F.c. Bloxom Company v. TOM LANGE COMPANY INTERNATIONAL, INC ., doing business as SEVEN SEAS FRUIT

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Nos. 22-3268 and 23-1022
F.C. BLOXOM C OMPANY ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
TOM LANGE C OMPANY I NTERNATIONAL, I NC ., doing business
as S EVEN S EAS F RUIT,
Defendant-Appellee.
F.C. BLOXOM C OMPANY , doing business as F.C. BLOXOM
I NTERNATIONAL,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
JASON LAYE,
Respondent-Appellee.
____________________
Appeals from the United States District Court for the
Central District of Illinois.
Nos. 3:20-cv-3147 & 3:22-mc-03005 — Sue E. Myerscough, Judge.
___________________
A RGUED O CTOBER 30, 2023 — DECIDED J ULY 25, 2024
____________________

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2 Nos. 22-3268 & 23-1022
Before EASTERBROOK, R IPPLE, and S CUDDER , Circuit Judges.
S CUDDER , Circuit Judge. This appeal presents a dispute
under the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act, a
Depression-era statute that regulates the market for fresh
fruits and vegetables. Seven Seas Fruit initiated
administrative proceedings against F.C. Bloxom Company
under the Act when Bloxom refused to pay for three loads of
onions. The Secretary of Agriculture found for Seven Seas,
and Bloxom exercised its statutory right to what the Act calls
a “trial de novo” in federal district court. Agreeing with the
findings of the Secretary, the district court entered summary
judgment for Seven Seas. Bloxom challenges that ruling on
appeal. Seeing no reversible error, we affirm.
I
A
F.C. Bloxom Company is a Seattle-based distributor, im-
porter, and exporter of fresh produce. The company does not
itself grow fruits or vegetables but instead acquires them from
suppliers for resale to customers in the domestic and interna-
tional markets.
In August 2018, Bloxom’s Brian Bernard received a call
from a customer in Honduras seeking to import U.S. No. 1
grade onions. Bernard tapped his colleague Alejandro Her-
nandez to help fill the order. Hernandez reached out to Seven
Seas salesman Jason Laye to see if Seven Seas could supply
the onions. Seven Seas agreed to do so, and the two sides ham-
mered out a deal. Their agreement required Seven Seas to de-
liver three loads of onions to the Port of Long Beach in Cali-
fornia, for transport via an oceangoing container ship—the

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Nos. 22-3268 & 23-1022 3
MSC Channe—that was slated to set sail for Honduras on Au-
gust 14.
In the course of the parties’ negotiations, one item seemed
to go overlooked. Honduras, like most countries, requires
shipments of fruits and vegetables to undergo inspection for
plant-borne pests and diseases before it will allow them to en-
ter the country. These inspections must be conducted in the
produce’s country of origin by a designated authority, most
often a government agency. Only if that entity issues a so-
called phytosanitary certificate declaring the inspected pro-
duce safe for export will Honduran customs officials let it into
the country. In Bloxom’s case, this meant that each load of on-
ions had to be inspected by the U.S. Department of Agricul-
ture before they left the Port of Long Beach.
At no point during the contract negotiations did the par-
ties expressly discuss the phytosanitary certificates. Bloxom’s
Brian Bernard nonetheless came to believe that Seven Seas’
Jason Laye would procure the certificates. Laye not only had
procured certificates for previous sales, but also, during the
negotiations of this new transaction, offered vague assurances
that that if Bernard secured space for the onions on the MSC
Channe, he would “take care of the rest.”
Bloxom claims to have had a second reason to believe that
Laye would procure the certificates. It insists that it emailed
purchase orders to Laye that explicitly stated that the certifi-
cates would be “provided by Seven Seas.” The purchase or-
ders further specified that Seven Seas would fax Bloxom cop-
ies of those certificates “before” the onions were loaded onto
the MSC Channe.

