Abd-El-Illah Serir v. Community College District No. 514

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted March 10, 2022*
Decided March 16, 2022
Before
DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
No. 21-2696
ABD-EL-ILLAH SERIR,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT
NO. 514,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Central District of Illinois.
No. 20-cv-1031
Michael M. Mihm,
Judge.
O R D E R
Abd-El-Illah Serir worked as an adjunct professor in the computer science
department at Community Central College District No. 514, which the parties refer to as
Illinois Central College (ICC). ICC discontinued Serir’s employment after the fall 2017
term, and Serir sued it for employment discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; 29 U.S.C.
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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§ 621. The district court entered summary judgment for ICC, ruling that claims were
untimely, unexhausted, or lacked evidence. We affirm.
Serir’s relationship with ICC began in 2014. He applied then for a tenure-track
job, but ICC declined to hire anyone after the number of applicants was low. ICC later
hired him as an adjunct professor on a semester-by-semester basis, beginning with the
spring 2015 term. As a Muslim, Serir needed space for his prayers. He asked the dean
for a private office to pray alone in, but she declined the request. Serir prayed alone in
an empty classroom and empty library rooms.
As early as Serir’s second semester of work, in spring 2017, his relationship with
ICC began to decline. First, Serir applied for the reopened tenure-track position, but in
May 2017 ICC cancelled the search after it again received too few applicants. Serir took
the cancellation personally after a faculty member involved in the search told him “do
not expect too much [from ICC] toward your retirement” and faulted Serir’s
“personality” for his inability to win the position. Second, ICC received complaints
about his adjunct teaching. They ranged from criticisms of the workload he assigned to
his lack of responsiveness to students and a bias against women. The dean assigned two
mentors to observe Serir’s classes and provide feedback. Serir resented their oversight.
Serir's relationship with ICC continued to decline through his final semester of
work in fall 2017. After ICC again posted a tenure-track position in December 2017,
Serir unsuccessfully applied for it. ICC awarded the job to another candidate, who was
51; Serir was 54. During his interview, the dean mentioned “the amount of time it
would take to obtain tenure.” Two female professors privately noted that Serir called
only the male faculty members “professors.” Suspecting from the dean’s post-interview
demeanor that he was not going to receive the job, Serir complained to the human
resources department. He alleged discrimination against him based on his age and
“ethnicity.” Later, Serir was not rehired as an adjunct. The college cited the ongoing
student complaints, his lack of receptiveness to mentorship, and the two occasions
where he raised his voice with the dean’s assistant.
Serir responded with litigation. In July 2018, he filed a charge with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission. Serir checked the boxes for discrimination
based on religion, age, and retaliation. He then wrote:
I was hired by Respondent in or around December 2014. My current
position is part-time Computer Networking Adjunct Faculty. Respondent
has failed to promote me into a full-time position for which I applied and

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No. 21-2696 Page 3
am qualified. On or about December 7, 2017, I complained to Respondent.
Thereafter, Respondent has failed to assign me to teach any classes.
I believe I have been discriminated against me because of my age, 54
(YOB: 1963), and in retaliation for engaging in a protected activity, in
violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as
amended.
I believe I have been discriminated against me because of my religion,
Muslim, and in retaliation for engaging in a protected activity, in violation
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended.
The EEOC provided Serir a right-to-sue letter, and Serir filed this lawsuit in the district
court, invoking Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e; 29 U.S.C. § 621. As he did at the EEOC, Serir alleged that ICC denied him the
tenure-track job, a private office for prayers, and another semester as an adjunct because
of his religion and age, and to retaliate for his internal complaint of discrimination. He
also added that these actions were based on his national origin, which he describes as
“Arab.”
The district court entered summary judgment for ICC. It ruled, first, that claims
based on the denial of his first two tenure-track applications (2014 and May 2017) were
untimely. Second, his national origin claim failed because Serir did not exhaust it in his
EEOC charge. For the remaining claims, the court concluded that Serir did not present
evidence that would allow a jury to find that ICC’s hiring decisions reflected unlawful
discrimination or retaliation.
On appeal, Serir first contends that the district court wrongly dismissed as
untimely his claims about the denial of his first two applications for the tenure-track
position. To file suit under Title VII and the ADEA, charges must be filed with the
EEOC within 300 days of an unlawful employment action. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1);
29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1)(B). Serir filed his charge in July 2018; that is far more than 300 days
after the first denial in 2014 and the second denial in May 2017. Serir responds that his
EEOC charge should be dated from May 8, 2018, when he first approached the EEOC.
But timeliness is tied to the date that the charge is filed. See id. In any case, even May
2018 is more than 300 days after the second denial in May 2017. These claims are thus
time-barred. See Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 115 (2002).
Next Serir contests the district court’s ruling that he did not exhaust his
discrimination claim based on national origin. A plaintiff has exhausted only those

