Travis D. Williams v. Leslie Patton

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted February 19, 2019*
Decided February 26, 2019
Before
DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge
No. 18‐1162
TRAVIS D. WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff‐Appellant,
v.
LESLIE PATTON, et al.,
Defendants‐Appellees.
Appeal from the
United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Wisconsin.
No. 14‐C‐452
William C. Griesbach,
Chief Judge.
O R D E R
Travis Williams suffered injuries after Wisconsin State Trooper Derek Bergum
rear‐ended his car using the “Pursuit Intervention Technique” while pursuing him in a
high‐speed chase. Williams sued Bergum and other officers, and also two jail nurses,
generally accusing them of inadequately addressing his medical needs. The district
* We agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. See FED. R. A PP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Because all defendants
acted reasonably, we affirm.
We construe the facts in the light most favorable to Williams. See Moore v. Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A., 908 F.3d 1050, 1054 (7th Cir. 2018). On May 8, 2013, Williams led police
on a high‐speed chase in Wisconsin, driving at speeds exceeding 100 miles per hour.
The chase ended when Trooper Bergum rear‐ended Williams’s car and placed him
under arrest. Williams complains about three episodes that followed.
The first episode occurred in the immediate aftermath of the arrest. Williams
complained of neck, back, and leg pain, so Trooper Bergum called an ambulance to take
him to the hospital. The hospital released him for transport to the jail a few hours later
because medical staff had concluded that his injuries did not require hospitalization.
Medical staff told Williams to take Tylenol or ibuprofen as needed for pain.
The second episode occurred after deputies transported Williams from the
hospital to the Racine County Jail for booking. Trooper Bergum arrived later to
complete the booking process. By that time Williams had fallen asleep. Neither Trooper
Bergum nor the jail’s intake officer forwarded any information about his medical status
to the jail’s medical staff. Within one day of booking, Williams received Tylenol for his
pain, and within two days he underwent a medical screening. At the screening Williams
stated that he did not have any physical limitations on his mobility that required
immediate accommodations. A week later he said that he could not stand or walk, so
medical staff evaluated him again. They found no acute abnormalities, and several staff
members reported that they had seen him stand and walk without assistance. A few
days later, Williams asked medical staff for a cream to treat his dry skin and an extra
mattress and pain pills to mitigate pain in his back, legs, and hips. A nurse
administered Tylenol and the cream but did not give Williams the extra mattress.
The third episode stretched over the next year. A month after the booking,
Williams complained that his Tylenol dosage was ineffective and that he needed a
plastic knee brace and a wrist bandage. Medical staff increased his Tylenol dosage.
After Williams complained again, a nurse switched him to ibuprofen. The following
month Williams asked for cream for his skin, and artificial tears and an antibiotic for an
eye condition. He received all three. When Williams’s eyes were still bothering him over
the next two months, a nurse switched the antibiotics twice. Later Williams repeated his
requests for a knee brace, a wheelchair, and an extra mattress. A doctor examined him
and determined that none of these accommodations was medically necessary. When

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Williams continued to complain about itchy skin and dry eyes the next month, he
received more cream and artificial tears.
Dissatisfied with his treatment, Williams took steps that led to this suit. He filed
grievances about the denied items (the extra mattress, wheelchair, and knee brace) and
his problems getting cream, antibiotics, and pain medicine. After complaint examiners
denied relief, Williams sued Trooper Bergum, the intake officer, two nurses, and the
complaint examiners. The district court screened his complaint, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A,
and allowed Williams to proceed on the following claims: (1) Trooper Bergum violated
the Fourth Amendment by not reporting Williams’s injuries to the jail’s staff; (2) the
intake officer deprived him of due process by not forwarding the hospital’s records to
the prison medical staff; (3) the complaint examiners deprived him of due process by
denying his grievances; and (4) the nurses violated his constitutional right to objectively
reasonable medical care.
As the case moved forward, the judge denied Williams’s repeated motions for
recruited counsel. The judge explained that because Williams had filed many “very
lucid” documents in previous cases, he could competently litigate this case. Williams
later argued that he needed counsel because the defendants were recording him and
planned to put him in segregation. The judge again declined to recruit counsel,
reasoning that Williams could still communicate with the court and conduct discovery.
In a later order denying a renewed motion for counsel, the judge cited Williams’s
extensive litigation history and ability to respond to motions “amply and extensively.”
The defendants eventually moved for summary judgment. The judge granted the
motion, holding that no jury could find that Trooper Bergum personally knew about
Williams’s medical needs or that any other defendant behaved unreasonably. Williams
asked for reconsideration, but the judge denied the motion because Williams presented
no new evidence or new controlling law.
On appeal Williams first contends that the district court erroneously entered
summary judgment in favor of Trooper Bergum. When Bergum arrived at the jail,
Williams had not yet received a judicial determination of probable cause, so the Fourth
Amendment standard of reasonableness governs. See Ortiz v. City of Chicago, 656 F.3d
523, 530 (7th Cir. 2011). Williams maintains that by not telling the jail’s staff that he had
medical limitations, Trooper Bergum violated the Fourth Amendment. Four factors
inform whether Bergum behaved unreasonably, but we need consider only the first one:
whether the officer had actual notice of Williams’s medical needs. See id. No evidence
suggests that he did. When Williams complained of injuries after his arrest, Trooper

