Chase M. Braun v. VILLAGE OF PALATINE and MICHAEL LICARI

In the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 20-3227
C HASE M. BRAUN ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
VILLAGE OF P ALATINE
and M ICHAEL LICARI ,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 18 C 4850 — Robert W. Gettleman, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED M AY 13, 2021 — DECIDED D ECEMBER 29, 2022
____________________
Before SYKES , Chief Judge, and S CUDDER and K IRSCH ,
Circuit Judges.
S YKES , Chief Judge. While driving home to Chicago one
night in September 2017, Chase Braun suffered a seizure and
crashed into a telephone pole in suburban Palatine. Officer
Michael Licari of the Palatine Police Department was first on
the scene; other officers arrived soon after. Braun could not
remember what happened, but his appearance, behavior,

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2 No. 20-3227
and the circumstances of the accident caused Officer Licari
to suspect that he was intoxicated. The crash occurred late at
night, and Braun had slurred speech, bloodshot and glassy
eyes, and difficulty balancing. Bizarrely, he told the officer
that he lived in “Chicago-Miami.” And he said he had
consumed a beer earlier in the evening.
Based on these signs of intoxicated driving, Officer Licari
administered field sobriety tests. After observing Braun
struggle with the tests, the officer arrested him. Though an
ambulance had been dispatched to the scene, Braun said he
was fine and declined medical assistance. When they arrived
at the police station, Officer Licari administered a Breatha-
lyzer test. Braun passed. But based on the presence of other
indicators of intoxication, Officer Licari took him to a local
hospital to collect blood and urine samples for more sensi-
tive testing. When the booking process was completed,
Braun was released. He suffered another seizure while still
at the station.
Braun then sued Officer Licari under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
raising Fourth Amendment claims for false arrest and failure
to provide medical care. He included the Village of Palatine
in the latter claim, necessarily implying municipal liability
under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658
(1978). He also brought a Monell claim against the Village
alleging a wide array of police misconduct, including mak-
ing false arrests, hiding evidence, and creating misleading
reports. Finally, he alleged several state-law claims, includ-
ing one for false arrest.
Early in the litigation, the district judge dismissed the
second Monell claim about widespread police misconduct.
After discovery closed, the judge entered summary judg-

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No. 20-3227 3
ment for the defendants on the other § 1983 claims and the
state-law false-arrest claim. More specifically, the judge
ruled that (1) Officer Licari had probable cause to arrest
Braun for driving under the influence; (2) the officer’s failure
to provide medical care was not objectively unreasonable;
and (3) the medical-care claim against the Village failed for
lack of evidence. The judge relinquished jurisdiction over
the remaining state-law claims, and Braun appealed.
We affirm. Although Braun passed a Breathalyzer test at
the station, other indicia of intoxication provided probable
cause to arrest him for driving under the influence. And
because Officer Licari neither knew nor had reason to know
of Braun’s initial seizure or other medical needs, his failure
to provide medical care was not objectively unreasonable.
With no underlying deprivation of a federally protected
right, Braun’s medical-care claim against the Village neces-
sarily fails. Finally, Braun abandoned his Monell claim about
widespread police misconduct. Though he moved to rein-
state it almost a year and a half after it was dismissed, the
judge reasonably concluded that the request came far too
late.
I. Background
In September 2017 Braun was living in Chicago and
working as an overnight pharmacist in suburban Cook
County. He has a complicated medical history, including
traumatic brain injury, seizures, anxiety, depression, and
attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder. After completing his
seventh consecutive ten-hour overnight shift on
September 11, Braun felt ill and slept at his parents’ house in
Park Ridge until the late afternoon. He then visited his
girlfriend’s condo in Palatine where he tried to eat some food

