Matthew J. Soderlin v. Lori Doehling

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted February 22, 2023 *
Decided March 8, 2023
Before
DIANE S. SYKES, Chief Judge
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
No. 22-2045
MATTHEW J. SODERLIN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
LORI DOEHLING, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Western District of
Wisconsin.
No. 18-cv-899-wmc
William M. Conley,
Judge.
O R D E R
Matthew Soderlin, a former Wisconsin prisoner, sued prison nurse Debra Bellin
alleging that she failed to promptly refill his prescription medication and ignored a
resulting medical crisis. He asserted an Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate
indifference to his medical needs and a medical-negligence claim under state law. The
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. See FED. R. A PP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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district judge denied Soderlin’s motions for recruited pro bono counsel and eventually
entered summary judgment for Bellin. We see no error and thus affirm.
We recount the evidence in the light most favorable to Soderlin. See White v.
Woods, 48 F.4th 853, 855 (7th Cir. 2022). Soderlin has Addison’s disease, a chronic
adrenal insufficiency for which he is prescribed medications, including the oral steroid
hydrocortisone. Without it he is susceptible to an “Addisonian crisis,” which causes
severe pain, vomiting, and other symptoms. (This is Soderlin’s description of his illness,
which we accept for present purposes. Bellin does not dispute that Addison’s disease is
an objectively serious condition for purposes of the Eighth Amendment claim.) While
imprisoned at Redgranite Correctional Institution, Soderlin was permitted to keep his
hydrocortisone tablets in his cell and was responsible for requesting refills as needed.
He sometimes went without the medication for several days because medical staff did
not always process the refills efficiently.
In late August 2017, medical staff took eight days to refill Soderlin’s prescription,
leaving him without medication for three days. On the evening of the third day,
September 6, he experienced an Addisonian crisis. He complained to Sergeant Zach
Bays, a correctional officer who called the prison’s medical unit. According to Soderlin’s
deposition testimony, Sergeant Bays told him that a nurse had replied: “It’s not like
[Soderlin] is gonna die without his medication for one night. Tell him that we will get it
to him tomorrow.” Soderlin’s condition worsened overnight. The next morning, he was
taken by wheelchair to the medical unit, where he received his medication.
Soderlin filed a grievance complaining about the repeated failure to timely refill
his hydrocortisone prescription, and it was sustained. He then filed this action alleging
that Nurse Bellin and other medical staff unconstitutionally and negligently allowed
delays in his prescription refills and ignored his Addisonian crisis on September 6. At
screening, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the judge allowed Soderlin to proceed with a
deliberate-indifference claim under the Eighth Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and a
medical-malpractice claim under Wisconsin law.
Soderlin asked the judge to recruit pro bono counsel, explaining that (1) he had
no legal training; (2) his claims involved the complex issue of the defendants’ state of
mind and required expert medical evidence that he could not obtain; and (3) he was
unable to investigate his claims because he had been transferred to a different prison.
Soderlin renewed this motion 11 months later. The judge denied both requests,
reasoning that Soderlin was capable of representing himself because his claims
appeared to turn on the defendants’ awareness of his condition and the lags in his

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No. 22-2045 Page 3
prescription refills, not complex medical questions, and because Soderlin had
demonstrated that he could communicate clearly and cite relevant legal authorities and
facts. Finally, the judge noted, Soderlin was now out of prison, making any
investigation easier. A reconsideration motion followed, but the judge again declined to
recruit counsel, explaining that Soderlin appeared competent based on his detailed
motions and reiterating that his claims did not appear to turn on questions requiring
expert medical testimony.
Meanwhile, the defendants moved for summary judgment on the deliberate-
indifference and medical-negligence claims. The judge granted the motion; Soderlin
challenges that ruling only as it relates to Nurse Bellin, so we limit our discussion
accordingly. Bellin conceded that Addison’s disease is a serious medical condition but
attested that she was not aware that Soderlin was not receiving timely refills of his
hydrocortisone medication. Soderlin responded that a reasonable jury could infer
knowledge because Bellin answered Bays’s call when Soderlin suffered the Addisonian
crisis on September 6, 2017. In support he submitted a declaration attesting: “I
personally witnessed [Bays] call [d]efendant Bellin. After Sergeant Bays called the nurse
clinician, he personally told me that defendant Bellin told him that ‘It’s not like he is
gonna die without his medication for one night. Tell him that we will get it to him
tomorrow.’” He also submitted two other prisoners’ declarations saying that they
observed Bays calling the medical unit and reporting Soderlin’s medical condition.
Nurse Bellin replied that Bays’s statement about what was said by the nurse who took
the call was hearsay and thus inadmissible. Soderlin countered that Bellin’s knowledge
was in dispute because (1) other defendants admitted that Bellin was on duty on the
night of September 6; and (2) the defendants had responded, “No dispute,” to this
proposed finding of fact: “Soderlin personally witnessed Bays call [d]efendant Bellin.”
The judge held that Soderlin’s attestation about Sergeant Bays’s statement
regarding what the nurse said during the call to the medical unit was inadmissible
hearsay. The judge further concluded that no reasonable juror could find that Nurse
Bellin acted negligently or with deliberate indifference because there was no admissible
evidence that she knew on the evening of September 6 that Soderlin’s hydrocortisone
refill had been delayed and he was experiencing adverse effects of the lack of
medication.
Our review of the judge’s summary-judgment ruling is de novo. White, 48 F.4th
at 861. To prove his claim for deliberate indifference against Nurse Bellin, Soderlin
needed evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that she displayed

