Chris Logan v. City of Chicago

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 20-1669
C HRIS LOGAN ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
C ITY OF C HICAGO, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 17-cv-8312 — Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED A PRIL 14, 2021 — DECIDED J ULY 14, 2021
____________________
Before M ANION , ST. EVE, and K IRSCH , Circuit Judges.
ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. After plaintiff Chris Logan was de-
nied a promotion, he sued his employer the City of Chicago
(the “City”) and several of the City’s employees. He alleged
that the City engaged in unlawful discrimination and retalia-
tion, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. He further alleged that all de-
fendants violated the Illinois Whistleblower Act (the “Act”),
740 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 174/1. On appeal, Logan challenges the

-- 1 of 19 --

2 No. 20-1669
district court’s grant of summary judgment for the defendants
on all claims. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.
I. Background
Chris Logan, an African American man, worked for the
City’s Department of Aviation, Security, and Safety Division
(the “Department”) as an Aviation Security Officer (“ASO”).
In 2015, he applied for a promotion to become an Aviation Se-
curity Sergeant. He was not selected, but the Department
placed him on a “Pre-Qualified Candidates” list (“PQC list”)
in the event of future vacancies during the following year. The
PQC list was set to expire in September 2016, but the Depart-
ment extended it another 12 months.
In March 2017—while the PQC list was still active—two
sergeant positions became available. Logan was second on the
list, so he completed the paperwork to fill one of the positions.
Two days later, the City informed him that he was ineligible
because he did not meet the promotional guidelines. The City
had a policy under which internal candidates were ineligible
for promotion if they had been suspended more than seven
days in the previous 12 months. Because Logan had been sus-
pended for more than seven days in the previous year, he was
ineligible for either sergeant position. The City promoted two
other candidates, a white man and woman.
The events surrounding Logan’s suspensions form the ba-
sis of this lawsuit. He does not challenge the City’s policy; ra-
ther, he alleges that he was wrongfully singled out for disci-
pline and as a result became ineligible for promotion.
A. Conversation with Jeffrey Redding
According to Logan, the problems began when he con-
fronted his new supervisor—defendant Jeffrey Redding—

-- 2 of 19 --

No. 20-1669 3
about Redding’s actions toward the woman Logan was dating
at the time, Audrey Diamond. Redding became Deputy Com-
missioner of the Department in February 2016. Diamond
worked for the United States Customs and Border Protection.
Logan, Redding, and Diamond all worked at O’Hare Airport.
Sometime between February and April 2016, Logan testi-
fied that Diamond told him that she was having problems
with Redding. Redding was coming to her office and flirting
with her.1 Logan went to speak to Redding and told him that
he wanted to talk about “a personal matter.” Logan told Red-
ding that Diamond was his girlfriend. When Redding asked
why Logan was telling him that, he replied that Redding was
making her feel uncomfortable and Logan wanted to let Red-
ding know “out of guy code.” When asked what he meant by
“guy code,” Logan testified “[g]uy code is a street lingo that
you don’t cross a certain line, or if you don’t know something
let someone know so they won’t cross that line.” When asked
1 According to Diamond, her conversation with Logan went differ-
ently. She testified that she only had one conversation with Redding, and
she told Logan that she had met his boss and he was a “nice guy.” She
further testified that Logan told her to stay away from Redding. She stated
that she was offended by Logan speaking to Redding about her because it
made her look unprofessional. For summary judgment, we “consider all
of the evidence in the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party, and we draw all reasonable inferences from that evidence in favor
of the party opposing summary judgment.” Skiba v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co.,
884 F.3d 708, 717 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Feliberty v. Kemper Corp., 98 F.3d
274, 276–77 (7th Cir. 1996)). Accordingly, we assume for purposes of this
appeal the truth of Logan’s testimony about his conversation with Dia-
mond.