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Bergum called an ambulance to take him to a hospital to see if he needed treatment.
After that Bergum knew only that the hospital had released him a few hours later, and
when Trooper Bergum came to the jail to complete the booking process, Williams was
sleeping. Thus no rational jury could conclude that Trooper Bergum knew of any
medical needs.
Next, Williams contends that the district court erroneously entered summary
judgment in favor of the intake officer. He argues that because the intake officer never
passed along the hospital’s discharge forms to the jail’s medical staff, she violated his
right to due process as a pretrial detainee. See Kinglsey v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466,
2473 (2015). But even if she did not forward these documents, no harm befell Williams.
The documents recommended only that he receive Tylenol for pain, and he received it
the day after his booking. Moreover, during a medical screening two days after
booking, Williams reported no problems that required immediate accommodations.
With no injury arising from the absence of the records, no constitutional tort occurred.
See Armstrong v. Daily, 786 F.3d 529, 553 (7th Cir. 2015).
Williams next argues that the complaint examiners deprived him of due process
by wrongly denying his grievances. But he acknowledges that they read the grievances,
considered his medical file, and relied on the medical staff, which is all that was
constitutionally required of them. See Miranda v. County of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 343 (7th
Cir. 2018); McCann v. Ogle County, 909 F.3d 881, 888 (7th Cir. 2018). The complaint
examiners were entitled to summary judgment.
Williams also contends that the two nurses unreasonably ignored his medical
needs. One nurse, he complains, denied his request for a knee brace and more drugs to
treat his pain. But even if the nurse could prescribe those treatments (no evidence
suggests that she could), a mere disagreement with a medical professional’s otherwise
reasonable treatment is not a basis for a constitutional claim. See Greeno v. Daley, 414
F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005). Based on Williams’s reports of pain, the nurse adjusted
doses of Tylenol and ibuprofen, and no medical professional has opined that a knee
brace or other drugs were medically necessary. Thus, a jury could not rationally
conclude that the nurse’s treatment was such a significant “departure from accepted
professional standards or practices” that it was objectively unreasonable. Pyles v. Fahim,
771 F.3d 403, 409 (7th Cir. 2014); see McCann, 909 F.3d at 887. Regarding the other nurse,
Williams argues that she ignored his eye and skin conditions. But the record shows that
each time Williams complained about his eyes, he received eye drops and antibiotics;
and every time he complained about his skin, he received more cream. Because no

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evidence suggests that these treatments were a significant departure from professional
norms, summary judgment was warranted. See Pyles, 771 F.3d at 409.
Two final procedural matters remain. First, Williams challenges the denial of his
requests for counsel. When addressing a motion for pro bono counsel, the judge must
decide whether the plaintiff appears competent to litigate his claims, given their
difficulty. Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 655 (7th Cir. 2007) (en banc). Williams says that
the court did not address his “psychological history, intellectual capacity, education,
communication skills, [and] litigation skills.” But the judge did just that when he
concluded that the case was not too complex for Williams given that he was an
experienced and “lucid” litigator who “amply and extensively” responded to motions
with neat and clear arguments. Second, Williams argues that the judge should not have
awarded costs to the defendants under Rule 54(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure because they did not reply to his objection to costs. But we give district
courts “virtually complete deference” when reviewing an award of costs. See Lauth v.
Covance, Inc., 863 F.3d 708, 718 (7th Cir. 2017) (quotation marks omitted). Though
Williams objected to the fees associated with acquiring a transcript of his deposition, a
court may tax as costs the fees for transcripts that are “necessarily obtained for use in
the case.” 28 U.S.C. § 1920(2); Montanez v. Simon, 755 F.3d 547, 558 (7th Cir. 2014).
Obtaining a transcript of the plaintiff’s deposition is a necessary part of the defense
case.
We have considered Williams’s other arguments, and none has merit.
AFFIRMED

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