United States of America v. Benjamin C. Lascelles

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted May 10, 2024
Decided May 13, 2024
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
No. 23-1650
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
BENJAMIN C. LASCELLES,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Central District of Illinois.
No. 20-CR-10022-001
James E. Shadid,
Judge.
O R D E R
Benjamin Lascelles pleaded guilty to producing and possessing child
pornography, and the district court sentenced him to 50 years’ imprisonment and a life
term of supervised release. Despite a broad appeal waiver in his plea agreement,
Lascelles now appeals. His appointed counsel asserts that the appeal is frivolous and
moves to withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). In his brief, counsel
explains the nature of the case and addresses issues that an appeal of this kind would
typically involve. Because counsel’s analysis appears thorough, and Lascelles did not
respond to the motion, see C IR . R. 51(b), we limit our review to the subjects that counsel
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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No. 23-1650 Page 2
discusses. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014). We grant the motion
and dismiss the appeal.
An investigation, prompted by a report that Lascelles had sexually abused an
eight-year-old girl, uncovered images of Lascelles in sex acts with that girl,
pornographic images that Lascelles had taken of a six-year-old girl, and pornographic
images of other minors. He was charged with two counts of sexual exploitation of a
minor (by producing child pornography), see 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), and one count of
possessing child pornography, see id. § 2252A(a)(5)(B).
Lascelles pleaded guilty to the possession count and to one of the two counts of
sexual exploitation; in exchange, the government dismissed the second count of sexual
exploitation. In his plea agreement, Lascelles expressly waived “all rights to appeal [or]
collaterally attack his conviction and sentence,” with an exception for claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel. At the change-of-plea hearing, the court conducted a
plea colloquy and found a sufficient factual basis for the two offenses. Lascelles also
confirmed under oath that he understood the charges, the penalties, and the rights he
was waiving, and he affirmed that his plea was voluntary. The court accepted the plea
and, at a later sentencing hearing, sentenced Lascelles to 50 years in prison (30 for the
sexual exploitation and 20 for the possession of pornography) followed by a life term of
supervised release.
In his brief, counsel first considers whether Lascelles could challenge the validity
of his guilty plea. It is unclear whether Lascelles wishes to raise such a challenge:
Counsel tells us that he “attempted, without success, to correspond with Lascelles,” and
Lascelles did not respond to this court’s notice about counsel’s motion. Because counsel
was unable to advise Lascelles about the risks and benefits of challenging the validity of
his plea and determine whether he wants to do so, see United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d
667, 671 (7th Cir. 2002), a review of the plea colloquy is proper, see United States v.
Konczak, 683 F.3d 348, 349 (7th Cir. 2012). As we are about to explain, that review
assures us that any challenge to the district court’s acceptance of the guilty plea would
be frivolous.
Lascelles did not move in the district court to withdraw his plea, so our review of
the plea’s acceptance would be for plain error, United States v. Davenport, 719 F.3d 616,
618 (7th Cir. 2013), and we see none. The district court properly found that Lascelles
was competent to enter a plea and that his plea was voluntary and supported by an
adequate factual basis. See FED. R. C RIM. P. 11(b)(2)–(3). The court also ensured that

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No. 23-1650 Page 3
Lascelles knew the nature of the charges against him, the possible penalties he faced,
the rights he would waive by pleading guilty, and the role of the Sentencing Guidelines.
See FED. R. C RIM. P. 11(b)(1); Konczak, 683 F.3d at 349.
The court omitted warnings from the colloquy, but the omissions are harmless.
First, the court did not inform Lascelles of any applicable forfeiture, its authority to
order restitution, or its obligation to impose a special assessment. See FED. R. C RIM. P.
11(b)(1)(J)–(L). But the written plea agreement (which informed Lascelles of these
matters) and Lascelles’s testimony that he read and understood the agreement are
“adequate substitutes for the verbal in-court colloquy.” United States v. Coleman,
806 F.3d 941, 945 (7th Cir. 2015). Likewise, the court’s failure to warn Lascelles that his
statements under oath could subject him to perjury charges, see FED. R. C RIM. P.
11(b)(1)(A), is harmless because Lascelles is not being, and is not expected to be,
prosecuted for perjury. See United States v. Stoller, 827 F.3d 591, 597–98 (7th Cir. 2016).
We are thus satisfied that Lascelles could not plausibly argue that the court plainly
erred in accepting his plea.
Counsel next considers whether Lascelles could raise a nonfrivolous challenge to
his sentence but rightly concludes that he could not. An appeal waiver “stands or falls”
with the underlying plea. United States v. Nulf, 978 F.3d 504, 506 (7th Cir. 2020). Because
the district court validly accepted Lascelles’s plea, we would enforce the waiver that
resulted from that plea unless an exception applies. Id. No exceptions could apply here:
Lascelles’s sentence did not exceed the statutory maximum, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(e),
2252A(b)(2), and the district court did not consider any constitutionally impermissible
factors at sentencing. Nulf, 978 F.3d at 506.
Finally, counsel correctly concludes that any challenge based on ineffective
assistance of counsel is best reserved for collateral review, where an evidentiary
foundation can be developed. See Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504–05 (2003);
United States v. McClinton, 23 F.4th 732, 737 (7th Cir. 2022).
We therefore GRANT counsel’s motion and DISMISS the appeal.

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