Donnell D. Wilson v. Ron Neal

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-2316
DONNELL D. WILSON ,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
R ON NEAL,
Respondent-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division.
No. 3:22-cv-00205-JD-MGG — Jon E. DeGuilio, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED A PRIL 10, 2024 — DECIDED J ULY 24, 2024
____________________
Before R IPPLE, HAMILTON , and BRENNAN , Circuit Judges.
HAMILTON , Circuit Judge. Petitioner Donnell Wilson is
serving an Indiana prison sentence of 100 years for
committing two murders when he was sixteen years old.
Wilson petitioned a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus.
He asserts that the sentence violates the Eighth Amendment
as construed by the Supreme Court of the United States in
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). Miller held that a person
may not be sentenced to a mandatory term of life in prison

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2 No. 23-2316
without parole for a homicide committed while under the age
of eighteen. Wilson contends the reasoning of Miller extends
to a sentence like his: a sentence for a term of years that is so
long that it amounts to a de facto life sentence.
We address two principal issues. First, the State contends
Wilson’s federal habeas petition is time-barred under
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). The district court found his petition
timely, and so do we. To decide that issue, we must consider
in some detail Indiana Rule of Appellate Procedure 7(B), a
unique rule that the Indiana Supreme Court invoked to
reduce Wilson’s sentence from 181 years to 100 years. Second,
the district court denied relief on the merits, finding that the
state-court decision rejected Wilson’s Eighth Amendment
claim under Miller on the merits and that the rejection was
neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of
Supreme Court precedent. We agree and, on that basis, affirm
the denial of Wilson’s petition on the merits.
I. Factual and Procedural History
A. The Underlying Convictions
We presume the facts set forth by the state court are correct
unless they are rebutted with clear and convincing evidence.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). We reproduce the facts of the murders
from the Indiana Supreme Court’s summary of the evidence
presented at Wilson’s trial:
In March 2013, sixteen-year-old Donnell Wil-
son, his then-girlfriend, her brother Jonte Craw-
ford, and another of the Crawfords’ relatives
were all walking home from playing basketball
in their hometown of Gary, Indiana. When the
group encountered fifteen-year-old Derrick

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No. 23-2316 3
Thompson, Wilson and Jonte flashed the hand-
guns they were carrying and began harassing
and intimidating Thompson, making references
to the local Tre 7 gang. The pair then took
Thompson’s smartphone and headphones and
walked away.
A short time later, the group happened upon
brothers Shaqwone Ham and Charles Wood.
Wilson and Jonte were members of several
interrelated gangs, including the Get Fresh
Boys, Tre 7, and Glen Park Affiliated, which
were all at odds with the Bottom Side gang, to
which Ham and Wood belonged. Wilson had
previously argued in person with the brothers
and their disputes had continued online with
the brothers threatening to fight Wilson. The
groups initially exchanged greetings, but
Wilson and Jonte soon began to argue with the
brothers. Wilson exclaimed, “Oh, y’all looking
for me? I’m in your hood.” Seconds later, he
fatally shot Wood in the head. When Ham tried
to run, Jonte shot him several times, killing him
too. It is unclear from the record if Wilson also
shot at Ham. The brothers were unarmed.
Three hours before the murders, Wilson—who
had previously made several gang-related posts
on Twitter—sent out a new tweet declaring
“Glen Park or get shot,” referring to the Gary
neighborhood where he lived. An hour after the
murder, he tweeted “Chillen wit my bros #[Get-
FreshBoys].” Jonte and Wilson were quickly