-- 3 of 19 --

4 No. 20-1669
what line Redding crossed, Logan replied “it more or less was
informative, letting him know that [Logan] was dating the
young lady.”
In April 2016, Redding received a text message from de-
fendant Robert May, the Department’s Director of Admin-
istration. The text stated that May “was in the terminals yes-
terday … and overheard an officer talking about how Chris
Logan had to let his new boss know to leave his woman alone.
[May] fell out laughing.” Redding replied that he would call
May later about that, and May responded, “Lol okay.”2
B. Disciplinary Incidents
In the next several months, Logan was accused of five dis-
ciplinary infractions. The first incident occurred on May 24,
2016. Logan went to the Traveler’s Aid office in O’Hare Air-
port and spoke with a staff member about the failure to staff
an information desk in the airport. The office complained to
Redding about Logan’s behavior toward the staff member. On
June 8, 2016, the Department served Logan with a notice of a
pre-disciplinary hearing for rule violations, including dis-
courteous treatment of a member of the public. The meeting
occurred on June 16. Afterward, defendant Anthony Bates—
an administrative lieutenant—reviewed the materials with
Redding. Bates recommended discipline somewhere between
a written reprimand and a three-day suspension. Redding de-
cided that Logan should receive a one-day suspension. Logan
was informed of the suspension on July 8, 2016.
2 The district court incorrectly stated that “wow LOL okay” was Red-
ding’s response to May’s first message, but the record shows that Redding
responded that he would call later and May replied “Lol okay.”

-- 4 of 19 --

No. 20-1669 5
The next three incidents are all related to Logan allegedly
misrepresenting the time he worked or leaving his post. As an
ASO, Logan was responsible for securing and controlling ac-
cess to secure areas at O’Hare. ASOs are assigned to fixed
posts and are not allowed to leave their posts until another
officer relieves them. They are required to record their work
hours by swiping in and out. In the event the swiping system
malfunctions or there is another reason their time was not rec-
orded, ASOs must provide documentation of the time they
worked, referred to as edit sheets. Defendant David Schmidt
is a lieutenant who regularly reviews time records for the
ASOs to avoid payroll issues. In the event of a swipe failure,
Schmidt usually refers to the times an officer swiped his or
her badge at the secure doors at O’Hare. If that is unsuccess-
ful, as a last resort, Schmidt reviews video footage.
On July 7, 2016—one day before Logan was notified of his
one-day suspension—Schmidt noticed that Logan did not
have swipe times for the previous day. When reviewing his
badge swipes at the secure doors, Schmidt discovered that Lo-
gan had swiped at the Department’s offices at 9:07 p.m., about
an hour before his shift ended. In reviewing video footage,
Schmidt saw that Logan entered the Department offices at
9:07 p.m. dressed in shorts and flip-flops. He left through the
building’s backdoor at 9:25 p.m. On July 8, 2016, Logan signed
an edit sheet representing that he had worked until the end of
his shift at 10 p.m. on July 6.
Schmidt notified Redding of the discrepancy, and Red-
ding asked Schmidt to review the records of his entire watch
to determine if there were any other officers engaged in simi-
lar conduct. Schmidt testified that no other ASOs had a simi-
lar number of swipe problems during the relevant time.

-- 5 of 19 --

6 No. 20-1669
Redding also asked defendant Jorge Rodriguez—a sergeant—
to review camera footage for certain days when Logan was
assigned to particular posts. In doing so, Schmidt and Rodri-
guez discovered two other discrepancies. On June 17, 2016,
Logan was assigned to one post but swiped out at a different
post at 9:53 p.m., a 10–15-minute drive from his assigned post.
On June 18, video footage showed Logan entering the Depart-
ment offices at 7:50 p.m. and leaving while dressed in civilian
clothes, two hours before his shift ended. According to Logan,
he obtained permission from a supervisor to leave work early.
He signed a sheet representing that he had worked until 10
p.m. the evening of June 18.
The fifth incident occurred on July 12, 2016. Logan called
an Airserv Transportation employee, attempting to recover
the lost cellphone of an airline employee. The next day, Red-
ding received a complaint from Airserv about Logan’s con-
duct. Logan allegedly repeatedly threatened to deactivate the
Airserv employee’s security badge if Airserv did not quickly
return the cell phone.
On July 18, 2016, Logan was served with a notice of a pre-
disciplinary meeting regarding the Airserv incident and the
three swipe-related incidents. The meeting occurred on July
21, 2016. Afterward, Schmidt assembled the documentation
and forwarded the materials to Bates. Bates gave them to Red-
ding, who reviewed the report and submitted it to May. On
September 9, 2016, May recommended to Redding that Logan
receive a 10–15 day suspension. Redding decided to suspend
Logan for 14 days, which he served between September 21
and October 5, 2016.

