Sheila Arnold, as Administrator of the Estate of Brandon C. Lewis v. State of Indiana

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted June 23, 2023*
Decided June 27, 2023
Before
DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
No. 22-2750
SHEILA ARNOLD, as Administrator of
the Estate of Brandon C. Lewis,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
STATE OF INDIANA, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
No. 1:21-cv-02769-JMS-MG
Jane Magnus-Stinson,
Judge.
O R D E R
Sheila Arnold, the mother of Brandon Lewis, sued the Indiana Department of
Correction on behalf of her son’s estate after he died in state custody. After Arnold’s
court-recruited counsel withdrew, Arnold proceeded pro se. The district court
repeatedly warned Arnold that, because the estate had multiple beneficiaries, it had to
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

-- 1 of 4 --

No. 22-2750 Page 2
appear through an attorney. When Arnold continued unrepresented, the court
dismissed the case. We affirm.
We accept the complaint’s factual allegations as true and draw reasonable
inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. See Otis v. Demarasse, 886 F.3d 639, 644 (7th Cir. 2018).
On the day her son died, Arnold was driving to a visit at Wabash Valley Correctional
Facility in Carlisle, Indiana. While on the road, she received a series of calls from
another Wabash detainee (an acquaintance of Arnold’s passenger, it appears). In the
first, he explained that there was an ongoing medical emergency involving Arnold’s
son. In the second, he elaborated that her son was receiving CPR. In the third, he shared
the tragic news that her son had died. When Arnold arrived at the prison, investigators
confirmed that her son had died, and she saw his body in an ambulance. She noticed
that his eyes were “black and wide open” and “blood was on his head.”
Wabash staff later told Arnold that her son, while hallucinating under the
influence of drugs, had died after striking his head against walls and bed rails, and
otherwise injuring himself. Arnold believes that, at best, correctional staff allowed this
to happen despite knowing that her son was a drug user and being required to check on
him at least every half hour. At worst, his injuries showed that someone had beaten and
stabbed him, suggesting to Arnold foul play and a cover-up.
Arnold, as the administrator of her son’s estate, sued the prison’s policymakers,
the officers on duty at the time, the Indiana Department of Correction, and the State of
Indiana. Arnold’s pro se complaint included ten counts, each stating a legal theory,
including various constitutional violations and a state-law claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress based on her viewing of her son’s body. Arnold sought
damages for herself and her son’s children as beneficiaries of the estate.
Two months after Arnold filed her complaint, the district court granted her
motion for recruitment of counsel. But just one week later, citing a request from Arnold,
counsel moved to withdraw. After holding a telephone conference, the court granted
the motion, warned Arnold that she could not represent the estate herself, and set a
deadline of 20 days for her to secure new counsel.
On the day of the initial deadline, the court granted a three-week extension of
time for Arnold to obtain new counsel or show cause why the case should not be
dismissed. The court also warned her that failure to comply could result in the case
being dismissed “without further warning or opportunity to show cause.” Arnold, still
pro se, responded to the rule to show cause by arguing that, as administrator, she had

-- 2 of 4 --

No. 22-2750 Page 3
standing to sue, and that she had a constitutional right to represent her son’s estate
without having a lawyer. In response, the court warned her that she could not act pro se
because the estate was the real party in interest, and only natural persons may act pro se
(and may not represent others). The court admonished Arnold that if she did not obtain
new counsel in 15 days, it would dismiss the case.
Arnold then moved for leave to amend her complaint so she could proceed as
the next friend of her son’s children, or alternatively, for the re-recruitment of counsel
for the estate. The district judge referred the motion to the assigned magistrate judge.
After a hearing, the magistrate judge denied the motion and recommended that the case
be dismissed without prejudice because Arnold could not represent the estate without a
lawyer but had already rejected one court-recruited counsel. Arnold did not object to
the report and recommendation. A month later, the district judge adopted it in full,
dismissed the case without prejudice, and entered final judgment.
Arnold, still pro se, appeals. To begin, we confirm that we have appellate
jurisdiction. The district court dismissed the complaint without prejudice. Often, this is
a signal that the case is not fully resolved, rendering the judgment non-final and
unappealable. See Carter v. Buesgen, 10 F.4th 715, 720 (7th Cir. 2021). This is not such a
case. Here, the court was clearly “done with the case”: it did not allow amendment of
the complaint, Arnold could no longer timely object to the magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation, and the court entered a separate judgment order labeled “final.”
See Davis v. Advocate Health Center Patient Care Express, 523 F.3d 681, 683 (7th Cir. 2008).
Moreover, the two-year statute of limitations, which, for § 1983 claims, we borrow from
Indiana law, has now run. See Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4; Richards v. Mitcheff, 696 F.3d 635,
637 (7th Cir. 2010). The claims are no longer revivable, and so the judgment is final.
See Anderson v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 759 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2014). We therefore
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
On appeal, Arnold argues that requiring her to obtain a lawyer for the estate
violates her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to freedom of religion and speech
and to due process of law. But we have held that a non-attorney representative of an
estate with multiple beneficiaries (like Arnold) cannot litigate pro se because doing so
would be representing another party in litigation without a law license. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1654; Malone v. Nielson, 474 F.3d 934, 937 (7th Cir. 2008). Arnold urges, in broad terms,
that this holding imperils her constitutional rights. But states may impose licensing
qualifications so long as they have a “rational connection” with the “fitness or capacity
to practice law.” Schware v. Bd. of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957); see also Scariano

-- 3 of 4 --

No. 22-2750 Page 4
v. Justices of the Supreme Court of Ind., 38 F.3d 920, 923 (7th Cir. 1994). And our concern is
for the estate; the purpose of the federal rule forbidding one person from litigating pro
se on behalf of another person or entity “is to protect the rights of the represented
party.” Elustra v. Mineo, 595 F.3d 699, 706 (7th Cir. 2010). Arnold’s rights must yield to
this sound restriction on the unlicensed practice of law.
Arnold continues that she should have been allowed to proceed as next friend of
her son’s minor children. See F ED. R. C IV. P. 17(c). She might be entitled to do so, but,
again, not pro se: “[T]he normal rule is that a next of friend may not, without the
assistance of counsel, bring suit on behalf of a minor party.” Elustra, 595 F.3d at 704.
Finally, Arnold contends that the district court should not have dismissed her
claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress because it does not belong to the
estate. But she waived her argument by not objecting within 14 days to the magistrate
judge’s report and recommendation, which included a warning of the consequences of
the failure to object. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); F ED. R. C IV. P. 72(b); Lorentzen v. Anderson
Pest Control, 64 F.3d 327, 330 (7th Cir. 1995). And regardless, Arnold is a party only in
her representative capacity, so she cannot raise arguments that pertain to claims that
she would have to bring personally.
We note, however, that Arnold is correct that, as pled, the emotional-distress
claim belongs to her personally. Thus, because the federal complaint identifies the
estate as the only plaintiff, the judgment in this case does not preclude Arnold from
pursuing any personal claims in the appropriate forum, with or without an attorney,
subject to the statute of limitations and any other defenses.
AFFIRMED

-- 4 of 4 --