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4 Nos. 22-3268 & 23-1022
But there was a gap, and that gap proved consequential.
Seven Seas resolutely denied receiving these purchase orders
or otherwise agreeing to procure the certificates. And at no
point has Bloxom supplied concrete proof that they were sent.
In the days following their negotiations, neither party
arranged for a phytosanitary inspection, leaving the onions to
arrive at the Port of Long Beach without the certificates
necessary to clear Honduran customs. Even then, though, the
Department of Agriculture could have performed an
inspection at the port itself. But Bloxom believed that the
phytosanitary certificates were in place, despite Seven Seas’
failure to fax copies as the purchase orders required. So, on
August 13, Bloxom took no action as the onions were loaded
onto the MSC Channe. They set sail for Honduras the next
day—uninspected and indeed now uninspectable.
Reality dawned slowly. It was not until the onions ap-
proached Honduras that Bloxom began asking about the cer-
tificates. On August 23, and again on August 27, Bernard
asked Laye for a copy of “the phyto” for each load of onions.
Laye responded that “[t]he shipper is FedEx directly to Hon-
duras.” Bernard apparently took this to mean that the phyto-
sanitary certificates had been procured by the company that
grew the onions and that this third-party would FedEx them
directly to Bloxom’s customer in Honduras. On this under-
standing, Bernard asked Laye to “have them send [him] a
copy via email.” No email followed.
Pressure mounted once the onions arrived in Honduras.
On September 1, Bernard informed Laye that Bloxom’s cus-
tomer could not “get the containers of onions” out of the port
because it “never got the phytos.” Bernard asked Laye
whether he had “a scan” of the certificates that he could send

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Nos. 22-3268 & 23-1022 5
him and stressed that he “really need[ed] it ASAP.” Laye re-
plied that he “emailed the shipper and requested” copies. On
September 4, Bernard texted Laye that “[t]he Honduras cus-
tomer [was] all over [him]” and pleaded with him to “work
on the Phytos as soon as possible tomorrow morning.” That
evening Laye informed Bernard of the worst possible news:
no phytosanitary inspection had taken place. Now Bloxom
had a major problem on its hands, for there was no way to
obtain phytosanitary certificates in Honduras and, conse-
quently, no way to deliver the onions to the buyer.
To salvage the situation, Bloxom and Seven Seas began
brainstorming alternative outlets for the onions. On Septem-
ber 9, Bernard raised the possibility of selling them to custom-
ers in Trinadad or the Dominican Republic. But these efforts
did not pan out, and the onions remained in quarantine in
Honduras. After much consternation, Bloxom had no choice
but to ship the onions back to the United States.
Jason Laye proposed shipping the onions to Jacksonville,
Florida, where Seven Seas had contacts that might be willing
to acquire them. Bloxom agreed to the proposal, and the on-
ions took to sea a second time.
The onions arrived in Jacksonville on December 18, 2018.
But the return shipping company would not release the on-
ions until freight charges totaling $21,135 were paid. For sev-
eral weeks, Bloxom and Seven Seas could not agree on which
company should bear those expenses. And as long as the fees
went unpaid, the onions could not be inspected for quality,
let alone resold. So the onions sat.
Eventually Bloxom and Seven Seas resolved the disagree-
ment. In a letter agreement, which Bloxom signed on

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6 Nos. 22-3268 & 23-1022
February 5, 2019, Seven Seas agreed to pay the $21,135 ship-
ping fee “on behalf of Bloxom Company … in order to facili-
tate release of the Onions.” The parties also formalized the
terms of the consignment arrangement they had worked out
in principle before. Bloxom expressly agreed to release the on-
ions to Seven Seas as Bloxom’s consignee. As consignee,
Seven Seas agreed to “perform an inspection” and, should
they be found “salvageable/marketable,” to “place the Onions
for Bloxom Company’s account.” The letter agreement made
clear that although Seven Seas would take physical posses-
sion of the onions, “at no time [would] ownership transfer
from Bloxom Company to Seven Seas.”
Once Seven Seas paid the return shipping fee, Bloxom re-
leased the onions for inspection. Only then did it become clear
that the onions had spoiled. So Seven Seas had them de-
stroyed.
B
This suit arose from Seven Seas’ efforts to exact full
payment for the onions at the agreed-upon price. When
Bloxom refused to pay—citing Seven Seas’ failure to procure
the certificates—Seven Seas commenced administrative
proceedings against Bloxom under the Perishable
Agricultural Commodities Act.
Congress enacted that statute to combat “unfair and
fraudulent practices” in the interstate market for highly per-
ishable agricultural commodities like fresh fruits and vegeta-
bles. Pub. L. 71–325. To further that objective, the Act created
a federal cause of action against regulated entities (like
Bloxom and Seven Seas) that engage in any one of a number
of unfair trade practices. See 7 U.S.C. § 499e(b) (creating cause

