United States of America v. Eddie M. Knox

I’d
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted July 11, 2023
Decided July 17, 2023
Before
DIANE S. SYKES, Chief Judge
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
No. 22-2449
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
EDDIE M. KNOX,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Indiana,
Fort Wayne Division.
No. 1:20CR48-006
Holly A. Brady,
Judge.
O R D E R
Eddie Knox pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute methamphetamine and
fentanyl, see 21 U.S.C. § 846, and was sentenced to 25 years in prison and five years of
supervised release. Knox “expressly waive[d] [his] right to appeal or to contest” the
“conviction” and “sentence” or “the manner in which” they were determined “on any
ground other than a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” But he appeals
nonetheless. His appointed counsel asserts that the appeal is frivolous and moves to
withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Counsel’s brief explains the
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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No. 22-2449 Page 2
nature of the case and raises potential issues that an appeal like this would be expected
to involve. Because counsel’s brief appears thorough and Knox has not responded to
counsel’s motion, see 7TH C IR . R. 51(b), we limit our review to the subjects that counsel
discusses. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014).
Counsel tells us that Knox wishes to challenge his guilty plea, but we agree with
him that such a challenge would be frivolous. Knox swore at his colloquy before a
magistrate judge (before whom he consented to plead) that his plea was voluntary; that
he understood the possible penalties, which included a maximum term of life in prison;
and that he had received no promises about his sentence. He also confirmed that he
understood the rights he was giving up, which the judge reviewed, including the right
to appeal his conviction or sentence. Next, the government provided the factual basis
for his plea. Finally, the judge asked Knox whether he had had enough time to talk to
counsel and was satisfied with the representation he received, and Knox said “yes.” The
district judge accepted the magistrate judge’s recommendation to accept Knox’s plea.
The magistrate judge substantially complied with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, rendering a challenge to the plea pointless. See United States v.
Davenport, 719 F.3d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 2013). The judge explained, and determined that
Knox understood, the effect of his plea. Specifically, he determined that Knox
understood the charges, the government’s right to use his statements against him, and
the various rights he was waiving. See FED. R. C RIM. P. 11(b)(1)(A)–(G), (N). Likewise,
Knox swore that he understood the minimum penalty for his offense (ten years in
prison), the maximum (life in prison), the applicable forfeitures and special
assessments, and the role of the Sentencing Guidelines in sentencing. See id.
R. 11(b)(1)(H)–(J), (L)–(M). Finally, the magistrate judge confirmed that Knox’s guilty
plea was voluntary and based on an adequate factual basis. See id. R. 11(b)(2)–(3). No
evidence undermines these sworn statements, which are presumed true. See United
States v. Barr, 960 F.3d 906, 917 (7th Cir. 2020). Thus, the plea is valid.
Next, counsel correctly explains that in light of his appeal waiver, Knox cannot
contest on appeal the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Before
sentencing Knox obtained new counsel and moved to withdraw his guilty plea on the
ground that his prior counsel was ineffective because counsel did not explain the
potential impact of the plea. He testified that counsel had promised that the judge
would not sentence him to more than the ten-year statutory minimum, and counsel did
not explain that the Sentencing Guidelines could yield the advisory sentencing range of
30 years to life. The district judge denied Knox’s motion for two reasons. First, the judge

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No. 22-2449 Page 3
determined that Knox’s statements under oath at the plea colloquy refuted his current
assertions. Second, Knox failed to establish that he would not have pleaded guilty if his
counsel had advised him differently.
An appellate challenge to the denial of a motion to withdraw a plea is a challenge
to the conviction, United States v. Alcala, 678 F.3d 574, 578 (7th Cir. 2012), and Knox’s
broad appeal waiver would foreclose any appellate challenge to his conviction. An
appeal waiver “stands or falls” with the underlying guilty plea, United States v. Nulf,
978 F.3d 504, 506 (7th Cir. 2020), and as we have just discussed, Knox’s guilty plea is
valid. Moreover, a challenge to his criminal judgment based on ineffective assistance of
counsel is best saved for collateral review, where an evidentiary foundation can be fully
developed. See Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 503–05 (2003).
Finally, counsel rightly concludes that the appeal waiver also prevents Knox
from challenging his 25-year prison term. We agree with counsel that no exception
could apply—Knox’s sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum of life in prison
and the judge did not consider any constitutionally impermissible factors at sentencing.
See Nulf, 978 F.3d at 507.
Therefore, we GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

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