-- 6 of 19 --

No. 20-1669 7
C. Internal Complaints and Grievances
When Logan returned to work, he informed the Depart-
ment’s Labor Relations Supervisor, Argentene Hrysikos, that
he was being bullied at work. Hrysikos provided Logan with
forms and referred him to the City’s Equal Employment Op-
portunity (“EEO”) office. Logan sent an email to the EEO of-
fice, alleging that he had begun having problems at work after
he had discussed a “personal matter” with Redding. Logan
acknowledged his complaint was not an EEO matter, and the
EEO office advised Hrysikos that Logan’s complaint did not
fall under the City’s EEO policy because it was not based on
any protected category.
In December 2016, Logan requested a meeting with the
Department’s Human Resources Division “to report discrim-
ination against black officers.” Logan then cancelled the meet-
ing. Logan also called the City’s Office of the Inspector Gen-
eral and lodged a complaint that the Department disciplined
ASOs in a discriminatory manner.
In March 2017, after May informed Logan that he was in-
eligible for promotion due to his suspensions, Logan
amended his workplace bullying complaint to include a loss
of promotion. A few months later, in May 2017, he filed a
charge of discrimination with the EEO Commission alleging
that the City unlawfully discriminated against him on the ba-
sis of his race, sex, and age, and also retaliated against him.
Logan grieved both suspensions, and arbitration hearings
took place in August and September 2017. In November 2017,
the arbitrator found that the City had failed to prove that Lo-
gan had acted discourteously toward the Traveler’s Aid em-
ployee and vacated the one-day suspension. In March 2018,

-- 7 of 19 --

8 No. 20-1669
the arbitrator issued a decision reducing Logan’s 14-day sus-
pension to seven days. The arbitrator concluded that while
Logan committed misconduct sufficient to warrant discipline,
the length of his suspension was excessive. In October 2018,
Logan participated in another arbitration hearing to deter-
mine the appropriate remedy based on his reduced suspen-
sion. The arbitrator determined that, under the City’s policy,
Logan would have been promoted if he had only been sus-
pended for seven days. So the arbitrator ordered that the City
promote Logan to the position of sergeant and give him back
pay and benefits.
D. Lawsuit
Logan filed the current lawsuit in November 2017 against
the City and defendants Redding, May, Bates, Schmidt, and
Rodriguez. He alleged the City unlawfully discriminated
against him on the basis of his race and gender and retaliated
against him, in violation of Title VII. He also alleged that the
City and all individual defendants violated the Illinois Whis-
tleblower Act, 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 174/1. All defendants
moved for summary judgment, which the district court
granted.
Regarding Logan’s Title VII discrimination claims, the dis-
trict court concluded that Logan had failed to establish a
prima facie case—and, even assuming he had, no reasonable
jury could determine that the City’s reasons for disciplining
him were a pretext for discrimination. For Logan’s retaliation
claim, the district court determined that no reasonable jury
could find that Logan subjectively believed he was opposing
an unlawful practice when he spoke to Redding about Dia-
mond. Furthermore, even if Logan subjectively believed he
was engaging in Title VII protected activity, that belief was

