta, the Board interpreted “membership in
a particular social group” to mean “an individual who is a
member of a group of persons all of whom share a common,
immutable characteristic.” 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985),
overruled, in part, on other grounds by Matter of Mogharrabi,
19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (BIA 1987). The Board defined “immutable
characteristic” to mean a characteristic “that either is beyond
the power of an individual to change or that is so fundamental
to his identity or conscience that it ought not be required to
be changed.” Id. “Particular social group” is an ambiguous
phrase, and we have deferred to the Board’s interpretation in
Acosta. Cece, 733 F.3d at 669, citing Lwin v. INS, 144 F.3d 505,
511 (7th Cir. 1998).
In the decades since Acosta, the Board has added social dis‐
tinction (also called social visibility) and particularity as two
requirements in addition to the immutable‐characteristic test.
See, e.g., In re C‐A‐, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 957, 959 (BIA 2006).
These two requirements are at issue here. W.G.A. proposed
two social groups as the basis for asylum and withholding of
removal: (1) members of his nuclear family; and (2) family
members of tattooed former Salvadoran gang members. The

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No. 16‐4193 11
Board and immigration judge accepted the first but rejected
the second as overbroad and not “a socially distinct group
within El Salvador.”
W.G.A. correctly points out that we have not yet accorded
Chevron deference to the Board’s interpretation that includes
social distinction and particularity. He also cites several cases
in which we have disapproved—sometimes strongly—of
these two requirements. See, e.g., N.L.A. v. Holder, 744 F.3d
425, 438 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[I]t would be antithetical to asylum
law to deny refuge to a group of persecuted individuals who
have valid claims merely because too many have valid
claims.”); Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615–617 (7th Cir.
2009) (rejecting social distinction because “it makes no sense”
given examples of previously recognized particular social
groups). Those cases, however, either predate or fail to ad‐
dress intervening Board opinions that engage in statutory in‐
terpretation and explain the Board’s reasoning. See Matter of
M‐E‐V‐G‐, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227 (BIA 2014); Matter of W‐G‐R‐, 26
I. & N. Dec. 208 (BIA 2014); see also Gatimi, 578 F.3d at 615
(rejecting social distinction and particularity in part because
Board failed to explain its reasoning “in this or any other
case”). Whether the Board’s particularity and social distinc‐
tion requirements are entitled to Chevron deference remains
an open question in this circuit. 4
4 W.G.A.’s arguments that the Board’s interpretation is unreasonable
have some force. He argues that social distinction and particularity create
a conceptual trap that is difficult, if not impossible, to navigate. The appli‐
cant must identify a group that is broad enough that the society as a whole
recognizes it, but not so broad that it fails particularity. And as we have
stated, rejecting a social group because it is too broad “would be akin to
saying that the victims of widespread governmental ethnic cleansing can‐
not receive asylum simply because there are too many of them.” N.L.A.,

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12 No. 16‐4193
We decline to make the Chevron determination in this case,
where the government has chosen not to make any substan‐
tive arguments on the issue and there are alternative grounds
for decision. The Board and immigration judge agreed that
W.G.A.’s second proposed group—membership in his nu‐
clear family—is cognizable. See Torres v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d
616, 629 (7th Cir. 2008) (“Our prior opinions make it clear that
we consider family to be a cognizable social group.”), citing
Iliev v. INS, 127 F.3d 638, 642 & n.4 (7th Cir. 1997). Because we
find that the record compels the conclusion that W.G.A. was
persecuted on account of his membership in his nuclear fam‐
ily, we need not resolve the Chevron question regarding the
family members of former gang members.
C. Nexus to Persecution
Next, W.G.A. challenges the Board’s finding that he was
not persecuted “on account of” his membership in his family.
Whether W.G.A. met this burden is a question of fact that we
review for substantial evidence. Martinez‐Buendia v. Holder,
616 F.3d 711, 715 (7th Cir. 2010), citing Mabasa v. Gonzales, 455
F.3d 740, 744 (7th Cir. 2006). We may reverse “only if we de‐
termine that the evidence compels a different result.” Cece,
733 F.3d at 675–76, quoting FH‐T v. Holder, 723 F.3d 833, 838
(7th Cir. 2013); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).
To be eligible for asylum, W.G.A. must show that he was
persecuted “on account of” his social‐group membership. 8
744 F.3d at 438, citing Cece, 733 F.3d at 675. W.G.A. also claims that in the
decade since the Board introduced social distinction and particularity, it
has approved only one new particular social group. The Board has not
responded to this troubling assertion.