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4 No. 23-2316
arrested, and police found Thompson’s posses-
sions on Jonte. Wilson was charged with two
counts of murder, Class B felony armed rob-
bery, and a Class D felony conspiracy to commit
criminal gang activity. The State also sought a
criminal gang enhancement.
While Wilson was lodged in the Lake County
Jail awaiting trial, he told his cellmate he killed
Ham and Wood because they were affiliated
with the rival Bottom Side gang. He also
explained how his gang affiliation had led to
Twitter disputes with members of the Bottom
Side gang. Wilson, along with some fellow
inmates, later jumped this cellmate because he
was from the “other side of the bridge” dividing
Gary. During this period, Wilson was also
recorded on a jailhouse video conference stating
he wanted to “smash” a member of a rival gang
incarcerated in the same facility and indicated a
desire to continue participating in gang activity.
After a four-day trial beginning in June 2014, a
jury found Wilson guilty on all counts. The trial
court sentenced Wilson to a term of sixty years
for the first murder conviction, fifty-five
consecutive years for the second murder
conviction, six consecutive years for armed
robbery, and two years for criminal gang
activity, with an additional sixty consecutive
years added under the criminal gang
enhancement, for an aggregate sentence of 183
years. Wilson’s trial counsel did not retain any

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No. 23-2316 5
experts in preparation for the sentencing
hearing and did not present any witnesses at
sentencing. When handing down the sentence,
the court cited several aggravating factors, but
found Wilson’s youth to be a mitigating factor.
Wilson v. State, 157 N.E.3d 1163, 1167–68 (Ind. 2020) (internal
record citations and footnotes omitted).
B. Procedural History
Wilson’s case has an unusual procedural history resulting
from the operation of Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), discussed
below. The exact dates of various state-court events are vital
in determining whether Wilson’s petition is timely.
On August 5, 2014, a state trial court formally issued its
judgment sentencing Wilson to 183 years in prison. Wilson
appealed to the Indiana Court of Appeals. That court
affirmed, except for finding that the two-year sentence for
criminal gang activity duplicated the 60-year criminal gang
sentencing enhancement. The appellate court vacated the
gang activity conviction and reduced the total sentence to 181
years. Wilson’s direct appeal ended with the Indiana Supreme
Court denying a transfer petition (Indiana’s form of
discretionary review). After that, the Indiana appellate
opinion was certified and became final on August 19, 2015.
Next, on August 11, 2016, Wilson filed his petition for post-
conviction relief in a state trial court. The trial court denied
relief on November 21, 2018, after an evidentiary hearing.
Wilson appealed. The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed that
denial on June 27, 2019, finding that Wilson’s trial counsel had
been ineffective by failing “to present any evidence related to
youth and its attendant characteristics or to Wilson’s own

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6 No. 23-2316
youth, environment, mental health, good character, or
prospects of rehabilitation.” Wilson v. State, 128 N.E.3d 492,
502 (Ind. App. 2019). The state appellate court ordered a new
sentencing hearing. Id. at 503. The State then petitioned the
Indiana Supreme Court for transfer.
The Indiana Supreme Court granted the transfer petition,
thus vacating the appellate opinion, and issued its own
opinion on November 17, 2020. 157 N.E.3d 1163 (Ind. 2020).
Wilson argued to the Indiana Supreme Court that his 181-year
cumulative sentence was unconstitutional under the Eighth
Amendment based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Miller
v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and that his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to investigate and present mitigation
evidence at his sentencing hearing. Wilson also argued that
his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge
the appropriateness of his sentence under Indiana Appellate
Rule 7(B) on direct appeal.
The Indiana Supreme Court rejected Wilson’s argument
that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment. The court
explained its view that, first, Miller did not apply to sentences
for terms of years, even if they amount to de facto life
sentences like Wilson’s, and second, that even if Miller
applied, the sentencing court’s consideration of Wilson’s
youth and background would suffice to satisfy this expanded
application of Miller. Wilson, 157 N.E.3d at 1184. The Indiana
Supreme Court also found that Wilson’s trial counsel
sufficiently investigated Wilson’s background and potential
mitigation arguments. Id. at 1177–78. The court found,
however, that Wilson’s appellate counsel was ineffective for
failing to challenge the sentence under Indiana Appellate
Rule 7(B). Id. at 1180–81.