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Nos. 22-3268 & 23-1022 7
of action); id. § 499b(1)–(7) (enumerating unfair trade prac-
tices). Injured persons can file a lawsuit directly in state or
federal court. See id. § 499e(b). But they can also seek repara-
tions in proceedings before the U.S. Department of Agricul-
ture. See id.
Seven Seas elected the administrative path. It sought relief
from Bloxom under § 499b(4), which makes it an unfair trade
practice to, among other things, “fail or refuse … [to] make
full payment promptly in respect of any transaction in any
[covered] commodity to the person with whom such transac-
tion is had.” Bloxom counterclaimed, seeking damages for
Seven Seas’ failure to procure the phytosanitary certificates.
The Secretary of Agriculture ultimately found in favor of
Seven Seas. Its reasoning was straightforward. Seven Seas de-
nied receiving the purchase orders, and Bloxom, for its part,
was unable to prove that they had been sent. This proved fatal
to Bloxom’s position because the company had not come for-
ward with evidence that the duty to procure certificates was
otherwise delegated to Seven Seas during the negotiations.
Without evidence of such delegation, Bloxom could not get
out of its contractual obligation to pay for the onions at the
contract price and was not entitled to damages on its counter-
claim.
The Secretary made another finding that would prove im-
portant to subsequent litigation and, indeed, to this appeal:
breach or no breach, Bloxom “accepted the subject loads of
onions” at the Port of Long Beach despite Seven Seas’ failure
to fax it copies of the phytosanitary certificates “prior to load-
ing” as the purchase orders required.

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8 Nos. 22-3268 & 23-1022
C
Bloxom appealed the Secretary’s ruling to federal district
court. See id. § 499g(c). The term “appeal” here is a bit of a
misnomer. The Act states that a party that appeals an admin-
istrative reparation order to a federal district court is entitled
to “a trial de novo” that “shall proceed in all respects like
other civil suits for damages.” Id. The only difference between
the path Bloxom chose and an original suit for damages under
§ 499e(b) is that “the findings of fact and order or orders of
the Secretary” serve as “prima-facie evidence of the facts
therein stated.” Id. § 499g(c). This simply means that “the facts
found by the Secretary shall stand as the established facts un-
til sufficient evidence is produced on the trial to overcome
them.” Farris v. Meyer Schuman Co., 115 F.2d 577, 579 (7th Cir.
1940); see also Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Willoughby, 863 F.2d 1029,
1032–33 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
The district court set an initial discovery deadline of Sep-
tember 30, 2021. From the outset, the focus of discovery was
on the purchase orders and, to a lesser extent, on evidence
that might show that, during the contract negotiations,
Bloxom delegated the duty to procure phytosanitary certifi-
cates to Seven Seas.
It quickly became apparent that more time would be
needed. The district court demonstrated considerable pa-
tience and three times extended the discovery deadline.
As the litigation dragged on, the relationship between the
parties grew increasingly acrimonious. Bloxom came to be-
lieve that Seven Seas and Jason Laye were withholding infor-
mation critical to its theory of the case. And Seven Seas grew
increasingly frustrated with the scope of Bloxom’s discovery

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Nos. 22-3268 & 23-1022 9
requests, which it felt was not commensurate with the litiga-
tion’s modest financial stakes. Amid that fractious backdrop,
Seven Seas filed an early motion for summary judgment.
Although three months of discovery remained, Seven Seas
urged the district court to bring the litigation to a close. Its
principal reason for that outcome had to do with the purchase
orders. After years of litigation and ample discovery, Bloxom
remained unable to point to any evidence proving that it sent
Seven Seas the purchase orders. Nor could Bloxom point to
evidence showing the company delegated to Seven Seas an
obligation to obtain the phytosanitary certificates during the
negotiations themselves.
Seven Seas saw an early award of summary judgment as
warranted for a second reason. Even assuming the company
breached a duty to procure phytosanitary certificates, Bloxom
could not prevail because it accepted the onions at the Port of
Long Beach under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code
without then ever later revoking that acceptance.
Bloxom responded to Seven Seas’ summary judgment
motion by filing a floodtide of discovery requests. For good
measure, Bloxom filed a motion to compel against Laye in a
federal district court in Florida, where Laye lived. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 45(d)(2)(B)(i). (That action was later transferred to the
Central District of Illinois and assigned to the same judge
handling Bloxom’s appeal from the Secretary’s decision.)
Believing these efforts to be futile, Seven Seas sought a stay of
all discovery. As it saw things, nothing could change two
bottom-line realities: Bloxom never sent Seven Seas purchase
orders evidencing the certificate requirement, and even if
such an obligation did exist, Bloxom had waived the
requirement by taking possession of the onions at the Port of

