United States of America v. Hector Castaneda

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted January 23, 2024
Decided January 24, 2024
Before
DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
No. 23-1645
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
HECTOR CASTANEDA,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Indiana, Fort Wayne Division.
No. 1:12CR33-001
Holly A. Brady,
Chief Judge.
O R D E R
Hector Castaneda pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute and to
possess five kilograms or more of a controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1), 846. The district court imposed a within-guidelines sentence of 292 months’
imprisonment and 5 years of supervised release. In his plea agreement, Castaneda
“expressly waive[d] [his] right to appeal or to contest” the “conviction,” “all
components of [his] sentence” including “the manner in which” they were determined
or imposed “on any other ground than a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” But
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 23-1645 Page 2
he appeals nonetheless. His appointed counsel asserts that the appeal is frivolous and
moves to withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Counsel’s brief explains
the nature of the case and raises potential issues that an appeal like this would be
expected to involve, and Castaneda has responded to the brief, see CIR . R. 51(b). Because
counsel’s brief appears thorough, we limit our review to subjects that counsel and
Castaneda discuss. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014).
Counsel tells us that Castaneda wishes to challenge his guilty plea, but we agree
with counsel that such a challenge would be frivolous. Before accepting the guilty plea,
the district court complied with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
rendering an appellate challenge to the plea’s acceptance futile. See United States v.
Davenport, 719 F.3d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 2013). The judge determined that Castaneda
understood the effect of his plea, see F ED. R. C RIM . P. 11(b)(1), by confirming that
Castaneda understood the charge against him, id. at (G), the penalties he faced (ten
years to life imprisonment, a minimum of five years’ supervised release, possible fines
and fees, and the potential effect on his immigration status), id. at (H)–(O), and the trial
and appellate rights he was waiving by pleading guilty, id. at (A)–(E). No evidence
negates these sworn statements, which are presumed true. See United States v. Barr,
960 F.3d 906, 917 (7th Cir. 2020).
Castaneda proposes arguing that because, in his view, the government breached
the plea agreement before sentencing, the district court should have rescinded its
acceptance of the guilty plea. Specifically, Castaneda believes that the government
breached the agreement by supporting the probation office’s recommendation to apply
two enhancements under the Sentencing Guidelines (two points for maintaining a drug
premises and four points for his leadership role in the scheme). Because Castaneda
never moved to have his guilty plea withdrawn on this (or any) ground, we would
review for plain error the district court’s failure to rescind its acceptance of the plea.
United States v. Williams, 946 F.3d 968, 971 (7th Cir. 2020). But for two reasons no error,
let alone a plain one, occurred.
First, the government made no written promise to refrain from supporting these
enhancements. And it complied with the written promises that it did make: It promised
not to seek, and did not seek, an enhanced penalty under 21 U.S.C. § 851 (based on
Castenada’s prior drug convictions). And as promised, it moved for a reduction in
offense level based on his acceptance of responsibility, recommended a sentence at the
bottom of the guideline range, and dismissed three other counts.

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No. 23-1645 Page 3
Second, Castaneda could not plausibly argue that the government breached any
unwritten promises. In his plea agreement, he stated that “no promises have been made
to [Castaneda] other than those contained in this agreement.” And at the change-of-plea
hearing Castaneda confirmed that this statement was correct.
Counsel also rightly concludes that Castaneda’s appeal waiver would render any
challenge to his sentence frivolous. An appeal waiver “stands or falls” with the
underlying guilty plea, United States v. Nulf, 978 F.3d 504, 506 (7th Cir. 2020), and, as we
have just discussed, Castaneda’s guilty plea is valid. Further, we agree with counsel
that no exception to his appellate waiver could arguably apply—Castaneda’s sentence
does not exceed the statutory maximum of life imprisonment and, as the sentencing
transcript shows, the judge did not consider any constitutionally impermissible factors
at sentencing. See id. Moreover, the waiver forgoes any appellate challenge to the term
and conditions of supervised release, which are also within applicable statutory limits.
Last, Castaneda wishes to challenge his conviction based on ineffective assistance
of counsel. This challenge, to the extent it would be consistent with the terms and
conditions of his plea agreement, is best saved for collateral review, where an
evidentiary basis can be fully developed. See Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 503–
05 (2003).
Accordingly, we GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

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