Dana Watson v. Metropolitan Enforcement Group of Southern Illinois

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted August 16, 2023*
Decided August 16, 2023
Before
DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
No. 23-1412
DANA WATSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
METROPOLITAN ENFORCEMENT
GROUP OF SOUTHERN ILLINOIS,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Illinois.
No. 3:22-cv-2555-JPG
J. Phil Gilbert,
Judge.
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 23-1412 Page 2
O R D E R
Dana Watson sued the Metropolitan Enforcement Group of Southern Illinois
(MEGSI),1 a multijurisdictional law enforcement task force, for civil rights violations
after officers executed a no-knock warrant at her home. Because she filed her complaint
more than eight years after the incident, the district court concluded that the statute of
limitations bars her suit. We agree and affirm the dismissal.
According to Watson’s operative complaint, MEGSI officers executed a no-knock
warrant at her East St. Louis home in January 2014. In the early morning, officers kicked
in the door and threw a stun grenade into the home, surrounded an undressed Watson
and pointed their guns at her, frisked her, and searched the home for drugs. (They
purportedly had received a tip that drugs were being sold there.) Officers seized
Watson’s legally owned handgun and cash that she had saved to pay a contractor. She
was not taken into custody, and although state charges were filed, they were later
dismissed. According to Watson, the court clerk still has not released the cash (despite a
court order to do so) or the handgun.
In 2022, eight years after the search and seizure, Watson sued MEGSI in state
court. She alleged that the officers had violated her constitutional rights, in addition to
acting with negligence, displaying willful or wanton conduct, and inflicting emotional
distress. MEGSI removed the case under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), invoking federal-question
and supplemental jurisdiction, id. §§ 1331, 1367. After Watson amended her complaint,
1 MEGSI is a task force composed of federal, state, and local law enforcement
officers under the auspices of the Illinois State Police. I LL. S TATE P OLICE, 2014 A NNUAL
R EPORT 50, available at https://isp.illinois.gov/StaticFiles/docs/Directors
/LegislationNPublicNotice/annrpt14.pdf. In her amended complaint, Watson named
only MEGSI as a defendant, and MEGSI argued in its motion to dismiss that Watson
failed to allege grounds for its liability under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658,
690 (1978). We note, however, that it is not clear to us that Monell should apply to a
group managed by the state police; Monell applies to municipalities. But if MEGSI is best
considered a state agency, then it would not be a “person” subject to suit under § 1983,
see Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). On the other hand, if MEGSI
is a group within or among agencies of government, it might not even be a suable
entity. See Rogers v. City of Hobart, 996 F.3d 812, 819 n.13 (7th Cir. 2021). Because we
conclude that Watson’s complaint is barred by the statute of limitations, we need not
decide these non-jurisdictional matters.

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No. 23-1412 Page 3
MEGSI moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) because,
among other reasons, the suit was untimely.2
The district court agreed that the statute of limitations barred the claims. It
explained that, because we borrow the statute of limitations for § 1983 claims from the
forum state, see Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007), Watson’s state and federal
claims were both subject to the two-year statute of limitations set forth in 735 ILCS 5/13-
202. More than eight years had passed between the allegedly unlawful conduct and the
filing of the complaint, so the court granted the motion to dismiss. Watson appeals, and
we review the decision de novo. Neita v. City of Chicago, 830 F.3d 494, 496 (7th Cir. 2016).
Watson argues that her suit should be considered timely. We apply federal law
to determine when Watson’s § 1983 claims accrued—when the alleged constitutional
violation was complete, and she knew of her injury and its cause. Wallace, 549 U.S.
at 387–88. Watson’s complaint makes clear that she believed the forced entry, the
search, and the seizure of her property were unlawful as they were occurring, and so
claims about those actions accrued immediately. See Neita, 830 F.3d at 498. The same is
true of any unlawful seizure of Watson herself, because she was not detained after the
search. See Lewis v. City of Chicago, 914 F.3d 472, 478 (7th Cir. 2019). And under Illinois
law, the state law claims, too, accrued when she knew she had been injured and the
injury was wrongfully caused. Khan v. Deutsche Bank AG, 978 N.E.2d 1020, 1028–29 (Ill.
2012). Therefore, Watson’s claims, brought eight years after they accrued, were
untimely.
Watson invokes equitable tolling, but her assertion that she followed an
attorney’s advice does not satisfy the conditions for applying this doctrine. Under
Illinois law (which supplies the tolling rules here, see Wallace, 549 U.S. at 394), equitable
tolling applies under limited circumstances, such as when a defendant actively misleads
the plaintiff. Clay v. Kuhl, 727 N.E.2d 217, 223 (Ill. 2000). Watson has not argued that any
recognized circumstance is present here. Her reliance on potentially misleading advice
from her attorney—not the defendant—does not justify tolling against MEGSI.
See Modrowski v. Mote, 322 F.3d 965, 967 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[W]e, and numerous other
courts, have held that attorney negligence is not grounds for equitable tolling.”); Griffin
2 Ordinarily a statute of limitations defense should not be raised under
Rule 12(b)(6), but dismissal under that rule is allowed if the complaint contains
everything needed to establish the affirmative defense. Collins v. Vill. of Palatine, 875
F.3d 839, 842 (7th Cir. 2017).

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No. 23-1412 Page 4
v. Willoughby, 867 N.E.2d 1007, 1016 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (equitable tolling not justified
where plaintiff’s attorney was mistaken about the statute of limitations period).
AFFIRMED

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