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No. 23-2316 7
Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) authorizes an unusual degree
of appellate review of criminal sentences: “The Court may
revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due
consideration of the trial court’s decision, the Court finds that
the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the
offense and the character of the offender.” On direct appeal,
Wilson’s appellate counsel did not argue that his sentence
should be revised under this rule. The Indiana Supreme Court
explained: “The correct remedy for this failure, in this
instance, is to give Wilson a new chance to present an
Appellate Rule 7(B) claim. But rather than remand for
consideration, in the interest of judicial economy, we choose
to now conduct a review of the sentence under Appellate Rule
7(B).” 157 N.E.3d at 1181.
Taking into account the evidence available during the di-
rect appeal of Wilson’s original conviction and sentence, the
Indiana Supreme Court explained that a downward adjust-
ment to his sentence was appropriate. Id. The court reduced
Wilson’s sentence from 181 years to 100 years, finding that his
youth at the time of conviction was “the main factor weighing
in favor of a shorter sentence.” Id. at 1184.
Wilson sought rehearing, arguing that the 100-year
reduced sentence also violated the Eighth Amendment. The
Indiana Supreme Court denied Wilson’s petition for
rehearing in an order without an opinion on January 22, 2021.
Wilson’s new 100-year sentence was entered by the state trial
court on February 12, 2021. Wilson tried to appeal the new,
reduced sentence on February 22, 2021, but the Indiana Court
of Appeals dismissed the appeal just two days later, on
February 24, 2021, explaining that it did not have authority to
review decisions of the Indiana Supreme Court.

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8 No. 23-2316
On March 15, 2022, Wilson filed a federal habeas corpus
petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Wilson asserted that he was a
juvenile at the time of his offense and that his new 100-year
sentence amounts to a mandatory, de facto life sentence with-
out parole that violates the Eighth Amendment as construed
in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). In opposition, the
State argued that Wilson’s petition was filed too late and that
relief was not justified on the merits.
The federal district court denied the petition, finding that
Wilson’s petition was timely but that no clearly established
law extended the Supreme Court’s holding in Miller to de
facto life sentences. Wilson v. Neal, No. 3:22-cv-00205-JD-
MGG, 2023 WL 3750544, at *5, 8–9 (N.D. Ind. May 31, 2023).
The district court issued a certificate of appealability on the
question whether the Indiana Supreme Court ruling on the
Eighth Amendment challenge contradicted or unreasonably
applied clearly established law. Id. at *10, applying Rule 11 of
the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States
District Courts.
II. Timeliness
The State argues first that we should not reach the merits
of Wilson’s claim because he filed his federal petition too late
under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). No facts material to the issue are in
dispute, and we review this question de novo. See Arnold v.
Richardson, 14 F.4th 780, 784 (7th Cir. 2021). The statute of lim-
itations for a habeas petition is one year from (for purposes of
this case) the date upon which the judgment against Wilson
became final either by the conclusion of direct review or the
expiration of time for seeking direct review. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(d)(1)(A). The statute of limitations is tolled, however,
during the time in which a properly filed petition for state

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No. 23-2316 9
post-conviction collateral review is pending in the state
courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).
The district court and parties agree on these general rules
but disagree on how to apply them to Wilson’s petition. The
parties put forth several theories on timeliness. To avoid
undue confusion, we will not recount and refute all the
theories they suggest. Instead, we agree with the district
court’s bottom line that Wilson’s petition was timely, and we
explain only our route to this conclusion.
A. Competing Timelines
The dispute boils down to whether the Indiana Supreme
Court’s decision to reduce Wilson’s original sentence should
be deemed to have caused entry of a new, intervening judg-
ment that reset to zero the one-year clock in section 2244(d).
If so, then his petition was timely, and if not, then it was in-
deed untimely.
To unpack this a bit further, recall that direct review of
Wilson’s original sentence concluded on August 19, 2015,
when the Indiana appellate court’s opinion reducing the
sentence to 181 years was certified. The section 2244(d) one-
year statute of limitations clock began to run 90 days later, on
November 17, 2015. (The extra 90 days come from the 90-day
deadline to file a petition for certiorari. See Supreme Court
Rule 13; Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113, 119–20 (2009)
(petitioner’s conviction becomes final for purposes of
section 2244(d)(1)(A) when time for seeking certiorari review
by Supreme Court expires if no petition is filed).)
Wilson filed his state petition for post-conviction relief on
August 11, 2016, tolling the limitations period, effectively
stopping the clock with 98 days left in the one-year limitations

