United States of America v. Arthur Miles

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-2805
U NITED STATES OF A MERICA ,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
A RTHUR MILES ,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
No. 19-cr-00183 — Tanya Walton Pratt, Chief Judge.
____________________
A RGUED SEPTEMBER 13, 2023 — D ECIDED N OVEMBER 13, 2023
____________________
Before FLAUM, R IPPLE , and SCUDDER , Circuit Judges.
FLAUM, Circuit Judge. Arthur Miles was sentenced to 240
months’ imprisonment for four drug and firearm offenses. On
appeal, he mounts several challenges to his convictions and
sentence. For the following reasons, we vacate the district
court’s judgment with respect to Miles’s multiplicitous fire-
arm convictions and remand for the limited purpose of vacat-
ing one of his firearm sentences and merging his two firearm
convictions. In all other respects, we affirm.

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2 No. 22-2805
I. Background
A. Factual Background
In 2019, Indianapolis-based law enforcement officers in-
vestigated Christopher Deeren for suspected drug trafficking.
The officers used a confidential source (CS) to perform and
surveil two controlled methamphetamine buys from Deeren.
During both purchases, the CS met Deeren at a gas station,
got into a car with him, and headed to 3243 Brouse Avenue.
The CS handed Deeren cash, and Deeren entered the house
alone. A few minutes later, Deeren returned to the car and
handed the CS meth. The two drove back to the gas station,
where the CS gave the meth to an undercover officer. Deeren
used a different car for each controlled buy.
Based on this information, officers believed that Deeren’s
supplier was located at the Brouse Avenue address. They ap-
plied for a warrant to search that residence and any vehicles
on its premises for evidence of drug trafficking. Then-Magis-
trate Judge Pryor approved the warrant.
A few days later, the CS arranged another controlled buy
from Deeren so officers could execute the warrant. In ad-
vance, officers set up surveillance around the property. They
observed a person, later identified as Arthur Miles, using a
key to enter the residence. Soon after, Deeren and the CS ar-
rived. Deeren exited the car and began speaking with Miles
on the front porch of the residence. At that point, officers ar-
rested both Miles and Deeren and executed the search war-
rant.
After Miles waived his Miranda rights, he admitted to liv-
ing at 3243 Brouse Avenue and owning two vehicles on the
premises. The cars that belonged to Miles—a Honda Odyssey

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No. 22-2805 3
and a Dodge Charger—were different than those Deeren used
during the controlled buys. The officers found 107.3 grams of
pure meth inside the Honda. Inside the residence, they dis-
covered an additional 160.5 grams of pure meth, 124 grams of
a mixture containing cocaine, two rifles, and various drug dis-
tribution paraphernalia.
B. Procedural Background
Miles was indicted for possession with intent to distribute
meth (Count 1); possession with intent to distribute a mixture
containing cocaine (Count 2); and knowing possession of two
firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (Counts 3 & 4).
Miles made two motions to suppress the evidence recovered
via the search, arguing that the warrant did not establish
probable cause and was not sufficiently particular. The dis-
trict court denied both motions.
A jury convicted Miles on all four counts, and the court
entered concurrent sentences for each. Miles’s meth convic-
tion carried the longest sentence, and he received a within-
the-Guidelines sentence of 240 months’ imprisonment. Miles
now appeals.
II. Discussion
On appeal, Miles challenges his felon-in-possession con-
victions, the court’s denials of his suppression motions, and
the reasonableness of his sentence. We take each argument in
turn.
A. Section 922(g)(1) Convictions
Miles challenges his felon-in-possession convictions on
two grounds. First, he argues that the convictions are multi-
plicitous. Second, he submits that they are unconstitutional

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4 No. 22-2805
under N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111
(2022).
1. Multiplicitous Convictions
Miles argues, and the government concedes on appeal,
that his two § 922(g)(1) convictions are multiplicitous because
he possessed the two firearms underpinning his convictions
simultaneously. United States v. Haas, 37 F.4th 1256, 1260 (7th
Cir. 2022) (“An indictment is multiplicitous when it charges a
single offense as separate counts.”); United States v. Buchmeier,
255 F.3d 415, 422 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[W]hen a defendant’s pos-
session of multiple firearms is simultaneous and undifferen-
tiated, the government may only charge … one violation of
§ 922(g)(1) … regardless of the actual quantity of firearms in-
volved.”). As such, this error requires remand so that “one
conviction [can] be vacated and merged into the other.”
United States v. Bloch, 718 F.3d 638, 644 (7th Cir. 2013).
Miles argues full resentencing is necessary because his
“invalid convictions played a significant role [in] the district
court’s sentencing considerations, to [his] prejudice.” How-
ever, Miles does not provide support from case law or the fac-
tual record for this argument. These sorts of “perfunctory and
underdeveloped arguments … unsupported by pertinent au-
thority” are insufficient to maintain a claim on appeal. Green-
bank v. Great Am. Assurance Co., 47 F.4th 618, 629 (7th Cir.
2022).
Even absent Miles’s waiver, full resentencing is unneces-
sary. Although “we prefer to [remand for resentencing] to
give the district court the opportunity to reconsider the sen-
tence as a whole,” United States v. Mobley, 833 F.3d 797, 801
(7th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted), a “more limited remand is