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10 Nos. 22-3268 & 23-1022
Long Beach and shipping them to Honduras without any
certificates in hand.
Bloxom disagreed and pleaded for more time under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d), which “permits a
district court to delay consideration of a summary judgment
motion and order additional discovery before ruling if the
non-movant demonstrates that ‘it cannot present facts
essential to justify its opposition.’” Sterk v. Redbox Automated
Retail, LLC, 770 F.3d 618, 627–28 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(d)). Bloxom supported that request with sworn
declarations explaining why it needed yet more time for
discovery and what kinds of information it expected
additional discovery to uncover.
The district court did not rule on Seven Seas’ requested
stay or on Bloxom’s motion under Rule 56(d), so discovery
proceeded apace. In the closing weeks of discovery, Bloxom’s
flurry of discovery activity became an avalanche. In rapid suc-
cession, Bloxom filed a motion seeking permission to take
more than ten depositions, a motion seeking additional time
to depose Alejandro Hernandez (who no longer worked at
Bloxom), and two motions to compel. And with just four days
remaining in discovery, Bloxom filed a renewed Rule 56(d)
motion, moved for a fourth extension of the discovery dead-
line, and sought leave to supplement its brief opposing sum-
mary judgment. The district court permitted Bloxom to sup-
plement its opposition brief but did not otherwise act on these
requests.
And in the end, it never did. On November 22, 2022,
months after the close of discovery, the district court entered
summary judgment against Bloxom on both of the grounds
urged by Seven Seas. See F.C. Bloxom Co. v. Tom Lange Co. Int’l,

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Nos. 22-3268 & 23-1022 11
Inc., 642 F. Supp. 3d 775 (C.D. Ill. 2022). It determined that no
reasonable trier of fact could find that Bloxom had delegated
the task of procuring phytosanitary certificates to Seven Seas.
See id. at 783. It also concluded that Seven Seas was entitled
to summary judgment under the Uniform Commercial Code.
Breach or no breach, the record conclusively established “that
Bloxom accepted the onions, did not reject the onions at the
Port of Long Beach, [and] [n]ever revoked [that] acceptance.”
Id. at 787. Because none of the discovery sought by Bloxom
would have altered these conclusions, the district court de-
nied all requests for more discovery. Id. at 786.
The district court entered final judgment soon thereafter—
in both Bloxom’s appeal and in the ancillary action it brought
against Jason Laye. Bloxom filed timely notices of appeal in
both cases, and we have consolidated them for decision.
II
Bloxom challenges the district court’s summary judgment
ruling on two grounds. Its principal objection goes to timing.
In Bloxom’s view, the district court abused its discretion
denying its Rule 56(d) motions and should have instead given
it the additional time it sought to develop the record before
ruling on Seven Seas’ motion for summary judgment. In the
alternative, Bloxom contends that unresolved questions of
material fact precluded the entry of summary judgment even
on the record that the district court did consider.
Before turning to these contentions, we pause to empha-
size that our analysis takes as its starting place assumptions
by the parties that may or may not be legally sound. Seven
Seas and Bloxom have litigated this case on the shared under-
standing that the Uniform Commercial Code’s standards for

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12 Nos. 22-3268 & 23-1022
acceptance, rejection, and revocation are relevant to determin-
ing the scope of liability under 7 U.S.C. § 499b. Both in the
district court and on appeal, Seven Seas has maintained that
breach or no breach, Bloxom cannot prevail if it accepted the
onions under § 2-606 of the UCC and did not revoke that ac-
ceptance under § 2-608. Rather than fight the legal premises
underlying this contention, Bloxom has joined issue only on
the facts, insisting alternatively that it did not accept the on-
ions, that it did so in reasonable reliance on statements sug-
gesting that the phytosanitary certificates were in place, or
that it revoked its acceptance after learning that the certifi-
cates had not been procured. By litigating in this manner,
Bloxom has implicitly accepted Seven Seas’ framing of the
case and waived any legal arguments that could be raised
against it. See O’Neal v. City of Chicago, 588 F.3d 406, 409 (7th
Cir. 2009) (arguments not raised on appeal are waived).
We underscore this point because the parties have left sev-
eral legal questions unexamined in both the district court and
on appeal. For one, the UCC does not appear to support the
dispositive importance placed by the parties on acceptance.
Section 2-607(2) of the UCC makes clear that “acceptance does
not of itself impair any other remedy provided by this Article
for non-conformity.” More broadly, it is not even clear that
the UCC applies in the first place. The Perishable Agricultural
Commodities Act does not incorporate the UCC, or any other
source of state law for that matter. And its implementing reg-
ulations define many of the critical terms used in 7 U.S.C.
§ 499b, including “reject without reasonable cause,” 7 C.F.R.
§ 46.2(bb), and “acceptance,” id. at § 46.2(dd). Although it is
certainly possible that the UCC could supplement those pro-
visions as a matter of federal common law, we have never