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10 No. 23-2316
period for filing a federal petition. Wilson’s state post-
conviction proceedings concluded on January 22, 2021, when
the Indiana Supreme Court denied his petition for rehearing.
At that time, the federal statute of limitations clock began to
run again. The question, though, is whether the new 100-year
sentence ordered by the Indiana Supreme Court reset the
clock to zero, giving him one year plus 90 days to file, or
whether he had only 98 days left to file his federal petition.
Wilson filed his federal petition on March 15, 2022. It was
timely if the new sentence reset the clock at zero but late if it
did not.
B. New Judgment
We agree with Wilson and the district court that Wilson’s
reduced 100-year sentence constituted a new, intervening
state-court judgment that started a new statute of limitations
clock for federal habeas relief. We draw from the Supreme
Court’s reasoning in Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320 (2010).
In Magwood, the Supreme Court analyzed section 2244(b)’s
bar on “second or successive habeas corpus application[s].”
Id. at 330–36, quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) & (2). The
petitioner in Magwood had been sentenced to death, and the
state courts had upheld the sentence on direct appeal and in
state post-conviction proceedings. A federal district court
then set aside the death sentence and ordered a new
sentencing proceeding in state court. After a new sentencing
hearing in the state trial court, the petitioner was again
sentenced to death. He then challenged the new death
sentence in another federal habeas petition. The federal
district court granted relief, once again finding the sentence
constitutionally defective. The federal appeals court reversed,

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No. 23-2316 11
holding that the petition was barred as a “second or
successive” challenge.
The question for the Supreme Court was whether the new
federal petition constituted a “second or successive”
application under section 2244(b). Id. at 330. The Court held
that it was not, and its reasoning applies to the mirror-image
question here. The Court looked to section 2254 to determine
the meaning of “second or successive.” Id. at 331–34.
Section 2254 specifies that a petition sought under that
statutory provision is an “application for a writ of habeas
corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a State court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) (emphasis
added). A federal habeas petition thus “seeks invalidation (in
whole or in part) of the judgment authorizing the prisoner’s
confinement.” Magwood, 561 U.S. at 332 (emphasis in
original), quoting Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 83 (2005).
As the Supreme Court explained: “Custody is crucial for
§ 2254 purposes, but it is inextricable from the judgment that
authorizes it.” Id. at 333. This means “a prisoner is entitled to
one free-standing collateral attack per judgment, rather than
one attack per stretch of imprisonment.” Id. at 334 (alteration
omitted), quoting Beyer v. Litscher, 306 F.3d 504, 507 (7th Cir.
2002). This meant for the petitioner in Magwood that his
second death sentence was imposed by a new judgment. His
second federal habeas petition was his first to challenge that
judgment, so it was not “second or successive” for purposes
of section 2244(b). Id. at 342. Implicit in that reasoning is the
conclusion that the new judgment also started a new clock
under section 2244(d) for the petitioner in Magwood.
In this case we address a different subsection of
section 2244—subsection (d) regarding the statute of

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12 No. 23-2316
limitations—but the same language and logic apply. Section
2244(d) itself specifies that the one-year statute of limitations
applies to “an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a
person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.”
That’s the same language the Supreme Court drew from
section 2254 and relied upon in Magwood. The judgment that
now authorizes Wilson’s confinement is the judgment to
which the statute of limitation applies. See Magwood, 561 U.S.
at 332; Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147, 156 (2007) (“Final
judgment in a criminal case means sentence. The sentence is
the judgment.” (quoting Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 211,
212 (1937)).
C. Distinguishing White
The State argues that, pursuant to our decision in White v.
United States, 745 F.3d 834 (7th Cir. 2014), Wilson’s new 100-
year sentence was a simple reduction in his original sentence,
not a resentencing, and therefore not a new judgment. Based
on this logic, the State contends, Wilson is not in the same
position as the petitioner in Magwood, who had a full
resentencing.
We do not think this case should be decided based on
labels and a court’s choice to say that a sentence was reduced
rather than that the defendant was resentenced. Instead, we
look to what the courts actually did in Magwood and White and
compare that to what the Indiana Supreme Court did in
determining that Wilson should have been sentenced to 100
years in prison.
In White, a federal prisoner moved to reduce his sentence
under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) after the United States Sentencing
Commission adopted a guideline amendment that applied

