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22-2102•United States of America v. Sinval De Oliveira
22-2102Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit20.03.2023
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted February 28, 2023*
Decided March 20, 2023
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK Circuit Judge
DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
No. 22-2102
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
SINVAL DE OLIVEIRA,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Western District of
Wisconsin.
No. 3:21-cr-00081-003
William M. Conley,
Judge.
O R D E R
Sinval De Oliveira was sentenced to 60 months’ imprisonment after pleading
guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h).
De Oliveira challenges his sentence, arguing that the district court improperly
calculated the applicable range of imprisonment under the Sentencing Guidelines by
* We granted the appellant’s unopposed motion to waive oral argument. Thus,
the appeal is submitted on the briefs and record. See F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(f).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1
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No. 22-2102 Page 2
using an inflated loss amount to set the offense level. See U.S.S.G. §§ 1B1.3, 2S1.1.
Because the court did not commit clear error in its loss calculation, we affirm.
In late 2020, an unknown person contacted a retail store in Rib Mountain,
Wisconsin, and convinced a manager at the Walmart store to remove $242,980 in cash
from the premises to satisfy a fraudulent shipping invoice. A store employee delivered
the cash to brothers Mario and Moises Amezcua-Cardenas. The brothers then brought
the cash to De Oliveira at a hotel in Milwaukee. De Oliveira deposited the funds (minus
his and the brothers’ cuts) into a bank account through 42 separate ATM cash deposits
across Wisconsin.
As part of an ongoing investigation by local police, the Department of Homeland
Security, and the FBI into similar thefts, the Amezcua-Cardenas brothers were arrested
in December 2020. About four months later, De Oliveira was arrested in Illinois. At the
time of his arrest, he had $70,000 in cash, a ledger, and numerous bank receipts from ten
states showing cash deposits totaling $5.1 million made between December 2020 and
April 2021. His ledger contained an accounting of the Wisconsin theft, including notes
about a Milwaukee hotel stay. De Oliveira explained to police that he was involved
with trading Bitcoin on behalf of a company. He was released without charge. Further
investigation established that De Oliveira had deposited $233,177 into an account using
ATMs throughout Wisconsin the day after the Walmart robbery. Online wire transfers
totaling $221,706 were made from the same account to foreign accounts in the days after
De Oliveira deposited the money.
In September 2021, the grand jury indicted De Oliveira for conspiracy to commit
money laundering. De Oliveira was arrested again in North Carolina, this time with
$4,000 cash, more ATM receipts, and another ledger showing that he had deposited
$7.9 million since his previous arrest. He again told the agents that he traveled the
country as a “bitcoin broker,” picking up and depositing money into bank accounts. He
denied knowing where the cash came from, though he admitted the source was a “grey
area” of operation and speculated it could be from Mexican politicians or drug cartels.
De Oliveira pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit money
laundering of the proceeds of a wire fraud scheme. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). The pre-
sentence investigation report (PSR) calculated a guidelines range of 87 to 108 months’
imprisonment, based on a total offense level of 28 and a criminal-history category of II.
The base offense level was 7, see U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(a)(1), and increased by 18 levels based
on a loss of more than $5 million, see id. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(J). This loss amount included the
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No. 22-2102 Page 3
$5.1 million in deposits that was reflected in the ledger found during De Oliveira’s first
arrest. De Oliveira objected to the loss amount, arguing the court should only consider
the proceeds of the Wisconsin theft because the government had not proved any other
specific criminal act.
At the sentencing hearing, De Oliveira renewed his objections to the PSR and
proposed a 24-month sentence, noting that no other bank deposits and transfers
occurred in Wisconsin. The court overruled his objections and concluded that the
preponderance of the evidence showed that De Oliveira continued participating in the
money laundering conspiracy after the Wisconsin theft by traveling to multiple states
and depositing large amounts of cash. The court discussed the parties’ aggravating and
mitigating arguments and imposed a below-guidelines sentence of 60 months’
imprisonment.
On appeal, De Oliveira challenges the loss amount calculation and the resulting
18-level increase to the offense level. We review the application of the Sentencing
Guidelines de novo and any factual findings for clear error. United States v. Buncich,
20 F.4th 1167, 1172 (7th Cir. 2021). In determining the offense level under U.S.S.G.
§ 2S1.1, a district court must look to a defendant’s relevant conduct under § 1B1.3 to
decide the “value of funds” involved in money laundering. United States v. Baker,
227 F.3d 955, 965 (7th Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted). The government must
prove relevant conduct by a preponderance of the evidence before it can be held against
a defendant at sentencing. See United States v. Schaefer, 291 F.3d 932, 939–940 (7th Cir.
2002).
De Oliveira argues that the government did not meet its burden of proving that
the $5.1 million was relevant conduct because it did not link those funds to any specific
unlawful acts. But the law does not require this. Because De Oliveira pled guilty to a
conspiracy to launder money, the guidelines attribute all reasonably foreseeable
unlawful activity taken in furtherance of the conspiracy to his loss amount. U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.3(a)(1). In a conspiracy case, the government is not required to trace each dollar to
a specific instance of money laundering. Baker, 227 F.3d at 966, see United States v. Gabel,
85 F.3d 1217, 1224 (7th Cir. 1996). In other words, while Oliveira’s substantive charge of
money laundering is limited to financial transactions tied to a “specified unlawful
activity,” 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1), his loss amount at sentencing includes any unlawful
activity that was reasonably foreseeable and taken in furtherance of the money
laundering scheme, so long as it can be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. See
Baker, 227 F.3d at 965 (money not linked to any particular transaction but used to
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No. 22-2102 Page 4
facilitate and “bank roll” a money laundering scheme was properly included in the loss
amount at sentencing). The government identified the unlawful conduct—laundering
fraud proceeds—and linked it with circumstantial evidence to the offense of conviction
as part of a common scheme. See United States v. Turner, 400 F.3d 491, 497 (7th Cir. 2005).
De Oliveira contends, however, that there is insufficient evidence for the finding
that all his deposits were part of the same scheme or plan. He acknowledges
responsibility for the $242,980 from the Wisconsin theft, and he concedes that he
deposited $5.1 million into multiple bank accounts, including the one he used for the
proceeds of the Wisconsin theft. He insists that this not enough.
The district court, however, cited ample evidence supporting its finding of a
common scheme. The loss calculation can include amounts involving similar actors,
modus operandi, time, and purpose. See United States v. Watts, 535 F.3d 650, 658 (7th Cir.
2008). De Oliveira continued to use the same methods and make similar records of his
activity after the Wisconsin theft. He made small deposits at multiple bank branches
into the same account into which he had deposited the Wisconsin proceeds at the
direction of the same people. Based on reasonable inferences from this evidence, the
court permissibly found that the $5.1 million in deposits was part of the same money
laundering scheme or plan to conceal wire fraud as the losses created by the Walmart
theft.
Further, De Oliveira acknowledged the likelihood of the funds being from illegal
activity in his plea agreement. The agreement states the government would prove that
he knew that the funds were generated from some sort of illicit activity, and that the
financial transactions were designed to conceal the nature, location, and ownership of
those illicit funds. Depositing checks with the knowledge that his actions were likely
illegal weighs in favor of finding relevant conduct. See United States v. Kosmel, 272 F.3d
501, 510 (7th Cir. 2001). Therefore, it was not clear error for the court to find that the
$5.1 million reflected illegal activity related to De Oliveira’s offense of conviction and
include it in the loss amount calculation.
AFFIRMED
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