KELLY McGOFFNEY v. MATTHEW KINCAID and VIGO COUNTY PROBATE COURT

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted January 4, 2024 *
Decided January 4, 2024
Before
ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge
DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
No. 22-3047
KELLY McGOFFNEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
MATTHEW KINCAID and VIGO
COUNTY PROBATE COURT,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Indiana, Terre Haute Division.
No. 2:21-cv-00478-JRS-DLP
James R. Sweeney II,
Judge.
O R D E R
Kelly McGoffney sued Judge Matthew Kincaid and the Probate Division of the
Vigo County Superior Court after the judge removed her as personal representative to
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. FED. R. A PP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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No. 22-3047 Page 2
her mother’s estate and closed the estate. The district court dismissed the suit for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. We affirm.
Following her mother’s death in 2012, McGoffney became the personal
representative of the estate, and she then spent five years pursuing multiple medical
malpractice and wrongful death suits. The estate did not recover anything. But
McGoffney believed that the estate should remain open to receive millions of dollars
from bankruptcy and Social Security claims, civil lawsuits, and potential income from
the mass production of one of her grandmother’s famous recipes. After an intervenor
filed a motion to show cause why McGoffney, who is not an attorney, should not be
removed as personal representative, Judge Kincaid ordered McGoffney to hire an
attorney to represent the estate and warned that not doing so would result in both her
removal as personal representative and closure of the estate. McGoffney did not hire an
attorney, and the judge followed through on his warning.
McGoffney attempted to persuade the state court to reopen the estate. When
Judge Kincaid denied her petitions, McGoffney unsuccessfully appealed, and the
Supreme Court of Indiana denied her request to consider the case. She then returned to
the probate court to file an “emergency petition” to reopen the estate and to disqualify
the judge for bias, but Judge Kincaid struck the petition as redundant. See IND . R. T RIAL
P. 12(F). The appellate court affirmed.
McGoffney then sued Judge Kincaid and the probate court (perhaps as the
judge’s employer, though the reason is not clear) in federal court. She alleged that by
removing her as personal representative, closing the estate, and denying her repeated
requests to reopen the estate, the judge violated her rights under the federal
Constitution, see 28 U.S.C. § 1983, and the “Open Courts” clause of the Indiana
Constitution, see IND. C ONST. art. I, § 12. She asked the district court to reopen the estate,
restore her as personal representative, and effect a change of judge.
The defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine, see Rooker v. Fidelity Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of
Columbia Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). The district court granted that
motion; it explained that McGoffney’s effort to use civil rights claims to void decisions
of the probate court was a “blatant attempt at an appeal” of a state judgment.
On appeal, McGoffney argues that the district court failed to account for her
constitutional arguments when it said that she was attempting to appeal the state

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No. 22-3047 Page 3
court’s rulings. We review the jurisdictional dismissal de novo. Sykes v. Cook Cnty. Cir.
Ct. Prob. Div., 837 F.3d 736, 739 (7th Cir. 2016).
The district court was correct. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives the lower
federal courts of jurisdiction when someone who lost in state court sues in federal court,
seeking, directly or indirectly, to overturn the state court’s judgment. Exxon Mobile Corp.
v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). Here, the injuries McGoffney
complains of—being required to obtain a lawyer, her removal as personal
representative, the premature closure of the estate, and the denial of her petitions to
reopen—resulted directly from the probate court’s decisions. See Mains v. Citibank,
852 F.3d 669, 675 (7th Cir. 2017). Moreover, she expressly seeks reopening of the estate—
relief that would be “tantamount to vacating the state judgment.” Id.
Although McGoffney correctly asserts that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not
apply when a plaintiff challenges independently unlawful conduct, see id. at 675, she
does not raise that type of challenge. She points to nothing other than judicial rulings as
the wrongs against her. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine blocks such challenges, even if they
are constitutional in nature. See Hadzi-Tanovic v. Johnson, 62 F.4th 394, 401 (7th Cir. 2023).
And, to the extent that McGoffney implies that the state judgment was the product of
bias or corruption, such allegations do not shield her lawsuit from the application of the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See id. at 404–06.
Finally, even if the Rooker Feldman doctrine did not apply across the board to
McGoffney’s claims (and we think it does), the probate exception would deprive the
federal courts of jurisdiction. The probate exception to federal jurisdiction “reserves to
state probate courts the probate or annulment of a will and the administration of a
decedent's estate.” Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 311 (2006). McGoffney’s claims all
pertain to how the probate court administered her mother’s estate. See Owsley v. Gorbett,
960 F.3d 969, 971 (7th Cir. 2020) (“[T]he state court’s decision to retain Lisa as the estate's
representative is not subject to collateral attack.” (citing Marshall, 547 U.S. at 305–12)).
The federal courts, therefore, cannot adjudicate them.
AFFIRMED

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