United States of America v. Karl C. Quilter

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted June 14, 2024
Decided June 20, 2024
Before
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge
No. 23-2411
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
KARL C. QUILTER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 20-CR-00826(1)
Virginia M. Kendall,
Judge.
O R D E R
Karl Quilter paid thousands of dollars for nine children in the Philippines to
produce and send him hundreds of videos and images of them engaging in sexually
explicit conduct. He pleaded guilty to sexually exploiting one of those children,
see 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), and in his plea agreement, he stipulated to having sexually
exploited the eight others. The district court imposed a sentence of 30 years’
imprisonment and 10 years’ supervised release. It also assessed mandatory restitution
of about $75,000 under 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(2).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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Quilter filed a notice of appeal, but his appointed lawyer asserts that the appeal
is frivolous and moves to withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
Counsel’s brief explains the nature of the case and addresses the issues that an appeal of
this kind might be expected to involve. Quilter did not respond to the motion. See C IR .
R. 51(b). Because counsel’s analysis appears thorough, we limit our review to the
subjects that she discusses. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014).
Counsel tells us that she consulted with Quilter and confirmed that he wants to
withdraw his guilty plea. See United States v. Konczak, 683 F.3d 348, 349 (7th Cir. 2012).
Because Quilter did not move in the district court to withdraw his guilty plea, we
would review the validity of the plea for plain error. See United States v. Davila, 569 U.S.
597, 607–08 (2013). An error is reversible under this standard only if it is “obvious,
affected the defendant’s substantial rights and seriously undermined the fairness or
integrity of the proceedings.” United States v. Davenport, 719 F.3d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 2013).
Counsel concludes, and we agree, that Quilter could not plausibly challenge his
guilty plea because the district court substantially complied with Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 11 before accepting the plea. See id. The court advised Quilter of the
nature of the charges, the range of penalties he faced, and the role of the Sentencing
Guidelines and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) in determining his sentence. It advised him of the
rights he would be waiving by pleading guilty and confirmed that Quilter was pleading
guilty of his own accord. See FED R. C RIM. P. 11(b)(1)–(2).
Counsel spots deficiencies in the plea colloquy but correctly concludes that any
omissions were harmless. The district court neither warned Quilter that lying under
oath risked a perjury prosecution nor advised him that he could persist in a plea of not
guilty. See FED. R. C RIM. P. 11(b)(1)(A)–(B). And while the court asked Quilter if anyone
was “forcing” him to plead guilty (he said “no”), it did not ask him if the guilty plea
was the result of “threats” or “promises” beyond those in the plea agreement. See FED.
R. C RIM. P. 11(b)(2). But as to the perjury warning, nothing in the record suggests that he
faces a risk of being prosecuted for perjury. See United States v. Stoller, 827 F.3d 591, 597–
98 (7th Cir. 2016). Quilter also knew that he could persist in his plea of not guilty
because his plea agreement told him as much, and he confirmed to the district judge
that he had reviewed the plea agreement and understood its contents. Quilter had also
previously entered a plea of not guilty and the context of the plea hearing makes clear
that he knew he could continue with that plea and go to trial. The district court’s failure
to advise him of this right during the colloquy was harmless. See United States v. Adams,
746 F.3d 734, 746–47 (7th Cir. 2014). Finally, the court’s omission of “threats” or

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No. 23-2411 Page 3
“promises” from its inquiry into whether Quilter was pleading guilty voluntarily did
not affect his substantial rights. These are minor deviations from the language of Rule
11(b) that were covered in his plea agreement, and the rest of the colloquy leaves no
doubt that the judge adequately verified that Quilter’s plea was voluntary. See United
States v. Driver, 242 F.3d 767, 771 (7th Cir. 2001).
Even so, counsel tells us, Quilter “would like to argue that his plea was not
knowing and voluntary because he believed he would receive a 15-year sentence upon
pleading guilty.” But Quilter acknowledged in his plea agreement, then stated under
oath at the plea hearing, that he understood he faced up to 30 years in prison. (Indeed,
the plea agreement specified that the anticipated guideline range was 30 years, and the
court walked through this calculation with him, so Quilter knew that 30 years was
likely to be the starting point for the court.) Counsel correctly concludes that Quilter’s
assertion about the expected sentence contradicts his sworn statements and so a
challenge to the plea has essentially “no chance of success on appeal.” United States v.
Collins, 796 F.3d 829, 835 (7th Cir. 2015).
Counsel next discusses potential challenges to Quilter’s sentence and rightly
concludes that any argument attacking the sentence on procedural grounds would be
frivolous. Counsel explains that the district court correctly calculated Quilter’s offense
level to be, functionally, the maximum of 43 (though several levels higher in reality) and
his criminal history category to be I. And while this ordinarily would yield a guideline
sentence of life in prison, the court correctly reduced the guideline “range” to 30 years,
the statutory maximum. See 18 U.S.C. § 2251(e), U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(a). Counsel notes that,
at the sentencing hearing, Quilter agreed with this calculation, which deviated only in
inconsequential ways from what Quilter acknowledged in his plea agreement. Counsel
further explains that the district court discussed the sentencing factors of 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) and otherwise complied with the procedural requirements of sentencing.
See United States v. Jerry, 55 F.4th 1124, 1130 (7th Cir. 2022) (outlining possible
procedural errors).
Finally, counsel explains that any challenge to the substantive reasonableness of
Quilter’s sentence would be futile. The within-guideline prison sentence is
presumptively reasonable, and counsel identifies no plausible grounds for rebutting
that presumption. See United States v. McGhee, 98 F.4th 816, 823–24 (7th Cir. 2024). The
district court discussed the seriousness of Quilter’s offense, his background and
upbringing, the need to deter him from inflicting further irreparable harm to children,
possible sentencing disparities, and the need for restitution. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

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Counsel correctly concludes that the district court adequately stated its reasons for
imposing its sentence with reference to the factors in § 3553(a) and that it would be
frivolous to argue that the district court should have weighed the factors differently.
See McGhee, 98 F.4th at 823–24.
Therefore, we GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

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