-- 8 of 19 --

No. 20-1669 9
not objectively reasonable because Redding and Diamond
had different employers and so Title VII did not apply to Red-
ding’s alleged conduct. Lastly, the district court concluded
that Logan’s whistleblower claim was time-barred. Logan
now appeals.
II. Discussion
A. Legal Standard
“We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment
de novo.” Skiba v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 884 F.3d 708, 717 (7th
Cir. 2018). Summary judgment “is appropriate ‘if the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’”
Marnocha v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 986 F.3d
711, 718 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). We
“consider all of the evidence in the record in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, and we draw all reasona-
ble inferences from that evidence in favor of the party oppos-
ing summary judgment.” Skiba, 884 F.3d at 717 (quoting Felib-
erty v. Kemper Corp., 98 F.3d 274, 276–77 (7th Cir. 1996)).
B. Title VII Discrimination
Logan contends that the City violated Title VII because it
discriminated against him based on his race when it targeted
him for discipline and then failed to promote him.3 Title VII
“prohibits an employer from ‘discriminating against any in-
dividual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s
3 At oral argument, Logan clarified that he was not appealing the dis-
trict court’s grant of summary judgment to the City on his Title VII gender
discrimination claim. Accordingly, we will not discuss it further.

-- 9 of 19 --

10 No. 20-1669
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.’” Igasaki v. Illinois
Dep’t of Fin. & Pro. Regul., 988 F.3d 948, 957 (7th Cir. 2021)
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)). For summary judgment,
we ask “whether the evidence would permit a reasonable
fact-finder to conclude that [Logan] was subjected to an ad-
verse employment action based on a statutorily prohibited
factor—here, race.” McCurry v. Kenco Logistics Servs., LLC, 942
F.3d 783, 788 (7th Cir. 2019). “Whether a plaintiff offers direct
or circumstantial evidence of discrimination, [we] made clear
in [Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 766 (7th Cir.
2016)] that ‘all evidence belongs in a single pile and must be
evaluated as a whole.’” Igasaki, 988 F.3d at 957.
“One way of proving employment discrimination under
Title VII remains the burden-shifting framework of McDon-
nell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).” Id. For a failure-to-
promote claim, the McDonnell Douglas framework requires
the plaintiff to show “(1) [he] was a member of a protected
class; (2) that he was qualified for the position; (3) that he was
rejected for the position; and (4) that the position was given to
a person outside the protected class who was similarly or less
qualified than he.” Stockwell v. City of Harvey, 597 F.3d 895, 901
(7th Cir. 2010). If the plaintiff meets each element of his prima
facie case, “the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employ-
ment action, at which point the burden shifts back to the
plaintiff to submit evidence that the employer’s explanation
is pretextual.” Skiba, 884 F.3d at 719–20 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
“We approach [Logan’s] termination claim as presented—
through the lens of the McDonnell Douglas framework.” Mar-
nocha, 986 F.3d at 719. Logan contends that he established a

-- 10 of 19 --

No. 20-1669 11
prima facie case, even though he was not qualified for the ser-
geant position because he was ineligible for promotion under
the City’s policy. In his view, he would have received the pro-
motion but-for being improperly targeted for discipline. Lo-
gan’s arguments on this point are muddled, but he seemingly
posits two alternative theories as to why he was improperly
targeted for discipline: (1) in retaliation for his conversation
with Redding about Diamond or (2) due to his race, because
he was disciplined for behavior for which other ASOs were
not disciplined. To the extent that Logan is attempting to es-
tablish a prima facie case for race discrimination based on al-
leged retaliation for his conversation with Redding, we echo
the district court’s rejection of Logan’s attempt to “shoehorn
a retaliation claim into a disparate treatment framework.” Lo-
gan v. City of Chicago, No. 17-cv-8312, 2020 WL 1445632, at *6
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 25, 2020).
Even if we assume that Logan has established a prima fa-
cie case, his Title VII race discrimination claim nonetheless
fails. The City’s proffered reasons for disciplining Logan—
that it received complaints from Airserv and Traveler’s Aid
about his behavior and that he left multiple shifts early—were
sufficiently nondiscriminatory. An independent arbitrator de-
termined that he had committed misconduct sufficient to give
rise to discipline. So, in order to show pretext, Logan must
“show that (1) the employer’s non-discriminatory reason was
dishonest and (2) the employer’s true reason was based on a
discriminatory intent.” Stockwell, 597 F.3d at 901 (citation
omitted). But here, no reasonable jury could find that the
City’s reasons for disciplining Logan were pretextual.
Logan argues he was singled out for discipline even
though there were other ASOs who had missing swipes. This

