Rodney L. Falls v. Tina M. Paries

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted March 9, 2023*
Decided March 10, 2023
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
No. 22-2252
RODNEY L. FALLS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
TINA M. PARIES,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division.
No. 1:21-cv-02490
Gary Feinerman,
Judge.
O R D E R
Rodney Falls appeals the imposition of sanctions against him under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 11(c) for violating the requirement of good-faith pleading. The
district court reasonably imposed the sanction, and we therefore affirm.
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. FED. R. A PP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

-- 1 of 4 --

No. 22-2252 Page 2
Falls sued a private attorney, Tina Paries, purportedly under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He
alleged that Paries violated his right of due process by preventing him from litigating
pro se in state court as the successor in interest to his involuntarily dissolved company,
Chiliad Partners. According to the amended federal complaint (which also named
defendants, including a state-court judge, who are not relevant to the appeal), in the
state case, Paries urged the judge not to let Falls litigate pro se and also filed—based on
allegedly false allegations—an administrative complaint against him for the
unauthorized practice of law.
Along with the other defendants, Paries moved to dismiss the federal complaint,
which was assigned to Judge Feinerman, for failure to state a claim. She also moved for
sanctions, asserting that Falls’s amended complaint violated the requirements of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b) that representations to the court be based on
reasonable inquiry, that pleadings not be presented for an improper purpose, and that
any legal claims be warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for
expanding the law. Paries argued that Falls knew his claims against her lacked any legal
foundation. In particular, she pointed out that Falls filed this lawsuit soon after the
dismissal of a similar § 1983 lawsuit of his against another private attorney. Falls v.
Schuster, No. 21-C-1502 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 22, 2021). In the Schuster case, Chief Judge
Pallmeyer dismissed the complaint because, as relevant here, the attorney Falls sued
was not a state actor for purposes of § 1983 and because the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction over the entire lawsuit, which
challenged the fairness of a state-court domestic-relations proceeding. Id.
In this case, Judge Feinerman granted all defendants’ motions to dismiss the
amended complaint. As to the § 1983 claim against Paries, he determined that Falls did
not plausibly allege the infringement of any constitutional right nor that Paries, as a
private attorney, could be treated as a state actor because of a conspiracy with the state-
court judge. Falls received leave to amend his complaint again, but he never did, nor
did he file a timely notice of appeal from the judgment that followed the dismissal.
Paries renewed her motion for Rule 11(c) sanctions, and the district court orally
granted her motion after full briefing (though Falls did not attend the hearing). Noting
that it was “treading carefully” because Falls was pro se, the court nevertheless
concluded that Falls’s persistence in his claim against Paries was both objectively and
subjectively unreasonable. Paries’s initial Rule 11 motion and the ruling in Falls v.
Schuster—which the court said was dismissed “on the very same grounds” as the
complaint in this case—put Falls on notice that he could not sue Paries under § 1983

-- 2 of 4 --

No. 22-2252 Page 3
unless he plausibly alleged some joint action or conspiracy with a state actor—beyond a
judge granting the lawyer’s motions. But, despite receiving this notice twice, Falls
pressed a constitutional claim against Paries.
After the sanctions motion was granted, Falls did not oppose Paries’s prove-up
motion requesting fees in the amount of $22,350.00. Falls instead moved,
unsuccessfully, to reconsider the decision to grant any sanctions. Because Falls never
responded to the prove-up motion, the court concluded that any arguments against the
amount were forfeited and that, in any event, Paries had reasonably incurred those fees
in defending against Falls’s “baseless claims.”
Falls then appealed. Because the notice of appeal was timely only with respect to
the post-judgment order entering sanctions in an amount certain, see Bell v. Vacuforce,
LLC, 908 F.3d 1075, 1079 (7th Cir. 2018), we limited the scope of this appeal accordingly.
Falls v. Paries, No. 22-2252 (7th Cir. Aug. 24, 2022).
Falls asserts that the district court based its sanctions ruling on two erroneous
conclusions: that Falls did not allege a conspiracy between Paries and a state actor, and
that his prior lawsuit was dismissed “on the very same grounds” as this case. We
review the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions for an abuse of discretion. Royce v. Michael R.
Needle P.C., 950 F.3d 939, 957 (7th Cir. 2020).
The district court reasonably concluded that Falls violated his obligations to the
court and Paries under Rule 11(b) when he pressed constitutional claims against her for
her work on the state-court case involving Chiliad Partners. Falls takes issue with the
court’s statement that the alleged conspiracy rested on the “mere fact” that the state
court judge agreed with an argument Paries made. He points to various other
allegations in his complaint that, he thinks, show a plausible basis for believing that
Paries and the judge conspired.
The court committed no error here. Fall’s assertion of a conspiracy was frivolous,
and the district court correctly sanctioned him for it because this precise issue had been
explained to him. Bell, 908 F.3d at 1079–80. State and private actors form a conspiracy
when they reach an understanding to violate a plaintiff’s rights and willfully participate
in joint activity, Dix v. Edelman Fin. Servs., LLC, 978 F.3d 507, 518 (7th Cir. 2020), but
none of Falls’s allegations suggests that Paries and the state judge worked in concert.
See Cooney v. Rossiter, 583 F.3d 967, 971 (7th Cir. 2009). Presenting a legal claim that is

-- 3 of 4 --

No. 22-2252 Page 4
unwarranted under the law, as this one was, may incur a Rule 11(c) penalty. Royce,
950 F.3d at 957–58.
Falls also argues that the entry of sanctions rests on the faulty premise that his
§ 1983 claim in Falls v. Schuster had been dismissed “on the very same grounds” as his
claim against Paries here. He asserts that Judge Pallmeyer dismissed Schuster for lack of
jurisdiction, whereas Judge Feinerman dismissed this complaint on the merits, for
failure to state a claim. But to the extent this distinction exists, it is immaterial to the
Rule 11 issue here. Although Judge Pallmeyer ultimately dismissed Schuster for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, she nevertheless explained that § 1983 permits relief against
non-state actors in limited circumstances that were not met by his “unsupported
allegations of joint action or a conspiracy.” This discussion and Paries’s first motion for
Rule 11(c) sanctions both put Falls on notice about what was required to bring a
nonfrivolous § 1983 claim against a private attorney such as Paries. Fabriko Acquisition
Corp. v. Prokos, 536 F.3d 605, 610 (7th Cir. 2008).
AFFIRMED

-- 4 of 4 --