Jacqueline A. Watkins v. City of Chicago

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted May 5, 2022*
Decided January 11, 2023
Before
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
No. 20-1750
JACQUELINE A. WATKINS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CITY OF CHICAGO,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:17-cv-02028
Edmond E. Chang,
Judge.
O R D E R
Chicago police officer Jacqueline Watkins was accused of ignoring a call to report
to the scene of a burglary, which led to a one-day suspension after a years-long
investigation. The suspension was eventually reversed. Watkins has sued the City of
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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Chicago under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for discrimination based on her
race and sex and for retaliation based on her complaints that her supervisor reported
her because she is Black and a woman. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 & 3. The district court
entered summary judgment for the City, concluding that Watkins had not offered
evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to find discriminatory or retaliatory
motives on the part of the relevant decision-makers. We affirm.
We present the factual record at summary judgment in the light most favorable
to Watkins, the non-moving party. Eaton v. J.H. Findorff & Son, Inc., 1 F.4th 508, 511
(7th Cir. 2021). One night in September 2008, the police department’s radio dispatcher
reported a “priority one” burglary and assigned a unit—not Watkins and her partner—
to respond. All available units are required to respond to priority-one calls. Watkins
and her partner had reported to dispatch ten minutes earlier that their previous call was
“clear,” meaning finished. Their shift was ending, and they were driving away from the
site of the burglary; they did not immediately answer dispatch or make a U-turn. When
Sergeant Francis Higgins passed their car, he ordered them (by unit number) to the
scene. They hesitated in responding by radio but turned around immediately and
arrived as little as ninety seconds after the sergeant.
That night, without discussing the situation with Watkins and her partner,
Higgins filed an interdepartmental complaint against them for driving “AWAY from an
all-call assignment.” (The departmental jargon for such a report is “complaint register”
or “CR,” but we use “complaint” for simplicity.) When Watkins received notice of this
complaint, which charged “inattention to duty,” she wrote to the assistant
superintendent of police that she and her partner (also a Black woman) responded
properly to the burglary call, that Higgins falsely accused her, and that Higgins
discriminated against her and her partner because of their race and sex. The
investigation into these accusations was folded into the one opened by Higgins’
complaint, and because of its subject, it had to be conducted outside the precinct by the
Internal Affairs Division.
The complaints took six years to resolve. Sergeant Jamie Kane conducted the
initial investigation and did not make a recommendation for almost two years, by
which time Higgins had retired. After reviewing the dispatch recordings and
interviewing witnesses, Kane recommended suspending Watkins for two days and her
partner (the driver) for one day for “failure to properly respond” to the burglary call.
Kane did not find cause to pursue Watkins’ complaint of discrimination. Watkins attests
that during her interview, Kane had told her that her allegations against Higgins

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defamed his reputation. (This remark is not in the transcript, but because we are
reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we assume that Kane said it off the record.)
At the next stage, a committee of senior officers (two deputy chiefs and a chief)
rejected the recommendation to suspend Watkins. They cited a lack of objective
evidence of her delayed arrival at the burglary once summoned. Chief of Internal
Affairs Juan Rivera, the next reviewer, disagreed; he concluded that the officers failed to
respond immediately over the radio to the priority-one call. Rivera recommended a
one-day suspension for Watkins for being “inattentive to duty.” Garry McCarthy, the
police superintendent at that time, received the file next. He approved Watkins’
suspension and imposed the same on her partner (whom Rivera had recommended
reprimanding).
Watkins filed a complaint through her union about the suspension, which she
alleged was discriminatory. An arbitrator ultimately found that there was no clear
evidence that Watkins had broken any rule in how she responded to the burglary. Her
suspension was reversed and she received backpay for that day. Her record now
reflects that a complaint was filed but “not sustained.” Still, the complaint was on her
record for years. Watkins believes that it damaged her chances of promotion, but she
has not provided evidence about any promotion decision.
Watkins also filed a charge with the Illinois Department of Human Rights (the
local counterpart to the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission). In the
end, the agency made no findings and issued a right-to-sue notice. That brings us to this
lawsuit against the City of Chicago under Title VII.
Watkins alleged that Higgins’ complaint and her suspension by the City were
discriminatory acts based on her race and sex and that the suspension was retaliation
for her complaints about Higgins. (Watkins does not try to revive other claims that were
dismissed on the pleadings.) The City moved for summary judgment. In granting the
motion, the district court explained that Watkins did not offer evidence that would
support a finding that the City acted with discriminatory or retaliatory motives.1
1 The City also presented the (non-jurisdictional) affirmative defense that
Watkins did not properly exhaust her administrative remedies because her charge with
the Illinois Department of Human Rights was untimely. See Delgado v. Merit Sys. Protec.
Bd., 880 F.3d 913, 925 (7th Cir. 2018), citing Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S.