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No. 22-2805 5
advisable when the district court’s reasoning convinces us
that the rest of the sentence would not change,” United States
v. Teague, 8 F.4th 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted).
Although the district court mentioned Miles’s firearm pos-
session at sentencing, it discussed the facts related to Miles’s
drug charges and his history with drugs extensively. Most im-
portantly, while the court sentenced Miles to 60 months’ im-
prisonment for each § 922(g)(1) conviction, those sentences
have no effect on Miles’s overall term of incarceration because
they run concurrently with his lengthier 240-month meth sen-
tence. As a result, plenary resentencing is unnecessary be-
cause “[b]ased on the court’s findings[,] … we are persuaded
that the rest of the sentences it imposed should be left intact.”
Teague, 8 F.4th at 616; see also United States v. Parker, 508 F.3d
434, 442 (7th Cir. 2007) (remanding with instructions to vacate
one multiplicitous § 922(g) sentence and merge the two
§ 922(g) convictions but affirming the judgment of the district
court “[i]n all other respects”).
2. Constitutionality of 922(g)(1)
Miles next argues that both of his § 922(g)(1) convictions
should be vacated because the statute violates the Second
Amendment.
Last year, Bruen established a new framework for analyz-
ing Second Amendment challenges to firearm restrictions,
which relies solely on the Amendment’s “text, as informed by
history.” 142 S. Ct. at 2127; see also Atkinson v. Garland, 70 F.4th
1018, 1020 (7th Cir. 2023) (“Bruen leaves no room for doubt:
[T]ext and history … now define the controlling Second
Amendment inquiry.”). To start, if “the Second Amendment’s
plain text covers an individual’s conduct, the Constitution

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6 No. 22-2805
presumptively protects that conduct.” Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at
2126. To overcome this presumption, “[t]he government must
then justify its regulation by demonstrating that the regula-
tion is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of fire-
arm regulation.” Id. at 2130.
Before Bruen, this Circuit rejected challenges to
§ 922(g)(1)’s constitutionality. See, e.g., Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d
437, 443, 450–51 (7th Cir. 2019), abrogated by Bruen, 142 S. Ct.
2111. However, “we did so under the means-end inquiry after
determining that the historical record on felons possessing
firearms was ‘inconclusive.’” Atkinson, 70 F.4th at 1022 (quot-
ing Kanter, 919 F.3d at 445–447).
Bruen, however, rendered the means-end analysis obso-
lete, 142 S. Ct. at 2126–30, and since Bruen’s pronouncement,
challenges like Miles’s have proliferated both in this Circuit
and across the country. See, e.g., United States v. Prince, No. 22
CR 240, 2023 WL 7220127 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 2, 2023); United States
v. Sims, No. 22-cr-30081, 2023 WL 4461997 (C.D. Ill. July 11,
2023); United States v. Freeman, No. 23 CR 158, 2023 WL
3763745 (N.D. Ill. June 1, 2023); United States v. Bullock, No. 18-
CR-165, 2023 WL 4232309 (S.D. Miss. June 28, 2023).
While three of our sister circuits have decided as-applied
challenges to § 922(g)(1) in Bruen’s aftermath—two uphold-
ing the statute’s validity—this Circuit has not.1 See Atkinson,
1 Compare Vincent v. Garland, 80 F.4th 1197, 1199–1202 (10th Cir. 2023)
(upholding § 922(g)(1) against a nonviolent felon’s post-Bruen, as-applied
Second Amendment attack), and United States v. Jackson, 69 F.4th 495, 505–
06 (8th Cir. 2023) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s assurances … cast no doubt on
the constitutionality of laws prohibiting [felon firearm possession], [so] we
conclude that [§ 922(g)(1)] is constitutional as applied ….”), reh’g en banc
denied, 2023 WL 5605618, with Range v. Att’y Gen., 69 F.4th 96, 106 (3d Cir.