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No. 23-2316 13
retroactively to his original sentence. 745 F.3d at 835. The
judge granted relief under section 3582(c) and reduced the
sentence by 68 months. Nine months later, the prisoner filed
a section 2255 motion. The district court denied the motion,
finding it was both untimely and barred as a “second or suc-
cessive” petition. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2255(f) & (h).
We dismissed the appeal, explaining that a sentence reduction
under section 3582(c) is distinct from resentencing. 745 F.3d
at 836–37. We relied on Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817
(2010), where the Supreme Court explained: “Section
3582(c)(2)’s text, together with its narrow scope, shows that
Congress intended to authorize only a limited adjustment to
an otherwise final sentence and not a plenary resentencing
proceeding.” 560 U.S. at 826.
We also explained in White the notable procedural
differences between a resentencing and a sentence reduction
under section 3582(c). 745 F.3d at 836. For example, a district
judge considering a petition under section 3582(c) is not
required to receive evidence or to reopen any issue decided in
the original sentence. Id. To the contrary, U.S. Sentencing
Guideline § 1B1.10(b)(1) specifies that courts making
retroactive adjustments to a sentence “shall leave all other
guideline application decisions unaffected.” Thus, a judge
acting under section 3582(c) is circumscribed to reducing a
sentence in accordance with the retroactive U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines amendment. Further, section 3582(c) does not
entitle a prisoner to this retroactive sentence reduction. If a
court grants such a discretionary reduction, it is not a
resentencing that constitutes a new judgment and does not
“reset the clock or the count, for purposes of § 2244 and
§ 2255.” White, 745 F.3d at 836–37.

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14 No. 23-2316
By contrast, in Magwood the petitioner’s second death
sentence was “the result of a complete and new assessment of
all the evidence, arguments of counsel, and law.” 561 U.S. at
326 (internal quotations omitted). The Supreme Court
explained: “An error made a second time is still a new error.
That is especially clear here, where the state court conducted
a full resentencing and reviewed the aggravating evidence
afresh.” Id. at 339.
We now return to the Indiana Supreme Court’s analysis
under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). We may frame our issue
as whether that court’s reduction of Wilson’s 181-year
sentence to 100 years was more akin to the new sentence in
Magwood or the reduced sentence in White. Rule 7(B) permits
an appellate court to modify a sentence where “the sentence
is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the
character of the offender.” The Indiana Supreme Court has
explained that the rule authorizes a comprehensive look at the
offense and the offender: “Whether a sentence should be
deemed inappropriate ‘turns on our sense of the culpability
of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done
to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a
given case.’” McCain v. State, 148 N.E.3d 977, 985 (Ind. 2020),
quoting Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008).
In Wilson’s case, that’s exactly what the Indiana Supreme
Court did. It analyzed the nature of his offenses and
compared them to other cases to determine, for example, if
the murder victims were “tortured, beaten, or lingered in
pain.” 157 N.E.3d at 1181–82 (internal quotations omitted).
The court also explained that the crime’s gang connections
warranted an enhanced sentence. Next, the court considered
Wilson’s character, including his prior misdemeanor and his