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4 No. 20-3227
but vomited. Once his girlfriend went to sleep, he left to
drive home to Chicago.
The next thing Braun remembers is waking up to two po-
lice officers shining flashlights into his car. He had crashed
into a telephone pole. Although he would later discover that
a seizure caused the accident, at the time he could not de-
scribe how the crash had happened. Officer Licari, the first
officer to respond, opened the door to check on Braun.
Initially Braun told the officer that he did not feel well and
that he “need[ed] medical attention.”1 But a few minutes
later, he said he was “fine.”
Officer Licari did not smell alcohol during this interac-
tion, but Braun’s behavior and appearance caused him to
suspect that Braun was intoxicated. The officer observed that
Braun was confused, slurred his speech, struggled with
balance, and had bloodshot and glassy eyes. Braun made the
odd statements that he was “not in an accident” and that he
“live[d] in Chicago-Miami.” And he told the officers that he
had consumed “one beer with [his brother] Scott” earlier
that evening.2
Palatine police officers do not carry portable Breathalyzer
devices, so Officer Licari administered standardized field
sobriety tests. These included the horizontal gaze nystagmus
test, which assessed Braun’s eye movement in response to an
object being waved near his face; the walk-and-turn test,
which had him take a certain number of heel-to-toe steps
1 This point is disputed. Because the case comes to us on appeal from a
summary judgment, we construe the facts in the light most favorable to
Braun. Reget v. City of La Crosse, 595 F.3d 691, 695 (7th Cir. 2010).
2 This statement, it turned out, was incorrect.

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No. 20-3227 5
before turning and returning; and the one-leg-stand test,
which required him to lift one leg off the ground and count
out loud. Officer Sopcak, who arrived shortly after Licari,
asked Braun to recite the alphabet without singing.3 Officer
Licari reported that Braun failed all these tests.4
The officers at the scene asked Braun if he was injured,
needed medical care, or had any medical conditions. He
replied “no” to all three questions and told them that he was
“fine.” Braun neither informed the officers of his various
medical conditions nor wore a medical bracelet or other
indicator of his conditions. And although he was confused,
struggled with balance, and had bloodshot eyes, Braun did
not exhibit any physical injuries. As a result, Officer Licari
concluded that he did not require medical assistance, so the
officers waved off an ambulance that had been dispatched to
the scene.
After the field sobriety tests, Officer Licari arrested Braun
and took him to the police station for a Breathalyzer test. The
test results did not show the presence of alcohol; the device
registered 0.000. But based on the other signs of intoxication,
Officer Licari took Braun to Northwest Community Hospital
for a “DUI kit,” which uses blood and urine samples to test
for the presence of “volatiles” (like alcohol) and drugs. A
3 Sergeant Baker and Officer Robertson were also present.
4 Specifically, Officer Licari reported that Braun’s eyes did not move
smoothly during the horizontal gaze nystagmus test; that he took the
wrong number of steps, struggled with balance, and did not touch his
heel to his toe during the walk-and-turn test; and that he swayed,
hopped, and put his foot down during the one-leg-stand test. He also
reported that Braun’s ability to recite the alphabet was poor and that he
sang certain letters.

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6 No. 20-3227
nurse asked Braun if he had any injuries or needed to see a
doctor; he said “no” to both questions.5
After the samples were collected, Officer Licari took
Braun back to the station to finish the booking process.
Braun was released from custody when booking was com-
pleted, but he suffered another seizure while still at the
station and was rushed to the hospital.6
The test results from the DUI kit came in months later.
They showed that at the time of his arrest, Braun had no
alcohol or drugs in his system other than diphenhydramine,
which is a central nervous system depressant. In December
2017 the charges against him were dismissed.
In July 2018 Braun filed this § 1983 suit alleging eleven
federal and state-law claims against Officer Licari and the
Village of Palatine. As relevant here, he raised Fourth
Amendment claims against Licari for false arrest and failure
to provide medical care. The Village was named as an addi-
tional defendant on the medical-care claim, implicitly under
Monell. Braun brought a second Monell claim against the
Village alleging that it was responsible for widespread
unlawful police practices, including making false arrests,
hiding evidence, and creating false reports. Finally, the
complaint asserted several claims under state law, including
one for false arrest.
5 Braun asserts that he does not remember giving this response, but he
does not dispute that he declined the offer of medical help.
6 The parties do not describe what happened to Braun after he was taken
to the hospital for this seizure, and Braun does not claim that he was
detained again after receiving treatment.