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claims that are “like or reasonably related” to the allegations raised in the EEOC charge.
Chaidez v. Ford Motor Co., 937 F.3d 998, 1004 (7th Cir. 2019). Recognizing that his EEOC
charge does not mention national origin, Serir argues that, in this case, his religion as a
Muslim “correlat[es]” with his national origin, which he describes as Arab. We will
assume that, depending on the details, claims of discrimination based on religion and
national origin can overlap. But Serir’s charge did not mention any details about anti-
Muslim discrimination that he faced. He thus gave neither the EEOC nor ICC reason to
think that a national origin claim would “grow out” of an investigation of the
allegations in his claim of religious discrimination. See Vela v. Vill. of Sauk Vill., 218 F.3d
661, 664 (7th Cir. 2000). Serir replies that his EEOC charge incorporated his complaint to
ICC’s human resources department of discrimination based on his “ethnicity.” But the
EEOC charge does not mention or attach that letter; thus this argument is unsupported
by the record.
That brings us to Serir’s remaining claims of age and religious discrimination,
and retaliation regarding the denial of his final application for the tenure-track position,
ICC’s decision not to rehire him, and the lack of a private office for prayers. We can
analyze these claims under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under
McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff carries the initial burden of establishing a prima facie
case; if the plaintiff does so, the burden shifts to the employer to offer a
nondiscriminatory motive, and, if the employer does so, the burden shifts back to the
plaintiff to show that the employer’s stated reason was a pretext. Id. at 802–04.
We begin with the denial of Serir’s third application for the tenure-track job. Serir
fails to establish a prima facie case because he does not assert (let alone show) that the
successful applicant was non-Muslim, substantially younger than Serir, or had never
complained about discrimination. See Marnocha v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr.,
Inc., 986 F.3d 711, 719 (7th Cir. 2021) (age); Khungar v. Access Cmty. Health Network,
985 F.3d 565, 573 (7th Cir. 2021) (religion); Harper v. C.R. England, Inc., 687 F.3d 297, 309
(7th Cir. 2012) (retaliation). True, the successful applicant is three years his junior. But
that small age gap is not enough for a prima facie case of age discrimination. See Bennin
Ton v. Caterpillar Inc., 275 F.3d 654, 659 (7th Cir. 2001) (five-year difference insufficient).
Second, McDonnell Douglas to the side, Serir’s evidence would not permit a
reasonable jury to conclude that ICC denied Serir’s final application because of his age.
See Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises, Inc., 834 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2016). He cites the statements
from the faculty member who said, in the context of his second application, “do not
expect too much [from ICC] toward your retirement” and his “personality” is a
problem. But even if the first comment alludes to his age (the second comment plainly
does not), it is insufficient because Serir does not assert that this member had any role in

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his third application. He also cites a statement from the dean who referred to how long
it takes to obtain tenure. But again, even if this comment alludes to age, given the
successful applicant’s similar age, the comment does not permit an inference that ICC
refused to hire him because of his age. See Igasaki v. Illinois Dep't of Fin. & Pro. Regul.,
988 F.3d 948, 961 (7th Cir. 2021).
Likewise, a jury could not find that ICC discriminated against him because he is
a Muslim. Regarding the tenure-track job, Serir cites the two female professors who said
that during his interview he called only the male faculty “professors.” But Serir does
not explain how this observation reflects religious hostility. Similarly, the dean’s refusal
to give him a private office does not reflect religious hostility or suggest that ICC
refused to rehire him as an adjunct because he is a Muslim. He does not dispute that he
could, without interference, pray alone in private spaces. He also does not dispute ICC's
contention that it does not give any other adjunct faculty a private office. An
accommodation for a religious practice “need not be the employee’s preferred
accommodation or the accommodation most beneficial to the employee.” See Porter v.
City of Chicago, 700 F.3d 944, 951 (7th Cir. 2012).
Finally, Serir did not present sufficient evidence to allow a jury to find that the
college did not hire him for the tenure-track position, and did not rehire him as an
adjunct, to retaliate for internally complaining about discrimination. Serir needed to
furnish evidence that would permit a factfinder to infer that, without his complaint to
human resources, ICC would have placed him in either of those positions. See Univ. of
Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 362 (2013). The only evidence that Serir has
presented of causation is sequential timing: both hiring decisions occurred after his
internal complaint. “Suspicious timing is rarely enough to create a triable issue,” see
Khungar, 985 F.3d at 578, and it is not enough here to show that Serir’s complaint to
human resources caused ICC’s hiring decisions. ICC explained that it based its
decisions on the undisputed evidence of complaints from students about Serir’s lack of
responsiveness and gender bias, among other work-performance problems. Serir
speculates that the college fabricated these complaints and never seriously considered
him for the tenure-track job. But speculation is not rebuttal evidence. See Igasaki,
988 F.3d at 961.
Serir raises other arguments on appeal, but they are defective for the reasons
explained above.
AFFIRMED

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