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No. 22-2805 7
70 F.4th at 1019–20 (remanding for “the historical analysis
now required by Bruen” where district court dismissed a chal-
lenge to § 922(g)(1) before the Supreme Court announced
Bruen).
Because Miles did not raise his constitutional challenge be-
fore the district court despite opportunities to do so, we re-
view only for plain error. Greer v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 2090,
2096 (2021); Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b) (“A plain error that affects
substantial rights may be considered even though it was not
brought to the court’s attention.”).
To be plain, an error must be “clear and uncontroverted at
the time of appeal.” United States v. Trudeau, 812 F.3d 578, 589
(7th Cir. 2016). Since the Seventh Circuit has not yet ruled on
§ 922(g)(1)’s constitutionality after Bruen, the law is unsettled.
United States v. Hosseini, 679 F.3d 544, 548 (7th Cir. 2012). As a
result, “the claimed error—if there [is] one—[is] not plain.” Id.
at 552; see also United States v. Hill, No. 22-2400, 2023 WL
2810289, at *2 (7th Cir. Apr. 6, 2023) (citing Hosseini and hold-
ing that, because this Circuit has not resolved § 922(g)(1)’s
constitutionality in Bruen’s aftermath, the district court could
not plainly err in upholding § 922(g)(1)’s constitutionality).
That ends Miles’s challenge. We remand to the district
court with instruction to vacate one of Miles’s § 922(g) sen-
tences and to merge his two § 922(g)(1) convictions.
2023) (holding § 922(g)(1) unconstitutional as applied to a felon convicted
of making a false statement to obtain food stamps when government did
not show that “our Republic has a longstanding history and tradition of
depriving [such] people … of their firearms”).

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8 No. 22-2805
B. Search Warrant
Miles next challenges the district court’s denials of his sup-
pression motions. We apply “a dual standard, assessing con-
clusions of law de novo and evaluating factual findings for
clear error with special deference granted to the court’s cred-
ibility determinations.” United States v. Bailon, 60 F.4th 1032,
1036 (7th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted).
1. Residence
Miles first argues that the search warrant application did
not establish probable cause to search the Brouse Avenue res-
idence. The Fourth Amendment requires search warrants to
be supported by probable cause. U.S. Const. amend. IV. As
such, “a neutral magistrate must decide [whether] probable
cause [exists] before the police conduct a search.” United States
v. Taylor, 63 F.4th 637, 648 (7th Cir. 2023). “We afford great
deference to” that determination, “uphold[ing it] so long as
there is a substantial basis for concluding that a search would
uncover evidence of wrongdoing.” United States v. Yarber, 915
F.3d 1103, 1105 (7th Cir. 2019) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted).
To satisfy probable cause, “a warrant application must
contain facts that, given the nature of the evidence sought and
the crime alleged, allow for a reasonable inference that there
is a fair probability that evidence will be found in a particular
place.” United States v. Roland, 60 F.4th 1061, 1064 (7th Cir.
2023) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the warrant application relied on facts discovered
through the two controlled buys between Deeren and the CS.
Miles argues that these controlled buys did not establish
probable cause because they did not sufficiently indicate that

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No. 22-2805 9
drugs were coming from the residence. He stresses that the
CS did not enter the house during the controlled buys, and
Deeren was not searched before entering the house.
“[P]robable cause does not require direct evidence linking
a crime to a particular place,” though. Yarber, 915 F.3d at 1105
(citation omitted). Instead, probable cause “turn[s] on the as-
sessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts.” Illi-
nois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983); see also United States v.
Sidwell, 440 F.3d 865, 869 (7th Cir. 2006) (“Probable cause re-
quires only a probability or substantial chance that evidence
may be found ….”).
The facts described in the search warrant application cre-
ate a reasonable inference that Deeren obtained drugs from
the house. In two separate controlled buys, Deeren gave the
CS meth immediately after exiting the residence and return-
ing to a vehicle. This “allow[s] for a reasonable inference that
there is a fair probability that evidence” of drug trafficking
would be found in the residence. Roland, 60 F.4th at 1064.
In similar circumstances, we have found probable cause to
search a house for drugs. See United States v. Scott, 731 F.3d
659, 666 (7th Cir. 2013) (concluding probable cause supported
a warrant to search a house when, during two controlled
buys, seller left the CS at a gas station, drove to the house, and
then returned to the gas station with drugs); United States v.
Orr, 969 F.3d 732, 737 (7th Cir. 2020) (determining search war-
rant application established probable cause to search apart-
ment “[e]ven though [the CS] did not report seeing crack co-
caine in [defendant’s]” residence). While it is “theoretically
possible” that Deeren did not obtain the meth from Miles’s
house, it is not “so likely as to defeat probable cause, which
after all requires only a probability—not absolute certainty.”