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No. 20-3227 7
The defendants moved to dismiss all claims. In response
Braun asserted summarily that his complaint “sufficiently
state[d] all eleven causes of action,” but he discussed only
the false-arrest claims against Officer Licari and, to a lesser
extent, the medical-care claim and the various state-law
claims. He did not mention the Monell claim about wide-
spread police misconduct. The judge dismissed the medical-
care claim and the Monell claim alleging unlawful police
practices based on Braun’s failure to adequately respond to
the defendants’ motion. But he permitted the other claims to
proceed. Braun moved for reconsideration, or alternatively,
for leave to replead the medical-care claim. Notably, the
reconsideration motion did not seek reinstatement of the
Monell claim for unlawful police practices. The judge grant-
ed the motion, reinstating only the medical-care claim.
In August 2019—about 10 months later—Braun obtained
leave to amend his complaint. The amended complaint
included the Fourth Amendment false-arrest claim, the state-
law false-arrest claim, and the § 1983 claim for failure to
provide medical care. The medical-care claim named both
Officer Licari and the Village of Palatine as defendants, the
latter on a Monell theory that the Village had failed to train
its officers to recognize medical emergencies. The amended
complaint also included the original state-law claims. Once
again, the Monell claim about widespread police misconduct
was not mentioned.
In January 2020 Braun moved to vacate the order dis-
missing the Monell claim about police misconduct so he
could replead the claim. The motion, filed under Rule 59(e)
and Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, came
more than fifteen months after the judge’s dismissal order

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8 No. 20-3227
and five months after Braun obtained leave to file the
amended complaint. Based on this lengthy delay and
Braun’s omission of this Monell claim from the proposed
amended complaint, the judge denied the motion as untime-
ly.
After completing discovery, the defendants moved for
summary judgment on the § 1983 claims and the state-law
claim for false arrest. Braun filed a cross-motion for sum-
mary judgment on the § 1983 medical-care claim and the
state-law false-arrest claim. The judge granted the defend-
ants’ motion and denied Braun’s. Based on the undisputed
evidence, the judge determined that Officer Licari had
probable cause to arrest Braun for driving under the influ-
ence, which defeated both the Fourth Amendment false-
arrest claim and the false-arrest claim under Illinois law. And
because no evidence showed that Officer Licari knew or had
reason to know of Braun’s seizure or any other medical need,
the judge held that the officer’s failure to provide medical
care was not objectively unreasonable. Braun’s evidence also
fell short on the Monell claim against the Village for failure to
train its officers to recognize medical emergencies. Having
ruled in favor of the defendants on the § 1983 claims and the
state-law claim for false arrest, the judge relinquished juris-
diction over the remaining state-law claims and entered final
judgment for the defendants.
II. Discussion
We review a summary judgment de novo. Pulera v.
Sarzant, 966 F.3d 540, 549 (7th Cir. 2020). Braun had the
burden to produce evidence sufficient to show “at least a
triable issue on each element” of his claims; if he failed to do
so, summary judgment for the defendants was appropriate.

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No. 20-3227 9
Id. Braun’s arguments regarding the judge’s treatment of his
dismissed Monell claim implicate different standards of
review, which we discuss below.
A. False-Arrest Claims Under Federal and State Law
Braun’s claims for false arrest arise under the Fourth
Amendment and § 1983, and also under Illinois law. To
prevail on a Fourth Amendment false-arrest claim, “a plain-
tiff must show that there was no probable cause for his
arrest.” Neita v. City of Chicago, 830 F.3d 494, 497 (7th Cir.
2016). Put slightly differently, “[t]he existence of probable
cause to arrest is an absolute defense to any § 1983 claim
against a police officer for false arrest.” Jump v. Village of
Shorewood, 42 F.4th 782, 788 (7th Cir. 2022) (quotation marks
omitted). The existence of probable cause also defeats a
false-arrest claim under Illinois law, see McBride v. Grice,
576 F.3d 703, 706–07 (7th Cir. 2009), so we analyze these
claims together.
Probable cause to arrest exists “when the facts and cir-
cumstances that are known to [the officer] reasonably sup-
port a belief that the individual has committed, is
committing, or is about to commit a crime.” Holmes v. Village
of Hoffman Estates, 511 F.3d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 2007). This is a
“common-sense inquiry requiring only a probability of
criminal activity”; probable cause exists “whenever an
officer … has enough information to warrant a prudent
person to believe criminal conduct has occurred.” Leaver v.
Shortess, 844 F.3d 665, 669 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Whitlock v.
Brown, 596 F.3d 406, 411 (7th Cir. 2010)).
Applying this common-sense standard, Braun’s behavior
and the circumstances of his accident easily provided proba-