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Nos. 22-3268 & 23-1022 13
expressly held that it does and deciding that question would
call for careful analysis.
None of the analysis that follows should be read to express
any view on how these and other issues might be resolved in
future cases.
A
As for the merits, we begin on the substantive front with
Bloxom’s challenge to the district court’s summary judgment
ruling. We do so without deference to the analysis of the dis-
trict court, drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most
favorable to Bloxom. See Chi. Reg’l Council of Carpenters Pen-
sion Fund v. Schal Bovis, Inc., 826 F.3d 397, 402 (7th Cir. 2016).
When a district court enters summary judgment on multi-
ple independent grounds, reversal is appropriate only if none
of those grounds is supported by the record. What that means
here is that Bloxom must prove that a reasonable trier of fact
could find two things: first, that it delegated to Seven Seas the
duty to procure phytosanitary certificates and, second, that it
either did not accept the onions at the Port of Long Beach un-
der § 2-606 of the UCC or that it validly revoked that ac-
ceptance under § 2-608. Because Bloxom’s inability to make
the second of these two showings is clear, we focus on ac-
ceptance and revocation without considering the antecedent
question of whether a reasonable jury could find that Seven
Seas bore the burden of procuring phytosanitary certificates
for the onions.
Which brings us to yet another issue. Neither the district
court nor the parties have taken a position on which version of
the UCC applies to this case. They have instead drawn dis-
parately on the law of no fewer than four states. Seven Seas

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14 Nos. 22-3268 & 23-1022
insists that “[n]o choice of law analysis is required because
Article 2 of the UCC has been adopted” in every state whose
law could conceivably apply. Although we follow the think-
ing, we do not agree. That two states have enacted the same
version of the UCC does not mean that their respective courts
have interpreted those provisions the same way. When those
interpretations conflict, a choice must be made between one
state’s law and the other’s, even if the provisions are identical.
Neither Seven Seas nor Bloxom has identified any such con-
flict in this case, and both have drawn heavily on Illinois law.
We will do so as well, without deciding what rules would
govern the choice-of-law analysis were there a conflict.
Under Illinois’s codification of the UCC, “[a]cceptance of
goods occurs when the buyer” does one of three things:
(a) after a reasonable opportunity to inspect the
goods signifies to the seller that the goods
are conforming or that he will take or retain
them in spite of their non-conformity; or
(b) fails to make an effective rejection [under
§ 5/2-602(1)], but such acceptance does not
occur until the buyer has had a reasonable
opportunity to inspect them; or
(c) does any act inconsistent with the seller’s
ownership; but if such act is wrongful as
against the seller it is an acceptance only if
ratified by him.
810 ILCS 5/2-606(1)(a)–(c). The district court held that Bloxom
accepted the onions under § 606(1)(c). See F.C. Bloxom Co., 642
F. Supp. 3d at 785. We see no error with that conclusion. It is
difficult to imagine an act more “inconsistent with” Seven

