United States of America v. Cottrell Mackey

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Argued June 5, 2024
Decided June 10, 2024
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
No. 23-2295
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
COTTRELL MACKEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:17-CR-00040(7)
John J. Tharp, Jr.,
Judge.
O R D E R
Cottrell Mackey, a former member of the LAFA street gang, pleaded guilty to
conspiracy to engage in racketeering activity, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), and was sentenced
above his calculated guidelines range to 420 months’ imprisonment. He appeals,
arguing that the district court procedurally erred by failing to consider all relevant
factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and substantively erred by (1) improperly situating his
offense in the context of broader Chicago gun violence and (2) failing to craft an
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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individualized sentence. Because the district court considered the relevant § 3553(a)
factors and adequately justified the above-guidelines sentence, we affirm.
Mackey and other LAFA members drove to a rival gang’s territory on the far
south side of Chicago in June 2014 in search of a rival gang member to shoot. They
spotted Denero Appleton, whom they recognized as a member of the Merrill Park
Gangster Disciples. Mackey and two other LAFA members shot Appleton thirteen
times and then sped away from the scene. Appleton died.
In the years after Appleton’s murder, Mackey continued his involvement in
LAFA activities. He bragged online (on social media and in a YouTube music video)
about killing Appleton. He committed an armed robbery. And, upon learning that the
robbery victim had cooperated with police and provided descriptions of LAFA
members, Mackey directed a cohort to bribe the victim into retracting his account.
Mackey was charged with conspiring to engage in racketeering activity, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962(d), and witness tampering, id. §§ 1512(b)(3), (2). He pleaded guilty to the
racketeering conspiracy offense in 2023, under a written plea agreement with the
government; the government later dismissed the witness-tampering count.
At sentencing, the district court calculated a guidelines range of 292 to
365 months’ imprisonment, based in part on Mackey’s minimal prior criminal history
(only one conviction) and acceptance of responsibility. Mackey did not object to this
calculation. The government, noting the aggravating circumstances and unprovoked
nature of Mackey’s offenses, recommended a within-guidelines sentence. Mackey,
pointing to his acceptance of responsibility, limited criminal history, difficult childhood,
and personal successes (working consistently, raising a son), argued that even the low
end of the guidelines range was “excessive.”
The district court settled upon an above-guidelines sentence of 420 months. The
court explained, “You can’t kill another human being for sport and not expect to spend
most of the rest of your life behind bars.” In its consideration of the § 3553(a) sentencing
factors, the court identified the most significant to be the nature and circumstances of
the offense: Mackey went “hunting” to find rival gang members to kill; “brutally
ambush[ed]” Appleton and shot him 13 times, even after he already was on the ground;
endangered innocent bystanders; and—even years later—was “not the least bit
remorseful for his conduct.” As for mitigating factors, the court dismissed any
suggestion that Mackey had accepted responsibility by pleading guilty; the court
pointed out that as recently as 2016 Mackey was “more interested in laughing about

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No. 23-2295 Page 3
how many times [Appleton] had been shot in the face.” The court also downplayed
Mackey’s limited criminal record, noting that he had belonged to LAFA for more than a
decade and that the lack of any convictions was “just luck.” The court recognized that
Mackey’s difficult childhood “provide[d] some context” for his actions but determined
that it was “not an excuse” and merited only “minimal consideration and weight” in the
sentencing calculus. And the court acknowledged the other factors weighing in
Mackey’s favor, including his significant employment history, relationship with his
wife and children, and support from his family and friends. The court explained that its
sentence would promote retribution, specific deterrence (to make sure Mackey “think[s]
twice” before picking up a gun again), and general deterrence (to send a message to the
public that gun violence in Chicago will not be tolerated). The court also asked Mackey
whether there were any other § 3553(a) factors that it neglected to discuss, and Mackey
said there were not.
Mackey first contends that the district court procedurally erred by not
adequately considering the mitigating § 3553(a) factors. He asserts that the court “never
discussed how [the § 3553(a)] factors were being considered” in relation to his case and
“did not give meaningful consideration to [Mackey’s] history and characteristics.”
Mackey appears to take issue with the court’s treatment of his mitigating factors,
arguing that the court “only addressed [his] arguments in order to minimize” them.
The court’s consideration of the relevant § 3553(a) was more than adequate. The
court’s burden of explanation is “not particularly onerous,” United States v. Hendrix,
74 F.4th 859, 867 (7th Cir. 2023), and here, the court dwelled upon the barbaric nature
and circumstances of the offense. The court also acknowledged Mackey’s history and
characteristics, as well as his mitigating arguments, including his lack of criminal
history and acceptance of responsibility. Disagreement with how the court weighs
mitigating factors generally is not grounds for reversal, see United States v. Hatch,
909 F.3d 872, 875 (7th Cir. 2018), and the record here establishes that the court’s
consideration of Mackey’s arguments in mitigation was sufficient. Hendrix, 74 F.4th at
868 (citations omitted).
Mackey also raises a two-part challenge to the substantive reasonableness of his
above-guidelines sentence. First, he argues that the district court should not have based
its sentence on the trend of on gun violence in Chicago. He argues that doing so was
“not only improper but also completely irrelevant,” and that the goal of general
deterrence is an “improper use of sentencing procedures.”

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The district court did not abuse its discretion by referring during sentencing to
Chicago’s gun violence. This court permits district courts to “consider the serious
problem of gun violence in Chicago in imposing stiff sentences on those who commit
firearms offenses in the city,” so long as there is a “reasonable nexus” between that
problem and the crime committed. Id. at 870, 867 (collecting cases). Such a nexus surely
exists here: Chicago is beset with gun violence, and Mackey shot to death a rival gang
member in Chicago. The court also appropriately decided that general deterrence was a
penological goal it wished to address. See Hatch, 909 F.3d at 876.
Second, Mackey again seems to take issue with the court’s consideration of his
mitigating factors, but this time frames it as substantive error, contending that his
sentence was not sufficiently individualized. He argues that the court, in fashioning his
sentence, “minimiz[ed] any and all mitigation” and “did not “tak[e his] unique
characteristics … into account.” He maintains that the court “failed to give meaningful
consideration” to his lack of a criminal background and traumatic childhood, and that
the court was unduly dismissive of the letters of support from his friends and family.
The district court engaged Mackey’s mitigating arguments and more than
adequately considered the individual circumstances of his case. The court highlighted
the specific nature of Mackey’s actions (unjustified and “brutal”), the setting of the
shooting (a residential area), and Mackey’s actions after the offense (bragging about
killing Appleton). The court bluntly refuted Mackey’s arguments that he accepted
responsibility and that his criminal record was limited. As to the letters from Mackey’s
friends and family, the court acted within its discretion to discount their force by stating
that Mackey had not exhibited those positive traits when he committed the crimes at
issue. Mackey seems to take issue with how the district court weighed his mitigating
factors, but, again, disagreement with the court’s weighting of these factors does not
warrant reversal. Id. at 875.
AFFIRMED

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