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No. 16‐4193 13
U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(A)–(B)(i), 1101(a)(42)(A). In 2005, Con‐
gress clarified that the protected ground must be “at least one
central reason” for the persecution. See REAL ID Act of 2005,
Pub L. No. 109–13, § 101(a)(3), 119 Stat. 302, 303 (2005), codi‐
fied at 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B). The protected trait does not
have to be the only reason for the persecution, but it “cannot
play a minor role.” L‐E‐A‐, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 44, quoting J‐B‐
N‐ & S‐M‐, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 214. Different language governs
eligibility for withholding of removal. Congress has not
amended the sections governing withholding to include the
“one central reason” language. Compare 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) with 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A).
To start, in W.G.A.’s case, the Board stated the wrong legal
standard for withholding of removal. Confusingly, the Board
reasoned that because “the respondent did not establish the
lower burden of proof applicable to asylum, he necessarily
did not establish his eligibility for withholding of removal,
which carries a higher burden of proof.” This is not quite cor‐
rect. Withholding of removal carries a higher burden on two
questions: the severity of the harm the applicant faces (perse‐
cution versus threat to life or freedom) and the likelihood that
the applicant will be harmed (well‐founded fear versus clear
probability). See Matter of H‐L‐H‐ & Z‐Y‐Z‐, 25 I. & N. Dec.
209, 218 (BIA 2010) (reasoning that applicant who failed to
show fear of persecution necessarily had not shown a threat
to life or freedom); Toptchev v. INS, 295 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir.
2002) (reasoning that applicant who failed to show a well‐
founded fear necessarily had not shown clear probability).
The nexus requirement, however, is the same for both asylum
and withholding of removal. At least, that’s the position the
Board has taken in other cases. See, e.g., Matter of C‐T‐L‐, 25 I.

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14 No. 16‐4193
& N. Dec. 341, 343 (BIA 2010). 5 Because W.G.A. does not argue
that different standards should govern the two claims, we ap‐
ply the “one central reason” standard throughout our analy‐
sis.
Returning to the merits, this record compels the conclu‐
sion that W.G.A.’s membership in his nuclear family was one
central reason for the persecution that both sides agree he suf‐
fered. Testimony by W.G.A. and his family members leaves
no doubt that the gang repeatedly targeted the entire family
because of their relationship to S.R.P. Country reports and
news articles throughout the record corroborate this testi‐
mony and demonstrate widespread recognition that the Sal‐
vadoran gangs target nuclear family units to enforce their or‐
ders and to discourage defection. In other words, substantial
evidence does not support the immigration judge’s finding on
the lack of a nexus between the gang’s persecution of W.G.A.
and his membership in the family.
To start, the timing of the persecution demonstrates that
W.G.A.’s family relationship with his brother caused the gang
to target W.G.A. The gang members threatened W.G.A. at
gunpoint just two days after S.R.P. said he was defecting. The
immigration judge and Board doubted whether S.R.P. had ac‐
tually defected, but that detail is unimportant. What matters
is that the gang was looking for S.R.P., likely because they be‐
lieved he had defected. What’s more, the gang’s own words
reveal their motivation. When the gang held a gun to W.G.A.’s
5 The Ninth Circuit has recently held that position unreasonable and
not entitled to Chevron deference. See Barajas‐Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351,
360 (9th Cir. 2017).