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10 No. 22-2805
United States v. Fifer, 863 F.3d 759, 765 (7th Cir. 2017) (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted).
2. Vehicles
Miles further submits that the search warrant was overly
broad because it extended to “any vehicles on [the] premises.”
The Fourth Amendment requires search warrants to “partic-
ularly describ[e] the place[s] to be searched.” U.S. Const.
amend IV. “This particularity requirement protects persons
against the government’s indiscriminate rummaging through
their property,” Taylor, 63 F.4th at 659 (citation omitted), and
it “ensures that the scope of a search will be confined to evi-
dence relating to a specific crime that is supported by proba-
ble cause,” United States v. Snyder, 71 F.4th 555, 565 (7th Cir.
2023) (citation omitted).
Still, “[w]arrants may be issued even in the absence of di-
rect evidence linking criminal objects to a particular site.”
United States v. Orozco, 576 F.3d 745, 749 (7th Cir. 2009) (cita-
tion omitted). As the search warrant application in this case
explains, it is common for drug dealers to store proceeds from
drug deals, such as cash, in their cars, and “a warrant appli-
cation is entitled to take an officer’s experience into account
in determining whether probable cause exists.” Id. Similarly,
“issuing judges may draw reasonable inferences about where
evidence is likely to be found based on the nature of the evi-
dence and the offense.” United States v. Zamudio, 909 F.3d 172,
175 (7th Cir. 2018).
Miles argues that the warrant should have been limited to
vehicles connected to the Brouse Avenue residence or the ob-
served drug trafficking activities. For support, he points to
other cases involving more specific warrants. However, “[a]

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No. 22-2805 11
warrant that may be overbroad in one context may be suffi-
ciently specific [in a different context in which] the officers
have less reliable information about where, exactly, the evi-
dence is likely to be found.” United States v. Vizcarra-Millan, 15
F.4th 473, 502 (7th Cir. 2021).
The key question is whether the information contained
within the warrant application “allow[ed] for a reasonable in-
ference that there [was] a fair probability that evidence [of
drug trafficking] w[ould] be found in” any car on the prem-
ises of the Brouse Avenue residence. Roland, 60 F.4th at 1064.
“[N]either an absolute certainty nor even a preponderance of
the evidence is necessary.” United States v. Aljabari, 626 F.3d
940, 944 (7th Cir. 2010).
Prior to obtaining the warrant, officers were unable to de-
termine who lived at the Brouse Avenue residence or antici-
pate which vehicles would be on the premises during the war-
rant’s execution. Nevertheless, they had observed Deeren us-
ing different vehicles to travel to and from the residence on
two occasions. During both controlled buys, Deeren gave the
CS meth while the two sat inside a vehicle at the Brouse Ave-
nue residence. While Miles maintains that Deeren’s use of
those vehicles did not justify such a broad search, given the
flexible probable cause standard and our deferential level of
review on appeal, the warrant passes muster.
Two factors underpin that conclusion. First, warrants are
constitutional when they are as “specific [as the officers’]
knowledge allows.” United States v. Bishop, 910 F.3d 335, 338
(7th Cir. 2018). If officers knew which vehicles were associ-
ated with the drug-dealing activities, “failure to identify
[them] in the warrant would have violated the constitutional
particularity requirement.” Id. at 337–38 (holding warrant

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12 No. 22-2805
permitting search of all files on cell phone was supported by
probable where officers “did not know where on his phone
[the defendant] kept his drug ledgers and gun videos”). In-
deed, officers could not have described the vehicles with
more particularity because they were unable to identify the
residence’s owner and observed Deeran using different vehi-
cles to facilitate the two controlled buys. Thus, the warrant
was as “specific [as the officers’] knowledge allow[ed]” under
the circumstances, id. at 338, and it did not “allow officers to
search for items that [were] unlikely to yield evidence of the
crime,” Vizcarra-Millan, 15 F.4th at 502. See also Bishop, 910 F.3d
at 337 (“A warrant may be thought ‘too general’ only if some
more-specific alternative would have done better at protect-
ing privacy while still permitting legitimate investigation.”
(internal citation omitted)).
Second, because Deeren handed the CS meth immediately
after exiting the house in both controlled buys, the officers
reasonably believed that the residence’s owner was Deeren’s
meth source. On these facts, it is reasonable to infer that there
was a fair probability that evidence of drug trafficking would
be found in any car on the Brouse Avenue residence. See
United States v. Evans, 92 F.3d 540, 543–44 (7th Cir. 1996) (per-
mitting the police to search any car parked in a garage “unless
it is apparent that the [car] does not belong to anyone con-
nected with the illegal activity—a condition that will rarely be
satisfied” even when the officers know the identity a of
home’s owner). Accordingly, the warrant did not violate the
Fourth Amendment.
C. Sentence
Last, Miles challenges his sentence, arguing that it is sub-
stantively unreasonable because it is “greater than necessary”