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No. 23-2316 15
continued expression of pro-gang sentiments while
incarcerated, balanced against his status as a minor when he
committed the murders. In particular, the court compared
Wilson’s situation—“a sixteen-year-old who committed
robbery and a double murder”—to factually analogous cases
to determine an appropriate sentence. Id. at 1183–84.
While the Indiana Supreme Court did not consider new
evidence, it did consider new arguments, and it
independently reviewed sentencing factors, all after full
briefing and oral argument. If the Indiana Supreme Court had
remanded for the trial court to reweigh the sentence, the
result would have been a new judgment indistinguishable
from the new judgment ordered on collateral review in
Magwood. We see no reason that the state court’s choice on
collateral review, “in the interest of judicial economy,” 157
N.E.3d at 1181, to take the shortcut by conducting the review
itself rather than remanding for a new trial-court decision
should produce a different result for purposes of the section
2244(d) federal statute of limitations.
The Indiana Supreme Court’s application of Rule 7(B) was
much closer to the new sentencing hearing in Magwood than
the limited sentence reduction procedure in White under
section 3582(c). The Indiana Supreme Court itself has
explained that review and revision of sentences under Rule
7(B) is “an exercise of judgment that is unlike the usual
appellate process, and is very similar to the trial court’s
function” when weighing various sentencing factors.
Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1223. We thus find that the Indiana
Supreme Court’s decision to reduce Wilson’s sentence to 100
years, and the resulting Indiana trial court order entering that
sentence, constituted a new judgment that reset the clock on

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16 No. 23-2316
the section 2244(d) statute of limitations for federal habeas
relief.
Wilson’s 100-year sentence was entered by the trial court
on February 12, 2021. That was the new judgment ordering
the custody that he challenges in this habeas proceeding. See,
e.g., Jensen v. Pollard, 924 F.3d 451, 455 (7th Cir. 2019) (noting
that petitioner was challenging custody imposed by new
judgment). Wilson tried to appeal that sentence through
direct review in the state courts, but no such further review
was available. The Indiana Court of Appeals found it did not
have jurisdiction to hear what was in effect a request to review
a decision by the Indiana Supreme Court, so it dismissed
Wilson’s appeal with prejudice. See Dkt. No. 7-21 at 2; see also
Dragon v. State, 774 N.E.2d 103, 107 (Ind. App. 2002) (“We are
bound by the decisions of our supreme court. Supreme court
precedent is binding upon us until it is changed either by that
court or by legislative enactment,” and “it is not this court’s
role to ‘reconsider’ supreme court decisions.” (internal
citations omitted)), transfer granted, 783 N.E.3d 702 (2002),
transfer vacated, 783 N.E.2d 687 (2003). The new federal
habeas clock started running no earlier than February 12,
2021, when the new judgment imposing custody was entered,
though perhaps it might not have started until twelve days
later on February 24, 2021, when the Indiana Court of Appeals
dismissed Wilson’s attempt to appeal. That difference does
not matter here.
Wilson could have petitioned the Supreme Court of the
United States for certiorari review. See, e.g., Wallace v.
Mississippi, 43 F.4th 482, 498 (5th Cir. 2022) (explaining that
review on petition for certiorari is available when highest
state court in which review may be had is the trial court).

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No. 23-2316 17
Thus, Wilson had one year and ninety days running at least
from February 12, 2021 to file his federal petition. His federal
petition filed on March 15, 2022 was timely.
III. The Merits
A. Review under AEDPA
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA) amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, a habeas petitioner
faces steep obstacles to prevail on a claim the state courts have
rejected on the merits. To obtain federal relief, the state court’s
decision must have been “contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” or
“based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.” 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) & (2). Federal courts review “the specific
reasons given by the state court and defer[] to those reasons if
they are reasonable.” Wilson v. Sellers, 584 U.S. ___, ___, 138 S.
Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018). A state-court decision is contrary to
clearly established law if it “applies a rule that contradicts the
governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases” or
“confronts a set of facts that is materially indistinguishable
from a decision of [the Supreme Court] but reaches a different
result.” Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005). In this
context, an “unreasonable” application of clearly established
law means “objectively unreasonable, not merely wrong;
even clear error will not suffice.” White v. Woodall, 572 U.S.
415, 419 (2014) (internal quotations omitted). A petitioner
must show “the state court’s ruling on the claim being
presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that
there was an error well understood and comprehended in
existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded
disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011).

