United States of America v. Cory L. Williams

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Argued December 14, 2022
Decided January 20, 2023
Before
DIANE S. SYKES, Chief Judge
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
No. 22-2141
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
CORY L. WILLIAMS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Indiana.
No. 1:15-cr-00111
Tanya Walton Pratt,
Chief Judge.
O R D E R
Cory Williams, a federal prisoner, appeals the denial of his motion for
compassionate release. During Williams’s imprisonment, the First Step Act of 2018
changed federal criminal sentencing law in such a way that Williams would have been
permitted to receive a shorter sentence had the Act applied at the time of his sentencing.
Williams argued in his compassionate-release motion that these changes amounted to
an “extraordinary and compelling” reason for a sentence reduction. The district court
denied the motion, recognizing that our 2021 decision in United States v. Thacker, 4 F.4th
569, 575 (7th Cir. 2021), foreclosed Williams’s argument. We agree and affirm.
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 22-2141 Page 2
I
In 2017 Williams pleaded guilty to conspiring to possess with intent to distribute
heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(A)(i). In the plea
proceeding Williams acknowledged in open court that, by virtue of the government
filing a prior felony information pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851, he faced a statutorily
enhanced mandatory minimum sentence of 240 months’ imprisonment and 120 months’
supervised release. The district court sentenced him to the enhanced statutory
minimum of 240 months.
In 2021 Williams invoked 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) and moved for
compassionate release. He argued that the First Step Act created extraordinary and
compelling circumstances warranting his release because under the Act the 240-month
statutory mandatory minimum—based on his prior felony offense—would no longer
apply. Williams emphasized that, if sentenced today, the advisory range under the
Sentencing Guidelines would be 135 to 168 months.
The district court denied the motion. The court highlighted that our decision in
Thacker precluded consideration of whether a nonretroactive legal change could be an
extraordinary and compelling reason for release because “the discretionary sentencing
reduction authority conferred by § 3582(c)(1)(A) does not permit—without a district
court finding some independent ‘extraordinary or compelling’ reason—the reduction of
sentences lawfully imposed before the effective date of the First Step Act’s
[nonretroactive] amendment.” 4 F.4th at 575.
Five days after the district court entered judgment, the Supreme Court decided
Concepcion v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 2389 (2022), holding that a district court may
consider nonretroactive legal changes when resentencing under the First Step Act.
On appeal Williams argues that Concepcion implicitly overrules Thacker. He
asserts that because Concepcion does not distinguish between resentencing under the
First Step Act—at issue in that case—and the “extraordinary and compelling reasons”
threshold for eligibility under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), courts may consider nonretroactive
legal changes on motions for compassionate release. To his credit, though, Williams’s
counsel recognizes that Thacker and our post-Concepcion decision in United States v. King,
40 F.4th 594 (7th Cir. 2022), foreclose this argument.

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No. 22-2141 Page 3
II
Since Concepcion, we have reaffirmed Thacker several times. Indeed, in King we
explained that “Concepcion is about the matters that district court judges may consider
when they resentence defendants. So understood, Concepcion is irrelevant to the
threshold question whether any given prisoner has established an ‘extraordinary and
compelling’ reason for release.” 40 F.4th at 596. Thacker, which addresses the threshold
eligibility question, therefore remains good law after Concepcion. See United States v.
Peoples, 41 F.4th 837, 842 (7th Cir. 2022) (“[N]othing in Concepcion calls into question our
decision in Thacker.”); United States v. Neubert, No. 22-1522, 2022 WL 4244895, at *1 (7th
Cir. Sept. 15, 2022) (same); United States v. Purham, No. 22-1554, 2022 WL 17413560, at *1
(7th Cir. Dec. 5, 2022) (“Concepcion does not address how a judge may decide the
preliminary question whether a prisoner showed an extraordinary and compelling
reason.”).
Congress has limited our consideration of “extraordinary and compelling”
reasons for release under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) to prospective legal changes. The
nonretroactive amendments in the First Step Act are beyond these limits. We therefore
AFFIRM.

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