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No. 16‐4193 15
head, they demanded that W.G.A. reveal his brother’s loca‐
tion. And when the gang warned W.G.A. not to notify the po‐
lice, they threatened to kill his entire family.
W.G.A. also provided examples from his community as
circumstantial evidence of the gang’s motivation. See
Martinez‐Buendia, 616 F.3d at 715 (applicant can prove
motivation by direct or circumstantial evidence), citing INS v.
Elias‐Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483 (1992). W.G.A. testified that
when a young man he knew reported a robbery to the police,
gang members “disappeared” him and his father in
retaliation. W.G.A.’s mother submitted an affidavit that
described a young woman in the community who refused
requests to become a “gang member’s woman.” In response,
the gang disappeared her and her brother. These anecdotes
are analogous to W.G.A.’s situation: S.R.P. crossed the gang,
and they retaliated by targeting his nuclear family.
Country reports and news articles corroborate this testi‐
mony. A report by the U.S. Department of State says that “the
families of gang members often face the same risks of being
killed or disappearing as the gang members themselves.” R.
290. The United Nations also reports that family members can
“also be a target for attacks and assassination by gangs, some‐
times even after the person who was initially targeted by the
gang in question has fled or has already been killed.” R. 368.
One news article describes a woman who went into hiding
after the gang accused her husband of talking to police. R.
477–78. Another describes a man who rescued his daughter
after gang members abducted and raped her. As retribution,
the gang shot and killed the man’s wife. R. 463. These reports
are only a few examples. We see nothing in the record that

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16 No. 16‐4193
calls into question W.G.A.’s claim that he was targeted be‐
cause of his family membership.
Despite the extensive record, the Board adopted the immi‐
gration judge’s conclusion that W.G.A. had not shown a suf‐
ficient nexus because other family members continue to live
in El Salvador unharmed. This is factually inaccurate. W.G.A.,
his mother, and his sister described how the gang continued
to target the family. W.G.A.’s mother reported that she had
received at least four threatening phone calls from “angry,”
yelling gang members and that the calls continued until she
threw her cell‐phone chip away. W.G.A.’s mother and sister
described how masked gang members have appeared at their
home at least twice, threatening them and demanding to
know where S.R.P. and W.G.A. were. We cannot accept the
immigration judge’s conclusion that threatening phone calls
and home invasion by masked gang members are not evi‐
dence that other family members have been harmed. Plus, as
the government correctly acknowledged in oral argument, it
was improper for the immigration judge to rely on a lack of
harm to other family members, without more, to find that
W.G.A. was not targeted on account of his kinship ties. See
R.R.D. v. Holder, 746 F.3d 807, 809 (7th Cir. 2014) (reasoning
that statute “does not require that all members of” the pro‐
tected group “suffer the same fate”); see also Cordova v. Holder,
759 F.3d 332, 339 (4th Cir. 2014) (refusing to uphold Board’s
reasoning that petitioner could not have been targeted on ac‐
count of his kinship ties because other family members were
not targeted for same reason).
The immigration judge also relied on W.G.A.’s testimony
that the gang has a personal vendetta against him. But that
testimony does not actually support the immigration judge’s

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No. 16‐4193 17
finding. On cross‐examination, the government’s lawyer
asked W.G.A. if the “gangs just have a … personal vendetta
against you.” W.G.A. responded affirmatively. But this ques‐
tion does not contradict the overwhelming record evidence
that the gang targeted W.G.A. because of his familial relation‐
ship to S.R.P. The government did not ask W.G.A. why the
gang had a personal vendetta against him, and the most plau‐
sible answer is because he is related to S.R.P. The record sug‐
gests only one other potential motive for the persecution.
W.G.A. testified that, in 2014, members of the gang asked him
to do favors for the gang and he refused. Even if W.G.A.’s re‐
fusal to help the gang in 2014 influenced the gang’s decision
to target him in 2015, that one fact does not undermine the
overwhelming evidence showing that W.G.A.’s familial ties
were one central reason for his persecution.
Finally, the immigration judge also improperly stressed
that W.G.A.’s parents and seven siblings remain in El Salva‐
dor. This is true, although the family is so fearful that they
sent their other teenage son, J.R.P., into hiding. This is not ev‐
idence of a safe family. Additionally, the fact that some family
members have not relocated within El Salvador has little force
in light of the rest of the record. Country reports describe how
relocation is difficult and often dangerous: the choice is be‐
tween remaining in the Mara 18’s territory and risking retri‐
bution, or relocating to the rival gang’s territory and being
killed by them. A United Nations report estimates that
600,000 to 700,000 Salvadorans—or 10% of the population—
are affiliated with the gangs and act as lookouts in the gangs’
territories. R. 338. The record describes various incidents
when gangs killed non‐members who had crossed gang
boundaries for innocent reasons like visiting a family member
or walking to school. R. 338, 470, 547. And W.G.A. testified