-- 11 of 19 --

12 No. 20-1669
argument is unpersuasive. Logan was not disciplined because
he was missing swipes, so whether other ASOs also had miss-
ing swipes is irrelevant. Schmidt testified that he regularly
tracked when ASOs on his watch were missing swipes, and
would confirm the times they worked by looking at when
they accessed the secure doors. Logan failed to have time
swipes for July 6, and Schmidt discovered that Logan had ac-
cessed the secure doors before the end of his shift, even
though Logan had signed an edit sheet attesting to the fact he
worked until his shift ended. This discrepancy caused Red-
ding to order Rodriguez and Schmidt to look into Logan fur-
ther, and they discovered the June 17 and 18 incidents. Logan
has put forth no evidence of other ASOs who engaged in sim-
ilar behaviors and were not disciplined.
Additionally, even assuming Logan was singled out for
discipline, he failed to “provide evidence that supports the in-
ference that the real reason” he was singled out “was discrim-
inatory.” Stockwell, 597 F.3d at 902. Other than the fact that
Logan is a member of a protected class, there is no evidence
in the record from which a reasonable juror could infer that
his race caused him to be disciplined and therefore not pro-
moted. See Lindale v. Tokheim Corp., 145 F.3d 953, 957 (7th Cir.
1998) (finding that “a suspicion that [the plaintiff’s protected
class] may have played a role in her failing to be promoted …
is not enough”). His Title VII discrimination claim thus fails,
and we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment
to the City.
C. Title VII Retaliation
Alternatively, Logan contends that he was singled out for
improper discipline in retaliation for his conversation with
Redding about Diamond. Title VII “prohibits employers from

-- 12 of 19 --

No. 20-1669 13
discriminating against an employee ‘because he has opposed
any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this
subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, as-
sisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, pro-
ceeding, or hearing.” Igasaki, 988 F.3d at 959 (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)). “To survive summary judgment on a
timely retaliation claim, plaintiff must offer evidence of: ‘(1) a
statutorily protected activity; (2) a materially adverse action
taken by the employer; and (3) a causal connection between
the two.’” Skiba, 884 F.3d at 718 (quoting Baines v. Walgreen Co.,
863 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2017)). For the first element—a stat-
utorily protected activity—“[t]he plaintiff must not only have
a subjective (sincere, good faith) belief that he opposed an un-
lawful practice; his belief must also be objectively reasonable,
which means that the complaint must involve discrimination
that is prohibited by Title VII.” Scheidler v. Indiana, 914 F.3d
535, 542 (7th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted).
According to Logan, he had a sincere, good faith belief that
he was opposing an unlawful practice when he spoke to Red-
ding about Diamond, because Diamond had told him that
Redding was flirting with her and making her uncomfortable.
But even assuming Logan held a subjective belief that he was
opposing an unlawful employment practice, his belief was
not objectively reasonable. Redding and Diamond did not
have the same employer. This undisputed fact is fatal to his
claim.
“The objective reasonableness of the [plaintiff’s] belief is
not assessed by examining whether the conduct was persis-
tent or severe enough to be unlawful, but merely whether it
falls into the category of conduct prohibited by the statute.”
Lord v. High Voltage Software, Inc., 839 F.3d 556, 563 (7th Cir.