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18 No. 23-2316
These deferential approaches to state-court decisions ap-
ply, however, only if the petitioner’s claims were adjudicated
on the merits by a state court. “If no state court has squarely
addressed the merits of a habeas claim, we review the claim
de novo under the pre-AEDPA standard of 28 U.S.C. § 2243,
but still with deference to the state court.” Ruhl v. Hardy, 743
F.3d 1083, 1091 (7th Cir. 2014). Wilson contends here that the
state courts did not adjudicate the merits of his federal Eighth
Amendment challenge under Miller, which would leave us
free to decide the Eighth Amendment issue de novo, “to dis-
pose of the matter as law and justice require.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2243; Harris v. Thompson, 698 F.3d 609, 623 (7th Cir. 2012)
(ordering habeas relief).
B. Adjudicated on the Merits
We find that the Indiana Supreme Court did adjudicate
Wilson’s Eighth Amendment claim on the merits. The
standard of review under section 2254(d) therefore applies
and defeats Wilson’s claim.
Wilson points out correctly that the state trial court’s order
entering his 100-year sentence did not contain any reasons ex-
plaining the sentence. A federal court must, however, “‘look
through’ the unexplained decision to the last related state-
court decision that does provide a relevant rationale. It should
then presume that the unexplained decision adopted the
same reasoning.” Wilson v. Sellers, 584 U.S. at ___, 138 S. Ct. at
1192. That reasoning applies with even more force when the
unexplained order comes from a lower court that is required
to follow the instructions of the higher court, here the Indiana
Supreme Court.

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No. 23-2316 19
Wilson argues, though, that his arguments in his federal
habeas petition are different than his original arguments to
the Indiana Supreme Court because of the state trial court’s
issuance of his new sentence. Wilson’s habeas petition makes
two primary arguments: (1) that Miller extends to de facto life
sentences for minors; and (2) his 100-year sentence qualifies
as a de facto life sentence and therefore is unconstitutional
under Miller and the Eighth Amendment. Before the Indiana
Supreme Court, Wilson’s arguments were aimed at a 181-year
sentence but were otherwise identical: (1) Miller extends to de
facto life sentences; and (2) his 181-year sentence qualified as
a de facto life sentence. We do not require that the state court
have considered a federal claim in exactly the same format as
it is presented in a federal habeas petition to find the claim
was adjudicated on the merits. See Flint v. Carr, 10 F.4th 786,
796–97 (7th Cir. 2021) (state-court determination on
ineffective assistance of counsel claim premised on failure to
object on double jeopardy grounds was enough to find
petitioner’s double jeopardy claim was adjudicated on the
merits); Murdock v. Dorethy, 846 F.3d 203, 208–09 (7th Cir.
2017) (state court determination affirming denial of
suppression of pretrial statements was enough to find
petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on a
failure to file a motion to suppress pretrial statements was
adjudicated on the merits); Sturgeon v. Chandler, 552 F.3d 604,
611–12 (7th Cir. 2009) (state court considering argument of
need for a competency hearing in resolving ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel claim was enough to find
petitioner’s due process claim of a right to a competency
hearing was adjudicated on the merits).
The Indiana Supreme Court found that “Miller’s enhanced
protections do not currently apply to Wilson’s 181-year term

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20 No. 23-2316
of years sentence” and that Miller applies “only to life-with-
out-parole sentences.” 157 N.E.3d at 1176. This reasoning
would apply to Wilson’s reduced 100-year sentence just as it
did to his 181-year sentence. We are confident that when the
Indiana Supreme Court reduced Wilson’s sentence under
Rule 7(B), it had not forgotten his Eighth Amendment argu-
ments it had rejected earlier in the same opinion. Because the
state court “could not have decided the same … question any
differently … the merits were effectively reached.” Sturgeon,
552 F.3d at 612. A state court adjudicated Wilson’s federal ha-
beas petition claim on the merits, so we apply the section
2254(d) standard of review.
C. Miller and Clearly Established Law
Both sides agreed correctly at oral argument that if typical
section 2254(d) review applies to Wilson’s claim, it must
ultimately fail on the merits. The Supreme Court of the United
States has not established the view Wilson presses,
specifically, that Miller applies to de facto life sentences. The
Supreme Court held in Miller that “mandatory life without
parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes
violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel and
unusual punishments.’” 567 U.S. at 465. According to the
Miller Court, “the distinctive attributes of youth diminish the
penological justifications for imposing the harshest sentences
on juvenile offenders, even when they commit terrible
crimes,” id. at 472, but “mandatory penalty schemes …
prevent the sentencer from taking account of these central
considerations,” id. at 474. Critical for Wilson’s case, the
Supreme Court did not bar courts, in their discretion, from
imposing a sentence of life without parole on a juvenile
convicted of murder. Instead, the Court required sentencing