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10 No. 20-3227
ble cause to believe that he had committed the offense of
driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or some
combination of intoxicating substances. See 625 I LL. C OMP.
S TAT. 5/11-501(a)(2)–(5). Officer Licari responded to a single-
car accident that occurred late at night. Braun, the driver,
was confused, slurred his speech, had bloodshot and glassy
eyes, and had difficulty balancing. He also struggled with
multiple field sobriety tests and made several bizarre state-
ments, including that he was “not in an accident” and that
he lived in “Chicago-Miami.” Moreover, he told the officer
that he had consumed a beer earlier in the evening (though
that, of course, turned out to be untrue). These facts and
circumstances, considered together, gave Officer Licari
probable cause to believe that Braun was under the influence
of alcohol or another intoxicant when he crashed his car. See
Jump, 42 F.4th at 789 (explaining that resolving probable-
cause questions requires us “not to dissect every fact in
isolation but to look at the totality of the circumstances—the
whole picture”).
Nor was probable cause eliminated because an innocent
explanation for the crash and Braun’s behavior emerged
later. There is no requirement that “the officer’s belief be
correct or even more likely true than false, so long as it is
reasonable.” Qian v. Kautz, 168 F.3d 949, 953 (7th Cir. 1999).
And “the fact that the officer later discovers additional
evidence unknown to [him] at the time of the arrest is irrele-
vant to whether probable cause existed at the crucial time.”
Bailey v. City of Chicago, 779 F.3d 689, 695 (7th Cir. 2015)
(quoting Qian, 168 F.3d at 953–54)). Here, Officer Licari
encountered a man who was in a single-car accident at about
midnight, was confused and slurred his words, had blood-
shot eyes and difficulty balancing, and struggled with

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No. 20-3227 11
several sobriety tests. The officer did not need to eliminate
every innocent explanation for a situation that had many
hallmarks of a DUI crash.
This is especially true because Braun gave the officers no
reason to think that a medical problem had caused the
accident. Although he initially suggested otherwise, he
quickly changed course and told the officers that he was
“fine.” He also responded “no” when they asked if he
needed medical care or had any medical conditions. And he
did not wear a medical bracelet or other indicator “that
would have alerted the [o]fficers to his medical condition” as
a potential explanation for the crash and his behavior. Padula
v. Leimbach, 656 F.3d 595, 601 (7th Cir. 2011).
Our decision in Qian is instructive on this point. There
the police encountered a driver who had crashed his car and
was slurring his speech and struggling to walk. 168 F.3d at
954. But he “showed no physical signs of injury” and “de-
nied being injured.” Id. We held that this “overall setting
easily support[ed] [the officer’s] decision to arrest [the
driver] on the scene,” id., even though the driver—like
Braun—did not smell of alcohol, had no alcohol or drugs in
his car, and later blew a 0.000 on a Breathalyzer test, id. at
952; see also Gutierrez v. Kermon, 722 F.3d 1003, 1013 (7th Cir.
2013) (“[C]ertain behavior can be so extreme and dangerous
that it can be inferred for purposes of probable cause that it
resulted from alcohol or drug impairment, such as erratic
driving leading to the loss of control of a vehicle and a
serious crash. This is true even if the basis of impairment
later proves to be something else.” (citations omitted)).
Braun presses several arguments on appeal, but none is
persuasive. First, he argues that summary judgment was