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“something approaching a total unconcern” for his welfare by consciously disregarding
a substantial risk of serious harm. Stockton v. Milwaukee County, 44 F.4th 605, 615
(7th Cir. 2022) (quotation marks omitted). The only evidence offered about Bellin’s state
of mind was Soderlin’s account of Sergeant Bays’s statement about the content of his
phone call to the medical unit on the evening of September 6—that is, Soderlin’s
deposition testimony that Bays told him that the nurse who answered the call said that
he would not die and could wait until morning. As the judge explained, that statement
is hearsay because Bays, a nonparty, did not attest to it, and Soderlin offered it for the
truth of what Bays said. See FED. R. EVID. 801(c); MMG Fin. Corp. v. Midwest Amusements
Park, LLC, 630 F.3d 651, 656 (7th Cir. 2011). Soderlin does not contend that the statement
is not hearsay or is covered by an exception to the hearsay rule. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d),
802.
Similarly, on the negligence claim, Soderlin offered no admissible evidence from
which a reasonable jury could conclude that Nurse Bellin breached a duty to him and
caused him harm. See Gil v. Reed, 535 F.3d 551, 557 (7th Cir. 2008). This claim too
requires evidence that Bellin knew that Soderlin’s hydrocortisone refill had been
delayed and he was experiencing symptoms from not having his medication. As we
have explained, Bays’s statement to Soderlin about what was said by the nurse during
the September 6 phone call is inadmissible hearsay. Soderlin personally observed Bays
make the call for medical help, but he submitted no admissible evidence of what Bays
said during that call or who received it. His attestation that he observed Bays “call
Bellin” provided no foundation for his personal knowledge of who answered the call.
Though the defendants did not dispute Soderlin’s proposed factual finding that he
“witnessed Bays call [d]efendant Bellin,” there is no admissible evidence about what
was said during the call. Finally, the attestations by two other prisoners that Bays talked
about Soderlin’s “medical condition” during the call does not permit an inference that
the nurse who answered the phone was specifically notified that Soderlin was having a
medical crisis based on delayed medication. Accordingly, there is no evidence from
which a reasonable jury could find that Nurse Bellin had the knowledge required to
create a duty to act immediately (even assuming, but not deciding, that immediate
action was necessary).
Next, Soderlin argues that the judge erroneously denied his motions for recruited
counsel. We review for an abuse of discretion. Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 658 (7th Cir.
2007) (en banc). In deciding whether to recruit counsel, judges must weigh the
complexity of the pro se litigant’s claims against the litigant’s competence to represent
himself. Id. at 655. The judge here applied the correct standard and reached a reasonable

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decision. See id. at 658. He explained that Soderlin’s claims were relatively simple
because they turned on straightforward factual questions, not medical ones requiring
expert testimony, and that Soderlin had demonstrated in his filings that he could
communicate clearly and cite pertinent facts and law. We see no reason to second-guess
that decision. See id.
Soderlin raises three arguments, but none is persuasive. He notes that he was
transferred to a different prison after filing suit (making it more difficult to access
evidence) and that another prisoner helped him with his filings. But Soderlin had
already been released from prison when the judge addressed and denied his motions
for recruited counsel. It was appropriate to assess his ability to litigate the case himself
in light of his current circumstances and submissions to the court. Soderlin also argues
that our caselaw requires the court to recruit counsel for prisoners whose claims involve
medical issues or might require expert testimony. There are no such general rules.
See Olson v. Morgan, 750 F.3d 708, 711–12 (7th Cir. 2014); Romanelli v. Suliene, 615 F.3d
847, 853–54 (7th Cir. 2010). We instead require case-by-case consideration. Pruitt,
503 F.3d at 655–56.
AFFIRMED

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