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No. 22-2805 13
under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) given his physical and mental
health issues.2
We review the substantive reasonableness of a district
court’s sentencing decision for abuse of discretion. United
States v. Griffith, 913 F.3d 683, 689 (7th Cir. 2019). Under this
deferential standard, “[w]e do not ask what sentence we
would impose; we ask whether the district judge imposed a
sentence for logical reasons that are consistent with
the … § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Campbell, 37 F.4th
1345, 1352 (7th Cir. 2022). Importantly, if the court-imposed
sentence falls within the Guidelines-range, we presume it is
reasonable. United States v. Major, 33 F.4th 370, 379 (7th Cir.
2022).
Here, the court sentenced Miles to 240 months’ imprison-
ment, which was on the low-end of the Guidelines range of
235 to 293 months’ imprisonment. The sentence is thus pre-
sumptively reasonable, id., so Miles “bears the burden of re-
butting that presumption by demonstrating that the sentence
is unreasonably high in light of the [§] 3553(a) factors,” Grif-
fith, 913 F.3d at 689. He attempts to do so by arguing that, con-
trary to § 3553(a)(2)(D), his sentence prevents him from re-
ceiving necessary medical care in the most effective manner.
No one disputes that Miles, who was forty-eight years old
at the time of his sentencing, faces serious health problems:
His kidneys are failing, so he requires dialysis three times a
week and takes five different prescription medications. Miles
2 Miles also challenges the procedural reasonableness of his sentence,
but, as explained above, the appropriate remedy for his multiplicitous
§ 922(g)(1) convictions is a limited remand to vacate one sentence and
merge the two convictions.

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14 No. 22-2805
also takes medication for high blood pressure, and he has un-
dergone separate surgeries on his knee and to remove his thy-
roid. In addition, Miles has an IQ of 72.
The district court addressed these concerns in its careful
explanation of its sentence. To start, the court listed Miles’s
“very poor” health as a mitigating factor in declining to im-
pose the government’s proposed thirty-year term of impris-
onment. Nevertheless, the court explained that Miles’s “very
serious health problems … have not impacted his criminal-
ity.” As the court noted, “despite the fact that [Miles] was on
dialysis” and while under pretrial supervision for this case,
“he was arrested for distributing methamphetamine.” The
court concluded by stating:
Mr. Miles has made very unfortunate decisions
that have landed him in a very difficult position
where he’s going to lose his freedom and be sep-
arated from his family while a very sick man.
The evidence seized during the search depict[s]
an armed drug trafficker, and Congress imposes
serious penalties for his crimes.
As such, the court considered Miles’s medical needs as re-
quired by § 3553(a)(2)(D).
“At sentencing, district judges have discretion over how
much weight to give a particular [§ 3553(a)] factor. Although
the weighting must fall within the bounds of reason, those
bounds are wide.” Campbell, 37 F.4th at 1353 (citation and in-
ternal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Hen-
drix, 74 F.4th 859, 872 (7th Cir. 2023) (“We decline to second-
guess the district court’s weighing of the information at its
disposal, a task committed to its sound discretion.”).

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No. 22-2805 15
Due to the seriousness of the crimes at issue and Miles’s
lengthy criminal history, the court’s evaluation of the
§ 3553(a) factors fell within the bounds of reasonableness.
Moreover, Miles’s health issues did not deter his criminal ac-
tivity. See United States v. Elmer, 980 F.3d 1171, 1177–78 (7th
Cir. 2020) (rejecting substantive reasonableness challenge to
sentence at “the low end of the advisory range” where district
court considered defendant’s health conditions as a mitigat-
ing factor); United States v. Rothbard, 851 F.3d 699, 701–03 (7th
Cir. 2017) (affirming custodial sentence for defendant who
had been diagnosed with leukemia prior to committing the
operative offense because the district court sufficiently con-
sidered defendant’s diagnosis and imposed a within-the-
Guidelines sentence). At bottom, Miles has not rebutted the
presumptive reasonableness of his sentence. As a result, we
conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in fash-
ioning Miles’s sentence.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we VACATE the district court’s
judgment with respect to Miles’s § 922(g)(1) convictions and
REMAND with limited instructions to vacate one of Miles’s
§ 922(g)(1) sentences and merge his multiplicitous § 922(g)(1)
convictions. We AFFIRM the district court’s judgment in all
other respects.

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