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Nos. 22-3268 & 23-1022 15
Seas’ ownership of the onions than shipping them to a foreign
country for sale to a customer with whom Seven Seas has no
contractual relationship. 810 ILCS 5/2-606(1)(c). We note, too,
that Bloxom did so with full knowledge that Seven Seas had
failed to fax copies of the phytosanitary certificates and that
the onions could not be inspected outside of the United States.
Although it could have taken steps to investigate the status of
the phytosanitary certificates before the onions left port, it did
not do so, eliminating any possibility that the problem could
be addressed and the consequences minimized.
We also agree with the district court’s assessment that
Bloxom did not revoke that acceptance, even after learning
that the phytosanitary certificates had never been procured.
For revocation to be effective under § 5/2-608, it “must occur
within a reasonable time after the buyer discovers or should
have discovered the ground for it and before any substantial
change in condition of the goods which is not caused by their
own defects.” Id. § 5/2-608(2). Bloxom first learned that the
phytosanitary certificates had not been procured on Septem-
ber 4. At no point in the months that followed did Bloxom
notify Seven Seas of an intent to revoke.
To the contrary, Bloxom doubled down on its ownership
in the letter agreement it signed settling the dispute over the
cost of shipping the onions to Jacksonville. That agreement
stated unequivocally that “ownership” of the onions would
not “transfer from Bloxom Company to Seven Seas” during
the time that Seven Seas attempted to sell them on
consignment. At the time Bloxom signed this agreement, the
non-existence of the phytosanitary certificates had been
known for months. In full possession of this information,

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16 Nos. 22-3268 & 23-1022
Bloxom took steps to reinforce, rather than disavow, its
ownership of the onions.
The combination of Bloxom’s conduct at the Port of Long
Beach and the contents of the letter agreement leave us with
no doubt that the district court was right to enter summary
judgment for Seven Seas.
B
We close by addressing Bloxom’s contention that the dis-
trict court was wrong to rule on Seven Seas’ summary judg-
ment motion without giving it additional time to develop the
record. Our review of that claim is only for an abuse of discre-
tion, see Arnold v. Villarreal, 853 F.3d 384, 389 (7th Cir. 2017),
and we see none.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(b) authorizes parties to
move for summary judgment “at any time” until 30 days after
the close of discovery, regardless of whether discovery has
been completed or even begun. See Waterloo Furniture Compo-
nents, Ltd. v. Haworth, Inc., 467 F.3d 641, 648 (7th Cir. 2006)
(“Rule 56 does not require that discovery take place in all
cases before summary judgment can be granted.”). This flexi-
bility reflects the foundational premise that discovery is not
an end unto itself, but rather only a means of determining
whether there are genuine issues of material fact that necessi-
tate a trial. When evidence comes to light that conclusively
establishes or conclusively forecloses a party’s entitlement to
relief, further discovery becomes futile and wasteful. Rule
56(b), in short, allows and indeed encourages parties under
these circumstances to use summary judgment to bring litiga-
tion to a “just, speedy, and inexpensive” end. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 1.

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Nos. 22-3268 & 23-1022 17
For its part, Rule 56(d) protects non-movants who believe
a summary judgment motion has been filed prematurely. It
“permits a district court to delay consideration of a summary
judgment motion and order additional discovery before rul-
ing if the non-movant demonstrates that ‘it cannot present
facts essential to justify its opposition.’” Sterk, 770 F.3d at 627–
28 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d)). A party seeking to invoke
the rule must support their request with a sworn “affidavit or
declaration” that gives “specific reasons discovery should be
extended.” Smith v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 933 F.3d 859, 864 (7th
Cir. 2019).
A Rule 56(d) affidavit must do more than express “a fond
hope” that additional discovery would uncover useful evi-
dence. MAO-MSO Recovery II, LLC v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 994 F.3d 869, 877 (7th Cir. 2021). It must instead iden-
tify with specificity the information that additional discovery
is expected to uncover. Even more, it must explain how that
information would allow the non-movant to proceed to trial
on the legal theory articulated by its adversary. As we have
recognized many times over the years, a district court need
not permit discovery that would make no difference. See
Grayson v. O’Neill, 308 F.3d 808, 816 (7th Cir. 2002); Arnold, 853
F.3d at 389; Jimenez v. Kiefer, 100 F.4th 931, 939 (7th Cir. 2024).
Applying these principles here, the district court acted
well within its discretion in denying Bloxom’s Rule 56(d) mo-
tions. Bloxom supported its motions with declarations from
its counsel. Those declarations focused almost exclusively on
information related to the conduct of Jason Laye, information
that would prove useful to establishing that Seven Seas bore
the burden of procuring phytosanitary certificates. But that
information had no obvious relevance to Seven Seas’

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18 Nos. 22-3268 & 23-1022
alternative, UCC-based theory for summary judgment. No-
where did Bloxom’s counsel even attempt to explain how ad-
ditional discovery would allow it to survive summary judg-
ment on that issue. Under these circumstances, the district
court was free to determine that additional discovery was not
warranted. We see no abuse of discretion in the district court
concluding that it was time for this litigation to end.
For these reasons, we AFFIRM.

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