Jack Newson v. Oakton Community College

22-2279Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit23.01.2023

Gesamter Gesetzestext

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted January 19, 2023*
Decided January 23, 2023
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
No. 22-2279
JACK NEWSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
OAKTON COMMUNITY COLLEGE,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division.
No. 19 C 02462
John J. Tharp, Jr.,
Judge.
O R D E R
Jack Newson appeals the dismissal of his case as a sanction under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 37(b). Because Newson willfully defied warnings from the court that he
would incur sanctions, including dismissal, if he continued to disobey the court’s
discovery orders, we affirm.
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
the record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would
not significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 22-2279 Page 2
Newson, a student with learning disabilities, sued Oakton Community College
for allegedly denying him reasonable accommodations in his courses in violation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12132, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794. After partly denying the college’s motion to dismiss the amended
complaint, the district court, on its own motion, recruited counsel to assist Newson with
his claims. Newson rejected counsel’s assistance and then failed to appear as ordered
for a telephonic hearing on the issue, so the court allowed the recruited lawyer to
withdraw.
The case proceeded to discovery under the supervision of the assigned
magistrate judge, and the college made its first effort to depose Newson. But the college
ended the deposition after learning that Newson was recording it on his mobile phone
without having notified defense counsel. See F ED. R. C IV. P. 30(b)(3)(B). Afterward,
Newson sent an email to defense counsel and the court that included a YouTube link to
a recording of the deposition. Newson also demanded a settlement of $200,000 and
threatened to “expose” counsel for “wrong doings.”
In response to the college’s motion for a protective order, the magistrate judge
ordered Newson to appear for another deposition and, to prevent Newson from further
harassing and threatening defense counsel, forbade him from recording it. She also
“caution[ed] [Newson] that a failure to cooperate with defendant in scheduling and
completing his deposition may lead to the dismissal of this case with prejudice.” At the
time, she declined to award the college the costs and fees associated with its motion,
because Newson may not have known that his conduct was sanctionable. But she
warned that Newson’s “pro se status will not be an excuse should [he] engage in
similarly obstructive conduct” in the future.
Undeterred, Newson recorded his second deposition and did not cooperate with
defense counsel’s questioning. When asked if he was recording, Newson would say
only that he was “doing lawful activities.” Throughout the deposition, he provided
evasive answers to dozens of questions. And after, Newson admitted in an email to
defense counsel and the court that he had recorded the proceeding. He also accused
defense counsel of asking the court reporter to alter the deposition transcript and
speculated that the court reporter had agreed because “court reporters, often women,
appear to be willing to change transcripts … to earn additional income.”
The magistrate judge found that Newson had violated the protective order and
was acting in bad faith. She ordered him to remove the recordings of the depositions

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No. 22-2279 Page 3
from YouTube and file an affidavit confirming that he had done so. She also warned
him, again, that failure to comply with her instructions could lead to dismissal. But
Newson followed neither instruction. Instead, in an unsworn submission, he falsely
stated that he had never posted the recordings on YouTube and argued, in apparent
contradiction, that it was “against the law to force [him] to take down” the recordings.
The magistrate judge then recommended the dismissal of the case with prejudice
under Rule 37(b). Newson objected, see F ED. R. C IV. P. 72(b), and reiterated his argument
that he had a legal right to record the depositions and post them online. Unpersuaded,
the district judge adopted the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation in full,
concluding that dismissal was an appropriate sanction given Newson’s repeated
violations of court orders and his bad-faith litigation conduct.
We review a dismissal under Rule 37 for abuse of discretion. See Pendell v. City of
Peoria, 799 F.3d 916, 917 (7th Cir. 2015). District courts may dismiss a case when a party
disobeys a discovery order willfully or in bad faith. F ED. R. C IV. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(v);
see Brown v. Columbia Sussex Corp., 664 F.3d 182, 190 (7th Cir. 2011).
On appeal, Newson primarily repeats his contention that a federal one-party
consent law, 18 U.S.C. § 2511, gave him the right to record the depositions, and so he
was “not legally obligated to obey” orders that forbade it. But, in pursuing this case,
Newson was bound by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including the court’s
protective order under Rule 26(c) that required his cooperation and forbade him from
recording. See F ED. R. C IV. P. 1; see generally Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 407–10 (2010). Because Newson has no justification for
repeatedly disobeying orders to refrain from recording or publishing his deposition,
remove the recordings, and cooperate with questioning, sanctions were proper.
See Ramirez v. T&H Lemont, Inc., 845 F.3d 772, 779 (7th Cir. 2016).
Nor can Newson contest the finding that his conduct was willful and in bad
faith. He continued to obstruct discovery after the court repeatedly warned him that his
conduct could lead to dismissal. He also evaded questions at the depositions and levied
baseless accusations that defense counsel and the court reporter colluded to change the
deposition transcript. With these actions and his denial of ever having posted the
recordings, Newson “gave the court no reason to believe that [he] would respect the
judicial process” going forward. Pendell, 799 F.3d at 918. Therefore, dismissal was
within the boundaries of the district court’s authority under Rule 37(b)(2)(A) and
reasonable under these circumstances.

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No. 22-2279 Page 4
The appellees have not moved for sanctions under Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 38, and we do not find this appeal so frivolous as to require issuance
sua sponte of a rule to show cause why Newson should not be sanctioned. But we
caution Newson that we do not view favorably arguments, such as his, that a litigant
has the right to choose whether to comply with specific orders from a court. Litigants
should challenge orders they disagree with “through orderly legal channels,” not by
disobeying them. See Williams v. Dart, 967 F.3d 625, 639–40 (7th Cir. 2020); Retired
Chicago Police Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 76 F.3d 856, 870 (7th Cir. 1996). Should we
encounter arguments like this from Newson in the future, he can expect sanctions.
AFFIRMED

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