United States of America v. Tyrone Gaddis

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted May 2, 2024
Decided May 6, 2024
Before
DIANE S. SYKES, Chief Judge
ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge
JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge
No. 23-1913
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
TYRONE GADDIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:21-CR-00576(1)
Sharon Johnson Coleman,
Judge.
O R D E R
Tyrone Gaddis pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon. See 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(g)(1), 924. The district judge sentenced Gaddis to a within-guidelines sentence of
96 months in prison and 3 years of supervised release. Gaddis has filed a notice of
appeal, but his appointed counsel believes that the appeal is frivolous and seeks to
withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). Gaddis has not responded to
counsel’s motion to withdraw. See C IR . R. 51(b). Based on our review of counsel’s
submission, and following our practice in similar appeals, we will suspend this appeal
to determine if it presents a nonfrivolous issue.
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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No. 23-1913 Page 2
Counsel considers whether Gaddis may reasonably challenge the
constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) in light of New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen,
597 U.S. 1 (2022) (holding that restrictions on possessing firearms are constitutional only
if there is a tradition of such regulation in U.S. history). We have been holding appeals
challenging the constitutionality of § 922(g) in abeyance pending the outcomes of
United States v. Rahimi, No. 22-915 (argued Nov. 7, 2023) (considering whether
§ 922(g)(8), which bars the possession of firearms by persons subject to domestic-
violence restraining orders, violates the Second Amendment) and United States v. Prince,
No. 23-3155 (7th Cir.) (considering constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) in light of Bruen).
See, e.g., United States v. Pangborn, No. 23-3105 (7th Cir. Dec. 19, 2023) (suspending
appeal pending resolution of Rahimi); United States v. Mowen, No. 23-1890 (7th Cir.
Feb. 23, 2024) (suspending appeal pending resolution of Prince).
We acknowledge that Gaddis did not preserve this challenge in the district court,
so our review would be for plain error. See Greer v. United States, 593 U.S. 503, 507
(2021). And, as counsel observes, under the state of the law today, any error is not plain.
Still, the outcome of Rahimi or Prince might allow Gaddis to argue that the district judge
plainly erred in this case. See Henderson v. United States, 568 U.S. 266, 269 (2013) (error
may become “plain” under precedents released while appeal is pending). For that
reason, we recently suspended the appeal sua sponte in United States v. Taylor, an
Anders case also raising a potential plain-error challenge to § 922(g)(1). No. 22-3298
(7th Cir. Mar. 8, 2024). We also note that Gaddis does not face another, concurrent
sentence that might obviate a plain-error challenge to § 922(g). Cf. United States v. Leija-
Sanchez, 820 F.3d 899, 902 (7th Cir. 2016) (concurrent sentences can justify refusal to
review possible plain error in one sentence.) Thus, consistent with our practice in these
cases, we will hold this appeal in abeyance pending the outcome of Rahimi or Prince.
Proceedings in this appeal are SUSPENDED pending resolution of Rahimi or
Prince. Counsel shall file a statement of position within 14 days of a decision in one of
these cases, whichever is decided first, stating whether counsel intends to withdraw the
Anders motion or supplement the Anders brief, or whether a further stay is appropriate.

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