Chunyu Wu v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General of the United States

23-1916Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit12.12.2023

Gesamter Gesetzestext

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted December 6, 2023
Decided December 12, 2023
Before
JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
No. 23-1916
CHUNYU WU,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND,
Attorney General of the United States,
Respondent.
Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals.
No. A088-571-006
O R D E R
Chunyu Wu seeks review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals,
which dismissed his appeal of an immigration judge’s denial of his applications for
asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the regulations implementing
the Convention Against Torture. After review, we deny his petition.1
1 The parties agreed to submit this case for decision on the briefs under Federal
Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(f). We granted their motion to waive oral argument.
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 23-1916 Page 2
I. Background
Wu, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, arrived in the United
States in 2010 on a non-immigrant visitor visa, which he overstayed. He was charged
with removability under 8 U.S.C. §1227(a)(1)(B). He filed an asylum application and
applied for withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against
Torture (CAT). In 2019, Wu provided written materials and sworn testimony in support
of his application at an immigration hearing. He claimed he was persecuted in China
due to his political opinions and he fears further persecution if he returns.
The immigration judge denied Wu’s applications, finding that Wu was not
credible because portions of his testimony were inconsistent or implausible and lacked
adequate corroboration. Wu appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which
dismissed his case. In addition to finding that Wu waived his right to challenge the
immigration judge’s CAT denial, the Board concluded that the record supported the
immigration judge’s adverse credibility findings, and the Board agreed with the
immigration judge’s evaluation that Wu’s corroboration evidence did not rehabilitate
his discredited testimony or independently satisfy his burden of proof.
II. Discussion
Where, as here, the Board “agrees with the immigration judge’s decision but
supplements that decision with its own analysis … [we] review both the underlying
decision and the Board’s additional reasoning.” Cojocari v. Sessions, 863 F.3d 616, 621
(7th Cir. 2017). We review “administrative findings of fact, including credibility
determinations, for substantial evidence.” Santashbekov v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 836, 839 (7th
Cir. 2016). An immigration judge’s credibility findings should be “overturned only in
extraordinary circumstances.” Cui v. Garland, 71 F.4th 592, 600 (7th Cir. 2023). We may
not reverse an immigration judge’s determination as to the availability of corroborating
evidence under the asylum statute unless “a reasonable trier of fact is compelled to
conclude that such corroborating evidence is unavailable.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4).
Wu contends he met his burden of proof because he “testified consistently and in
detail regarding the harm he suffered while in China.” After Wu protested a
governmental environmental policy, he asserts the Chinese government harmed him.
Wu says that harm rose to the level of persecution. Wu claims the Board clearly erred in
affirming the immigration judge’s finding that Wu’s testimony was inconsistent. He

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No. 23-1916 Page 3
points to documentary and other evidence he says corroborates his position. Wu is
incorrect.
First, the Board did not err in affirming the immigration judge’s adverse
credibility determinations against Wu. The immigration judge identified significant
inconsistencies, explained why major aspects of Wu’s claims were implausible, and
detailed the reasons why Wu’s explanations for these inconsistent and implausible
statements were not persuasive. These discrepancies provided an ample basis for the
agency’s adverse credibility finding, and they require deference from this court.
Wu’s testimony was not only inconsistent with his written statement, but also
internally inconsistent. This included details as to who the Chinese government
arrested and brought to a mental hospital with Wu, who assisted Wu in escaping China,
and how Wu applied for and received his passport. Further, portions of Wu’s testimony
were implausible, including the circumstances of Wu’s escape from a mental hospital,
and Wu’s ability to obtain a visa in light of his own testimony and relevant country
conditions.
The immigration judge and the Board accurately identified and explained the
inconsistencies and implausibilities in Wu’s evidence and testimony, for which he
offered either incomplete or inadequate explanations. If an agency’s adverse credibility
finding is supported by “specific, cogent reasons that bear a legitimate nexus to the
finding,” Capric v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1075, 1086 (7th Cir. 2004), then the record does not
compel reversal of the agency’s adverse credibility finding. Substantial evidence
supports the agency’s adverse credibility finding as to Wu.
Second, the Board did not err in affirming the immigration judge’s finding that
Wu failed to adequately corroborate his claims. Rather, the immigration judge and the
Board identified and discussed multiple instances of this.
An immigration judge “enjoys substantial leeway to demand corroboration of an
asylum applicant’s allegations whether or not the judge finds the applicant credible.”
Krishnapillai v. Holder, 563 F.3d 606, 618 (7th Cir. 2009). That judge need only “point[ ] to
rational reasons” why an applicant’s claims require additional support. Darinchuluun v.
Lynch, 804 F.3d 1208, 1214 (7th Cir. 2015).

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No. 23-1916 Page 4
Substantial evidence supports the immigration judge’s determination that Wu’s
documentary evidence was insufficient to corroborate his otherwise incredible
testimony, as well as that Wu failed to present other, reasonably available evidence to
corroborate his claim. The evidence Wu submitted to corroborate his claim was
insufficient because it was “vague and lacking in detail and ultimately did not
adequately corroborate his claim.” This is especially true where key participants in
Wu’s testimony lacked knowledge of their role in his supposed escape. Wu also failed
to present other corroborative evidence which was reasonably available to him, such as
statements from a relative Wu claims to have stayed with for months in hiding, and
from a friend Wu claims helped him obtain and pay for travel arrangements. Wu’s
failure to provide adequate corroborative evidence is fatal to his attempts to rehabilitate
his deficient testimony. As a result, the agency’s denial of Wu’s applications for asylum
and withholding of removal should be upheld by this court.
Finally, if we affirm decisions of the immigration judge and the Board, Wu asks
us to conclude that he qualifies for withholding of removal. Wu’s argument covers a
single page, recites some case law regarding general asylum standards, and reiterates
his arguments from the prior sections. For the reasons listed above, the immigration
judge and the Board did not err in denying Wu all forms of relief, so he does not qualify
for withholding of removal.
For these reasons, we DENY the petition for review.

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