-- 13 of 19 --

14 No. 20-1669
2016) (quoting Magyar v. St. Joseph Reg’l Med. Ctr., 544 F.3d
766, 771 (7th Cir. 2008)). That assessment “requires us to ask
whether the complained-of conduct entailed a motive that Ti-
tle VII prohibits.” Id. The “specific evil at which Title VII was
directed was not the eradication of all discrimination by pri-
vate individuals, undesirable though that is, but the eradica-
tion of discrimination by employers against employees.” Silver v.
KCA, Inc., 586 F.2d 138, 141 (9th Cir. 1978) (emphasis added).
Thus, a defendant can only incur liability for sexual harass-
ment under Title VII if a plaintiff “can prove the existence of
an employer-employee relationship.” Nischan v. Stratosphere
Quality, LLC, 865 F.3d 922, 928 (7th Cir. 2017).4 Here, Redding
worked for the City and Diamond worked for the United
States Customs and Border Protection. They did not have an
employer-employee relationship, and so even if Logan sub-
jectively believed that Redding’s actions violated Title VII, his
belief was not objectively reasonable.
Logan urges us to take a broader view of conduct prohib-
ited by Title VII, but we decline to do so. “Title VII is not a
general bad acts statute … [r]ather, the conduct it prohibits is
specifically set forth.” Crowley v. Prince George's Cnty., Md.,
890 F.2d 683, 687 (4th Cir. 1989) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted) (determining a plaintiff’s retaliation claim
was not cognizable under Title VII where the plaintiff—an
4 We note that there are “certain limited circumstances” where a plain-
tiff can “bring a [Title VII sexual harassment claim] against a defendant
who is not [her] direct employer,” such as when a defendant “had suffi-
cient authority over her to be considered a ‘joint employer.’” Nischan, 865
F.3d at 928 (quoting Love v. JP Cullen & Sons, Inc., 779 F.3d 697, 701 (7th
Cir. 2015)). This exception is not applicable here, however, because Logan
has not argued that the City was Diamond’s joint employer.

-- 14 of 19 --

No. 20-1669 15
employee of the police department—was allegedly retaliated
against for investigating “instances of racial harassment per-
petrated by police officers against members of the commu-
nity”). It prohibits an employer from retaliating against an
employee for opposing “an unlawful employment practice.”
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3. “While Congress may decide to extend
the statute’s coverage to persons who bring any discrimina-
tory practice of an employer to light”—such as discrimination
or harassment of non-employees—“such a step lies beyond
the province of the courts. To find in Title VII protection for
whistle-blowers on each and every instance of discrimination
on the part of an employer is more than we think the plain
language of its provisions will support.” Crowley, 890 F.3d at
687; see also Wimmer v. Suffolk Cnty. Police Dep’t, 176 F.3d 125,
135 (2d Cir. 1999) (concluding that the plaintiff police officer’s
retaliation claim was “not cognizable under Title VII because
his opposition was not directed at an unlawful employment
practice of his employer” when he reported overhearing racial
slurs made by police officers against black citizens).
Logan replies that employers can be liable under Title VII
when nonemployees or nonsupervisory employees harass
their employees if the employer was “negligent either in dis-
covering or remedying the harassment.” Nischan, 865 F.3d at
930. This is true, but irrelevant to the facts at issue. Diamond’s
employer—U.S. Customs and Border Protection—may have
been liable under Title VII if it was negligent in discovering or
remedying Redding’s alleged harassment of her. But Logan’s
conversation with Redding was not about Diamond’s em-
ployer’s failure to remedy Redding’s harassment, it was about
Redding’s alleged harassment itself.

-- 15 of 19 --

16 No. 20-1669
Logan further contends that even though Redding and Di-
amond had different employers, “an employee may engage in
statutorily protected expression under section 2000e-3(a) even
if the challenged practice does not actually violate Title VII.”
Dey v. Colt Const. & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1457 (7th Cir. 1994).
It is true that “even if the degree of discrimination does not
reach a level where it affects the terms and conditions of em-
ployment, if the employee complains and the employer fires
him because of the complaint, the retaliation claim could still
be valid.” Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc.,
224 F.3d 701, 707 (7th Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds
by Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Indiana, 853 F.3d 339 (7th
Cir. 2017). But “the complaint must involve discrimination
that is prohibited by Title VII,” and “[i]f a plaintiff opposed
conduct that was not proscribed by Title VII, no matter how
frequent or severe, then his sincere belief that he opposed an
unlawful practice cannot be reasonable.” Id. Given that Red-
ding and Diamond do not share the same employer, Logan
has failed to show that his belief that he was opposing an un-
lawful employment practice was objectively reasonable. We
thus affirm the district court’s grant of summary to the City
on Logan’s retaliation claim.
D. Illinois Whistleblower Act
Logan next contends that the district court erred when it
concluded that his claim arising under the Act was time-
barred. The Act prohibits retaliation “against an employee for
disclosing information to a government or law enforcement
agency, where the employee has reasonable cause to believe
that the information discloses a violation of a State or federal
law, rule, or regulation.” 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 174/15. The par-
ties agree that Logan’s claim is subject to a one-year