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No. 23-2316 21
courts “to take into account how children are different, and
how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing
them to a lifetime in prison.” Id. at 480. Therefore, under
Miller, there is no categorical bar against sentencing juveniles
convicted of murder to life without parole.
Miller framed its holding in terms of mandatory sentences
of life without parole. The Court did not specify how its
reasoning might or might not apply (a) to sentences of life
without parole imposed by exercise of judicial discretion or
(b) to sentences imposing terms of years that may or will
amount, in effect, to life sentences. Nor did the Court reach
the question (c) of how courts might determine reliably when
a long sentence of years should be deemed a de facto life
sentence, if indeed its reasoning extends to such sentences.1
1 The parties dispute whether Wilson’s sentence amounted to a man-
datory de facto life sentence or whether it was discretionary. Under Indi-
ana law in effect when Wilson committed his crimes, the murder convic-
tions came with a mandatory sentence within the range of 45 to 65 years,
with an advisory sentence of 55 years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-3 (2013). The
criminal gang enhancement carries with it a mandatory, consecutive sen-
tence equal to the longest sentence imposed for one of the underlying fel-
onies. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-15 (2013). That means Wilson was required to be
sentenced to at least 90 years in prison. That is clearly a mandatory, de
facto life sentence—Wilson was sixteen at the time of his crimes, so he
would be in prison until at least the age of 106.
The State has two counterarguments, however. First, under Indiana
law that applied at the time, Wilson is eligible for day-for-day good-time
credit. This credit offers the possibility of reducing his original mandatory
sentence by half, so that he could be released within 45 years. While that
sentence would still be severe, the mandatory sentence would not neces-
sarily amount to a de facto life sentence for an offender who was 16 years
old. Second, the State argues that the existence of Rule 7(B) itself means
that Wilson’s sentence was not mandatory. As explained above, the rule

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22 No. 23-2316
In McKinley v. Butler, 809 F.3d 908, 911 (7th Cir. 2016), this
court concluded that the reasoning of Miller should extend to
discretionary life sentences and to de facto life sentences. But
see id. at 914–16 (Ripple, J., dissenting), citing Croft v. Williams,
773 F.3d 170, 171 (7th Cir. 2014) (denying permission to file
successive collateral attack because Miller does not apply to
discretionary life sentences). Our decision in McKinley does
not help Wilson satisfy the section 2254(d) standard of review.
See Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 505 (2012) (explaining
“clearly established law” refers to the holdings of the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decisions). Whether this court agrees with
the Indiana Supreme Court’s decision that Miller does not
apply to Wilson’s de facto life sentence does not matter. The
state court’s decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable
application of clearly established law set forth in precedents
of the Supreme Court of the United States.
The district court’s denial of Wilson’s petition for a writ of
habeas corpus is AFFIRMED.
allows appellate courts, in their discretion, to reduce an otherwise lawful
sentence, meaning no sentence is truly mandatory. Or at least, so the State
argues. At oral argument, Wilson pointed out the Indiana Supreme Court
has never upheld the use of Rule 7(B) to reduce a sentence below a statu-
tory minimum. We need not resolve the merits of these arguments here.
The Supreme Court of the United States has never extended Miller to a
sentence to a term of years, so it does not matter to our decision whether
Wilson’s sentence is deemed discretionary or mandatory.

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