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12 No. 20-3227
inappropriate because probable cause is always a question of
fact for the jury. That is incorrect. “If the underlying facts
supporting the probable cause determination are not in
dispute, … the court can decide whether probable cause
exists.” Holloway v. City of Milwaukee, 43 F.4th 760, 769 (7th
Cir. 2022) (quotation marks omitted). And here, as in Qian,
“there is no room for a difference of opinion concerning the
facts or the reasonable inferences to be drawn from them.”
168 F.3d at 953. Braun’s undisputed behavior and appear-
ance created a sufficient probability of criminal activity to
support the arrest, especially because it occurred before his
medical condition became apparent.
Braun also argues that even if probable cause existed at
the time of his initial arrest, his later 0.000 Breathalyzer
result extinguished it and rendered the arrest unlawful. Not
so. “[T]he probable cause analysis is an ex ante test,” Padula,
656 F.3d at 601 (quotation marks omitted), so the discovery
of subsequent information that was unknown to Officer
Licari at the time of the arrest does not speak to whether he
had probable cause to arrest Braun. In assessing the legality
of Braun’s arrest at the scene of the crash, what matters is
what Officer Licari knew then—not what he found out later.
See Bailey, 779 F.3d at 695.
To the extent Braun contends that his continued deten-
tion after he blew a 0.000 was unlawful, that argument also
falls short. The Breathalyzer result did not instantly negate
the clear indications of intoxication that Officer Licari and
the other officers observed at the crash scene. Cf. Seiser v.
City of Chicago, 762 F.3d 647, 656 (7th Cir. 2014) (noting that
an individual’s successful completion of “one or more field
sobriety tests … does not negate probable cause when other

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No. 20-3227 13
circumstances give rise to a reasonable belief that the indi-
vidual is intoxicated”). The undisputed signs of intoxication
could have stemmed from alcohol, drugs, or other intoxicat-
ing substances, which explains why Officer Licari took
Braun to the hospital for more comprehensive DUI blood
and urine testing.7
Put another way, even if we assume that the Breathalyzer
result should have informed Officer Licari that Braun had no
alcohol in his system, there was still probable cause to
believe that Braun had committed the crime of driving under
the influence of drugs or another intoxicating substance that
“render[ed] [him] incapable of driving safely.”
§ 5/11-501(a)(3)–(4). Probable cause persisted throughout
Braun’s limited detention after the Breathalyzer test, and that
detention did not become unlawful merely because Officer
Licari’s arrest report states that he arrested Braun for driving
under the influence of alcohol rather than some other intoxi-
cating substance. See Tapley v. Chambers, 840 F.3d 370, 377–78
(7th Cir. 2016) (“If there is probable cause to believe that a
person has committed a crime, it is constitutionally irrele-
vant whether the officer arrested the person on charges for
which there was no probable cause.” (citing Holmes, 511 F.3d
at 682)).
Given Braun’s behavior and the circumstances of his ac-
cident, Officer Licari reasonably believed that he had com-
7 Braun contends that charging him after he blew 0.000 on the Breatha-
lyzer test violated the Village’s policy. But the “only question that
matters … is whether [the defendants] violated the Fourth Amendment.”
Pulera v. Sarzant, 966 F.3d 540, 551 (7th Cir. 2020). A violation of the
Village’s policy does not necessarily amount to a constitutional violation
enforceable under § 1983.