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18 No. 16‐4193
about a community member who went to work at a business
in MS‐13 territory and who, upon arrival, was asked to iden‐
tify himself and where he came from. When he revealed that
he lived in Mara 18 territory, the questioner told him he
would be killed if he entered MS‐13 territory again. Once
again, W.G.A.’s testimony corroborates the indirect evidence
in the record. It means little, therefore, that W.G.A.’s family
has not sought to move elsewhere to avoid threats.
IV. Convention Against Torture
As a third ground for relief, W.G.A. seeks to defer removal
under Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture. W.G.A.
bears the burden of showing “that it is more likely than not
that he … would be tortured if removed” to El Salvador. 8
C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). Recognizing that precise probabilities
are difficult to prove and assess, we have interpreted this
language to mean a “substantial risk that a given alien will be
tortured if removed from the United States.” Rodriguez‐
Molinero v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 1134, 1135–36 (7th Cir. 2015).
Unlike asylum and statutory withholding of removal, W.G.A.
does not have to show that the torture relates to any protected
grounds. But the torture must be “inflicted by or at the
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public
official.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1).
W.G.A. argues that a remand is necessary because the
Board and immigration judge applied the wrong legal stand‐
ard and ignored key evidence. We agree. Neither the immi‐
gration judge nor the Board considered W.G.A.’s key evi‐
dence that he would likely be tortured in El Salvador. The
agency must consider “all evidence relevant to the possibility
of future torture,” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3), and must “an‐
nounce its decision in terms sufficient to enable a reviewing

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No. 16‐4193 19
court to perceive that it has heard and thought and not merely
reacted.” Ferreira v. Lynch, 831 F.3d 803, 810 (7th Cir. 2016),
quoting Solis‐Chavez v. Holder, 662 F.3d 462, 469 (7th Cir. 2011).
Together, the Board and immigration judge considered only
that W.G.A. had not been tortured in the past and that his
family remained in El Salvador unharmed. Neither consid‐
ered that the gang continues to threaten W.G.A.’s family and
raid their house looking for him. Nor did they consider the
strongest evidence of the risk of torture: that masked gang
members raided the house of a close family friend at night
and, when they found him there, murdered and dismem‐
bered him for disobeying their orders.6
The Board also applied the wrong legal standard when it
found that W.G.A. had not shown government acquiescence.
The Board stated that W.G.A. had “not indicated that there
was any involvement of a public official” in “any of the threats
directed” at him. W.G.A. does not need to show that a public
official was involved directly. Sarhan, 658 F.3d at 657–58. Per‐
haps for this reason, the immigration judge and Board ig‐
nored key evidence on this point too. They did not address
the extensive record that describes how corruption, judges’
refusal to protect witness anonymity, and the police’s fear of
reprisal all allow gangs to act with a high degree of impunity.
And when the agency found that the police arrested S.R.P.
twice for gang activity—and therefore do not acquiesce to any
torture—the agency failed to consider the evidence that gang
6 The briefs misread what the record says about the gang’s motivation
for this murder. W.G.A. testified that on that night, the gang was out look‐
ing for the friend, W.G.A., and S.R.P. W.G.A.’s sister and mother both said
that the gang murdered the family friend because he refused to join them
and collect extortion on their behalf.

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20 No. 16‐4193
members continue to operate from within prisons. For these
reasons, we also remand W.G.A.’s claim for deferred removal
under the Convention Against Torture.
Conclusion
We remand to the Board for further proceedings con‐
sistent with this opinion. On remand, the Board must also
consider two issues that we do not discuss. First, the Board
must consider the immigration judge’s finding that W.G.A.
would be able to relocate within El Salvador. Because the im‐
migration judge incorrectly found that W.G.A. had not been
persecuted in the past, the judge applied the wrong burden
on the question of relocation. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(b)(1)(ii),
1208.16(b)(1)(ii) (placing burden on government to rebut pre‐
sumption when applicant shows past persecution). Second,
the Board must review the immigration judge’s findings that
the Salvadoran government is not unable or unwilling to pre‐
vent the persecution. See, e.g., Pramatarov v. Gonzales, 454 F.3d
764, 766 (7th Cir. 2006), citing Hor v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 497,
501–02 (7th Cir. 2005). These issues remain open and require
reconsideration on remand.
We therefore GRANT the petition for review and
REMAND the case to the agency for further proceedings con‐
sistent with this opinion.

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