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No. 20-1750 Page 4
On appeal, Watkins challenges these conclusions, and we review the decision de
novo. Eaton, 1 F.4th at 511. Watkins first presses her claim that Higgins filed the
complaint, and that Superintendent McCarthy ultimately suspended her, because of her
race and sex. For a discrimination claim to survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must
offer evidence that would permit a reasonable jury to conclude that the plaintiff's race
or sex caused an adverse employment action. Purtue v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Corrections,
963 F.3d 598, 601 (7th Cir. 2020). The plaintiff can use the burden-shifting framework of
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), or simply show that the totality of
her evidence could convince a reasonable jury that illegal discrimination occurred.
Purtue, 963 F.3d at 602. Watkins argues that she prevails under any approach.
To show that racial animus motivated Higgins’ complaint, Watkins submitted
evidence that Higgins had a history of making racist comments, affording preferential
treatment to white and male officers, and regarding Black women as lazy. We accept
her account of the facts at summary judgment. In reviewing this grant of summary
judgment, we need not try to determine, at least as a matter of law, whether the
evidence amounts to so-called “stray remarks” or permits reasonable inferences of race-
and/or sex-based animus. Remarks reflecting a supervisor’s unlawful animus may be
evidence of his or her attitudes generally and in ways that may have affected the
challenged decision. See Joll v. Valparaiso Community Schools, 953 F.3d 923, 935 (7th Cir.
2020) (reversing summary judgment for employer); cf. Blasdel v. Northwestern University,
687 F.3d 813, 820 (7th Cir. 2012) (“same actor” inference permits but does not require
inference that attitudes of person who hired plaintiff, for example, would not have
changed by the time the same person fired plaintiff).
For purposes of this appeal, we will assume that Higgins filed the complaint
with discriminatory intent. This part of Watkins’ claim still comes up short because
filing the complaint was not an adverse employment action. Adverse actions that can
sustain an employment-discrimination claim under Title VII are limited to those that
“affect employment or alter the conditions of the workplace.” Burlington Northern &
Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 62 (2006). The complaint alone did not affect
Watkins’s pay, benefits, or working conditions. She suspects that it diminished her
promotion prospects, but without some additional evidence of a link between the open
complaint and a decision not to promote her, the required “material consequences” are
385 (1982). Watkins argued for equitable tolling because an agency lawyer told her she
could not file her charge until the internal investigation ended. The district court did
not decide the issue of tolling, and the City does not argue about exhaustion on appeal.

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lacking. See Porter v. City of Chicago, 700 F.3d 944, 955 (7th Cir. 2012) (explaining that
reprimands and progressive discipline do not qualify as adverse actions).
The suspension itself, however, cost Watkins a day’s pay and qualifies as an
adverse employment action. The City is responsible for the suspension because the
superintendent—the final decision-maker—imposed it. See Brooks v. Avancez, 39 F.4th
424, 439 (7th Cir. 2022). Still, more is required before the City can be held liable.
Watkins’ primary evidence of a discriminatory suspension is Higgins’ history of racist
and sexist remarks. But Higgins was not the decision-maker. The City can be liable for
the conduct of a biased employee only if that person’s bias proximately caused the
adverse employment action. Staub v. Proctor Hospital, 562 U.S. 411, 420 (2011). If the
adverse action resulted from an untainted investigation and rests on grounds
independent of the biased complaint, the City will not be liable. Id. at 421; Woods v. City
of Berwyn, 803 F.3d 865, 870 (7th Cir. 2015).
Because Higgins did no more than initiate an independent investigation, and
Watkins does not show that he influenced the outcome, the evidence about him is
insufficient to raise a jury question about whether discrimination caused her
suspension. See Staub, 562 U.S. at 421. Several layers of review by different officials,
senior to Higgins and outside his district, occurred before the suspension was imposed,
and Watkins does not show they all relied on Higgins’ report. See Brooks, 39 F.4th at
440; Woods, 803 F.3d at 871. Indeed, evidence from other sources was collected at the
first stage, and three senior Department officials later recommended against Kane’s
recommendation to suspend Watkins. The investigation was not an exercise in rubber-
stamping. Further, Rivera’s recommendation to suspend Watkins related to the failure
to use the radio in response to the priority one call. That decision was based on audio
recordings and Rivera’s interpretation of policy in addition to the accounts of Higgins
and other witnesses. The Superintendent then agreed with Rivera about Watkins
(though not about her partner). Accordingly, this is not a case like Vega v. Chicago Park
District, in which we said that a jury could conclude that the investigation was “too
superficial” to insulate the City from liability for a complaint based on a supervisor’s
animus. 954 F.3d 996, 1007 (7th Cir. 2020); see also Woods, 803 F.3d at 871 (affirming
summary judgment for employer where independent investigation broke chain of
causation relied upon by plaintiff). The evidence here shows an investigation that
similarly broke any chain of causation between Higgins’ (presumed) bias and plaintiff’s
suspension.

