United States of America v. Glenn Bowden

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted October 16, 2023
Decided October 16, 2023
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
No. 22-2309
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
GLENN BOWDEN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:19-CR-00924(1)
Harry D. Leinenweber,
Judge.
O R D E R
Glenn Bowden pleaded guilty to committing, and conspiring to commit, Hobbs
Act robbery. See 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). The district court sentenced him to 110 months in
prison, 3 years of supervised release, and restitution. Bowden appeals, but his
appointed attorney asserts that the appeal is frivolous and moves to withdraw.
See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). Bowden did not respond to counsel’s
motion. See CIR . R. 51(b). Counsel’s brief explains the nature of the case and discusses
potential issues that an appeal of this kind would be expected to involve. Because this
analysis appears thorough, we limit our review to the potential issues that counsel
identifies. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 22-2309 Page 2
Bowden and Marlon Jude worked together to rob three Sprint stores in the
Chicago area. Each time, Bowden or Jude pointed a gun—or what looked like one—at
employees or customers, restrained them with zip ties (two of three times), and took cell
phones and cash belonging to the store or the people present. The men stole property
worth $3,650, $44,639, and $8,273 from the first, second, and third robberies.
Law enforcement officers eventually arrested Bowden. Once in federal custody,
Bowden sent letters to Sprint and the district court, claiming that he gave the manager
of the third store $5,000 for her assistance in that robbery. Sprint took this false
allegation seriously and investigated the manager.
A year later, on the morning trial was set to begin, Bowden filed a plea
declaration in which he admitted that he was guilty of three counts of Hobbs Act
robbery and one count of conspiracy. The district court accepted his plea that day.
In applying the Sentencing Guidelines, the probation officer who prepared the
presentence investigation report (PSR) grouped the conspiracy count with each robbery
count. The base level for each group was 20. U.S.S.G §§ 3D1.1(a); 2B3.1(a). To Groups 1
and 2, the PSR added four offense levels for use of a dangerous weapon, id.
§ 2B3.1(b)(2)(D), and two more for physically restraining a victim, id. § 2B.3.1(b)(4)(B).
Group 2 also received a one-level increase for a loss amount exceeding $20,000. Id.
§ 2B3.1(b)(7)(B). Group 3 included an increase of five levels for brandishing a firearm,
id. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(c), and two levels for obstruction of justice, based on the letters falsely
implicating the store manager, id. § 3C1.1. The overall offense level was 30 after the
adjustment for multiple counts. Id. § 3D1.1(a)(3); 3D1.4. Bowden’s criminal history
category of V was based on six prior convictions, including one misdemeanor and one
conviction in 1995. See id. § 4A1.1(a).
At the sentencing hearing, the district court addressed Bowden’s objections.
Bowden argued against the enhancement for obstruction of justice, asserting that his
letters were immaterial. The court rejected the argument, finding Bowden sent the
harassing letters as an attempt to obstruct, influence, or impede an official proceeding,
or to influence, delay, or prevent the store manager’s testimony.
Otherwise, the court sustained Bowden’s objections. The court reduced the
criminal history category to IV, removing four criminal history points for the
misdemeanor and the conviction that was older than fifteen years. The court also
accepted Bowden’s argument, and the government’s stipulation, that Bowden should
receive a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility even though he had

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obstructed justice. Id. § 3E1.1. Bowden’s new criminal history category of IV and total
offense level of 28 resulted in a guidelines imprisonment range of 110–137 months and a
range of 0–3 years of supervised release. Id. § 5D1.2.
After hearing the parties’ arguments, the court discussed the factors under
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). In mitigation, the court considered the need to avoid a disparity
between Bowden’s sentence and Jude’s 110-month sentence, Bowden’s advanced age,
and the harshness of his pretrial custody during the COVID-19 pandemic. In
aggravation, the court considered the violence of armed robbery. It also mentioned the
need for deterrence given Bowden’s frequent contact with police. The court sentenced
Bowden to 110 months in prison, 3 concurrent terms of 3 years’ supervised release, and
it ordered restitution of $56,462, the value of the stolen electronics and cash adjusted for
any property that was recovered.
In the Anders brief, counsel reports that after she consulted with Bowden and
advised him about the risks and benefits of withdrawing his guilty plea, Bowden
affirmed that he wants to challenge only his sentence. Therefore, counsel properly
refrains from discussing the validity of the guilty plea. United States v. Konczak, 683 F.3d
348, 349 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 2002).
Counsel first considers whether the district court committed any procedural
errors at sentencing, beginning with the guidelines calculations. First, counsel discusses
the upward adjustments to which Bowden did not object: using a dangerous weapon,
brandishing a firearm, physically restraining a victim, and causing a loss exceeding
$20,000. We would review these increases for plain error. United States v. Mikulski,
35 F.4th 1074, 1077 (7th Cir. 2022). Each was based on uncontested information in the
PSR, and so counsel can identify no possible, let alone plain, error. See United States v.
Sunmola, 887 F.3d 830, 839 (7th Cir. 2018). We agree with this assessment.
Next, counsel discusses a potential challenge to the adjustment for obstruction of
justice applied to Group 3 (which Bowden concedes had no effect on the total offense
level because of the grouping rules). We would review the court’s factual findings for
clear error and its application of the guideline de novo. United States v. Price, 28 F.4th
739, 754 (7th Cir. 2022). Bowden argued that the court and the government did not take
the letters seriously and that the letters did not discourage the store manager from
testifying, but instead spurred her to assist the government. The court, however, found
that the letters were a form of harassment of the store manager—a witness—and an
attempt to influence, delay, or prevent her testimony. See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 cmt. n.4(I)
(incorporating 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b), (c)(1)); United States. v. Burgess, 22 F.4th 680, 686–88

