Detlef Sommerfield v. Christopher Knasiak

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted April 18, 2023 *
Decided July 19, 2023
Before
JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge
KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge
DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge
No. 22-1100
DETLEF SOMMERFIELD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CHRISTOPHER KNASIAK,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illi-
nois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:08-CV-03025
Joan B. Gottschall,
Judge.
O R D E R
After suffering from severe anti-semitic harassment at his workplace, plaintiff
Detlef Sommerfield won a $540,000 jury verdict in his discrimination suit against
* This appeal has been submitted to the panel that decided Sommerfield v. Knasiak,
No. 18-2045 (7th Cir. July 23, 2020), pursuant to Seventh Circuit Internal Operating Pro-
cedure 6(b). We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument, because the
briefs and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments and oral argument
would not significantly aid the court. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 22-1100 Page 2
defendant Lawrence Knasiak. See Sommerfield v. Knasiak, 967 F.3d 617 (7th Cir. 2020).
The present appeal concerns the award of fees associated with that case to Sommer-
field’s attorney, Joseph Longo. After careful consideration, the district court awarded
Longo $522,100.76 in fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1988 and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(k). Longo is pursuing this appeal because he believes that he is entitled to more.
Finding no legal error or abuse of discretion in the district court’s thorough analysis,
we affirm.
Longo first complains that the present appellee, Christopher Knasiak, who is the
son of the original defendant, Lawrence Knasiak, was inappropriately substituted as
a party after his father’s death. Longo contends that Christopher’s substitution is
“wrongful” because he has not been appointed the representative of his father’s es-
tate by an Illinois probate court. While this appeal was pending, Longo filed a peti-
tion in the Probate Division of the Circuit Court of Cook County to open an estate for
Knasiak. Longo nominated Mary Romano to act as the administrator of the estate. On
May 16, 2023, the probate court entered an order appointing Romano as “Supervised
Administrator to Collect” for Knasiak’s estate and specified that her letters of office
were to expire on July 14, 2023. Following the probate court’s order, Longo filed a
motion in this court to substitute Romano, in her capacity as the “supervised admin-
istrator” of the estate, for Christopher. Christopher opposes the motion, arguing that
he was properly substituted for his father and that Romano is not authorized to act
on behalf of his father’s estate for purposes of this appeal.
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(a) governs what should happen when a
party dies after a district court has entered its judgment. That rule does not demand
formal appointment of a successor. Rule 43(a)(3) instructs that when, as in this case,
“a party against whom an appeal may be taken dies after entry of a judgment or or-
der in the district court, but before a notice of appeal is filed,” the parties must com-
ply with Rule 43(a)(1). That rule in turn states that if the decedent has no “personal
representative,” “the court of appeals may then direct appropriate proceedings.” We
have interpreted this to mean that “we are free to exercise our discretion in substitut-
ing a new [party]” unless and until another party is designated as the representative
of the decedent’s estate in accordance with state law. Bennett v. Tucker, 827 F.2d 63, 68
(7th Cir. 1987); accord Anderson v. Romero, 42 F.3d 1121, 1124–25 (7th Cir. 1994).
Under Illinois law, the role of “supervised administrator-to-collect” is a limited
one that lacks the full powers of an “administrator.” An administrator-to-collect “is
merely a temporary officer appointed by the court to collect and preserve the estate of

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No. 22-1100 Page 3
a decedent pending the determination of its proper legal representative, and as such,
his or her duties are strictly limited to those prescribed by statute.” 1 Horner Probate
Prac. & Estates § 4:10, Westlaw (database updated June 2023); accord 18 Ill. Prac., Es-
tate Planning & Admin. § 93:8, Westlaw (database updated October 2022). The statu-
tory “powers and duties” of an administrator-to-collect include only the “power to
sue for and collect the personal estate and debts due the decedent or missing person
and by leave of court to exercise the powers vested by law in an administrator.” 755
ILCS 5/10-4.
The present suit is not an action to “sue for or collect the personal estate and
debts due the decedent.” Instead, it is a suit against the decedent. Therefore, the plain
text of the statute requires the administrator-to-collect to obtain “leave of court” to act
on the estate’s behalf in such an action. As best we can tell, Romano has neither
sought nor received permission from the probate court to do so here. In addition, the
court order appointing Romano indicates that her letters of office expired on July 14,
2023. Because Romano currently is not authorized under Illinois law to act as
Knasiak’s “personal representative” in this action, we decline to recognize her as an
appropriate substitute party under Rule 43(a). 1
Because no personal representative has been named, “we are free to exercise our
discretion in substituting a new [party].” Bennett, 827 F.2d at 68. Apart from arguing
that Rule 43(a) precludes his substitution, Longo provides no reason why Christopher
is an inappropriate representative in this action. We therefore reject his challenge to
the substitution.
Longo next argues that the district court applied the wrong legal framework for
the calculation of fees and abused its discretion in determining his fee award. “[S]o
long as a district court applies the correct legal standards, we ‘give the district court
the benefit of the doubt’ in exercising its discretion to award fees and determine the
size of any award.” Koch v. Jerry W. Bailey Trucking, Inc., 51 F.4th 748, 754 (7th Cir.
2022) (quoting Nichols v. Ill. Dep’t of Transp., 4 F.4th 437, 443 (7th Cir. 2021)).
The procedure for calculating a fee award is “well established and straightfor-
ward.” Nichols, 4 F.4th at 441. First, the district court determines “the ‘lodestar,’ which
1 We note that the defendant has raised some serious questions as to the appropriateness of Longo’s ac-
tions before the probate court, including the fact that he allegedly claimed to be the “attorney for the es-
tate.” While troubling, the questions whether Longo has engaged in misconduct and whether Romano is
qualified to serve as the supervised administrator-to-collect are issues for the probate court.

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No. 22-1100 Page 4
is the attorney’s reasonable hourly rate multiplied by the hours the attorney reasona-
bly expended on the litigation.” Id. Second, the court “may determine whether an ad-
justment is warranted under the case-specific circumstances.” Id. That is precisely
what the district court did here. It first determined, based on the record evidence, that
the reasonable hourly rate for Longo’s services was $360 (rather than Longo’s sug-
gested $550). It then painstakingly reviewed Longo’s submitted billing records and
Knasiak’s voluminous objections to estimate the number of hours Longo reasonably
expended on the case. Finally, it determined that a 25% downward adjustment was
warranted because of “time [Longo] unreasonably spent pursuing unsuccessful
claims.”
Longo’s principal argument is that the district court erred in relying on previous
district-court decisions that assessed Longo’s reasonable hourly rate in other similar
litigation to determine his fee award for this case. See Nichols v. Ill. Dep’t of Transp.,
2019 WL 157915 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 10, 2019) (setting Longo’s hourly rate at $360 in an em-
ployment discrimination suit); Smith v. Rosebud Farm, Inc., 2018 WL 4030591 (N.D. Ill.
Aug. 23, 2018) (setting Longo’s hourly rate at $360 in a workplace religious discrimi-
nation case). But as we explained in a previous case involving Longo, it is neither le-
gal error nor an abuse of discretion for a district court to consider an attorney’s fee
awards in other cases. See Nichols, 4 F.4th at 442. Indeed, “recent fee awards from an
attorney’s other cases provide a useful comparison when establishing that attorney’s
reasonable rate.” Id. That is especially true here, where the district court emphasized
that Longo produced “nearly identical” evidence to support his fee petitions in each
case.
We have reviewed Longo’s remaining arguments and none has merit. We AFFIRM
the district court’s award of fees and costs.

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