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14 No. 20-3227
mitted the Illinois offense of driving under the influence of
an intoxicant. See § 5/11-501(a)(2)–(5). The existence of
probable cause defeats both the § 1983 false-arrest claim and
the state-law false-arrest claim.
B. Failure to Provide Medical Care
Braun also challenges the judge’s rejection of his § 1983
medical-care claim. He argues that Officer Licari deprived
him of his right to medical care by dismissing the ambulance
from the scene of the accident. Additionally, he asserts that
the Village is liable under Monell for failing to adequately
train its police officers to assess the medical needs of people
involved in accidents like his.
Because these events took place while Braun was under
arrest and prior to a probable-cause hearing, the § 1983 claim
for denial of medical care arises under the Fourth Amend-
ment. See Pulera, 966 F.3d at 549; see also Currie v. Chhabra,
728 F.3d 626, 629 (7th Cir. 2013). Accordingly, we ask wheth-
er the “officer’s conduct was ‘objectively unreasonable under
the circumstances.’” Williams v. Rodriguez, 509 F.3d 392, 403
(7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Lopez v. City of Chicago, 464 F.3d 711,
720 (7th Cir. 2006)). The inquiry considers: “(1) whether the
officer ha[d] notice of the detainee’s medical needs; (2) the
seriousness of the medical need; (3) the scope of the request-
ed treatment; and (4) police interests, including administra-
tive, penological, or investigative concerns.” Ortiz v. City of
Chicago, 656 F.3d 523, 530 (7th Cir. 2011).
Braun’s claim falters on the first factor—notice. Whether
Officer Licari knew or should have known about Braun’s
medical needs is critical to the analysis because “[t]he ques-
tion on summary judgment is whether a jury could find that

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No. 20-3227 15
it was objectively unreasonable for [Licari] to take no action
to seek medical care for [Braun] based on what [he] knew at the
time.” Id. at 531–32 (emphasis added); see also Florek v. Village
of Mundelein, 649 F.3d 594, 600 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he intui-
tive, organizing principle is that police must do more to
satisfy the reasonableness inquiry when the medical condi-
tion they confront is apparent and serious and the interests of
law enforcement in delaying treatment are low.” (emphasis
added)). If an officer has no reason to think that a person
needs medical help, then failing to summon or provide
medical assistance is not objectively unreasonable.
With that principle in mind, we agree with the district
judge that Officer Licari’s response in the wake of Braun’s
crash was not objectively unreasonable. “Officers can be
placed on notice of a serious medical condition either by
word or through observation of … physical symptoms.”
Estate of Perry v. Wenzell, 872 F.3d 439, 454 (7th Cir. 2017). But
neither words nor observation suggested to a reasonable
officer in Officer Licari’s position that Braun had just suf-
fered a seizure or otherwise needed medical assistance.
Although Braun initially told the officers that he did not feel
well, he quickly changed course and said that he was “fine.”
When asked if he was injured, needed medical care, or
suffered from a medical condition, he responded “no.” And
nothing that Officer Licari observed undermined these
statements: Braun did not wear a medical bracelet or other
indicator of his underlying conditions, and his physical
symptoms were limited to those suggesting intoxication—
confusion, slurred speech, bloodshot eyes, and difficulty
balancing.

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16 No. 20-3227
Braun argues that his odd statements that he was “not in
an accident” and that he “live[d] in Chicago-Miami” should
have alerted Officer Licari that he was experiencing a medi-
cal emergency, particularly because Braun said that he had
consumed just one beer hours earlier. But just because Braun
claimed to have had only one drink does not mean that
Officer Licari had to believe him. That’s especially true
because Licari had observed classic symptoms of intoxica-
tion at the scene of a single-car accident shortly after mid-
night. Based on Braun’s appearance and behavior—and
especially considering the lack of obvious signs of medical
distress and his rejection of medical assistance when it was
offered—it was reasonable for Officer Licari not to interpret
Braun’s confused statements as cause for medical concern.
The “ultimate inquiry” is whether the officer’s conduct
“was objectively reasonable under the circumstances.” Id. at
453–54 (quotation marks omitted). Braun said he was not
injured, did not suffer from any medical conditions, and did
not need medical assistance. And his appearance and behav-
ior were entirely consistent with intoxication. Under these
circumstances, Officer Licari lacked notice that Braun need-
ed medical care. His response was therefore objectively
reasonable.
This conclusion also defeats Braun’s claim that the Village
is liable for failing to train its officers to recognize medical
emergencies. This claim arises under Monell, which requires
Braun to “prove that the constitutional violation was caused
by a governmental ‘policy or custom, whether made by its
lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be
said to represent official policy.’” First Midwest Bank ex rel.
Est. of LaPorta v. City of Chicago, 988 F.3d 978, 986 (7th Cir.