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No. 20-1750 Page 6
Watkins also sought to prove that her suspension was discriminatory with
statistical evidence that “neglect of duty” complaints are sustained against Black
women officers more often than against white men. The problem with this evidence is
that Watkins asserts a claim of discriminatory treatment against her as an individual—
not a pattern-or-practice claim. See Matthews v. Waukesha County, 759 F.3d 821, 829 (7th
Cir. 2014).2 Proving disparate treatment requires plaintiff-specific evidence of
discriminatory intent. Id.; see Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577 (2009). Of course, that
evidence may be circumstantial, and it may include “evidence, statistical or otherwise,
that similarly situated employees outside of the protected group systematically receive
better treatment.” Downing v. Abbott Labs., 48 F.4th 793, 804 (7th Cir. 2022). But Watkins’
evidence falls short of raising a genuine dispute of material fact.
Statistical (like individual) comparators need not be identical to the plaintiff in
every way, but they must be similar in material ways. Purtue, 963 F.3d at 603. Watkins’
evidence, however, spans decades, which at a minimum implicates different decision-
makers. And the nature of the underlying conduct, such as whether “priority one”
situations were involved, is unclear. This makes it “impossible to determine” whether
the statistical comparators are like Watkins in the respects that matter most. See id.
Further, even if there were probative value in this collection of district-wide statistics, it
cannot carry the day alone. Matthews, 759 F.3d at 829 (explaining that “evidence of a
pattern or practice can only be collateral to evidence of specific discrimination against
the plaintiff herself”). Watkins has no other evidence—excluding her account of
Higgins’ conduct, which we have already discussed—of the decision-makers’
discriminatory motives, for which the City could be responsible.
Watkins’s final claim is that she was suspended as retaliation for submitting her
internal complaint against Higgins and filing charges with her union and the Illinois
Department of Human Rights. As relevant here, Watkins needed evidence sufficient to
2 Originally, Watkins also asserted a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which can
provide a remedy for a constitutional violation caused by a municipality’s policy,
practice, or custom. See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).
On appeal, Watkins does not challenge the dismissal of this claim, but regardless, we
generally treat employment-related constitutional claims the same as those under Title
VII. Dunlevy v. Langfelder, 52 F.4th 349, 353 (7th Cir. 2022). Watkins also has no claim of
disparate impact. She is not challenging the lopsided effects of a neutral employment
practice. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 578 (2009), citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–
2(k)(1)(A)(i).

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raise a genuine issue of material fact about whether retaliatory intent was a but-for
cause of her suspension. University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar,
570 U.S. 338, 352 (2013). In other words, Watkins must show she would not have been
suspended if she had not accused Higgins of discrimination in various protected
contexts.
She falls short of doing so. She primarily cites her evidence that Sergeant Kane,
who first investigated the dueling complaints, told her that she was defaming Higgins’
reputation by accusing him of racism and sexism. But Kane’s report went on to five
reviewers, and only the final two supported the suspension.3 Even if we assume that
Kane intended for Watkins to incur discipline because she accused Higgins, there is no
evidence that Rivera or McCarthy had the same motive, nor that Kane influenced their
decisions. See Vesey v. Envoy Air, Inc., 999 F.3d 456, 462 (7th Cir. 2021).
Watkins also asserts that the six years it took to investigate the complaint against
her shows retaliatory motive. “Suspicious” timing can be evidence of retaliation when
the adverse action follows closely on the heels of the plaintiff’s protected action. See
Igasaki v. Illinois Dep’t of Financial and Professional Regulation, 988 F.3d 948, 959 (7th Cir.
2021). Watkins does not explain how the slow decision-making here shows retaliatory
motive. We agree that this investigation was hardly the prompt action that can signify
an employer’s reasonable response to a discrimination charge. See Milligan v. Bd. of
Trustees of Southern Illinois University, 686 F.3d 378, 385 (7th Cir. 2012). And being under
a cloud obviously caused strain on Watkins. But she has no evidence that the
department slow-walked the investigation to punish her and not, for example, because
of bureaucratic delay or, as Watkins suspects, to wait out Higgins’ retirement (a fishy
but non-retaliatory motive). More importantly, she did not show that the length of the
investigation caused harm that would prevent a reasonable worker from reporting
discrimination, and so it was not a materially adverse action for purposes of a
retaliation claim. Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 68; see Poullard v. McDonald, 829 F.3d
844, 857 (7th Cir. 2016) (explaining that “threats of future discipline can cause stress or
worry” but are not themselves materially adverse).
A final point: in her appellate brief, Watkins maintains that the Chicago Police
Department perpetrates systemic racism and sexism against Black women. We
3 In the district court, Watkins did not submit evidence that Rivera was biased
against Black people, and we cannot consider the new evidence she submits on appeal.
Carmody v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 893 F.3d 397, 402 (7th Cir. 2018).

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emphasize that we neither accept nor reject these assertions about the institution. Our
decision resolves only the individual claims that Watkins pursued in the district court
and argues on appeal. For the reasons we have explained, she did not raise a genuine
dispute of material fact about whether her one-day suspension was discriminatory or
retaliatory.
AFFIRMED.

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