-- 16 of 19 --

No. 20-1669 17
limitations period but disagree about when that limitations
period began to run.
“Generally, a limitations period begins to run when facts
exist that authorize one party to maintain an action against
another.” Feltmeier v. Feltmeier, 798 N.E.2d 75, 85 (Ill. 2003).
When the tort “involves continuous or repeated injurious be-
havior,” however, “under the ‘continuing tort’ or ‘continuing
violation’ theory … the limitations period is held in abeyance
and the plaintiff’s cause of action does not accrue until the
date the final injury occurs or the tortuous acts cease.” Taylor
v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chicago, 10 N.E.3d 383, 395 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2014). “A continuing violation or tort is occasioned by con-
tinuing unlawful acts and conduct, not by continual ill effects
from an initial violation.” Feltmeier, 798 N.E.2d at 85. So
“where there is a single overt act from which subsequent
damages may flow, the statute begins to run on the date the
defendant invaded the plaintiff’s interest and inflicted injury,
and this is so despite the continuing nature of the injury.” Id.
Logan was suspended in September 2016. He filed this suit
in November 2017, more than a year later. He nevertheless
contends that his suit was timely because the continuing vio-
lation doctrine applies. According to Logan, the defendants
committed a series of tortious acts by investigating, suspend-
ing, and failing to promote him. He argues that the last act—
the failure to promote him—occurred in March 2017, and so
his suit was timely filed in November 2017.
This argument fails because Logan’s loss of promotion is
an injury that stemmed from the earlier alleged tortious acts
of targeting him for discipline and suspending him. “A con-
tinuing tort … does not involve tolling the statute of limita-
tions because of delayed or continuing injuries.” Feltmeier, 798

-- 17 of 19 --

18 No. 20-1669
N.E.2d at 86. Logan does not challenge the City’s promotional
policy or argue that its application to him was discretionary.
He does not dispute that he was ineligible for the promotion
in March 2017 because of his September 2017 suspension. His
loss of a promotion, therefore, was a delayed injury rather
than a separate unlawful act. See Bank of Ravenswood v. City of
Chicago, 717 N.E.2d 478 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (determining that
a plaintiff’s cause of action arose during the construction of a
subway under its property, and the presence of the subway
there after construction was a continual effect not a continual
violation).
Logan replies that the continuing violation doctrine
should nevertheless apply because he could not have known
that the earlier acts of retaliation would result in the denial of
his promotion because he did not know when a promotion
might occur. This argument is meritless. The City’s promo-
tional policy clearly states that internal candidates are ineligi-
ble to be promoted if they had been suspended more than
seven days in the previous 12 months. Under this policy, as of
September 2016, Logan should have known that he was ineli-
gible to be promoted until September 2017. The PQC list that
he was on was set to expire in September 2017. Logan there-
fore had reason to know that his suspensions would disqual-
ify him from being promoted.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of sum-
mary judgment to all defendants on Logan’s whistleblower
claim because it is time-barred.

-- 18 of 19 --

No. 20-1669 19
III. Conclusion
For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of the defendants.5
5 The district court granted summary judgment for the City on Lo-
gan’s indemnification claim because it granted summary judgment for the
individual defendants on Logan’s whistleblower claim, so there was noth-
ing for the City to indemnify. On appeal, Logan contends that if we reverse
the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the individual defend-
ants, we should also reverse the district court’s grant of summary judg-
ment on his indemnification claim. Since we affirm the district court’s
grant of summary judgment for the individual defendants on Logan’s
whistleblower claim , we also affirm its grant of summary judgment to the
City on his indemnification claim.

-- 19 of 19 --