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No. 20-3227 17
2021) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). More specifically,
Braun must “have evidence of ‘(1) an action pursuant to a
municipal policy, (2) culpability, meaning that policymakers
were deliberately indifferent to a known risk that the policy
would lead to constitutional violations, and (3) causation,
meaning the municipal action was the “moving force”
behind the constitutional injury.’” Pulera, 966 F.3d at 550
(quoting Hall v. City of Chicago, 953 F.3d 945, 950 (7th Cir.
2020)). Here, the judge entered summary judgment for the
Village because Braun provided no evidence from which the
court or a jury could infer deliberate indifference.
But before these heightened requirements come into play
for municipal liability under § 1983, the plaintiff must take
the “first step in every § 1983 claim” by “prov[ing] that he
was deprived of a federal right.” First Midwest Bank, 988 F.3d
at 987; see also Bohanon v. City of Indianapolis, 46 F.4th 669, 675
(7th Cir. 2022) (describing the requirement that the plaintiff
prove that “he was deprived of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States” (quotation marks
omitted)). Braun has not done so.
As we have explained, Officer Licari’s response to Braun’s
condition was objectively reasonable under the circumstanc-
es. That means that there was no “underlying constitutional
violation by a municipal employee,” so the Village “cannot
be liable under Monell” for failing to train Licari and its other
officers. Sallenger v. City of Springfield, 630 F.3d 499, 504 (7th
Cir. 2010); see also id. at 501 (“Because the officers did not
violate [the plaintiff’s] Fourth Amendment rights by the way
in which they used [a device], the City itself cannot be liable
under Monell for failure to properly train them in the use of
the device.”). In other words, because “[a] failure to train

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18 No. 20-3227
theory … requires a finding that the individual officers are
liable on the underlying substantive claim,” Doxtator v.
O’Brien, 39 F.4th 852, 864 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting Tesch v.
County of Green Lake, 157 F.3d 465, 477 (7th Cir. 1998)),
Braun’s theory of municipal liability falls with his claim of
individual liability against Officer Licari. His failure to
establish a deprivation of a federally protected right dooms
both claims.
C. The Dismissed Monell Claim
Braun also raises several claims of error regarding the
judge’s dismissal of the second Monell claim, which alleged
widespread unlawful conduct in the Palatine Police Depart-
ment. Specifically, Braun challenges the judge’s initial deci-
sion to dismiss this claim, the denial of his motion to
reconsider, and the judge’s refusal to reopen the dismissal to
permit him to replead it.
When a judge dismisses a complaint in whole or in part
for failure to state a claim, we normally review that order
without deference to the district court. Alioto v. Town of
Lisbon, 651 F.3d 715, 720 (7th Cir. 2011). Here, however, the
judge dismissed this claim based on Braun’s failure to ad-
dress it in his response to the motion to dismiss. The judge
properly construed Braun’s omission as a waiver. A litigant
“waives an argument by failing to make it before the district
court.” Id. at 721. This rule applies when “a party fails to
develop arguments related to a discrete issue” and also
when he “effectively abandons” the issue “by not respond-
ing to alleged deficiencies in a motion to dismiss.” Id.; see also
Lekas v. Briley, 405 F.3d 602, 614 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding
waiver because the plaintiff “did not present legal argu-

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No. 20-3227 19
ments or cite relevant authority to substantiate [his] claim in
responding to [the] defendants’ motion to dismiss”).
Braun’s response to the motion to dismiss highlighted
what he argued were contested facts relating to other claims
but did not mention the Monell claim alleging widespread
misconduct in the Palatine Police Department.8 He also
argued that certain factual questions prevented a determina-
tion of probable cause at the pleading stage, which implicat-
ed only the false-arrest claims against Officer Licari. In short,
Braun “effectively abandon[ed]” his Monell claim alleging
widespread police misconduct by not addressing it in his
response to the motion. Alioto, 651 F.3d at 721. And because
Braun ignores on appeal the basis for the judge’s decision to
dismiss the claim—namely, that he never argued that it
shouldn’t be dismissed—he has “doubled down on his
waiver by failing to grapple with that aspect of the district
court’s order.” Id.
Braun emphasizes that he quickly asked the judge to re-
consider his dismissal decision and requested an opportuni-
ty to replead the claim. This argument overstates the record.
Braun’s reconsideration motion argued only that the com-
plaint adequately stated a claim for failure to provide medi-
cal care. He cannot now argue that the judge erroneously
denied the reconsideration motion with respect to a claim
that was never mentioned.9 His later motion for leave to file
8 Specifically, Braun discussed factual issues relating to Counts I (mali-
cious prosecution), II (intentional infliction of emotional distress), VI
(failure to provide medical care), VII (willful and wanton conduct), and
XI (respondeat superior).
9 In truth, the judge did not deny the reconsideration motion at all. As
we’ve noted, the motion addressed only the claim for failure to provide