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(7th Cir. 2022). It would be frivolous to cast this finding as clearly erroneous given
Bowden’s attempt to deflect guilt and the effect of the letter sent to Sprint. Further, an
attempt is sufficient to support the adjustment, regardless of whether the conduct has
the intended effect. United States v. Barber, 937 F.3d 965, 972 (7th Cir. 2019). Therefore,
we agree that it would be frivolous to argue that applying the enhancement for
obstruction of justice was improper.
Counsel next explains that Bowden cannot plausibly argue that he should have
received more than a two-level reduction for accepting responsibility. Under U.S.S.G
§ 3E1.1(b), the court cannot subtract a third offense level without a motion by the
government. Hicks v. United States, 886 F.3d 648, 651 (7th Cir. 2018). We would conclude
that withholding this motion was fitting because Bowden pleaded guilty after the
investment of substantial resources in trial preparation, and counsel identifies no reason
to believe that the government had invidious or improper motives. United States v.
Nurek, 578 F.3d 618, 624–25 (7th Cir. 2009).
Bowden also objected to his criminal history category, which was lowered when
points for a misdemeanor and a too-old conviction were subtracted, and so counsel
considers whether there was any other potential error in this calculation. Ultimately, the
court determined Bowden had eight criminal history points: three points for one
conviction resulting in two years’ imprisonment, three points for one conviction that
carried a sentence of twenty years’ imprisonment, one point for a conviction with a
sentence of two days’ imprisonment, and one point for a conviction resulting in 24
months’ probation. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(a), (c). This placed Bowden in category IV, id. at
§ 5 pt. A, and counsel is correct that it would be frivolous to argue otherwise.
Counsel identifies no other potential procedural errors with respect to the
sentence, such as relying on clearly erroneous information, overlooking mitigating
arguments, or failing to apply § 3553(a) and adequately explain the chosen sentence.
See United States v. Lyons, 733 F.3d 777, 784 (7th Cir. 2013). Based on the sentencing
transcript, we would agree with this assessment.
We also agree with counsel that challenging Bowden’s sentence as substantively
unreasonable would be futile. Bowden’s sentence is within the guidelines range and
therefore would be presumed reasonable. United States v. McDonald, 981 F.3d 579, 581–
82 (7th Cir. 2020). Rebutting the presumption would be impossible because the district
court consulted and reasonably applied the § 3553(a) factors: it heavily weighted the
seriousness of the offenses, which involved brandishing a gun at restrained victims, and

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it also cited Bowden’s history of violent crimes and the need to deter him and protect
the public. See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 51 F.4th 705, 718 (7th Cir. 2022).
Counsel also finds no possible issue regarding the amount of Bowden’s
mandatory restitution under 18 U.S.C. § 3664(a). The PSR contained an accounting of
the losses of each victim, which was sufficient for the district court judge to fashion a
restitution order absent an objection from Bowden. See Sunmola, 887 F.3d at 839–41.
Counsel confirmed with the prosecutor that the value of recovered property was
subtracted from the loss amount and can identify no other possible error. We agree with
counsel that it would be frivolous to argue the district court plainly erred when setting
the amount of restitution based on the undisputed facts in the PSR.
Finally, counsel considers whether Bowden could reasonably argue that the
district court erred when imposing the conditions of supervised release. The court
imposed only one condition, Special Condition 10, over Bowden’s objection, and our
review would be for abuse of discretion. United States v. Armour, 804 F.3d 859, 867
(7th Cir. 2015). The condition requires Bowden to pay at least 10% of his gross income
toward restitution once supervised release begins. Bowden wanted the condition to
“net out necessary living expenses.” Counsel points to authority that Special Condition
10 accounts for Bowden’s financial status by placing him on a payment schedule, under
which he retains most of his income. See United States v. Alverez, 21 F.4th 499, 504
(7th Cir. 2021). We agree that challenging this condition would be frivolous.
Therefore, we GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

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