Justin L. Dalcollo v. Anthony Wills

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted February 16, 2024*
Decided February 20, 2024
Before
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 23-2348
JUSTIN L. DALCOLLO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ANTHONY WILLS, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Illinois.
No. 23-cv-000828-SPM
Stephen P. McGlynn,
Judge.
O R D E R
Justin Dalcollo, a prisoner at Lawrence Correctional Center in Illinois, has sued
over two dozen prison staff to challenge prison conditions, his allegedly wrongful
conviction, and other asserted acts. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court screened and
properly dismissed his amended complaint for failure to state a claim; we thus affirm.
* The defendants were not served with process and are not participating in the
appeal. We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the
appellant’s brief and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral
argument would not significantly aid the court. F ED. R. APP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 23-2348 Page 2
Dalcollo’s amended complaint is unclear but appears to seek relief based on
three broad categories. First, he contests his prison conditions. He asserts that prison
staff have celled him with officers who intend to kill him, forced him to take estrogen,
denied him law library access, and impeded him from filing grievances. Second, he
alleges that he was wrongly tried and convicted, and as a result, is enslaved in violation
of his civil rights. Finally, he asserts that the defendants have tampered with witnesses,
obstructed justice, bribed officials, embezzled federal funds, and trafficked humans. The
only allegations that Dalcollo appears to tie to the defendants concern his conviction.
The district court dismissed Dalcollo’s original complaint for failure to state a
plausible claim for relief, gave Dalcollo leave to amend it, and when the amended
complaint did not cure the defect, the court dismissed it as well. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2). The court observed that, for the majority of the allegations in the amended
complaint, Dalcollo did not attribute them to any particular defendant or state when or
where the alleged incidents occurred; he thus denied the defendants fair notice of the
claims. For the allegations that Dalcollo tied to the defendants, the court ruled that they
appeared to contest Dalcollo’s underlying, intact conviction; thus a claim for damages
arising from it was blocked by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1993).
Dalcollo raises no cogent argument on appeal; as a result, we could dismiss his
appeal. See Anderson v. Hardman, 241 F.3d 544, 545–46 (7th Cir. 2001); F ED. R. A PP . P.
28(a)(8)(A). But we prefer to decide cases on the merits when we can, and we do so
here. See Boutros v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., LLC., 802 F.3d 918, 924 (7th Cir. 2015).
We review a dismissal based on lack of fair notice for abuse of discretion, see
Stanard v. Nygren, 658 F.3d 792, 796–97 (7th Cir. 2011), and the district court did not
abuse its discretion here. Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires
that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” The primary purpose of this requirement “is to give
defendants fair notice of the claims against them and the grounds supporting the
claims.” Stanard, 658 F.3d at 797. Dalcollo’s amended complaint, the district court
reasonably ruled, fails to meet this requirement: By raising wide-ranging allegations
without attributing them to any defendant, Dalcollo deprived the defendants of fair
notice of what he accused them of doing, despite having received a chance to cure this
defect. Without a “plain statement” of a claim, Dalcollo failed to state a claim for relief.
See Taha v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Loc. 781, 947 F.3d 464, 469 (7th Cir. 2020).

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No. 23-2348 Page 3
The district court also properly dismissed Dalcollo’s wrongful-imprisonment
claim. Although Dalcollo ties this claim to the defendants, the relief he seeks is not now
available. An award of damages would necessarily imply the invalidity of his intact
conviction, and under Heck, he may not pursue a claim for damages unless and until his
conviction has been set aside or invalidated. Heck, 512 U.S. at 486–87. And if Dalcollo
seeks release from state prison, he must file a proper petition for collateral relief, see
28 U.S.C. § 2254, and comply with the procedural and exhaustion requirements, rather
than invoke § 1983, see Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973).
For purposes of future proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, this affirmance for
failure to state a claim is a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
AFFIRMED

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