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20 No. 20-3227
an amended complaint likewise omitted any reference to the
dismissed Monell claim.
Finally, Braun argues that the judge wrongly denied his
later motion under Rules 59(e) and 60(b) to vacate the dis-
missal order to permit him to replead the Monell claim
alleging widespread police misconduct. Our review is
deferential; we will reverse the denial of a Rule 59(e) or 60(b)
motion only if we find an abuse of discretion. Anderson v.
Catholic Bishop of Chi., 759 F.3d 645, 652 (7th Cir. 2014).
As we’ve explained, Braun filed his motion to vacate very
late in the litigation—about fifteen months after the dismis-
sal order and about five months after his motion for leave to
amend the complaint. The judge deemed the motion untime-
ly and denied it. That ruling is unassailable. A Rule 59(e)
motion must be filed within 28 days of the entry of judg-
ment. F ED. R. C IV. P. 59(e) (“A motion to alter or amend a
judgment must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry
of judgment.”). The rule addresses “judgments,” but Braun
invoked it as a basis to reopen the judge’s interlocutory
dismissal order. Regardless of the procedural posture, the
judge was right to treat the motion as coming far too late.
The motion was also untimely if considered under the
rubric of Rule 60(b). The only possible basis for proceeding
under that rule is the catch-all provision in Rule 60(b)(6),
which provides that the court may grant relief from a final
judgment or order for “any … reason that justifies relief.” A
medical care, and the judge reinstated that claim in an oral ruling on the
motion. Tellingly, Braun’s counsel did not object during the hearing
when the judge clearly indicated that he viewed the motion as challeng-
ing only the dismissal of the medical-care claim.

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No. 20-3227 21
motion for relief under this subsection of Rule 60(b) “must
be made within a reasonable time.” F ED. R. C IV. P. 60(c)(1).
Setting aside the unusual procedural posture, Braun’s mo-
tion, coming fifteen months after the dismissal order, was
hardly filed “within a reasonable time.”
We note for completeness that the motion was also sub-
stantively defective. Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) “is available
only in ‘extraordinary circumstances.’” Buck v. Davis, 137 S.
Ct. 759, 777 (2017) (quoting Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524,
535 (2005)). A judge may consider many factors when mak-
ing this determination, including “the risk of injustice to the
parties” and “the risk of undermining the public’s confi-
dence in the judicial process.” Id. at 778 (quotation marks
omitted). Braun failed to identify any extraordinary circum-
stances to justify his request for relief. He argued only that
the dismissed Monell claim was adequately pleaded as an
initial matter. But the proper place for that argument was his
response to the defendants’ motion to dismiss. He did not
include it there or in his motion for reconsideration of the
judge’s dismissal order. And he did not take the opportunity
to include the dismissed claim in his August 2019 motion for
leave to amend his complaint.
Instead, Braun sought to revive this claim almost a year
and a half after it was dismissed and just days before the
close of fact discovery. Under these circumstances, the judge
was well within his discretion to deny the motion. See
Pearson v. Target Corp., 893 F.3d 980, 985 (7th Cir. 2018) (de-
scribing Rule 60(b)(6) and noting that “[i]t is fine to say that
individual parties must bear the responsibility for their
deliberate litigation conduct and leave it at that”).
A FFIRMED

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